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I. The research project: Making Latin American courts’ racial homogeneity visible 
 
1. Introduction and contribution of the project 
 
We live in an increasingly diverse world. At the turn of the 21st century, over 5,000 ethnic groups 
made a presence in over 180 independent states.1 Some countries have tried to respond to the challenge of 
diverse populations by enacting laws and public policies to accommodate minorities and unprivileged 
majorities into political institutions.2 However, socio-political conflict and exclusion continue to be 
significant threats to subordinated groups and democracies around the world.3 
Like most countries in Latin America, Colombia is a highly diverse country in ethno-racial terms. 
According to Daniel Bonilla, by 2006, there were approximately 1 million indigenous persons (who 
belonged to 82 different peoples and spoke approximately 64 different languages) and 4.5 million Afro-
descendants in the country. Unlike the indigenous peoples, Afro Colombians are—for the most part—
assimilated into the majoritarian culture of the country, with the notorious exceptions of the Palenquero 
people of San Basilio, some black communities living on the Pacific basin of the country, and the Raizal 
people of the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, who still preserve their cultural 
distinctiveness.4  
Perhaps one of the most apparent manifestations of Afro-descendants’ exclusion in Latin America 
is their limited presence in power positions in different areas, including public posts.5 Afro-descendants are 
 
1 DANIEL BONILLA MALDONADO, LA CONSTITUCIÓN MULTICULTURAL 19 (2006). 
2 MALA HTUN, INCLUSION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA: GENDER QUOTAS AND ETHNIC 
RESERVATIONS 2 (2016). (Noting that, by 2016, approximately 78 countries had created gender or ethnic quotas and 
reservations). 
3 Donna Lee Van Cott, Building inclusive democracies: Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in Latin America, 
12 DEMOCRATIZATION 820–837, 821–822 (2005). 
4 BONILLA MALDONADO, supra note 1 at 26–27. 
5 LA SITUACIÓN DE LAS PERSONAS AFRODESCENDIENTES EN LAS AMÉRICAS, 90 22–23 (2011), 
http://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2012/8311.pdf (last visited Sep 23, 2018). 
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significantly excluded from political positions and high-ranking governmental offices.6 The World Bank 
has warned that Afro-descendants absence from most positions of power in the region seems to be related 
to the significant obstacles and barriers they face at exercising their human rights.7 As an example, Mala 
Htun exposes the magnitude of the problem of Afro-descendant underrepresentation in the region's 
legislatures by stating: 
 
The degree of Afro descendant underrepresentation is pronounced in Brazil (51 percent of society, 
compared to some 20 percent of the lower house of Congress), Colombia (11 percent of society; 5% 
of the lower house), and Costa Rica (8 percent of population, no deputy). In Ecuador and Perú, by 
contrast, Afrodescendants were close to proportionally represented in 2014, and in Perú all three 
Afro descendant legislators were women.”8 
 
The difficulties in attaining proportional representation in public institutions are even more 
significant for black women, who face more limited access to public offices than other women and black 
men.9 By 2016, black women occupied only 0.03% of parliamentary seats in Latin America; far less than 
their percentage in the region’s general population.10 
The virtual absence of Afro-descendants in public institutions also means that they are excluded 
from the possibility of having their voices heard in the decision-making process on issues of public concern. 
In particular, they are excluded from participating as decision-makers in the design, public deliberation, 
and implementation of laws, public policies, and other official instruments that could impact their 
communities. As Álvaro Bello and Martha Rangel suggest, limited access to political participation and 
 
6 Álvaro Bello & Marta Rangel, Equity and exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean: the case of Indigenous 
and Afro-descendant peoples, CEPAL REV. 39–53, 47–48 (2002). (noting that one of the most striking illustrations of 
the situation of marginalization that Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples face in Latin America is their 
extremely-limited political representation and participation). 
7 3/27/20 4:41:00 PM 
8 HTUN, supra note 2 at 30–31. 
9 LA SITUACIÓN DE LAS PERSONAS AFRODESCENDIENTES EN LAS AMÉRICAS, supra note 5 at 25–26. 
10 Id. at 26. 
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representation also means that Afro-descendants are trapped in a cycle of constant disadvantage, as political 
leverage is fundamental for improving a disadvantaged group’s position in society.11 
Although there is some data about Afro-descendants' exclusion from public institutions in the 
region, we know little about the level of representation of this group on courts. This limited knowledge is 
closely related to the lack of sufficient research on the issue of Latin American courts in general and judicial 
politics in particular. As Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew Taylor explain, it is only until recently that Latin 
American scholars decided to prioritize the study of courts.12 Most political science researchers have 
focused their attention on more traditional political institutions, such as legislative bodies and the executive 
branch. The existing literature on Latin American courts centers around issues such as the judicial reform 
efforts of the 1980s and 1990s, transitional justice mechanisms in the post-authoritarian regimes in the 
region, courts’ contributions to social justice, and specific issues related to judicial politics.13  
Kapiszewski & Taylor sustain that there are three primary areas of interest for researchers in this 
last field: a) The relationship between courts and elected branches of government; b) the impacts that courts 
have on public policy processes and outcomes; and c) descriptive and taxonomic analysis of courts and 
legal institutions.14 Regarding the study of judges and magistrates in the region, they notice that: “For the 
most part, we know little about the backgrounds, ideologies, or preferences of the region’s judges and 
justices, and have barely begun to explore the politization of the region’s judiciaries or the implications of 
that dynamic for those who populate Latin American courts.”15 
In Colombia, the Justice Studies Center of the Americas—CEJA—has pointed out that there is no 
systematic information regarding the number of Afro-descendants working for the judiciary, and that it is 
expectable that many Colombians would deem the gathering such figures as a potential act of racial 
 
11 Álvaro Bello & Marta Rangel, Equity and exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean: the case of Indigenous 
and Afro-descendant peoples, CEPAL REV. 39–53 (2002). 
12 Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew M. Taylor, Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in Latin America, 6 
PERSPECT. POLIT. 741–767, 741 (2008). 
13 Id. at 741–742. 
14 Id. at 753. 
15 Id. at 754. 
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discrimination.16 However, the CEJA has also observed that public officials’ accounts largely converge in 
that black Colombians are absent from relevant public positions in the judiciary and other branches of 
government.17  
Brazil is, perhaps, the main exception to the lack of information regarding the ethno-racial 
composition of judicial institutions in Latin America. Anani Dzidzienyo asserts that, by 2003, time at which 
Joaquim Barbosa (a black prosecutor and law professor who had been vocal at denouncing racial injustice 
in Brazil) was appointed to the Supreme Federal Tribunal of his country, there were only 12 black judges 
among the approximately 800 federal judges and six black prosecutors among 600 federal prosecutors in 
Brazil.18 
Given the lack of primary data in Latin America and other regions of the world, existing literature 
on minority representation on judicial bodies has been predominantly focused on the United States of 
America and, to a less extent, Europe and Israel.19 This void in the literature is the one that this dissertation 
begins to close. By using Colombia as a case study (for reasons that I will detail in section 3 of this chapter), 
 
16 FELIPE GONZÁLEZ MORALES & JORGE CONTESSE SINGH, The Judicial System and Racism Against People of African 
Descent: The Cases of Brazil, Colombia, The Dominican Republic and Peru 74 35–36 (2004), 
http://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/3568/raz-sistema-judicial-racismo-
ing.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (last visited Oct 2, 2018). 
17 Id. at 35–36. (“On the other side of the system, no record exists of the number of people of African descent working 
within the justice administration system. Some observers believe that this is due to the belief that such cataloging 
would itself constitute or at least contribute to racial discrimination. It is worth pointing out that during the preparatory 
visit for this report, the Colombian Public Defense office, aware of the need to provide such statistical information, 
drafted letter to be sent to all judicial, legislative and administrative state agencies requesting information on the 
number of Afro-Colombians working in each institution. All those interviewed agreed that there are no black people 
in posts of relative importance, either in the justice administration system or within any other state body.") 
18 Anani Dzidzienyo, The Changing World of Brazilian Race Relations?, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS: 
LATINOS, BLACKS, AFRO-LATINOS 137–156, 141–142 (Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler eds., 2005). 
19 Barbara L. Graham, Toward An Understanding Of Judicial Diversity In American Courts, 10 MICH. J. RACE LAW 
153–181 (2004); Jonathan K. Stubbs, Demographic History of Federal Judicial Appointments by Sex and Race, 26 
BERKELEY RAZA LAW J. 92–128 (2016); Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan 
and Carter Administration, 71 JUDICATURE 136–142 (1987); Elliot E. Slotnick, The Paths to the Federal Bench: 
Gender, Race and Judicial Recruitment Variation, 67 JUDICATURE 371–388 (1984); Sheldon Goldman, Should There 
Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488–494 (1979); Carl Tobias, Diversity and the Federal 
Bench, 87 WASH. UNIV. LAW REV. 1197–1212 (2010); Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean 
for Justice, 6 MICH J GEND. L 113–152 (1999); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on 
State and Federal Appellate Benches, 85 JUDICATURE 84–92 (2001); Gregory L. Acquaviva & John D. Castiglione, 
Judicial Diversity On State Supreme Courts, 39 SETON HALL LAW REV. 1203–1251 (2009); Greg Goelzhauser, 
Diversifying State Supreme Courts, 45 LAW SOC. REV. 761–781 (2011). 
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my dissertation intends to expose the ethno-racial homogeneity of Latin American courts as a problem 
affecting Afro-descendants and judicial systems in the region, and to uncover its connection to formal and 
informal rules governing the composition and functioning of Latin American courts. 
This dissertation is a study of Afro descendant representation on Colombia's courts. Following the 
work of Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea, by Afro-descendants, I mean “the descendants of former 
African enslaved persons, across generations and processes of mestizaje, and regardless of the level of 
individual or collective identity that these populations may have.”20 Similarly, following Hannah Pitkin's 
conceptual work, by representation, I mean descriptive representation. From this perspective, “representing 
is not acting with authority, or acting before being held to account, or any kind of acting at all. Rather, it 
depends on the representative’s characteristics on what he is or is like, of being something rather than doing 
something.”21 In this sense, unless otherwise indicated, when I use the word representation, I refer to the 
inclusion or physical presence of members of a group within an institution.  
The study I offer differs from previous literature in its approach to the problem of minority 
underrepresentation in judicial bodies. I analyze this issue based on empirical evidence collected mostly 
through the use of qualitative instruments. This analysis diverges from studies that have framed the issue 
of minority presence in public institutions purely from a normative perspective, or that have focused on 
regions of the Global North.  
My particular interest in the courts derives from the fact that, in many Latin American countries, 
judicial bodies have proven to be final decision-makers on issues concerning the rights of minorities and 
other excluded groups.22 Courts' power to interpret the law with authority engenders a prerogative to 
establish the meaning and defining the scopes of rights, including minority rights. Moreover, in modern 
democracies, courts may play a role in curbing governmental arbitrariness and might also function as a 
 
20 Oliver Barbary & Fernando Urrea Giraldo, Introducción, in GENTE NEGRA EN COLOMBIA: DINÁMICAS 
SOCIOPOLÍTICAS EN CALI Y EL PACÍFICO 21–68, 52 (Olivier Barbary & Fernando Urrea Giraldo eds., 2004), 
http://www.humanas.unal.edu.co/colantropos/files/3714/8564/0886/Gente_Negra.pdf (last visited Dec 19, 2018). 
21 HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 61 (1967). 
22 Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa, Introduction, in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA 1–26 (Gretchen Helmke & 
Julio Rios-Figueroa eds., 2011). 
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counterweight to the majority rule in legislative bodies.23 Therefore, adequate functioning of courts is 
particularly crucial for minorities, who endure significant restrictions in their possibility to access power in 
government or to obtain sufficient assurances in legislative bodies.24 
A particular challenge for my research project stems from the taboo around race in Latin America. 
In this region, discussions about race discrimination are commonly avoided, and race is not a word usually 
heard in casual conversations among people.25 This does not mean that racial discrimination is not present 
in Latin American societies. To the contrary, racial discrimination and inequality, as previous studies have 
shown, are widespread across Latin America.26 Nevertheless, until recently, official and social accounts of 
Latin American societies described them as virtually free of racial discrimination.27 The main reason for 
this refusal to acknowledge racial tensions is the myth of mestizaje: The idea that the process of 
miscegenation that initiated during the Iberic colonization erased distinctions among European colonizers, 
indigenous peoples and Africans brought to the Americas in condition of slavery, leading to the creation of 
a mestizo identity that is distinct from—but inclusive of—all previous ethno-racial identities.28 Since many 
people believe that the populations of Latin American countries are the result of the mestizaje, some say 
that the region cannot have a severe problem of race discrimination as it is impossible to distinguish 
 
23 Charles Geyh, The role of courts in preserving customary independence, in WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS 
COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 223–251 (2006), https://eds-a-ebscohost-
com.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/eds/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzMxMDExNF9fQU41?sid=ba3bbb92-f2cd-
4e3f-b475-92daea56b319@sessionmgr4007&vid=4&format=EB&rid=7 (last visited Mar 10, 2019). 
24 GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICA (1993), https://eds-a-ebscohost-
com.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/eds/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzQ4MTg0X19BTg2?sid=ba3bbb92-f2cd-
4e3f-b475-92daea56b319@sessionmgr4007&vid=8&format=EB&rid=7 (last visited Mar 10, 2020). 
25 Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson & Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, Introduction: Racial Nations, in RACE 
AND NATION IN MODERN LATIN AMERICA 1–31 (Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, & Karin Alejandra 
Rosemblatt eds., 2003). 
26 AFRODESCENDIENTES EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE: DEL RECONOCIMIENTO ESTADÍSTICO A LA REALIZACIÓN DE 
DERECHOS, (Jhon Antón et al. eds., 2009), 
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/7227/1/S0900315_es.pdf (last visited Oct 8, 2018). 
27 PETER WADE, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN LATIN AMERICA 179 (second ed. 2010), 
http://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=625258 (last visited Jul 16, 2018). (Noting how, for example, until at least 
the 1950s, Brazil was internationally seen as a racially harmonious country). 
28 Appelbaum, Macpherson, and Rosemblatt, supra note 25. 
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segments of the population based on ethno-racial identity.29 The narratives of mestizaje make it extremely 
difficult to talk about minority underrepresentation, as this issue tends to go unnoticed or other categories 
of analysis, such as class, are used for explaining such phenomena.  
 
2. Specific research objectives 
 
In order to accomplish the primary research goal, the dissertation has three specific objectives: 
First, it aims to expose Afro-descendant underrepresentation in Colombia's judicial institutions. Second, it 
seeks to identify some of the reasons why Afro-descendants are underrepresented in this country's judicial 
power and that facilitate the continuation of racial hierarchies in judicial institutions. Third, it discusses the 
foundations of Afro-descendant (and other groups) representation on courts. 
 
3. Selection of the case study 
 
I selected Colombia as a case study for several reasons. First, in this country, the judicial system 
has played a significant role in promoting the rights of Afro-descendant communities, by contrast to other 
state institutions such as the legislature or the presidency that have had more starring roles in other Latin 
American countries.30 Second, Colombia has a significant Afro-descendant population, accounting for 
almost 11% of the national population according to the 2005 national census.31 Third, I am a Colombian 
national who was raised in Colombia. Given my previous work on issues of race discrimination in this 
country, this is a setting in which I had better access to sources and the collection of data was more feasible 
 
29 ELISA LARKIN NASCIMENTO, THE SORCERY OF COLOR: IDENTITY, RACE, AND GENDER IN BRAZIL. (2008), 
http://www.myilibrary.com?id=129906 (last visited Dec 6, 2018). 
30 CÉSAR A. RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO ET AL., RAZA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS EN COLOMBIA: INFORME SOBRE 
DISCRIMINACIÓN RACIAL Y DERECHOS DE LA POBLACIÓN AFROCOLOMBIANA (1 ed. 2009). 
31 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), Censo general 2005, DANE: INFORMACIÓN PARA 
TODOS (2020), https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/demografia-y-poblacion/censo-general-
2005-1 (last visited Mar 16, 2020). 
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in comparison to the other countries of the region.32 Fourth, in Colombia, as in most Latin American 
countries, the idea of mestizaje coexists with political and legal declarations rooted in modern 
multiculturalism.33 The paradoxical relationships between the colorblindness of racial democracy and the 
legal protection of different ethnic and racial groups make Colombia a case study that, in many ways, is 
archetypical to Latin America, where the discussions on diversity, inclusion, and minority representation 
are complex. Fifth, despite their numerous dissimilarities (e.g., the nature of judicial review or the existence 
of a specific court or a general court to settle constitutional law disputes),34 many countries in the Latin 
American region share with Colombia relevant aspects of their constitutional and judicial system 
architecture, such as “a common legal heritage, political culture, civil legal system, and presidential 
regime,”35 as well as the existence of the legal action of amparo (in Colombia: acción de tutela) for the 
immediate protection of fundamental or constitutional rights.36 Finally, as most countries in the region, 
Colombia has a history of discrimination against minorities, primarily indigenous peoples and persons of 
African descendant. 
 
4. Study setting and context 
 
As part of the study setting and context I will briefly discuss the history of race relations in Latin 
America, providing the background necessary to understand the study design and to evaluate its findings; 
succinctly characterize the race stratification and discrimination practices in Latin America; address the 
limitations on pre-existing data and the statistical invisibility of Afro-descendants in the region; reference 
 
32 WADE, supra note 27. 
33 TIANNA S. PASCHEL, BECOMING BLACK POLITICAL SUBJECTS: MOVEMENTS AND ETHNO-RACIAL RIGHTS IN 
COLOMBIA AND BRAZIL (2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691169385.001.0001 (last visited Dec 3, 
2018); TANYA KATERÍ HERNÁNDEZ, RACIAL SUBORDINATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE STATE, 
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the international, constitutional, and legal protections for Afro-descendants in Latin America, with 
particular emphasis in Colombia; and refer to the multiplicity of stakeholders in this discussion. 
 
4.1. An introduction to race relations in Latin America, with specific emphasis in 
Colombia 
 
In order to grasp modern race relations in Latin America, it is indispensable to go back in history 
to explore how the European colonization enterprise shaped the continent and stratified its social systems. 
In this section, I briefly reconstruct the main aspects of the history of race relations in Latin America, 
making particular references to the situation of Colombia.  
According to Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea,37 as in most of Latin America, the presence of 
Afro-descendants in Colombia can be traced back to the 16th century, when groups of Africans were brought 
to the Americas in the condition of slavery.38 During the colonial period, Afro-descendant's role in the 
region was mostly restricted to slavery. Enslaved laborers worked in activities such as mining, farming and 
housework.39 Although colonial society was highly stratified based on skin color, since the 17th century, 
miscegenation among African, European, and indigenous persons became common.40 The extent of 
miscegenation varied depending on the region, as it was less prominent in parts of the Pacific basin and 
certain portions of the Caribbean Coast, such as Cartagena.41  
Some authors argue that the differences in the magnitude of racial mixing in the Iberic and British 
colonies (racial mixing was more common in the Iberic than in the Anglo colonies) could have been the 
result of dissimilarities in the colonizers’ settlement patterns.42 The Anglo colonization practices seemed 
 
37 Barbary and Urrea Giraldo, supra note 20 at 58. 
38 Id. at 58. 
39 Id. at 51–52. 
40 Id. at 51–52. 
41 Id. at 51–52. 
42 EDWARD TELLES, PIGMENTOCRACIES: ETHNICITY, RACE, AND COLOR IN LATIN AMERICA 15 (2014), 
https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu (last visited Oct 20, 2018). 
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to have been family-oriented, as whole households moved from Europe to the British colonies, whereas in 
the Iberic colonies, the colonizers where mostly poor European men, who came to the Americas seeking 
wealth in extractive economies.43 The disparity in the numbers of white men versus white women in the 
Iberic colonies could have encouraged interracial relations between white men and African and indigenous 
women, leading to more significant racial mixing than in the North American context.44  
Demography, as Robert Cottrol points out, had a decisive role in the fluidity of racial categories 
and classifications in Latin America (racial mobility). Less numerous European populations meant that it 
was impossible for the Iberic colonies to properly fulfill their role unless persons of indigenous and African 
descent were allowed to move upwards in the social pyramid. Such need ultimately enabled some level of 
prosperity for significant groups of the new Afro-American populations, especially for those with mixed 
racial backgrounds.45  
During the colonial period, the Spanish authorities, worried by the extent of miscegenation in their 
newly acquired colonies, developed formal racial stratification systems known as "Sistemas de castas" 
(caste systems).46 These systems relied on the creation of human taxonomies based on ancestry and the 
establishment of a meticulous structure of racial classifications used for purposes such as taxation and the 
allocation of social benefits and burdens.47 Edward Telles mentions that it was not uncommon that, given 
the extent of miscegenation in the Iberic colonies, the track of ancestry lines was lost over time, in which 
 
43 Id. at 15. 
44 Id. at 15. (Telles mentions: "Throughout the colonial period, the biological reproduction of whites was generally 
constrained by the high sex ratio among Spanish and Portuguese colonists because their immigration to the Americas 
was largely male. Spanish and Portuguese males, seeking to escape poverty in Europe, came to the New World in 
search of wealth; in contrast, the English settlement of the United States tended to be more family-oriented, beginning 
with many families that were escaping religious persecution. In Latin America, the result was a relatively small, and 
mostly male, European population; they and their criollo (American-born) descendants focused on resource extraction 
economies, fueled by a large black, indigenous, and mixed-race population. The paucity of white women led to high 
rates of mixture between nonwhite women and white men, especially lower-class white men whose status reduced 
their marital prospects but whose whiteness gave them access to nonwhite women. The result was an extensive racial 
mixture (mestizaje), which was greater than in the United States, where a more balanced sex ratio among whites 
emerged from more family-based immigration in the colonial period.”) 
45 Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Racial Hierarchy and Identity in 
the Americas, 76 TULANE LAW REV. 11, 34 (2001). 
46 TELLES, supra note 42 at 15–16. 
47 Id. at 15–16. 
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case authorities would assign people their stations in the cast system based on physical appearance, rather 
than lineage.48 
The caste system provided whiteness a tangible value. White racial purity was relevant for different 
purposes, including marriage.49 Advantageous unions often allowed the exchange of whiteness and wealth 
in order to secure access to better social or economic positions for the parties.50 Although the use of the 
expression casta fell in disuse and was replaced by the term race, the casta laws remained in place at least 
until the beginning of the 19th century in some parts of the continent, and would not disappear entirely until 
the independency period, time at which most persons were declared free and formally equal before the 
law.51 
Robert Cottrol asserts the Spanish law of slavery was—perhaps—the one that created the more 
comfortable conditions for an enslaved person to receive manumission (i.e., to be freed), as slaves had the 
legal right to challenge their owners in court to require the enforcement of freedom agreements.52 Likewise, 
Cottrol asserts that “colonial Colombia and Venezuela provided legal protection for manumission and 
accepted a large free Afro-American population. It also provided a cultural acceptance of, and legal 
protection for, a certain level of racial mobility.”53 Racial mobility manifested in situations such as the 
possibility for free people of color to buy patents of whiteness (“cédulas de gracias al sacar”), which 
granted them privileges associated with having pure white blood, and in the complex and detailed taxonomy 
of racial types present in the Spanish colonies.54 It is also important to remark that all colonial subjects were 
not considered the same by colonial authorities. Peter Wade notes that: 
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Indigenous people and Africans thus had different locations in the colonial order, both socially and 
conceptually. Indigenous people were, officially, to be protected as well as exploited; Africans were 
slaves and, although they had rights enshrined in legislation, this was piecemeal and uneven – 
although the Spanish did produce a code in 1789 – and the main concern was with control, rather 
than protection. This difference continued through the colonial period. Ideally, the Spanish would 
have liked to maintain three separate categories: Spanish, indigenous people and Africans; rulers, 
tributaries and slaves.55 
 
The categories of “Indio” (Native) and “Negro” (Black) had particular meanings and occupied 
different places in Latin American colonies.56 “Indio” was an administrative, fiscal and census category. 
It was clearly embedded into the colonial institutions’ affairs.57 The situation of “Negro” was different. 
Even though slaves were a clear census category, many black persons were not slaves. Therefore, the 
categories of black and slave were not equivalent. Non-slave blacks fell into intermediate administrative 
categories.58 In the case of Nueva Granada, the category of “libre” (free) included mestizos, mulattos, 
indigenous persons who had abandoned their communal life in the resguardos, and black persons.59 Claudia 
Mosquera et al. mention that in the Latin American colonial society, the expression "Libres y de todos los 
colores" (free of all colors) is particularly relevant.60 Since the expression “negro” did not have a place in 
the colonial racial order in and out of itself, free of all colors denoted a subordinated group that would grow 
to occupy a buffer space between the whites, either pure blood Spanish or “criollos” (i.e., Euro descendants 
born in the Americas), the tributary Indians, and the enslaved Africans.61 
 
55 WADE, supra note 27 at 26–27. 
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57 Id. at 28. 
58 Id. at 28. 
59 Id. at 28. 
60 Claudia Mosquera, Mauricio Pardo & Odile Hoffmann, Las Trayectorias Sociales e Identitarias de los 
Afrodescendientes, in AFRODESCENDIENTES EN LAS AMÉRICAS: TRAYECTORIAS SOCIALES E IDENTITARIAS 612, 15 
(Claudia Mosquera, Mauricio Pardo, & Odile Hoffmann eds., 1st ed. 2002), http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-
doc/pleins_textes/divers11-03/010029701.pdf (last visited Nov 20, 2018). 
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As Edward Telles mentions, during the colonial period, race discrimination was visible not only in 
slavery but also in aspects such as the harassment against free black persons, their law-sanctioned inability 
to be elected for the “cabildos,” as well as the persecution they suffered under the Inquisition because of 
their religious beliefs and cultural practices.62 Due to this historical legacy of exclusion, significant tensions 
between the idea of formal equality and the racial stratification present in the society surrounded the nation-
building process in Latin America.63  
The racial pyramid of Latin American societies that originated in the colonial period would 
continue to exist during the independence era and beyond.64 As Mara Loveman explains, in the after-
independence period, the political leaders of the newly emancipated Latin American nations declared their 
firm intention to break away from the racial classifications used by colonial rulers and even forbade their 
use.65 Nevertheless, at the same time, the new regimes allowed racial classifications to informally and, 
sometimes, explicitly continue to influence state affairs.66 In many countries, slavery and the figure of the 
tributary Indians continued to be lawful for decades after independence.67 Pro-independence leaders 
adopted and updated racial stratification norms that originated in colonial times by associating the idea 
citizen to the characteristics of wealthy white men.68 Liberal leaders, such as Simón Bolívar and Domingo 
Sarmiento, tended to see non-white and mixed-race populations as obstacles in the consolidation of a stable 
and prosperous country and—on occasion—were keen to adopt confrontation politics regarding indigenous 
peoples, as they deemed them unfit for civility.69  
During the 18th century, the Latin American political leadership faced significant trouble adopting 
the liberal idea of citizenship for their post-colonial societies in a context in which colonial subjects were 
 
62 TELLES, supra note 42 at 81. 
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still commonly classified according to race and social status.70 Although these classifications were not 
particularly rigid, since individuals could climb up in these hierarchies (e.g., by acquiring wealth), some 
racial groups were still subjected to specific taxes and other forms of disadvantageous treatment.71 Edward 
Telles mentions that even though in some cases national elites sought the support of Afro-descendants and 
indigenous peoples to fight for independence —sometimes under the promises of freedom and land rights— 
they later declined to grant these patriots access to elevated positions in their armies, which were reserved 
for people of the elite.72 Despite this apparent act of ingratitude, the early 19th century independence 
movements in the Viceroyalty of New Granada significantly contributed to eroding slavery, as many 
enslaved persons joined Simon Bolivar's pro-independence forces, which “led to large-scale 
manumissions.”73 
In the post-independence period, Colombia and the rest of Latin America abolished slavery. 
However, before the definite outlawing of slavery from Colombia and Venezuela, a majority of Afro-
descendants was already free since the newly formed republics had initiated legal reforms aimed at 
eradicating slavery years ago; for example, by enacting the Freedom of Womb Law in 1821, 30 years before 
the abolition of slavery.74  
As Claudia Mosquera et al. explain, after the abolition of slavery, formerly enslaved persons were 
left to their own means.75 They did not obtain any form of compensation for their work, the damages caused 
to them, nor were other measures adopted to help them overcome their precarious socio-economic position 
or to address societal discrimination.76 After independence, blacks and other social groups situated at the 
bottom of the racial hierarchy continued to be discriminated against based on their culture and phenotype.77 
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71 Id. at 4. 
72 TELLES, supra note 42 at 16–17. 
73 Cottrol, supra note 45 at 50. 
74 TELLES, supra note 42 at 82. 
75 Mosquera, Pardo, and Hoffmann, supra note 60 at 16. 
76 Id. at 16. 
77 TELLES, supra note 42 at 42. 
 21 
In this period, race discrimination claims were constantly undermined. Blacks were primarily excluded 
from society and mulattoes—despite having some change of social mobility—were mostly excluded from 
prominent positions of society.78 Although racial prejudice was blatant in Colombia and Venezuela, these 
countries—as it was also the case of Brazil—did not have significant forms of legally sanctioned racial 
discrimination.79 This lack of formal segregation was not the case in all of Latin America as, for example, 
Panama did have legally-sectioned forms of segregation.80 
Since the late 19th century, Latin American national elites embraced scientific racism as a lens to 
read their national populations and to justify racially-biased reforms to bring development and progress to 
their nations.81 In consequence, as Cottrol points out, during the decades to follow, two ideas would shape 
Latin American societies’ race relations:  
 
The first was the Darwinian notion that inferior races would lose in the competition with superior 
races and ultimately would die out. The second was that the relative underdevelopment in Latin 
America could be attributed to the significant African and Indian elements in the region and the 
relatively small European presence.82  
 
Since the predominant idea at that time was that non-white persons could be an obstacle for the 
region’s development, political elites decided to whiten their national populations.83 Their intention was to 
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80 Edward Telles & Tianna Paschel, Who Is Black, White, or Mixed Race? How Skin Color, Status, and Nation Shape 
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erase blackness and indigeneity of their countries.84 Whitening was attempted, in part, through racially 
targeted immigration policies that promoted European immigration and restricted the arrival of people from 
other parts of the world, such as Africa.85 Despite the national efforts, the ethno-racial composition of Latin 
American societies frustrated the success of the eugenics project, as Afro-descendant and indigenous 
populations continued to constitute significant portions of the region's national populations.86 This lack of 
success was real even in the case of Brazil, which succeeded in attracting a substantial immigration flow 
from Europe.87 European immigration was encouraged through the granting of land titles to new settlers, 
while at the same denying land rights to the descendants of African enslaved persons over the “Quilombos” 
they had occupied for generations.88 Race-based immigration policies in Brazil were more successful at 
attracting immigrants than in other parts of the region.89 In Brazil, pro-whitening immigration policies 
started as early as the 1850s, had their peak during to government of Getulio Vargas, and continued with 
significant force until almost the 1970s.90 
In the early 20th century, nationalistic movements arose in different parts of Latin America, 
including Mexico and Cuba.91 These movements pressured the elites to expand their national projects to 
embrace social groups that had historically been left at the margins of politics. In order to receive social 
support, nationalist leaders adopted a unifying discourse that appealed to the idea of racial homogeneity 
and national concord to promote alliances that transcended gender, race, and class divisions.92 The idea that 
nations could work as “cohesive races” gained strength within Latin American political discourses, as the 
region’s intellectuals rejected the scientific racist idea of the inferiority of Latin American peoples.93 In this 
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respect, poet José Martí and others called for the formation of social coalitions that included both former 
enslaved persons and slave owners, arguing that Cuba was a nation that did not see race and integrated all 
Cubans.94  
Similar episodes occurred in different countries of the region. Intellectuals such as Gilberto Freyre, 
Manuel Gamio, José Vasconcelos, and Uriel García adopted the idea of mestizaje, which highlighted the 
positive consequences of the mixing of races.95 Hence, the mestizo was anointed as the racial model of 
national identity, displacing the white-defined liberal citizenship model that had been central during the 
independence period. Nationalist thinkers managed to re-frame Afro-descendant and indigenous 
populations' legacy within Latin American nations.96 In their discourse, these groups were no longer to be 
seen as a sign of backwardness, but as a particular trait of Latin American identities, whose contributions 
could be celebrated as an essential part of the national history: The history of the mestizo nations.97 In the 
case of Brazil, mestizaje had a particular variance which would come to be known as racial democracy.98 
In practice, however, the mestizaje narratives were more a doctrine about the origin and character 
of Latin American national identities than a framework for the actual transformation of the state to attain 
substantive equality for all. Nancy Appelbaum et al. explain that, even though during the late 19th and early 
20th centuries the use of national identities as a form of racial identity (e.g., the Chilean race) was common, 
there were variances in how these "national races" interacted with racially subordinated groups that lived 
within their national borders.99 Specific populations, such as the indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants, 
were commonly placed “outside of the nation” in the mestizaje narratives and continued to face significant 
exclusion.100 Ultimately, the nation was still defined in opposition to these others: The indigenous peoples, 
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the immigrants, the poor.101 Moreover, the narratives of mestizaje did not eradicate racial subordination nor 
translated into an improvement in the living conditions of racially ostracized groups, who continued to be 
defined by exclusion and exoticization.102 Even though the discourses of mestizaje was not benign to all 
racial groups,103 some authors argue that the construct of Latin American nations as racially homogenous 
was not something that was not defended only by the elites. Instead, they argue that it was appropriated by 
disadvantaged social groups in order to advance their political agendas.104 
Whitening and mestizaje narratives supplemented one another. Tanya Hernandez explains that 
different countries responded differently to the influence of eugenics, depending on their capacity to attract 
European immigrants and the size of their non-white groups. While some countries focused almost 
exclusively on whitening their national populations (e.g., Chile, Argentina, and Urugüay), others invested 
significant effort in promoting the discourse of mestizaje.105  
Moreover, Shane Greene, following the ideas of Gordon (1998), explains that the predominant 
narratives on mestizaje in Latin America begin with the mixture of white men and indigenous women as 
their starting point, positioning the indigenous component as an essential piece of the nation’s fabric.106 
These same accounts tend to erase blackness from national memories, discarding its participation in the 
construction of the nation and rendering this part of the population invisible.107 As Edward Telles and 
Tianna Paschel explain, blackness was a vital part of the construction of the Brazilian racial democracy, 
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but was almost wholly excluded from the construction of mestizaje narratives in the Dominican Republic, 
and was reduced to its most minimalistic expression in the case of Colombia and other countries.108 
Despite the long history of slavery and racial stratification in Latin America, the ideological power 
of mestizaje was such that it managed to project a virtually-free-of-discrimination image of the region to 
the world. During a good part of the 20th century, Latin American countries were internationally perceived 
as places characterized by racial harmony, especially when compared to the United States of America and 
South Africa.109 This supposed absence of racial conflict was reinforced by governmental discourses across 
the region that sustained that the extensive miscegenation practices and the well-established color-blind 
legalist tradition had eradicated racial animosity in the region.110 In the specific case of Colombia, Edward 
Telles mentions that during the second part of the 1900s, issues of race were typically understood as being 
subsumed in aspects of class inequality.111 During this period, the idea of ethno-racial minorities was not 
salient in the national imaginary, except perhaps for indigenous peoples, who were portrayed as savages.112 
In those times, Afro-descendants continued to be politically and legally invisible, except for being included 
in an extended idea of mestizaje.113 
However, Latin America’s perceived racial harmony would start to crumble. After World War II, 
the impulse of the global decolonization trends and the surge of new social movements in the U.S. gave 
birth to social movements in the region that began to question the mestizaje narratives.114 Revisionist 
scholars played a significant role in this process, as they evidenced racial discrimination practices in places 
such as Brazil and Cuba. While referring to Nicaragua, Jeffrey Gould used the expression “the myth of 
mestizaje” to contest the accounts denying the racial tensions that had been preached throughout this 
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country.115 In his view, the idea of mestizaje was commonly used to conceal the deep patterns of race 
discrimination, exclusion, and violence present in Latin American societies, being in this sense nothing 
more than an allegory.116 Likewise, as Deborah Yashar asserts, the increasing relevance and visibility of 
ethnic movements in the 20th century challenged the 19th-century idea of homogenous societies as the base 
of state-building processes.117 Several Latin American thinkers opposed disputing the idea of a racially 
harmonious region on the grounds that it would legitimize the concept of race, which they deemed U.S.-
centric and unfit for Latin America.118 
Starting in the mid-1980s, most Latin American countries adopted new constitutions. Rodrigo 
Uprimny comments that these new political documents introduced significant changes to favor minorities 
and to embrace multiculturalism and diversity.119 Furthermore, Tianna Paschel clarifies that these 
constitutional reform processes left aside the rhetoric of mestizaje and—instead—granted new rights to 
indigenous peoples and, in some cases, Afro-descendants.120 Paschel explicates that these new changes 
were more radical for Afro-descendants than for indigenous peoples, as this was the first time Afro-
descendants would engage with the state as a group entitled to collective rights.121  
According to Paschel, these new forms of ethno-racial policies are not the result of a single multi-
cultural turn, but instead ensued from two distinct phenomena: The first is the “multicultural alignment,” 
which opened the door to collective ethnic rights (e.g., territorial rights, political autonomy, rights to use 
traditional languages) in some countries. The second is the “racial equality alignment,” which led to the 
creation of affirmative action policies (e.g., equal opportunity laws and quotas in education) in some parts 
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of the region.122 The multicultural alignment, which was the dominant discourse in countries such as 
Colombia, had its roots in the adoption of ILO Convention 169 and was cemented on the principle of 
cultural difference. For this reason, it mainly targeted indigenous communities and some rural Afro-
descendant communities.123 In contrast, the racial equality alignment was based on the equality principle. 
This alignment was tailored to reach general black populations, had particular influence in Brazil, and was 
anchored in the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 
Durban Conference.124 César Rodríguez and Carlos Baquero recognize that these legal changes advanced 
the protection of diversity in Latin American societies.125 Although, they also assert that the region's states 
have only been open to the idea of protecting indigenous and Afro-descendants when their claims do not 
entail economic redistribution policies, being in this sense a form of "neoliberal multiculturalism.”126 
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean—ECLAC—has reported that, by 
the end of 2017, at least 14 countries in the Latin American region had some type of racial equality or Afro 
descendant rights policy, and that additional public programs against racism and race discrimination were 
expected in the coming years.127 Many Latin American countries have established specialized 
governmental agencies and institutions to handle cases of race discrimination.128 In the case of Bolivia, for 
example, the national government has a plan for the eradication of race discrimination and ethnic and 
cultural exclusion, which includes a diagnostic of the scope of the problem, a map of key actors to address 
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violations, a strategic plan with general and specific objectives to accomplish the plan’s goals, and a system 
of oversight and evaluation.129 
In Colombia, many institutions are in charge of promoting the rights of Afro-descendant 
populations, including the Direction for Black, Afro Colombian, Raizal and Palenquero Communities of 
the Ministry of Interior; the Direction of Populations of the Ministry of Culture; and the Vice-Ministry for 
Participation and Equality of Rights.130 Additionally, Afro-descendants also find participation in other 
institutional arrangements, including the National Planning Council, the High-Level Advisory Commission 
for Black, Afro Colombian, Raizal and Palenquero Communities; the Pedagogic Commission of Black 
Communities; the National Culture Council, among others.131 
 
4.2. Characterizing the Latin American racial order 
 
In Latin America, racial hierarchies can be described using a pyramidal shape, in which whiteness 
is located at the top and blackness and indigenousness at the bottom.132 Yesilernis Peña et al. conducted a 
study in which they compared levels of racial prejudice in three countries in Latin America (Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico) and the United States.133 They were looking to see whether they 
could find empirical evidence to support the Iberian exceptionalism (racial democracy) thesis, which denies 
the existence of significant levels of racial prejudice and discrimination in Latin America, or at least similar 
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levels of prejudice than in the U.S.134 The results revealed that racial prejudice could be found in all Latin 
American countries. The authors concluded that: 
 
Not only were both explicit and implicit prejudice in the Caribbean higher than in the United States, 
but it is also noteworthy that the levels of both forms of racial prejudice in socialist (ostensibly 
classless) Cuba appeared no less severe than that found in either the Dominican Republic or the 
American-controlled island of Puerto Rico.135 
 
In addition to being widespread, racism and racial discrimination seem to manifest in particular 
ways in this region. Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea differentiate between direct and indirect 
discrimination in their characterization of racism in Latin America.136 The authors mention that forms of 
indirect discrimination are, since the abolition of slavery, the most prevalent manifestation of racism in this 
region.137 Despite the number of laws and public policies aimed at protecting Afro-descendant populations, 
situations of disparate negative impact on ethno-racial minorities continue to be frequent in the region.138 
According to a World Bank report, this is due, at least in part, to the fact that discrimination is rooted in 
informal forms of expression and practices–often considered benign—that have naturalized racism, making 
it almost invisible.139 In this respect, Rita Segato asserts that, unlike in the U.S., where racism tends to be 
made visible in the relationship of subordination between different racial groups, in Latin America, racism 
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is constructed in the interactions among individuals, being in that sense an inter-personal rather than an 
inter-group relationship.140 
A particular characteristic of Latin America’s racial order is that phenotype, and particularly skin 
color, plays a determinant role in the processes of racialization. Anani Dzidzienyo writes that race relations 
in Brazil, as in much of Latin America, have been characterized by two parallel situations.141 The first is 
that phenotype and physical appearance have significant relevance in defining racial privilege and 
subordination, with whiteness being praised and blackness decried. The second is that these assessments of 
racial value coexist with narratives of formal racial equality, which in theory secured an equal opportunity 
for everyone to participate of racial mixing, but contributed in practice to the exclusion of non-white persons 
(indigenous and black) from power positions in the social, economic and cultural spheres.142 
Regarding the role of skin color in race discrimination, Eunice Aparecida de Jesus has written about 
how, in Brazil, racial prejudice hits harder individuals who have more prominent black features.143 She 
warns that the more visible these black features are in a person, the greater are the difficulties that they face 
in their lives.144 Along the same vein, Hebe Clementi describes Latin America as a pigmentocracy, in which 
the color of the skin is particularly important hierarchy marker.145 Edward Telles uses this same term in the 
description of the results of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA)–an empirical 
study based primarily on topics of race, ethnicity, and color. PERLA concluded that, in Latin America, skin 
color closely correlates to social stratification.146 At describing some of the findings of PERLA, Telles 
mentions that, in Colombia, skin color correlates with aspects such as educational attainment, parents' level 
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of education, type of employment, monthly income, and discrimination experiences. In all of these areas, 
lighter-skinned individuals fair better than darker-skinned persons.147 Telles also documented other patters 
of color-based residential segregation in Brazil.148 
From a similar perspective, Tanya Hernandez stresses that phenotype is at the core of racial 
identities in Latin America. She indicates that “for instance, before a racial designation of Black is deemed 
appropriate, custom dictates an informal visual assessment of an individual’s hair texture, nose width, 
thickness of lips, and degree of dark pigmentation for consistency with what is stereotypically viewed as a 
Black person.”149 In this sense—Hernandez notes—racial classifications can be described as a “prejudice 
of mark,” as two people with similar ancestries but different phenotypes can be classified differently based 
on their physical traits.150 In contrast, Elisa Larkin Nascimento sustains that there is little difference 
between the prejudice of mark (color) and the prejudice of origin (ancestry), as color is nothing more than 
the sign of origin, which is the ultimate factor leading to rejection and discrimination.151 
Despite the evidence suggesting that color constitutes the basis of the racial stratification system in 
Latin America, some believe that color differences—and the privileges or burdens that are attached to 
them—are not explicitly connected to race discrimination.152 While discussing the case of Brazil, Elisa 
Larkin Nascimento sustains that even though racial classifications are enforced based on skin color and 
physical traits (rather than blood or ancestry), the idea that preferences are based solely on appearance, 
potentially shields them from being decried as racist.153 This denial of the correspondence between color 
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and race-based stratification is designated by this author as the “sorcery of color,” as it is continuously used 
as a screen for hiding color-based hierarchies that shape white supremacy.154 
The law has played a central part in the construction of racial stratification in Latin America. 
Following the work of Costa, who identified four types of regimes affecting Afro-descendant populations 
in the region, Manuel Góngora-Mera characterizes four different articulations between racial hierarchies 
and the law in this region since colonial times.155 these are: 
 
1) a widespread practice of noncompliance with protective provisions while formally honoring strict 
adherence to the letter of the law, hiding the real situation of ethno-racial groups under the 
appearance of legal protection; 2) the consequent tradition of unequal application of law according 
to the addressees of the norms, with strong correlation to racial hierarchies; 3) the legal 
normalization of transregional and domestic race-based inequalities; and 4) the legal 
inclusion/exclusion of ethno-racial groups, in line with the political interests of the elites.156 
 
Góngora-Mera points out that these articulations have allowed the persistence of ethno-racial 
exclusion in Latin America, as they have prompted the preservation of white supremacy and reinforced 
racial hierarchies.157 In this respect, he asserts that, until recently, Latin American societies denied the 
existence of racial discrimination in the region, hiding behind "a legal veil of formal equality.”158 Since 
most countries in the region had granted citizenship to non-whites at least since the time of the independence 
and, with few exceptions, there were no systems of formal segregation in the post-independence period, 
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some use this “formal equality argument” to deny the existence of a significant problem of race 
discrimination in the region.159  
However, the use of the formal equality argument seems to disregard that subordinated ethno-racial 
groups were primarily excluded and ignored during vast periods of the region's history, and also that in 
certain parts of Latin America there were, in fact, systems of formal and informal segregation. Elisa Larkin 
Nascimento remembers that, in parts of Brazil, racial segregation was possible thanks to the support of 
public authorities.160 Tanya Hernandez argues that the role of the law in the creation of whitening 
immigration policies. Hernandez also mentions that many unwritten norms (consuetudinary laws), which 
were enforced by public authorities, were used as an instrument for racial exclusion against different 
populations.161 In the particular case of Colombia, Daniel Bonilla argues that the state has used the legal 
system to try to eradicate or assimilate ethnic groups into the majoritarian culture.162 
 
4.2.1. The nuances of racial fluidity in Latin America: Racial classifications, 
racial identities, and ways of naming race 
 
A particular aspect of Latin America’s racial order is that ethno-racial identities in this region are, 
in general, more fluid than in other countries such as South Africa and the United States.163 By fluidity, I 
mean that in Latin America, ethno-racial identities may change or be contingent upon circumstances such 
as geographic location, class status, self-identification, sharing of a non-majoritarian culture, among others. 
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In contrast to the hypo-descent rules governing race relations in the United States, the small white 
population in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador and the national aspiration of whiteness 
seemed to have promoted the use of distinctions between black and mix-race individuals. This situation 
facilitated the development of a system of racial classification that allowed people with traceable white 
ancestry and an advantageous social position to be considered white despite having some African ancestry, 
too.164 In this respect, Edward Telles and Tianna Paschel argue that, in Latin America, racial classifications 
tend to be more fluid than in the United States. In this region racial classifications are based mostly on 
phenotype, include a significant number of intermediate categories, and they describe a spectrum of 
colors.165 
Peter Wade mentions that there is significantly more ambiguity in the use of racial categories in 
Latin America than in other regional contexts, as the boundaries of who falls within the category of black 
or indigenous are far from being clear or self-evident.166 Since in Latin America the boundaries of racial 
classifications have not always been stable, the definition of who is white and who is not has varied 
throughout the years.167 The traits commonly associated with whiteness also vary from country to country, 
and different factors influence how ethno-racial classifications are defined and applied to people.168 In a 
study conducted by Edward Telles and René Flores, the authors mention: “This study has shown that 
identifying as white, although constrained by skin color, is also shaped by age, education, and national 
context, as well as by the color of those one is interacting with.”169 Due to similar situations, the World 
Bank has stated that it is necessary to study the situation of Afro-descendants from a variety of angles and 
to use different ways of measuring Afro-descendants.170 
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Different racial groups have distinct forms of fluidity or mobility in the Latin American racial 
stratification scale.171 In this sense, citing Peter Wade's work on the position of both indigenous and Afro-
descendants, Edward Telles refers to the differences in racial mobility of indigenous and Afro-descendant 
persons:  
 
Mobility out of the indigenous category is often achieved through demographic, cultural, or status 
change as indigenous is often understood on the basis of community, language, and low 
socioeconomic status (Patrinos and Psachoroupoulos 1994; Friedlander 1975; Sieder 2002). One 
can become a mestizo by moving to an urban area, speaking Spanish, or moving out of poverty. 
Blacks and mulattos can sometimes move out of these categories through changes in status, as in 
the popular phrase ‘money whitens’ (Schwartzman 2007), though such mobility has probably been 
overstated and may even be reversed (Mareletto 2012; Telles and Paschel forthcoming). Thus, social 
mobility seems less likely to change the racial status of individual Afro descendants compared to 
that of indigenous people.172 
 
Also, regarding the influence of class status on racial identities and classifications in Latin America, 
Tanya Hernandez asserts that: 
 
In Latin American settings, social status informs formal racial classification, as illustrated by the 
common belief that persons of prominence should not be ‘insulted’ by referencing their visible 
African ancestry. Additionally, it is generally presumed that because no person of prominence could 
be Black, these persons should be designated distinctly.173 
 
 
171 TELLES, supra note 42. 
172 Id. at 32. 
173 Hernández, supra note 149 at 1105–1106. 
 36 
This specific relation between high-class status and racial mobility has historical antecedents since, 
as I mentioned before, during colonial times, wealthy individuals could purchase "cédulas de gracias al 
sacar,” which allowed them to have access to some of the privileges that the caste system granted to 
whites.174 
In this region, there is a robust lexicon of terms used to describe people's racial features, whose 
fluidity is at odds with the race-based hierarchical structure of Latin American societies.175 Henry Gates 
asserts that answering the question of who is black in Latin America is a complex task since there are many 
ways in which Afro-descendants refer to their ethno-racial identity (e.g., using words as preto, negro, 
mulato, pardo, moreno).176 Moreover, people with similar phenotypes can be described using different 
racial classifications, depending on a broad range of situations, such as the intended politeness of the 
interaction or the level of intimacy among the parties involved.177 Livio Sansone explains that color 
terminology can be particularly subjective, as it varies depending on the person doing the assessment, the 
purpose of such assessment, and the context in which it is done.178 Sansone mentions that "a son can be 
preto to his mother and moreno to his father, or, as proven by my questionnaire, a family can be called 
escuro by their neighbors to the left and mista by their neighbors to the right."179  
However, color terminology could be less related to racial classifications than one might imagine. 
Robin Sheriff, in her ethnological study of a community in Rio de Janeiro, affirms that the participants in 
her study used this variety of color terminology not to classify each other in racial terms, but rather to 
describe themselves and others based on physical appearance, as they continued to have a clear white-black 
division of the racial world.180 Thus, she suggests that anthropologists could have misinterpreted the 
multiplicity of color-based terms as forms of racial categories, while they are simply adjectives to describe 
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physical characteristics.181 In contrast, Mara Loveman sustains that, although people in Latin America are 
attentive to racial differences, they are not familiar with the use of racial classifications, and most would 
generally describe to their race by stating their nationality.182 
Due to the fluidity of ethno-racial categories, determining who is Afro-descendant is not easy in 
Latin America. According to the World Bank, the term Afro-descendant was first used by civil society 
organizations in the region in the early 2000s to describe a population that shared a particular common 
ancestry (usually linked to being the descendants of African enslaved persons that were brought to the 
Americas during the European colonization period) but that have significant dissimilarities among them.183 
This umbrella term includes Afro-indigenous communities, such as the Garifuna people, and also large 
portions of Latin American non-ethnic groups, such as the pardos in Brazil.184  
The particularities of racial classifications, terminology, and identities in Latin America, 
undoubtedly, affect my research agenda, as they add a level of complexity to my inquiry. 
 
5. Limitations on pre-existing data and statistical invisibility 
 
An additional aspect to consider is the limited pre-existing information related to race 
discrimination in Latin America, especially in the context of the justice system. This lack of substantial 
previous data is a direct consequence of the myth of mestizaje: As racial discrimination in the region was 
believed to be inexistent, there was no apparent reason to collect data on race.185 International organizations 
have already diagnosed the problem of the limited or total absence of data on race discrimination issues and 
the situation of minority populations in Latin America. They have warned about its negative consequences 
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to guarantee the rights of Afro descendant populations in the region.186 The ECLAC has mentioned that 
although Afro-descendants account for a significant share of the Latin American population, they have 
traditionally made invisible in the general population, and their contributions to the region's development 
had not been sufficiently acknowledged.187 I will refer more extensively to the issue of statistical invisibility 
of the Afro descendant population when I discuss the potential factors influencing Afro descendant 
representation. 
 
6. Institutional precariousness of Latin American judiciaries 
 
In addition to the limited available information on issues of race, many Latin American countries 
also struggle with an acute institutional weakness in their judicial sectors. By institutional weakness, I refer 
to the severe limitations of the judicial institutions and procedures to effectively deliver justice and to 
efficiently process the load of cases before them with transparency. Gretchen Helmke and Julio Rios-
Figueroa comment that, despite their prominent role in the political landscape of individual countries, Latin 
American courts face significant dangers and constrains in the work they do.188 As an example, the authors 
reference that, between 1985 and 2008, high courts in the region encountered numerous situations that put 
their survival at risk.189 Additionally, courts seem to have a reputation problem and they do not enjoy the 
confidence of the people. Their levels of trust among the population were crumbling by the early 2010s.190  
However, authors such as Jorge Esquirol have warned that neoliberal institutions might be 
overstating the perceived institutional weakness of Latin American judicial systems when compared to 
those in the U.S.191 In Esquirol’s view, this generalized perception of Latin American “failed law” have led 
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to continuous and unsuccessful reform efforts which have had different objectives over time. Nevertheless, 
he argues that none of these reform efforts will be able to solve this perceived breakdown in judicial 
institutions as “the failure they purport to redress is actually a combination of features endogenous to all 
systems of law, problems projected on the region as a whole, and assessments contingent on political and 
organizational preferences.”192 
 
7. International, constitutional and legal protections for Afro-descendants in Latin 
America 
 
The international law protections established for Afro-descendants have been well-received in 
Latin America.193 By the end of 2017, the subscription of instruments to combat racial discrimination was 
standard among Latin American states. All countries in the region had ratified the Convention 111 of the 
International Labor Organization on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Most countries had also ratified 
either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, and the remain countries had adhered to these covenants.194 A similar situation 
takes place with the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
and the Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the International Labor Organization. Both 
instruments had have been ratified or adhered to by most countries in the region.195 Besides, the 2001 
Durban Conference (as well as the Durban Declaration and Action Plan), which called for state action to 
guarantee Afro descendant's rights and combat racial discrimination, has had a prominent role in promoting 
the rights of Afro-descendant populations in the region.196 
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Within the Inter-American system, in 2005, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—
IACHR—established the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Afro-descendants and Against Racial 
Discrimination.197 In 2013 the Organization of American States—OAS—adopted the Inter-American 
Convention Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, and Related Forms of Intolerance, and the Inter-
American Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance. 
At a national level, attention should be paid to constitutional and legal instruments as well. During 
the past 30 years, countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Venezuela, Argentina, Paragüay, and 
Urugüay enacted new constitutional texts that introduced significant changes to the structure of these states, 
including their judicial systems.198 This neo-constitutionalist trend has also led to what some refer to as the 
Latin American multicultural turn, consisting of the constitutional and legal acknowledgment that different 
cultures are coexisting at the interior of many Latin American countries.199 In practice, this 
acknowledgment translated into the adoption of legal instruments aimed at securing, with different degrees 
depending on the country, the rights of ethno-racial groups in the region.200 
 
7.1. The multicultural turn in Colombia 
 
In Colombia, the neo-constitutional and multicultural trends materialized in the enactment of a new 
Constitution in 1991.201 This political document was crafted by a National Constitutional Assembly, which 
included the participation of many different social and political groups.202 The Assembly was formed after 
a significant number of voters supported the decision to enact a new Constitution in a special election.203 
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Donna Van Cott argues this constitutional process was an institutional response to a political crisis in terms 
of representation, participation, and legitimacy of the Colombian state.204 The process leading to the 
adoption of the new Constitution occurred amid an unstable political and social period, as the violence 
resulting from the confrontation between the leftist guerrilla groups, the drug cartels, and the Colombian 
state was raging through the country.205 The constitutional change that arose from this crisis marked a break 
with the liberal constitutional tradition that had dominated the political landscape since the time of 
independence, as this constitutional text relinquished the idea of the mestizo nation and recognized 
multiculturalism and ethnic diversity in the country.206  
This constitutional process opened the door for different excluded groups to seek the recognition 
of past injustices and the granting of new fundamental rights, including indigenous peoples and Afro-
descendants, who, until that moment, lacked significant legal protection for their lands.207 The National 
Constitutional Assembly included the participation of three indigenous delegates, which used their 
positions to advance ethnic rights in the country and to achieve the recognition of cultural autonomy of 
their peoples.208 These delegates argued against the disadvantageous treatment that cultural minorities had 
historically faced in Colombia and in favor of acknowledging the Colombian nation’s diversity.209  
According to Daniel Bonilla, the Constitution included three specific types of rights for ethnic 
communities: Those that secure the self-government for minority groups; those that promote the political 
participation of ethnic groups; and those that protect the expression and reproduction of the cultural heritage 
of these groups.210 Although, these newly adopted rights have created tension between the principles of 
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cultural unity and cultural diversity incorporated in the Constitutional text, as well as between the principle 
of minorities' self-determination and the centralized political and juridical character of the Colombian 
state.211 The new Constitution granted some ethnic groups, and particularly indigenous peoples, the rights 
to reserved seats in Congress, the explicit recognition of the multicultural character of the nation, the legal 
protection of indigenous territories, political autonomy for such territories, the legal establishment of the 
Special Indigenous Jurisdiction, and right to be consulted regarding resource-extraction projects in their 
territories.212 Another relevant aspect of the 1991 Constitution is that its equality provision (article 13) does 
not only contemplate a right to formal equality before the law but also establishes that the state must 
promote conditions of substantive equality. This provision also orders the state to adopt special measures 
to favor discriminated groups.213 
Nevertheless, Afro-descendants were not so well-positioned as indigenous peoples to benefit from 
the changes introduced by the new Constitution, and there was little support for this group’s inclusion in 
the constitutional drafting process.214 Donna Van Cott explains that, unlike indigenous peoples, Afro-
descendants did not attain any seats at the Assembly elections and lack direct representation in this body.215 
This absence of representation seems to have been the consequence of several factors, including: The “lack 
of financing, weak politization of blackness in general, lack of support from other sectors, and 
fragmentation among the Pacific Coast black communities.”216  
Since Afro-descendants did not have direct representatives at the Constitutional Assembly, they 
lobbied delegates and formed alliances with indigenous peoples’ representatives to promote their interests 
in the Assembly.217 As a result of this mobilization strategy, the Assembly adopted at the last minute, 
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transitory article 55,218 which constitutionally recognized certain land rights for Afro-descendants, by 
allowing them to claim collective ownership over the territories that some black communities had inhabited 
for decades in the Pacific basin of the country.219 It is crucial to notice that the term "black communities,” 
coined in the Constitutional text, originally referred exclusively to the black communities of the Pacific 
coast, which were believed to be the descendants of cimarrones.220 However, the use of this term has 
expanded to cover other black populations in urban and rural areas of Colombia that claim a type of 
ancestral ethnic identity.221 
As a direct consequence of the constitutional process, the Colombian Congress enacted Law 70 of 
1993, which operationalized transitory article 55 of the Constitution by defining the process thorough which 
black communities of the Pacific coast could obtain legal recognition of their communal property rights.222 
In correspondence with the ethnic paradigm of multicultural rights, this law conceptually framed Afro 
Colombians as ethnic groups, portraying them as rural communities that were mostly located along the 
Pacific Coast of the country.223 Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea comment that the description of black 
communities as an ethnic group (which partially resembled the legal status of indigenous peoples) also had 
the intention of leaving behind the use of the concept of race and its perceived biological nature.224  
Parallelly to the passing of Law 70, Congress enacted Law 47 of 1993, which established a special 
statute for the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina and recognized ethnic rights for 
the Raizal people.225 According to Daniel Bonilla, both Law 70 and Law 47 of 1993 were, at the time, the 
most recent pieces of legislation enacted to benefit Afro-descendants in Colombia since the law that freed 
enslaved persons in 1851.226 More recently, the Colombian Congress has enacted new laws to protect Afro-
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descendants from discrimination, including a statute that criminalizes discrimination based on race and 
other factors, and a law that creates special seats in congress for black communities’ representatives.227 
The Latin American neo-constitutional trend and its multicultural turn are essential factors to keep 
in mind while studying the ethno-racial composition of the region's judiciaries. Not only due to the changes 
that these reforms introduced in the architecture of Latin American states but also because of the different 
protections that minority groups conquered. Such protections constitute transcendental changes in the 
position of these groups within the state. 
 
8. The multiplicity of stakeholders 
 
An additional aspect that is determinant to understand the study setting and context of this research 
is the different types of stakeholders present in the debate about the ethno-racial composition of the 
judiciary. Different groups may have different readings of the level Afro-descendant representation in the 
judicial systems and its consequences. It would be important to take into consideration the perspectives of 
a variety of actors. Analyzing minority representation on courts certainly is a task that usually centers 
around judges, but that may not be restricted to them. Judicial employees play a significant role in everyday 
court work. Depending on the institution, judicial employees may perform tasks such as reviewing and 
assessing the content of case dockets and even drafting court decisions. Thus, to study minority inclusion 
in the court system should also take into consideration the role and perspectives of the employees who assist 
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9. Positionality and social position 
 
According to Ravitch, positionality and social position are essential elements of the researcher's 
identity,228 which is, in turn, a central piece in the research design.229 In other words, the results of the 
inquiry will be, in the end, the results of research processes and data collection methods vis-à-vis the 
researcher’s positionality and social position.230 As the principal researcher in this project, I am “the 
primary instrument of the research."231 In consequence, it is essential to situate my inquiry within my own 
personal and professional background.  
I identify as a gay, Afro-Colombian man. I have middle to dark skin and curly hair. I grew up in a 
lower-class neighborhood of Medellín, a predominantly white-mestizo city in the Northwest part of 
Colombia. In my hometown, people would commonly describe me as Moreno—a word used to "politely" 
describe a male of black features who is not in the darker side of the skin color spectrum. Although I grew 
up in a context in which racially charged comments and attitudes are familiar, I did not identify as black 
until my late 20s. Before then, I did not have a clear consciousness about my racial identity, and I would 
have probably identified as mestizo if I had been asked. I initially started to self-identify as black after being 
confronted about my racial identity at the NGO I was working at as an intern. I am the only self-identified 
black person in my family. Despite having dark skin, my parents do not identify as black or Afro-
descendant, which they understand to be an identity reserved for people with darker skin tones and probably 
from the coastal regions of Colombia. Additionally, I was raised in the majoritarian culture of Colombia, 
which is markedly catholic, heteronormative, uneven in terms of class, and with the idea of mestizaje as a 
central component of national identity. 
 
228 SHARON M. RAVITCH & NICOLE MITTENFELNER CARL, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH BRIDGING THE CONCEPTUAL, 
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In terms of class, I was brought up in the context of urban poverty. My parents were low-income 
workers. I attended public schools and attended a private college in my hometown thanks to scholarships. 
Later on, and also funded by different scholarships and fellowships, I completed a master's degree in the 
U.S., which I specialized in critical race studies and law and sexuality. Currently, I am in the final stages 
of my doctoral dissertation. Due to my education, I believe that I am a person who, even though it is read 
as black and has specific lower-class identifiers, can often blend into spaces of privilege to some extent and 
who can navigate institutionalized settings with ease.  
I have dedicated my career to work on human rights issues, especially in the field of race and sexual 
orientation discrimination. I have done so by litigating discrimination and human rights cases before 
Colombian courts, and by working directly with black and LGBT persons and organizations in Colombia. 
At an ideological level, I believe that in most western societies, and especially in the context of Latin 
America, there is a problem of pervasive and widespread racial discrimination, which is rooted in situations 
such as the enslavement of Africans and the conquest of native peoples by European nations. Both in the 
case of Latin America and the United States of America, I believe that this situation of discrimination has 
structural dimensions. Racism has been and continues to be used as a condition that justifies the unequal 
allocations of privileges, burdens, benefits, and responsibilities based on factors such as phenotype, 
ancestry, cultural background, national and regional origin.  
Regarding my sexual orientation, I am openly gay to my family and friends. I believe that I have 
certain mannerisms that depending on the context, may indicate a non-heterosexual sexual orientation. 
Nevertheless, I conform to most traditional gender norms associated with masculinity in the context of 
Latin America. 
I have work experience within the judicial system and also litigating human rights cases before the 
courts in Colombia. For about two years, I worked as a judicial clerk for one of the magistrates of the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia, one of the high courts in the country. During my time working for the 
court, I was surprised by the fact that this court, which has one of the best records in the region on protecting 
the rights of these communities, was also space where Afro-descendants and other minorities were virtually 
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absent. Not only there has never been any black or indigenous tenured magistrate on this bench, but the 
staff of the court was almost entirely white and mestizo. Hence, my particular interest in studying the 
problem of black representation in spaces of power, and particularly in the judiciary, came not only due to 
my general interest in issues of race discrimination but also to my particular experiences as a judicial 
employee. I consider that my personal experiences regarding discrimination, as well as the situations I 
referred to during my practice as a lawyer in Colombia, shaped my view regarding the problem of minority 
underrepresentation on Colombia's judicial system. 
A final aspect that I deem relevant to mention is that, due to the nature of my inquiry, I will try to 
exalt black voices, their narratives, and perspectives about the object of this inquiry. This aspect of the 
research design relates to my experiences working as an advocate and a researcher. During my career, I 
have been in many scenarios in which situations affecting the lives, well-being, and rights of Afro-
descendants are often discussed, written about, and decided upon without considering the viewpoints of 
black persons. More usually than not, Afro-descendants are absent from decision-making processes 
involving them and their future. In this particular research endeavor, I try to counter this impulse by 
privileging black voices and by trying to elevate them to a place where they can be elements that allow for 
the transformation of their reality. This research is also the production of a counternarrative, as it tries to 
put Afro-descendant’s perspectives at the center of the debate. 
 
10. Theoretical framework and bodies of literature influencing the research 
 
The core of the theoretical framework for this study is the works of critical race scholars. Critical 
race studies can be understood as a “movement of left scholars, most of them scholars of color, situated in 
law schools, whose work challenges the ways in which race and racial power are constructed and 
represented in American legal culture and, more generally, in American society as a whole.”232 Critical 
 
232 Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii–xxxii (Kimberlé 
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). at xiii. 
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race theorists have inquired about the role of the law and the legal system in the preservation of white 
supremacy in the U.S. They have exposed the contradictions between racial inequality in the law and in 
society and the equality principle that is supposed to guide the functioning of the legal system.233 
  I opted for using critical race theory as the central pillar of this project's theoretical framework due 
to the centrality that this movement gives to the questions about race and the relationship between racial 
subordination, the legal system, and judicial institutions.234 Although critical race theory was born as a 
movement primarily interested in the particularities of race in the U.S., I consider that many of its postulates 
can be useful to understand the Latin American context. The former is due to the shared place that race 
inequality has in the histories, processes of nation-building, and the development of social relationships in 
both the United States and Latin America.235 I am, by no means, implying that Latin America and the 
United States of America share the same history regarding racial oppression. I am also not asserting that 
racial discrimination against minority groups has played out similarly in both regional contexts. Neither I 
am sustaining that the critical race theory's conceptual constructs can be applied to Latin America without 
dealing with the particularities of racial and political dynamics in this other regional context. What I want 
to express is that critical race theory provides a refined conceptual framework to explore how the legal 
system is intimately related to racial inequality. This aspect, which is common to the contexts of the United 
States and Latin America, provides significant justification to use this conceptual framework to study the 
problem of Afro-descendant underrepresentation in Latin American judiciaries. This use of the framework 
is especially warranted given the still nascent state of the debates on race and the law in the Latin American 
academic context. Therefore, it is necessary to explore different conceptualizations that may be useful to 
understand the region's reality. 
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 The second pillar of my theoretical framework comes from the works of legal realists and critical 
legal theorists, especially in their vision about the role of judges for the creation of law and the decision of 
cases.236 The debate about judicial impartiality and the role of judges in the process of case decision is one 
of the most traditional jurisprudential debates.237 It is possible to identify at least two main competing 
perspectives in this debate. First, there are formalist currents of thinking, which give impulse to the idea of 
judicial obedience to the will of the legislator as a precondition for a correctly working legal system. As 
Montesquieu would express regarding the separation of powers: Judges should be “no more than the mouth 
that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or 
rigor.”238 Second, there are realism perspectives, which dismiss the idea of judicial neutrality, instead of 
stressing the political role of the judicial function. Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of the most widely known 
realists, wrote about what constitutes the law, as the object of study of the legal discipline, that "The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."239 
Depending on the line of thinking, Afro descendant representation on courts seems to have different 
connotations. From a formalist perspective, the judge needs to be impartial, and the nature of its task makes 
its identity to have less importance for the decision of cases. From a neo-realist perspective, judges are 
political players. Given that a democratic government's basis is a fair representation, the identity of judges, 
their experiences, and interests are significantly more relevant.240 I believe, following the work of realists, 
that judges play an essential role in the process of knowing what the content of the law is. Judges are 
political actors that have the power to use the law as a way to protect their interests. I understand that such 
power of judges is not unrestricted, but I still believe that judges possess significant discretion in deciding 
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cases.241 Therefore, studying who judges are, their backgrounds, and the experiences informing their work 
is inquiring for nothing different than what the law is and how it is applied to specific cases and individuals. 
Consequently, to ask about judges is nothing different than to ask about the law itself. 
The third pillar for my inquiry is the previous work that lawyers and social scientists have done 
about the issue of minority and women's representation on U.S. courts. Recent discussions on group 
representation in U.S. public institutions have focused on the idea of diversity. This conceptual framework 
gained strength following Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,242 
in which the United States Supreme Court found the need for classroom diversity to fall within the category 
of a compelling governmental interest. Since then, diversity has become a common point of tension in 
debates on affirmative action in higher education and the composition of governmental institutions.243 
Political scientists have studied minority representation on courts in the United States since the 
1970s.244 There have been four main points of debate around this issue, which I will debate in more detail 
through the text: How the process of diversification of the U.S. judiciaries has taken place? What are the 
rationales to justify the need for judicial diversity? Do different judicial selection mechanisms lead to 
different judicial diversity outcomes? And what are the effects of diversity in judicial decision-making?  
One of the most common concerns regarding the discussion of judicial diversity is its tension with 
the principle of judicial impartiality, which is a constitutional guarantee in most western democracies.245 If 
judges are to be impartial, some question whether minority judges should be barred from knowingly 
considering minority points of view when they engage in legal reasoning.246 Some also question whether 
minority judges, due to constraints present in judicial activities, are in a position to represent minority 
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communities’ points of view. In other words, whether the expectations on minority judges to incorporate 
in their decision-making minority points of view may be the result of mere identity essentialism.247 
Nevertheless, there have been significant non-essentialist efforts to argue for minority representation in 
courts.248 
Some authors have argued that, despite being an important goal, judicial diversity should not lead 
to an endorsement of just any person of color nominated to a judicial station.249 Instead, they emphasize 
the idea that nominees should have representativeness.250 In this respect, Graham subscribes to Hannah 
Pitkin’s conceptual framework that differentiates between descriptive and substantive representation.251 
The first refers to the actual composition of institutions and the way they resemble the composition of the 
population they represent. The second focuses on the decisions governmental officials make concerning the 
interests of represented groups. How descriptive and substantive representation interrelate has been the 
subject of extensive debate. Some authors stress the importance of substantive representation, while others 
emphasize descriptive representation as a condition that increases the positive results of substantive 
representation. Nevertheless, debates on both aspects of representation are usually held simultaneously due 
to the multiple connections between them.252 
Part of the literature has problematized the discrete role that race and gender have played in the 
judicial selection process at a federal level in the United States.253 Nevertheless, for many years now, there 
has been an academic and public policy debate on which methods of filling court vacancies best ensure 
judicial diversity.254 Through the years, some studies suggested that appointive systems are more efficient 
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at increasing minority presence in the judiciary; others indicated that elective systems give women and 
minorities a higher chance of being selected. Others argued that merit-based systems are best-suited for the 
selection of minority and women judges.255 Finally, some propose that judicial selection procedures no 
longer have an impact on judicial diversity.256 Additionally, there are additional factors that determine 
minority representation in the judiciary.257 Studies on diversity in United States state courts have concluded 
that governors of different political parties have different inclinations when nominating judges, with 
Democratic governors appointing more women and minorities than those appointed by Republicans.258 
Feminist legal theory has energized the debate on judicial diversity, contributing studies on 
women’s presence in the judiciary.259 As the underrepresentation of women on judicial bodies continues to 
be a problem in many parts of the world, different conceptual approaches have been used to understand this 
issue. These frameworks include equal opportunity, representativeness, and diversity.260 Nevertheless, 
some have questioned the efficacy of such rationales to “address the symbolic exclusion of women from 
traditional notions of judging and judicial authority.”261 
In addition to the U.S., other countries have implemented a wide range of strategies to combat the 
lack of minority and women presence on courts. A segment of the literature indicates that current legal rules 
imposing restrictions on affirmative action may the most substantial barriers for achieving diversity in the 
judiciary: "paradoxically, the legal framework constructed to promote equality now stands in the way of 
the realization of it."262 
Minority representation on courts also appears to be a point of controversy outside of the U.S. 
Concerning France, where the collection on population's racial and ethnic data faces legal restrictions, there 
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have been efforts to identify how minorities and other marginalized groups are represented in the 
judiciary.263 Mathilde Cohen used qualitative data to assess how discourses by judges, prosecutors, and 
other types of actors involved in the judicial system undermine the perceived importance of race and sexual 
orientation on courts.264 According to the author, legal professionals use different mechanisms to avoid 
acknowledging the importance of race and sexuality in judicial bodies, while at the same time recognizing 
the importance of other characteristics–such as gender and socio-economic status–for the judiciary. The 
result of the deployment of such strategies is often a general denial of the importance of sexual orientation 
and racial identities in the judicial context.265 
The final pillar of my theoretical framework, refers to the previous work that scholars have done 
on the issue of race relations in Latin America. In this respect, I reviewed the literature on aspects such as 
the role of the law in maintaining racial subordination,266 Latin America’s colonial history, the relationship 
between race and the nation-building processes,267 the impact of blanqueamiento and mestizaje narratives 
on race-relations, the racial identity formation,268 the issue of Afro-descendant statistical invisibility,269 the 
concepts of race and ethnicity,270 previous studies on race discrimination,271 and scholarly texts on the legal 
instruments for protecting ethno-racial groups in the region, among other topics.272 Instead of explaining 
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11. Research design 
 
My research process had three stages: 1) Literature review; 2) data collection through the use of 
information requests; 3) data collection through interviews and site visits. 
 
11.1. Literature review 
 
At the first stage of the project, I conducted a literature review of the leading academic sources 
related to the two critical aspects of my inquiry: the key theoretical debates on minority representation on 
judicial institutions and the relationship between race and the law in Latin America. I used Zotero to collect, 
process, and organize the information I gathered in this process. With this information, I wrote two separate 
documents describing the findings this part of my research produced, which were later used to write the 
dissertation. I did not conduct specific searches for the critical race theory and the legal realism sources 
because I was already acquainted with these bodies of literature, which facilitated their use in this research 
endeavor.  
 
11.2. Data collection through the use of information requests 
 
In Colombia, as it is the case in most Latin American countries except Brazil, I could not find 
previous data on the ethno-racial composition of the region’s judiciaries. Hence, it was necessary to collect 
primary data. I considered different alternatives to gather that data, such as conducting an on-line survey to 
judicial servants or even to contact judiciary administrators to explore the possibilities of conducting a 
judicial census (as the one judicial authorities conducted in Brazil).273 However, due to time and financial 
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resources, I decided that the most feasible alternative to collect the information was to ask a sample group 
of courts to report about their gender and ethno-racial composition.  
 
11.2.1. Information requests concerning the composition of high and 
intermediate courts 
 
I decided to send information requests to request data on the ethno-racial composition of the court 
system in Colombia. I submitted requests to a group of courts asking them to self-report on the composition 
of the institution in terms of gender and race/ethnicity, as well as informing whether there were affirmative 
action policies in place for these groups. Since I had certain doubts about whether the courts would reply 
to my information requests, given the national reticence to discuss the racial exclusivity of its elite spheres, 
I submitted the information requests under the form of an administrative mechanism known as “derecho 
de petición” (right of petition). The right of petition is an administrative mechanism and constitutional right 
incorporated in article 23 of the Colombian Constitution, which reads: “Every individual has the right to 
present respectful petitions to the authorities on account of general or private interest and to secure prompt 
resolution of same.”274 According to the Statutory Law 1755 of 2015, which operationalizes the right of 
petition, any citizen may use this instrument to request information and copies of documents to public 
authorities.275 In the case of rights of petition that request information, public authorities have ten days to 
deliver a response to the petition.276 Given the constitutional right status of the right of petition, public 
authorities were, at least formally, required to provide a timely response to the requests, even if they did 
not deliver the demanded information.  
 
274 Constitución Política de Colombia [C.P.] art. 23.  
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Before I explain the sampling used for the information requests component of my research, I should 
briefly introduce the structure of the Colombian judicial system and its parallels and or distinctions from 
other judicial systems in the region. 
 
11.2.2. Structure of the Colombian judicial system 
 
In contrast to the US system, where there are a federal judicial system and several state judicial 
systems, in Colombia there is a unitary judicial system. This system includes the ordinary, contentious-
administrative, and constitutional jurisdictions, each with a high court of closure, the Office of the Attorney 
General of the Nation, and other special jurisdictions.277 
The Supreme Court of Justice is the court of closure of the ordinary jurisdiction. This jurisdiction 
also includes 33 superior tribunals of judicial district (intermediate courts), and several courts for civil, 
labor, criminal, adolescent, family, penalty execution, and small conflicts affairs (lower courts with circuit 
and municipal jurisdiction). The contentious-administrative jurisdiction has the Council of State as its 
highest Court and also includes 26 administrative tribunals (intermediate courts), as well as administrative 
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courts (lower courts). The constitutional jurisdiction's central institution is the Constitutional Court.278 The 
Superior Council of the Judicature is in charge of the administration, management, and control of the 
judiciary, and it is divided into two panels, one for the decision of disciplinary cases against judges and 
attorneys (jurisdictional-disciplinary panel) and one for the administration of the judiciary (administrative 
panel).279 The Office of the Attorney General has as its primary function to investigate and prosecute crimes 
before the court system, and it includes the Attorney General (Fiscal General de la Nación), a number of 
the deputy prosecutors, and other public servants.280 The special jurisdictions include the justice systems 
of the indigenous communities, which are in charge of applying the traditional law of these communities, 
and the peace judges, for the resolution of individual and commentary conflicts, among others.281  
Following the peace accords between the government of Colombia and the FARC, a Constitutional 
reform created the Special Jurisdiction for Peace—SJP. The SJP is the foremost institution crafted for 
achieving transitional justice in Colombia. Although the SJP was conceived as an autonomous organism 
and has a different legal regime than the rest of the judiciary, it transitionally administers justice.282 The 
SJP is composed of a Peace Tribunal, which is its closure body, and three panels: The Panel for the 
Acknowledgement of the Truth, Responsibility, and the Establishment of Facts and Conducts; the Panel for 
the Definition of Legal Situations; and the panel for Amnesty and Indult. Besides, it has a Special Unit for 
Investigation and Prosecution and an Executive Secretariat.283 
Despite their similarities, Latin American judicial systems have essential differences in terms of 
judicial authority (judicial review, certoriati, the value of precedent, among others),284 as well as in other 
aspects of judicial institutions. In this respect, Julio Ríos-Figuero and Andrea Pozas Loyo affirm that: 
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For instance, Mexico, Peru, and El Salvador have all created judicial councils, but only Peru has 
also created a constitutional tribunal, while both Mexico and El Salvador have transformed the 
Supreme Court and a chamber of it, respectively, into constitutional adjudication organs. At the 
same time, El Salvador allows all citizens to file suits before the constitutional organ, while Mexico 
and Peru provide access only to public authorities, such as a fraction of legislators or political parties. 
|| Similar interesting differences exist in virtually every other judicial institution, from the 
prosecutorial organ to the appointment and tenure of supreme, lower, administrative, and 
constitutional judges.285 
 
Furthermore, as Oswald Lara Borges and et at. describe, the region’s countries have adopted 
different models to aspects such as judicial review, determining the size and composition of the high courts, 
duration of judges’ mandate, judicial selection and appointment mechanisms over time.286 Nevertheless, 
many Latin American countries still have significant similarities in respect to their hierarchical nature of 
the judicial system, their civil law traditions, and similar challenges in terms of transparency, effectiveness, 
overload, among others.287 
 
11.2.3. Purposeful sampling 
 
The first major decision that arose regarding the submission of the information requests was the 
recipients’ selection. According to the statistics of the Superior Council of the Judicature, by October 10, 
2018, 5,354 judges were serving in courts and tribunals across Colombia. Additionally, there were 32,298 
 
285 Julio Ríos-Figueroa & Andrea Pozas-Loyo, Enacting Constitutionalism: The Origins of Independent Judicial 
Institutions in Latin America, 42 COMP. POLIT. 293–311, 300 (2010). 
286 Oswald Lara-Borges, Andrea Gastagnola & Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Diseño constitucional y estabilidad judicial en 
América Latina, 1900-2009 / Constitutional Design and Judicial Stability in Latin America, 1900-2009, 19 POLÍTICA 
GOB. 3–40 (2012). 
287 Shannon K. O’Neil, Latin America Needs Better Judges, BLOOMBERG, August 16, 2018, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-16/latin-america-needs-better-judges (last visited Mar 16, 
2020). 
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judicial employees (judicial workers that are not judges nor prosecutors) working for the judiciary. Given 
the significant number of courts in the judicial system, I decided to concentrate my efforts in the high and 
intermediate levels of the ordinary and contentious-administrative jurisdictions, as well as in the 
constitutional jurisdiction, the Superior Council of the Judicature. Likewise, I also decided to include the 
SJP in my study. 
I excluded the Office of the Attorney General because of the prosecutorial nature of its functions, 
which in general differ from the role of neutrally deciding cases associated with the courts. Additionally, 
the size complexity and autonomous nature of the Office of the Attorney General would require a specific 
inquiry for its study. Likewise, I excluded the special jurisdictions due to the specific type of cases they 
may decide as well as the restrictive range of their jurisdictional functions. In the particular case of the 
Special Indigenous Jurisdiction, since only indigenous peoples administer this type of justice, there was an 
additional reason for its exclusion from its study: It would have been redundant to inquire about the ethno-
racial composition of indigenous jurisdictions unless one were to distinguish among the different peoples 
and their particular use of their jurisdictions, which exceeds the objectives of this particular research. In 
contrast, despite the specific mandate of the SJP, I decided to include it this research because it was the 
most recently created judicial institution in Colombia. Besides, the peace accords that gave birth to the SJP 
included specific provisions regarding its ethnic and gender composition, which created specific incentives 
to study minority representation in it.288 
  I concentrated my study in the high and intermediate levels of the ordinary and contentious-
administrative jurisdiction because the number of high courts, superior, and administrative tribunals (61 in 
total) was manageable for this type of inquiry. Another important reason for including intermediate 
tribunals in the sample is that, as Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew Taylor point out, there is a need to expand 
judicial research in Latin America beyond the high courts of the region, to also focus on lower courts and 
other judicial bodies. In this respect, the authors remark that: "While the interventions of high courts are 
 
288 Acuerdo Final de Paz Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera. Signed 
between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP on Nov. 12, 2016.  
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doubtless important, the fact that they often transfix us can lead to insufficient attention to the 'everyday' or 
'routine' justice carried out by lower courts, which can be more socially relevant and certainly influence 
judicial politics.”289 
Despite my eagerness to study lower courts as well, I decided to abstain from including them in 
this part of the process. If I had decided to extend this exercise to the circuit, municipal and administrative 
courts, I would have ended with a sample pool of approximately 5,000 courthouses, which was extremely 
difficult to manage, given the limited financial and time resources for this research. An additional advantage 
of concentrating in high and intermediate courts is that they have a broader geographic jurisdiction than 
lower courts. Similarly, this selection followed the rationale that it is likely that at these top layers of the 
judicial system, judges will have more impact on the creation of legal norms.290 
 In addition to the courts, I also decided to request information to the National Registry of Attorneys, 
an office ascribed to the Superior Council of the Judicature, which is in charge of issuing professional 
licenses for attorneys. I decided to send an information request to the registry to try to establish how many 
lawyers there were in Colombia and to see if there was information regarding their gender or ethno-racial 
background. As being a lawyer is a precondition to becoming a judge, it is crucial to know how many black 
lawyers there are.  
In the end, I sent a total of 65 information requests to: 
-The four highest courts in the judicial system: The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of 
Justice, the State Council, and the Superior Council of the Judicature. 
-The SJP. 
-The National Registry of Attorneys. 
-The total number (33) of superior tribunals of judicial district. 
-The total number (26) of administrative tribunals. 
 
289 Kapiszewski and Taylor, supra note 12 at 755. 
290 Concernin the value of precedent in the Colombian legal system, see Jorge Andrés Contreras Calderón, El 
precedente judicial en Colombia: Un análisis desde la teoría del derecho, 41 REV. FAC. DERECHO CIENC. 
POLÍTICA 32 (2011). 
 61 
 
11.2.4. Content of the information requests 
 
  The information requests were, in the case of the courts, addressed to the president of each court. 
In the case of the National Registry of Attorneys, they were sent to the responsible head of the office. The 
reason for directing the letters to the courts' presidents is that, as a general rule, the president of each court 
has the power to represent the whole institution and is the authority that could have access to the data that 
I required.291 
The information requests were designed as follows: There was an introductory part stating that the 
right of petition had the purpose of obtaining information about the gender and ethno-racial composition of 
the particular court. This section also explained that this was part of my doctoral research on the issue of 
minority underrepresentation in judicial institutions. It mentioned that we already knew that there was 
minority underrepresentation in the courts of the region and that we were trying to assess the extent of the 
presence of women and ethno-racial minorities on Colombian courts to find alternatives to overcome this 
situation. This section also stated that the information request did not intend to establish the individual 
ethno-racial or gender identity of any particular individual, as I was just asking for anonymous statistical 
data.  
Clarifying that I was not trying to collect data on the racial identity of any specific individual was 
paramount. The habeas data law in Colombia (a type of privacy of information law) says that data on any 
particular person's ethnic or racial origin is considered sensitive. Thus, it cannot be collected unless certain 
exceptions.292 Fortunately, one of these exceptions is when the data about the racial origin is collected with 
scientific and statistical purposes, in which case it is necessary to share the data guaranteeing the anonymity 
of the individuals.293 
 
291 L. 270/96, marzo 7, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 15, 64, 79, 100. 
292 L. 1581/12, octubre 17, 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 5-6. 
293 Id. art. 6. 
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Following this section, I asked the recipient to inform on the total number of judicial posts there 
were at the court. I also requested them to specify how many of these positions were occupied by women, 
indigenous persons, afro-descendant persons, indigenous women and afro descendent women.294 I asked 
them to inform on the total number of judicial employee posts in the court and asked them how many of 
the employees that occupy such positions fell in the same gender and ethno-racial categories stated above. 
In the case of the high courts and the SJP, I formulated two separate questions regarding judicial employees: 
I inquired about the number and gender and ethno-racial breakdown of auxiliary magistrates and asked the 
same information about all other judicial employees. Third, I requested that in the case they did not provide 
the data about the gender or ethno-racial composition of the court, they explained why they could not do it. 
Fourth, I asked about the existence of programs intended to facilitate the hiring, permanence, or conditions 
of employment for women in the different positions at the court (affirmative action policies). In case such 
policies existed at the court, I asked them to explain their scope. Finally, I repeated the previous question 
about affirmative action policies for Afro-descendants and indigenous persons. 
In the case of the Superior Council of the Judicature, in addition to the questions about the 
composition of that particular institution, I also requested information concerning the number, gender and 
ethno-racial breakdown of judges serving at Supreme Court of Justice, the Constitutional Court, the State 
Council, the SJP, all superior tribunals of judicial district, all administrative tribunals, all sectional councils 
of the judicature, and all circuit and municipal courts of the ordinary jurisdiction, as well as all 
administrative courts of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. 
The information request for the National Registry of Attorneys asked them to provide information 
regarding the total number of attorneys with valid licenses in the country. Likewise, I required them to 
identify how many of them were women, indigenous persons, Afro-descendant persons, indigenous women, 
 
294 In the information requests, next to the word Afro-descendant, there was a footnote which asked the recipient to 
include in this category all black, mulatto, Afro Colombian, Raizal or the Archipelago of San Andres, Providencia 
and Santa Catalina, and Palenquero of San Basilio persons.  
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and Afro-descendant women. I also asked them to indicate before which sectional council of the judicature 
they completed their registration. 
The final section of the right of petition included contact information via e-mail, a physical address 
in case they decided to send a response in hard copy, and my signature. In addition to the petition, I 
submitted a presentation letter that confirmed my status as a doctoral student signed by my academic 
advisor. 
 
11.2.5.  The rationale for the content the information requests 
 
I used the verb "to inform" to ask about the composition of the courts because I wanted to let 
respondents decide how to assess its gender and ethno-racial composition. It is possible to think of many 
different methodologies and criteria to establish the gender and ethno-racial composition of a group or to 
determine the ethno-racial and gender identity of a person. It was possible to ask the person to self-identify 
in gender or ethno-racial terms, to ask another individual to hetero-identify them based on pre-established 
criteria, or to use standardized mechanisms as a way to identify a person (e.g., color palette).  
How defines ethno-racial identities in Latin America (e.g., whether based on phenotype, ancestry, 
DNA, geographical location, cultural background, discrimination experiences, or something else) 
influences the assessment of the ethno-racial composition of a group. The same can be said about 
establishing gender identities. Due to the complex debates about ethno-racial and gender identities and the 
impossibility to control the gender and ethno-racial composition assessment, I decided to leave the method 
for assessing ethno-racial identity open for courts to decide about it. A potential critique of the data 
collection process is that the lack of a unified methodology to collect the ethno-racial data represents a 
significant problem that poses questions on the reliability of the data. However, the purpose of the rights of 
petition was simply to attain a general view on the courts' perspectives on minority representation within 
them. The idea was to use the information as a proxy for the level of Afro-descendant representation inside 
judicial institutions. The responses of the information requests, instead of corresponding to the number of 
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Afro-descendants or indigenous persons working on Colombian courts, should be understood as reports 
that describe the perceptions that judicial institutions have concerning the presence of minority groups in 
their interior. Also, I should mention that the interviews and site-visit components of the empirical work I 
conducted pursue the attainment of supplementary information, context, and substantive meaning to some 
of these perceptions.  
I also consider that, despite the nuances of ethno-racial identities and classifications in Latin 
America, Afro-descendants are a visible minority, as people belonging to this group can be, generally 
speaking, classified as belonging to his group based on their physical appearance.295 I also believe that the 
diversity within the black identity and the complexities of racial classifications in Colombia have been used 
as an excuse to undermine the politicization of race in this country. A condition that discourages the 
acknowledgment of racial discrimination by way of defending the idea that racial differences in this context 
are too subtle to be recognized.296 My data collection process tries to refrain from the impulse to avoid 
asking about racial identification in Latin America due to its complexities in the region. In this respect, 
Mata Htun has argued that one of the main difficulties for the creation of affirmative action programs is the 
trouble of defining who is black. Likewise, as one of her interviewees pointed out, people in Brazil 
strategically use the intricacies of racial identification in the region to deny the possibility of compensatory 
measures for past discrimination.297  
An additional reason for not pre-establishing a particular methodology for courts to assess their 
gender and ethno-racial composition is that, depending on the nature of the complexity of the task, this 
could have discouraged courts to provide information about the perceived number of women and minorities 
working for the judiciary. For example, requesting the courts to ask each judge or judicial employee to self-
 
295 Regarding the concept of visible minority, the Canadian Employment Equality Act of 1995 mentions: “members 
of visible minorities means persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in 
colour” This concept, therefore, applies to minority groups whose color makes them identifiable among the general 
population. See Employment Equality Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44 art. 3 (Can.). 
296 VAN COTT, supra note 204 at 44. 
297 MALA HTUN, Dimensions of Political Inclusion and Exclusion in Brazil: Gender and Race 1–33 17 (2003), 
http://iknowpolitics.org/sites/default/files/dimensions_of_political_inclusion_and_exclusion_in_brazil.pdf (last 
visited Nov 27, 2018). 
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identify their gender and ethno-racial identity could be read as a petition to conduct a quasi-census. Courts 
could have easily refused to such possibility, given their limitations in terms of time, legal responsibilities, 
and access to resources. 
  I decided to ask about the number of judge and employee posts because I wanted to limit the 
influence that the potential unfilled vacancies at the court might have in the results. Inquiring about the 
number of posts allowed me to compare the perceived levels of women and minority representation to the 
number of available posts instead of comparing them to the number of judges or employees working for 
each court at any particular time. I decided to inquire about the gender breakdown for three reasons: The 
first is that from the literature about women representation on the United States' judiciary, I anticipated that 
women would be underrepresented on the bench in Colombia, as women continue to face discrimination 
on many aspects of public life, including employment.298 Given the still limited research on this issue in 
Colombia, it was essential to render this situation visible. Second, to ask about the gender composition, and 
especially to ask about it before asking about ethno-racial composition, was an incentive for courts to 
respond the questions about indigenous and Afro-descendant presence in the judiciary. I suspected that even 
though in Latin America is difficult to talk about gender issues publicly, it is even more challenging to talk 
about racial issues. If this were true, to ask about gender composition first presented an invitation to talk 
about ethno-racial composition without having to face address exclusively the racial component. Also, if 
the courts could provide data on their gender composition but not about their ethno-racial composition, 
there would be an immediate question about the asymmetrical treatment about gender and race. Third, to 
ask about gender composition also allowed me to ask about intersectionality vis-à-vis the presence of Afro-
descendant and indigenous women on courts.  
A final aspect of the gender composition questions that I should discuss is the implicit binary 
assumption underlying this part of the information requests. I decided to ask about women representation, 
assuming that men and women are the only gender identities present at these courts. Thus, by assessing the 
 
298 Las mujeres en Colombia ONU MUJERES | COLOMBIA (2020), https://colombia.unwomen.org/es/onu-mujeres-en-
colombia/las-mujeres-en-colombia (last visited Mar 16, 2020). 
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number of women at the court, I could also determine the number of men at the court. This assumption is 
problematic since it could be possible that at least some of the judges have gender identities that scape the 
gender binary. There is no public information about openly trans, gender fluid, or non-binary judges in 
Colombia. Nevertheless, I assumed that gender non-binary individuals constitute a small fraction of the 
Colombian judiciary and that the gender binary presumption can be used for this analysis, despite the 
general undesirability of this logic for social studies. 
Regarding the questions about indigenous persons, I decided to ask about their representation in 
the judiciary because indigenous peoples are the second-largest ethnic minority in Colombia, and they have 
been the central group for multiculturalist state policies in Latin America.299 Indigenous peoples in 
Colombia have faced significant levels of discrimination exclusion from public spheres.300 I anticipated 
that they would be significantly underrepresented in the judiciary. Hence, I considered necessary to render 
this situation visible.  
In the case of Afro-descendants, I decided to use such a term because, as I explained before, is the 
most accepted to refer to black persons in Latin America. Afro-descendant is used to include both racial 
and ethnic identities and does not have a negative connotation, unlike the word "black" has in specific 
contexts. In a footnote in the information request, I asked the respondents to include within this category to 
all black, mulatto, Afro Colombian, Raizal of the Archipelago of San Andres, Providencia, and Santa 
Catalina, and Palenquero of San Basilio persons. These additional categories represent groups within the 
universe of Afro-descendants. Some, such as black or mulatto, tend to emphasize the racial dimension of 
Afro-descendant identities. In contrast, Raizal and Palenquero refer to specific ethnic groups that have a 
distinctive culture and are located in particular parts of the country. The questions about ethno-racial 
representation are based on the assumption that only Afro-descendant, indigenous, and white-mestizo 
 
299 Van Cott, supra note 3; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Indigenous Peoples and the State in Latin America: An Ongoing 
Debate, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 24–44 (2002), 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781403937827_2 (last visited Jul 16, 2018); Yashar, supra note 115. 
300 Mario Villa, La ONU denuncia que los indígenas siguen siendo víctimas de la discriminación, EL PAÍS, August 9, 
2017, https://www.elpais.com.co/mundo/la-onu-denuncia-que-los-indigenas-siguen-siendo-victimas-de-la-
discriminacion.html (last visited Mar 16, 2020). 
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ethno-racial identities are present in the Colombian judiciary. Thus, it is possible to know the perceptions 
of the number of white-mestizo persons in the courts by subtracting the number of Afro descendant and 
indigenous persons from the total number of judges or judicial employees. This assumption is problematic 
because there might be other ethno-racial identities in the judiciary. Nevertheless, I believe that departing 
from this type of ethno-racial trinary logic can be pragmatic in this context, given our general knowledge 
on the ethno-racial composition of the country. 
I also decided to ask specific questions concerning the presence of indigenous and Afro-descendant 
women in the courts. I suspected that, as in the U.S. context, minority women could face different obstacles 
to access positions in the judiciary when compared both to minority and non-minority men, as well as non-
minority women.301 
Regarding the questions about judicial employees, it is essential to clarify that, under Colombian 
law, any judicial servant who is not a judge or a prosecutor is considered a judicial employee.302 In general 
terms, judicial employees do not have the power to conduct judicial functions. A problem with the category 
of judicial employees is that it encompasses a vast number of jobs that vary significantly in terms of 
prestige, salary, responsibilities, and hierarchy. For example, both judicial clerks and I.T. staff may be 
considered judicial employees, despite their job profiles being significantly different.  
I decided not to ask specifically about the gender and ethno-racial of each type of judicial employee 
position because of the difficulties to access the job descriptions. Likewise, such breakdown could have 
made it more difficult for courts to respond to my questions, as they would have needed to differentiate 
among the different types of judicial employees in their responses. This request could have ultimately 
discouraged courts to provide the required information. The only exception that I made about the non-
distinction among judicial employees was the specific questions that I asked about the jobs of auxiliary 
justices in the high courts that I sent information requests to. I specifically asked about the gender and 
 
301 April G. Dawson, Missing In Action: The Absence Of Potential African American Female Supreme Court Justice 
Nominees--Why This Is And What Can Be Done About It, 60 HOWARD LAW J. 177–220 (2016). 
302 L. 270/96, marzo 7, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 125. 
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ethno-racial composition of auxiliary justices because they occupy posts that are particularly well-
positioned within the judicial system's structure. They enjoy particular high prestige and significant income 
advantages when compared to other judicial employees.303 
The request of explaining why they could not provide the data on gender or ethno-racial 
composition had two purposes: To provide incentives for the courts to provide the information; and to 
understand the reasons for the negative answer. 
The questions about affirmative action policies were designed to see if the courts had implemented 
any measures on their own to promote women and minority representation. I was aware that there were not 
centralized affirmative action policies for the judiciary. However, it was still possible that particular courts 
had developed their own policies to promote the presence of persons belonging to certain groups in their 
staff. I decided to separate the gender-based from race-based affirmative action policies as special measures 
might be in place for women but not for indigenous or Afro-descendant persons, or vice versa, since that is 
the case in other public sectors. 
Last, in the case of the information request sent to the National Registry of Attorneys, I decided to 
ask about the sectional councils of the judicature before which the registered attorneys applied for the 
license. I considered that this could provide secondary data about the ethno-racial composition of the legal 




After working on an initial draft of the information requests, I undertook a vetting process of the 
instrument. Two Colombian colleagues, who had conducted significant research and advocacy on issues of 
 
303 Conozca cuál es el sueldo de los magistrados y jueces de Colombia ÁMBITO JURIDICO (2020), 
https://www.ambitojuridico.com/noticias/general/administracion-publica/conozca-cual-es-el-sueldo-de-los-
magistrados-y-jueces-de (last visited Mar 16, 2020). 
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racial discrimination in Colombia, and my academic advisor participated of the vetting process. I 
incorporated their comments into the information request template. 
 
11.2.7. Information requests’ sending 
 
The first group of information requests was sent out on October 24th, 2019. It included the rights of 
petition addressed to the four high courts, the SJP, the National Registry of Attorneys, and 11 superior 
tribunals of judicial district. On November 1st, I sent the second group of information requests addressed to 
the remaining superior tribunals of judicial district. Finally, on November 19, I sent all the remaining 
information requests addressed to the administrative tribunals. There were some information requests that 
were sent out on different dates that the ones formerly mentioned because their addresses were not available 
on those dates. The reason why the sending process was done progressively instead of in a single moment 
was that I wanted to make sure that people were receiving the information and that no significant 
adjustments were needed to the requests so that the courts could appropriately process them. As I will 
explain later, this precaution turned out to be vital, given the problems with courts' public contact 
information. 
All information requests were sent from my university e-mail address since my geographic location 
at the time was New York City. I sent the messages to the e-mail addresses of the presidents of each court. 
In the case of the four high courts, I called the general secretary of each of them and asked the e-mail 
addresses directly. In the case of the SJP, I send the e-mail through the Concerns, Petitions, Complaints, 
and Grievances' format as well as the information e-mail address that I found on their webpage. In the case 
of the National Registry of Attorneys, I sent the message to the registry's e-mail found in the Colombian 
judiciary's webpage. Finally, in the case of the superior tribunals, I used the directory of the presidencies of 
the superior tribunals made available to the public in the Colombian judiciary's webpage. This directory 
included information regarding most superior tribunals, but not all of them. In the case of the missing e-
mail addresses, I had to search online until I found the necessary information or even call the tribunals 
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directly to ask for their contact information. The process of calling to ask for the e-mail addresses was 
complicated in some cases. For example, a superior tribunal of the Caribbean region required me to send 
them my national identification number before providing me the e-mail address. 
Immediately after I sent the first group of e-mails, many of those addressed to superior tribunals 
bounced. Many of the e-mail addresses listed as contact information for the presidencies of the superior 
tribunals were incorrect. Likewise, in some cases, the e-mail addresses listed for a particular tribunal 
corresponded to those of another tribunal. Given this situation, I had to go on-line and try to find alternative 
e-mail addresses for sending the information requests. I also used the general courthouse directory included 
in the judiciary's webpage. In many cases, I had to re-send the e-mail several times until it did not bounce. 
In some instances, the name listed in the directory did not correspond to the president of the tribunal. For 
this reason, when days later I submitted the rights of petition addressed to the administrative tribunals, I 
decided not to include the name of the tribunal's president, but simply direct the document to the president 
of the tribunal. In the case of administrative tribunals, I sent the initial e-mail directed to each tribunal to, 
at least, two e-mail addresses, to minimize the risk of the e-mail bouncing. I used the e-mail addresses listed 
in the administrative tribunals' presidencies directory, in the general courthouse directory, and others I 
found online. 
After the information requests were sent out, I started receiving responses from the courts. In some 
cases, I had to send several e-mails reminding courts to respond, noticing that the legal deadline to reply 
had already expired. Moreover, some courts made singular requests as a precondition for responding. A 
tribunal that asked me to send them a scanned version of the right of petition with my original signature, as 
they alleged they could not process the request with my electronic signature alone. Some courts even argued 
that they were not legally authorized to respond to that kind of request, and therefore did not provide 
information or decided to forward the request to a different authority—usually to the executive director of 
judicial administration. Additionally, some courts would not deliver all the information required. Some, for 
example, gave me data about the gender composition of the court but not about its ethno-racial composition. 
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Hence, in order to obtain full responses, I had to engage in e-mail exchanges with the courts and perform 
constant oversight and follow up on the response progress.  
In the end, of the total of 65 information requests I submitted, 55 of them received some type of 
response, representing a response rate of 84,62%. The average number of calendar days that took courts to 
respond was 28 days. The superior tribunals had a response rate of 87,88%, whereas the administrative 
tribunals had a response rate of 76,92%. All the high courts, the SJP, and the National Registry of Attorneys 
responded to the information requests. This is different from the number of courts that provided complete 
information, as some courts only provided a formal response. The last response I received from an 
institution was on February 25th, 2019, which means that the information was collected in about four 
months. 
 
11.3. Information requests concerning group representation in legal education 
 
As I will explain in more detail later, access to good quality legal education rapidly became one 
topic that always arose during my research process, which increased the need to gather data about Afro-
descendants’ access to law schools. Since there was a virtual absence of data concerning the gender and 
ethno-racial composition of the legal profession, I decided to submit information requests to a group of law 
schools to inquire about the levels of Afro-descendant, indigenous, and women's presence in legal 
education. According to the data provided by Colombia's National Information System of Higher 
Education, by 2018, there were approximately 228 active undergraduate law programs with a qualified 
registry in the law related areas of knowledge core.304 However, some institutions appeared several times 
in the same registry, which means that the number of programs it was likely much lower. The proliferation 
of law programs in Colombia is extensive. I decided to send information requests only to a sample of them. 
The universities selected for this data collection exercise were those that had graduated Magistrates of the 
 
304 Sistema Nacional de Información de la Educación Superior BÚSQUEDA DE PROGRAMAS DE INSTITUCIONES DE 
EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR (2018), https://snies.mineducacion.gov.co/consultasnies/programa (last visited Mar 16, 2020). 
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Constitutional Court of Colombia. Since the Constitutional Court is the most prominent in the country, it 
was likely that they had graduated from law schools that provide high-quality education. Although this was 
not necessarily the case, the sample had the mere intention of providing a view of the level of presence of 
ethno-racial minorities in this area. In addition to these institutions, I also submitted an information request 
directly to the Minister of Education, which asked about this same topic. 
The information requests addressed to the Ministry of Education and the universities explained the 
purposes of my search and required them to inform on the number of undergraduate programs in law that 
had Ministerial approval. They were also asked to inform on the number of students matriculated and the 
number of graduates from such programs in the past five years, indicating how many of them are women, 
Afro-descendants, indigenous persons, Afro-descendant women, and indigenous women. I also asked them 
to explain why they could not provide such data in case they did not deliver it. Likewise, I inquired about 
affirmative action policies for the same population groups in these law schools. 
I submitted 13 rights of petition in total, some of which were sent by e-mail and some in hard copy. 
The first right of petition was sent on March 3rd, 2019. A total of 9 institutions (69.2%) offered some type 
of response to the information requests—this is lower than the number that provided the needed data. The 
last response was received on June 4th, 2019, which means that the data was collected in approximately 
three months. 58 was the average number of calendar days that took an institution to reply. 
 
11.4. Data collection through interviews and site visits 
 
  In addition to the information requests, I also decided to conduct semi-structured interviews to 
gather additional data, and to identify about potential reasons for the marginal level of Afro-descendant 





11.4.1. Interview process 
 
I requested IRB approval to conduct approximately 60 interviews with four types of relevant actors 
in the context of Afro-descendant representation in courts. Fordham University's IRB approved my 
application on February 25th, 2019. 
 
11.4.2. Purposeful sampling 
 
The interviews were held with: 
-Judges, the majority of whom were Afro-descendants. 
-Afro-descendant judicial employees, the majority of whom were Afro-descendant. 
-Afro-descendant attorneys. 
 
In the case of judges and judicial employees, I was particularly interested in interviewing those 
who were Afro-descendants because I believe they are the ones who could better identify the different 
obstacles that they have faced at entering the court system. However, the perspectives of non-Afro 
descendant judges and judicial employees also proved to be essential for the study, mainly because of the 
anticipated dearth of Afro-descendants working in certain courts. In the case of Afro-descendant lawyers, 
the rationale behind interviewing them is that they could be potential applicants to become judges or judicial 
employees in the future, and could provide additional perspectives to understand the obstacles to become 
part of the court system. Attorneys could also provide insights about whether the minimal number of Afro-
descendants serving in the court system impacts their work or the rights of the members of this group when 
they come before the tribunals. Due to the need to inquire about the relevance of certain aspects of the 
participant's identity, I used self-identification as a way to ascertain the ethno-racial identity in this 
component of my research. Asking about the experience of being an Afro-Colombian working for the courts 
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was only suitable for participants who self-identity with such a group. If participants did not identify with 
this group, the questions' pertinence would have been undermined. 
Since I could not find pre-existing data to help me locate Afro-descendant judges or judicial 
employees, I used snowballing sampling as the methodology to identify potential interviewees. I also 
utilized my professional network to locate some interviewees, which in turn provided me with the contact 
information to reach additional participants. In the case of the attorneys, I also used a directory provided by 
the Racial Discrimination Watch (Observatorio de Discriinación Racial), a human rights consortium.305 
This database had the contact information of approximately 40 Afro-Colombian lawyers. I had worked with 
this organization in the past. I received e-mail authorization from the coordinator of the Racial 
Discrimination Watch to use the database to contact potential interviewees on January 29, 2019. I also tried 
to balance the regional composition of the sample by conducting a limited number of interviews in every 
city. 
Initially, the study design contemplated two additional types of participants: Social leaders and 
representatives of Afro-descendant civil society organizations and judicial and public servants with a role 
in the judge and judicial employee selection process. These interviews were discarded after further 
consideration. In the case of civil society organizations, the changing nature of the civic leaders' obligations 
made it difficult to schedule appointments successfully. Many appointments were canceled immediately 
before, and, in the one case, an interview took place, but the responses of the interviewee made visible that 
the organization did not have a formed perspective on this particular issue. In the case of judicial servants 
involved in the judicial selection process, I tried to schedule an appointment with a representative of the 
Judicial Council of the Judicature. However, the interviewee failed to confirm the appointment or return 
my messages. 
I interview a total of 45 participants in 8 cities of the Andean, Pacific, Caribbean, and Insular 
regions of Colombia, in a period between March 4th and May 15th, 2019. 35.6% of the interviewees were 
 
305 Observatorio de Discriminación Racial, (2019), http://www.odracial.org (last visited Mar 16, 2020). 
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attorneys, a similar percentage were judges, and 28.9% were judicial employees. 13.3% of the interviews 
were conducted in Medellín, and a similar percentage in San Andrés, 35.6% in Bogotá, 8.9% in Cartagena, 
6.7% in Quibdó, 15.6% in Cali, 2.2% in Buenaventura, and a similar percentage in Tumaco. 2.2% were 
also completed online. The mean duration of the interviews was 46 minutes, with the shortest interview 
lasting 16 minutes and the most extended 102. 
Of the 45 participants, 62% identified as men and 38% as women. 88.9% of the interviewees self-
identified as Afro-descendant,306 6.7% as Indigenous, and 4.4% as White/Mestizo. The average age of the 
respondents who provided information about their age was 40.2 years.307 44.4% of participants reported 
being single, 33.3% married, 17.8% in a marital union and 4.4% did not provide information about their 
marital status. Regarding their place of origin, 6.7% reported being from Antioquia and a similar percentage 
from Bogotá. 13.3% from Bolívar, 4.4% from Cauca, 2.2% from Cesar, and a similar percentage from 
Putumayo. 20% from Chocó, 6.7% from Nariño, 8.9% from the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, 
and Santa Catalina. 13.3% from Valle del Cauca, and 17.8% did not provide information about their place 
of origin. Regarding the rural-urban divide, 77.8% of respondents reported that they grew up in urban areas, 
17.8% in rural areas, and 4.4% did not provide information in this regard. In terms of the highest degree of 
education attained, 15.5% of the sample held a bachelor's degree and the same percentage a post-graduate 
diploma (specialization),308 62.2% a master’s degree, and 6.7% a doctorate. Regarding the type of 
institution where they completed their secondary education, 24.4% of respondents declared that they 
completed high school education in a private institution, 73.3% in a public institution, and 2.2% did not 
answer this question. The mean year of graduation of those who provided information about the year they 
received their bachelor’s degree was 2001.309 60% of interviewees graduated from a private college and 
40% from a public college. 
 
306. This group includes people whose ethno-racial identity was Afro-descendant, black, Raizal, Palenquero, mulatto, 
and Afro Colombian. 
307 42 out of 45 respondents provided information about their age. 
308 In the Colombian education system this degree is known as “especialización.” 
309 42 out of 45 respondents provided information about the year they received their bachelor's degree.  
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11.4.3. Interview’s content 
 
The interview protocol for judges and judicial employees included four types of questions: About 
the experience of becoming judges or judicial employees; about the interaction of the interviewee's identity 
and the work they do; about their perceptions on Afro-descendant representation on the courts; about 
situations of discrimination. In the case of the attorneys, sections 1) and 2) were replaced by general 
questions about their professional experience and their perceptions of the justice system. The exact 
questions in the protocol can be found in the annexes. 
 
11.4.4. The rationale for interview questions 
 
I decided to use the first group of questions as a way to identify, based on their experiences, barriers, 
obstacles, or situations that shaped the interviewees' access to the courts and the legal profession. The 
second group of questions intended to capture the participants' perspectives on whether (and if so, how) 
judges' identities influence judicial activity. The third group of questions had the intention of gathering 
additional data on the ethno-racial composition of Latin American courts, and to supplement, provide 
context and meaning to the data collected through the information request component of the research. 
Lastly, the final group of questions had the intention of inquiring about experiences of discrimination in the 
context of the judicial system in order to identify potential prejudice-related factors affecting Afro-




Before being submitted to the IRB approval process, my academic advisor, and a colleague who 
has significant experience working on Afro-descendant issues in Colombia vetted the interview protocol. 
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11.4.6. Conducting the interviews 
 
In order to conduct the interviews, I asked permission to collect data directly to the judges, judicial 
employees, and attorneys. They could decide whether or not they desired to participate. In order to conduct 
the interviews, I visited the cities of Medellín, Bogotá, San Andrés, Cartagena, Quibdó, Cali, Buenaventura, 
and Tumaco. These sites were selected based on the findings acquired during stage two of the research 
process, their significant levels of Afro-descendant population, and their role in the public and economic 
life of the nation. 
The interviews took place in courthouses, public offices, attorney's offices, restaurants, and other 
spaces at the convenience of the interviewees. In general, the interview process took place as follows: After 
I made initial contact with the potential interviewee, I explained the purposes of my study, its objectives, 
and the types of questions they would be asked if they agreed to participate. I stressed the fact that they 
were completely free to decline my proposition, and that no unwanted repercussions would occur to them 
if they chose to decline. Before I started to formulate questions, I would answer to any concerns the 
participants would have and provided them the informed consent forms (in Spanish), so they could sign 
them if they agreed to participate in the research project. Immediately after, I proceeded to conduct the 
interview, which was audio-recorded in two separate devices. Once the interview concluded, I would ask 
participants to fill out the socio-demographic questionnaire, which I used to compile certain biographic 
information about the interviewees. Finally, I would ask participants if they could identify other persons 
that fall within the selection criteria that might be interested in participating in the study. Whenever possible, 
the first contact and subsequent interviews with participants were conducted in person. In certain occasions, 
I contacted participants beforehand by phone, text messages, e-mail, or social media. 
The interviews’ audios were transcribed into text in the Spanish language. I used Atlas.ti, a 
qualitative data analysis software to code, organize and analyze the information collected through the 
 78 
interview process and the notes stemming from the direct observation exercises, which I will reference in 
the following section. 
 
11.4.7. Site Visits 
 
In addition to the interviews, I completed a group of site visits to some courts in the cities of 
Medellín, Cartagena, San Andrés, Tumaco, and Buenaventura. These visits had the purpose of partially 
observing the composition of the judiciary in these cities and to witness some judicial proceedings taking 
place at the moment of my visit. During these visits, I took notes that were analyzed with the same software 
I used to code the data produced by the interviews. The primary purpose of these visits was to supplement 
the information I obtained through the interview concerning the ethno-racial composition of the judicial 
institutions in several cities. Notably, site visits allowed me to appreciate the level of presence or absence 
of Afro-descendants in the courts in locations where finding interviewees was difficult. Unlike in the 
interview process, in the site visits, the ethno-racial composition of the courts was assessed through hetero-
identification.  















II. “In Colombia we are all mestizos”: Afro-descendant representation on Colombian courts 
 
In this chapter, I will refer to several aspects concerning the composition of Colombian courts, 
including the judicial activity and the institutional problems that affect the judicial system in Colombia; the 
selection mechanisms for magistrates, judges, and judicial employees; the competing narratives on race 
present at the courts, which became visible during the data collection process;310 the gender and ethno-
racial composition of the legal profession and judicial institutions in Colombia; and the specific impact that 
geographical location has on the ethno-racial composition of judicial institutions in the country. 
 
1. The judicial activity and institutional problems affecting the judicial system in Colombia 
 
During a normal day at the courthouses, judicial servers (judges and judicial employees) spend 
most of their time reading case-dockets, attending hearings, engaging in legal research, drafting opinions, 
and issuing rulings.311 Judges and magistrates dedicate a significant part of their time to coordinate, 
supervise, and review the work of their chamber’s judicial employees. They also debate cases with other 
judges (in situations of collegiate courts) and perform specific administrative duties.312 Some of the study 
participants commented that, in most cases, courts operate as islands, separated from one another. A court 
rarely knows about the work of another court. This isolation is particularly true in the case of judges who 
do not serve in panels.313 
The respondents agreed on the idea that a person must have substantive experience and outstanding 
academic credentials to become a judge. These qualifications facilitate the access to the bench, at least in 
 
310 Given the need to protect the participants’ confidentiality, I will cite the interviews only by using a consecutive 
number. Annex 7 of this dissertation provides additional information concerning each individual interview associated 
to such number. 
311 Interviews 3, 15, 34 and 45. 
312 Interviews 1 and 15. 
313 Interview 3. 
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the cases of career positions. Working at a judicial institution has impacts on judicial servers, both inside 
and outside the courthouses. In the case of inter-personal interactions inside the courts, most participants 
describe their professional relations with colleagues as good.314 Concerning the impact that the judicial 
activity has on their personal lives, some judges asserted that they need to maintain a low profile and 
sufficient distance from attorneys who litigate in their jurisdictions since they need to preserve the 
perception of impartiality.315 Despite the general indications of positive work environments, interviewees 
affirmed that formalism and hierarchy characterize the judicial activity in Colombia.316 A participant who 
has several years of experience working at the high court level mentioned that, in this layer of the judiciary, 
auxiliary magistrates are: 
 
a precious asset because of how the law is spoken and told in these spaces, which is different from 
the everyday life of regular judges. It is a superior view, a different view; the rigor that the appeal 
techniques demand—and that it is not easy [to learn]—leads, one way or the other, to grant 
preference to those who have mastered that form of expressing the law.317  
 
An interviewee discussed how this hierarchy could also be felt in the subtleness of language. The 
participant stated that is not uncommon to hear judges calling “my employees” to the judicial personnel 
working at their chambers despite their actual employer being the judicial branch—in many cases, judges 
do not have the power to remove judicial employees from their stations directly.318 Hierarchy is also visible 
in the architecture of judicial institutions. During my site visit to Medellín's main judicial complex, I noticed 
that there were three separate entrances for accessing the judicial building. One was reserved for judicial 
 
314 Interview 5, 6 and 34. 
315 Interview 27. 
316 Interview 11. 
317 Interview 21. 
318 Interview 40. 
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servers, another for attorneys, and the last one for the general public. This arrangement seems to convey a 
clear stratification of the different types of participants in the judicial ecosystem.319 
Hierarchy is also present in the salary differences of judicial servers. According to data made 
available by a Colombian NGO, in early 2018, the monthly salaries for judicial functionaries (judges and 
magistrates) were approximately: 32,500,000 COP (11,000 USD) for high court magistrates; 25,100,000 
COP (8,655 USD) for intermediate tribunal magistrates; 10,600,000 COP (3,655 USD) for specialized 
judges; 9,500,000 COP (3,275 USD) for circuit judges; and 8,100,000 COP (2,793 USD) for municipal 
judges.320 A high court magistrate makes roughly four times as much as a municipal judge.321 Similar wage 
differences are present in the case of judicial employees: Auxiliary magistrates and specialized 
professionals 33, which are the first and second highest-earning judicial employee positions, made 
25,100,000 COP (8,655 USD) and 8,700,000 (3,000 USD), respectively.322 The first position pays almost 
three times as much as the second one per month.  
Hierarchization becomes notorious in the role that higher-ranking judges have in the evaluation of 
lower judges’ performance.323 Judges and judicial employees’ evaluation process considers four factors: 
quality, efficiency, organization, and publications.324 Magistrates of high courts and intermediate tribunals 
are subjected to this assessment process every two years, whereas regular judges and judicial employees 
are evaluated annually.325 Functional superiors appraise the “quality” of the judges and judicial employees’ 
work. The high courts’ magistrates assess the quality of the intermediate tribunals’ judges in their respective 
jurisdiction. These magistrates, in turn, value the work of circuit court judges.326  
 
319 Daniel Gomez-Mazo, Fieldwork notes (2019). 
320 Conozca cuál es el sueldo de los magistrados y jueces de Colombia, supra note 303. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
323 Interview 3. 
324 Acuerdo PSAA16-10618, diciembre 7, 2016, Consejo Superior de la Judicatura. [C.S.J.] (Colomb.) art. 22. 
325 Id. art. 4.  
326 Interviews 3 and 22. 
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Another topic that came up several times during the interviews was the judicial overload and the 
limited resources of the judicial system. According to the data provided by the Superior Council of the 
Judicature, by November 6, 2018, there were 32,298 judicial servants in Colombia, of which 5,354 were 
judges, and 26,944 were judicial employees. Nevertheless, the justice system is overstretched due to the 
high number of cases pending resolution. The number of judges and judicial employees insufficient for 
meeting the justice demand.327 An interviewee claimed that in the city of Tumaco, for example, there is 
only one specialized criminal judge in charge of deciding approximately 800 pending cases.328  
Overburden translates into significant delays in the processing of cases. Delays can last for several 
years, even for conflicts that lack significant complexity, and be more significant at the top of the judicial 
system.329 An interviewee mentioned that while she was working for a high court in the year 2009, the 
court was issuing rulings in cases that had initiated in the year 2001.330 Participants consistently identified 
judicial congestion as a factor that contributed to the denial of access to justice and legal remedies in many 
cases.331 In addition to this circumstance, the Superior Council of the Judicature’ case-processing goals can 
be exceedingly ambitious. A participant, who serves as an intermediate tribunal magistrate, mentioned that 
for the 2019-2021 period, the Council had established a benchmark of roughly 750 decisions per year for 
these tribunals. For the interviewee, this goal appeared impossible to reach.332 
Lack of sufficient resources, insufficient institutional capacity, and inadequate infrastructure are 
significant problems for judicial institutions in Colombia. Courts lack adequate infrastructure and office 
space. I could see directly that several courthouses had cracks in their ceilings and trash accumulating in 
the hallways—side by side with case dockets that could not be fitted into the regular storage facilities.333 
This situation was visible even in the responses that the courts gave to my information requests concerning 
 
327 Interview 1. 
328 Interview 38. 
329 Interviews 31, 32. 
330 Interview 42. 
331 Interviews 1 and 32. 
332 Interview 3. 
333 Gomez-Mazo, supra note 319. 
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the composition of judicial institutions. The lack of a centralized database with the résumes of all judicial 
servants, and the absence of an updated and publicly available directory of courthouses are examples of this 
institutional precariousness.334 
These findings seem to fall in line with previous literature on Latin American judiciaries’ 
institutional precariousness.335 Nevertheless, as Jorge Esquirol notes, it is important not to overstate the 
challenges that such limitations pose on the rule of law in Latin America, especially in comparison to other 
regions of the world.336 Esquirol argues that the generalized perception of failure can be harmful for Latin 
American societies, as this image undermines the legitimacy of state institutions, discards pre-reform 
options present in the existing Latin American law, and weakens the position of the region’s countries in 
the hemispheric legal relations.337 
 
2. Selection mechanisms for magistrates, judges and judicial employees 
 
It is crucial to differentiate among three types of judicial positions in order to explicate the different 
mechanisms used for judicial server selection. These are high court magistrates; career magistrates, judges, 
and judicial employees' positions; provisional and temporary magistrate, judges, and judicial employees' 






334 As I mentioned before, the public directories made available by the Superior Council of the Judicature were not 
updated, which made it more difficult to contact the courts to gather information about their composition. 
335 MARIA DAKOLIAS, The judicial sector in Latin America and the Caribbean 104 (1996), 
https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/0-8213-3612-6 (last visited Jul 16, 2018); Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial 
Reforms In Latin America: Good News For The Unprivileged?, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED 
IN LATIN AMERICA 255–277 (Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo A. O’Donnell, & Paulo Sérgio de M. S Pinheiro eds., 1999). 
336 Jorge L. Esquirol, supra note 191. 
337 Id. at 77. 
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2.1. High court magistrates 
 
 Each of Colombia’s high courts has a different magistrate selection procedure. The requirements 
to become a Magistrate of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice and the State Council are 
established in article 232 of the Constitution.338 In the case of the Constitutional Court, the Senate (the 
upper house of the Colombian Congress) has the power to appoint the magistrates. They select magistrates 
out of three-name lists of candidates. The President, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the State Council 
may propose three lists each.339 The Supreme Court of Justice and the State Council’s magistrates are 
appointed by the existing members of this court, out of a list of candidates submitted by the Administrative 
Chamber of the Superior Council of the Judicature.340 The term for these positions is eight years. 
Magistrates cannot be reappointed.341 It is not necessary to have been engaged in a judicial career to occupy 
one of these judicial positions.342 
In the case of the Superior Council of the Judicature—Administrative Chamber, the State Council 
selects three of the magistrates, the Supreme Court of Justice selects two, and the Constitutional Court 
selects one. Congress appoints the magistrates of the Superior Council of the Judicature—Disciplinary 
Chamber from three-name lists that the National Government submits.343 All Magistrates of the Superior 
Council of the Judicature are elected for non-renewable 8-year terms.344 
 
338 Article 232 of the 1991 Constitution describes the requirements necessary to become a magistrate of the 
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the State Council. These requirements are to be Colombian 
national by birth and a citizen in exercise; to be a lawyer; not to have been convicted to prison, except in the cases of 
political or guilty crimes; to have 15 years of experience at the judicial branch, the public ministry; or have practiced 
as a lawyer or university professor in the legal disciplines at institutions recognized by the state. In the case of the 
Supreme Court and the State Council, the teaching needs to have been in the areas related to the judicial position's 
specialty). Constitución Política de Colombia [C.P.] art. 232.  
339 Id. art. 239; Law 270 of 1996, art. 38.  
340 L. 270/96, marzo 7, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 15 and 34. 
341 Constitución Política de Colombia [C.P.] art. 233.  
342 Id. 
343 L. 270/96, marzo 7, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 76. 
344 To become a magistrate in this court, a candidate must be a Colombian national by birth, a citizen in exercise, and 
older than 35 years of age. The candidate also needs to be a lawyer have practiced as a lawyer with good credit for at 
least ten years. Id. art. 77.  
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 In the case of the SJP, the magistrates of the Peace Tribunal need to fulfill the same requirements 
established for the magistrates of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the State Council.345 In 
the case of the magistrates of the SJP’s chambers, they need to comply with the same requirements of the 
magistrates of the superior tribunals of judicial district.346 The magistrates of the SJP, whose term will last 
for the lifetime of the jurisdiction, were appointed by a selection committee.347 This committee was 
composed of delegates of the Supreme Court of Justice—Penal Chamber, the United Nations General 
Secretary, the Permanent Commission of the State University System, the President of the European Court 
of Human Rights, and the International Center for Transitional Justice’s mission to Colombia.348 
The judicial selection mechanisms for the high courts are political. Putting aside the basic 
requirements for the positions (which many candidates can potentially meet), the institutions who nominate 
or elect the magistrates have broad discretion to select the persons who will be appointed. Hence, the 
process is not necessarily centered around the idea of "finding the best candidate." There is no obligation 
for the selecting institution to pick the most qualified applicant since there is a lack of specific parameters 
to determine who the most competent contestant might be. 
 
2.2. Career magistrates, judges, and judicial employees 
 
According to article 125 of the Colombian Constitution, as a general rule, posts at the state’s organs 
and institutions are career positions. Access to them needs to follow the parameters established in the law 
to determine the merit and virtues of potential candidates.349 In the specific case of the judiciary, article 
156 of Law 270 of 1996 mentions that:  
 
345 AL. 1/17, abril 4, 2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 7. 
346 Id. (These requirements include: to be a Colombian citizen by birth, a citizen in exercise, and enjoy full civil rights; 
to be a lawyer; not to have an inability or incompatibility with the position, and to have at least eight years of 
professional experience). AL. 1/17, abril 4, 2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 127 and 128.  
347 AL. 1/17, abril 4, 2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) transitory art. 7, par. 1.  
348 PD. 587/2017, abril 5, 2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 2. 
349 Constitución Política de Colombia art. 125.  
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The judicial career is based in the professional character of functionaries and employees, in the 
efficacy of their work, in the guarantee of equality of possibilities in the access to career to all 
citizens that are apt for it, and in the consideration of merit as the fundamental principle for the 
access, remaining, and promotion in service.350 
 
In consequence, as a general rule, access to judicial positions should take place through merit-
selection, which shall seek to retain talent, improve judicial servers’ skills, and secure an adequate provision 
of justice services to all citizens.351 All intermediate tribunals’ magistrates, judges, and judicial employees 
positions that the law does not explicitly name as being of free appointment and removal are career 
positions. Merit selection is expected to determine access to these posts.352 The Superior Council of the 
Judicature is the institution in charge of managing the judicial career.353 
In the case of judges and magistrates, the selection process to access career positions are expected 
to be recurrent, open and public. The process consists of has five steps: The merit contest; the composition 
of a national eligibles' registry; the creation of a candidates’ lists; the appointment; and the confirmation.354 
In the case of judicial employees, step two is followed directly by the conveyance of the eligibles' list and 
the appointment.355 
The merit contest evaluates the applicants’ knowledge, capabilities, experience, and personal 
conditions. The contest has two parts: The selection, which includes an assortment of the applicants to 
become part of the eligibles’ registry—usually done through a group of tests and exams; and the 
classification, which involves the creation of an applicants' ranking based on merit.356 The Superior Council 
 
350 L. 270/96, marzo 7, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art.156. 
351 Id. art 157. 
352 Id. art. 158. 
353 Constitution, Article 256.  
354 L. 270/96, marzo 7, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art.163. 
355 Id. art. 162. 
356 Id. art. 164. 
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of the Judicature undertakes the creation of the national eligibles' registry for the magistrates, judges, and 
judicial employees’ vacancies, in which it includes the candidates who approved the previous stage of the 
process. In the registry, candidates are ranked based on merit. This registry expires after four years of being 
created.357 The following step (list of candidates) is the provision of positions to be covered with the lists 
of names. The list shall include at least five candidates.358 After this stage, every time there is a vacancy in 
a court, the nominating institution needs to notify the judicial administrators, which, in turn, will appoint 
the person selected to fill out the vacancy.359 
In the case of judges and magistrates, applicants who will occupy these positions for the first time 
ought to pass a judicial training course.360 This course has the purpose of training candidates to fulfill their 
obligations as judges. The course can be a step in the selection process, in which case it is known as “curso-
concurso” (course-contest). The course-contest has an eliminatory function. If candidates do not approve 
a stage of the contest, they are removed from the selection process.361 
Concerning the security of their positions, judges who attained their seats through merit-selection 
have tenure over their stations.362 They can stay on their seats until they decide to resign, receive a pension, 
reach the age of mandatory retirement (70 years of age), or are removed from their positions. Removal can 
only occur due to negative performance in their work, because of a disciplinary or criminal process, or 
because of other narrowly defined circumstances.363 These rules give a certain sense of employment 
stability to career judges.364 
A significant difference between the selection process for high court magistrates and career 
magistrates, judges, and judicial employees is that in the case of the latter, the selection process seeks to 
 
357 Id. art. 165. 
358 Id. art.166. 
359 Id. art.167. 
360 Id. art.160. 
361 Id. art.168. 
362 Id. art.173. 
363 Id. art. 149 and173. 
364 Interview 3. 
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recruit the most qualified applicants. In contrast, in the case of high court magistrates, the selection is mainly 
political. However, according to some participants, the merit-selection process is flawed and can lead to 
disparate impacts on individual applicants. I will discuss these aspects in the next chapter. 
 
2.3. Provisional and temporary magistrates, judges and judicial employees 
 
As I previously explained, according to the law, judicial positions are expected to be occupied by 
persons who have undergone a merit-selection process. However, under certain circumstances, these 
positions can be left vacant, either definitively or temporarily. Vacancies open the door for the appointment 
of provisional or temporary judicial servers. 
Provisional judicial servers (either magistrates, judges, or judicial employees) are appointed in 
situations in which there is a definitive vacancy (e.g., resignation). Provisionality can also happen when 
there is a short-term vacancy that is not filled out by a temporary commission (encargo), or that will last 
more than six months.365 A commission takes place when there is a need to appoint a judicial servant to 
temporarily cover another position. This commission should last for a maximum of two months, after which 
there must to be a new appointment (either provisional or through merit selection).366 The law establishes 
that provisional judicial servants should not remain in those positions for longer than six months in cases 
of definitive vacancies since, by that time, a merit-based appointment should take place.367 Although, as I 
will explain in more detail in another section of the manuscript, provisional appointments are, in reality, 
not only widespread in the judiciary but can also last for years. 
There are no clear rules to appoint provisional judicial servants, which allows for the nominating 
institution’s discretion to play a significant role in the provisional appointment of magistrates, judges, and 
judicial employees. The Constitutional Court has stated in several decisions that, following the principle of 
 




merit, "… judicial functionaries shall be elected from a list or registry created through a public merit contest, 
regardless of the position being only temporal."368 In theory, provisional judges should be selected from 
the pool of candidates included in the eligibles' list instead of being dependent upon the nominating 
institution's discretion. Nevertheless, the selection of provisional judicial servants continue to be 
discretional in many cases. 
 
2.4. Free appointment and removal judicial employees 
 
The free appointment and removal judicial employees are positions in which the judicial employee 
can be hired and dismissed at the discretion of the nominating authority. Free appointment and removal 
positions are relatively exceptional in the judicial branch, and they need to be established by law.369 Some 
examples of these positions are the auxiliary magistrates and other judicial employee positions in the high 
courts, assistant lawyer positions, positions that are dependent upon the office of the presidency of the high 
courts or the office of intermediate tribunals’ magistrates.370 Several judicial employee positions of the SJP 
are also of free appointment and removal.371 
 
3. The competing narratives on race present at the courts 
 
During the data collection process, courts seemed to convey competing narratives about race and 
race relations in Colombia. There was a marked difference between the narratives on race articulated in the 
answers to the rights of petition and those that judicial servers communicated during the interviews. In their 
 
368 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 15, 2008, Sentencia C-713/2008 Gaceta de la Corte 
Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colomb.). Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 27, 2015, Sentencia 
SU-553/15, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colomb.). 
369 L. 270/96, marzo 7, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 159. 
370 Id. art. 130. 
371 Acuerdo 003/18, enero 26, 2018, Jurisdicción Especial de Paz. [J.E.P.] (Colomb.). 
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answers to the information requests, courts tended not to recognize the relevance of race in the composition 
of judicial institutions. In contrast, judges and judicial employees seemed to acknowledge the relevance of 
race and even offered accounts concerning situations of race discrimination during the interview processes. 
I will refer to the two narratives about race that were evident during the data collection process: The refusal 
to acknowledge race and the use of the mestizaje narratives visible in the responses to the rights of the 
petition and the acknowledgment of racial tensions during the interview process. 
 
3.1. The refusal to acknowledge race and the use of the mestizaje narratives present 
in the responses to the rights of petition 
 
 Judicial institutions avoided discussing race in several forms in their responses to the rights of 
petition. This denial of race can is visible, for example, in that certain courts declined to provide information 
about their ethno-racial composition. The State Council refused to provide information concerning the 
ethno-racial composition of the institution, arguing that the racial or ethnic origin was sensible data 
protected by the right to habeas data (a type of data protection/privacy right). This answer is troubling. My 
information requested complied with Colombia's data protection law, which allows data-collection on race 
and ethnicity if the data is anonymized and used for scientific or academic purposes.372 Also, most courts 
in the country, including the Constitutional Court, provided the requested data, which is additional evidence 
that the information could be handed out without any legal infringement.  
The State Council was not the only court that declined to answer my request. Courts used different 
resources for not providing the requested information. The Supreme Court of Justice enunciated that such 
institution "is governed by principles of merit and equality," without providing any further explanation of 
its refusal to address the petition's queries. I believe that the use of the idea of merit in this context is 
strategic since it allows courts to avoid discussing issues of race in their composition. This use of the idea 
 
372 L. 1581/12, octubre 17, 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.) art. 5-6. 
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of merit as a means to not acknowledging race was also present in the courts' responses to the questions 
concerning affirmative action policies. Courts seemed to agree that, since the principle of merit governs the 
judicial career in Colombia, the law does not allow for any form of affirmative action programs in the 
judiciary.  
A third example worth mentioning concerning how courts and judicial servants attempt to avoid 
discussing race is the response that the Superior Tribunal of Santa Marta gave to the right of petition. Instead 
of informing the ethno-racial composition of the court, the Tribunal sent me a link to the court’s webpage, 
in which there were bios and pictures of the judicial servers—apparently suggesting that I should be the 
one making the assessment. After I iterated my request, the tribunal simply stated that the institution did 
not have among its duties the administrative affairs I was inquiring about and did not provide any further 
comment on the matter.  
I consider that these situations convey aversion to acknowledge the relevance of race inside judicial 
institutions, which seems to be an example of how courts may also consider race as a taboo. I also think 
that these findings resemble those found by Mathilde Cohen when discussing judicial diversity in 
“colorblind” France, as she also reported different ways in which French judges would use different 
mechanisms to avoid discussing race in the context of the judiciary.373  
Another type of response seemed to downplay the role of race by using mestizaje accounts to excuse 
the low levels of Afro-descendant representation on Colombian judicial institutions. For example, the 
answer provided by the Superior Tribunal of Armenia mentioned that, even though no Afro-descendants or 
indigenous persons were working at that court, "A majority of persons in Latin America descend from the 
indigenous peoples.” Regarding how the data was collected, the Superior Tribunal of Pamplona stated: 
“Being Colombia a mestizo society, the ethno-racial aspects you asked about are answered exclusively in 
relation to the more general traits of them and in response to the way the servers self-refence themselves.” 
Finally, the Superior Tribunal of Cali affirmed that, although none of the magistrates of that court self-
 
373 Cohen, supra note 263. 
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identified as Afro-descendant or indigenous: "Nevertheless, in reality, in Colombia we are all mestizos 
because Spain colonized us." 
These responses seem to minimize the relevance of race in the context of the judiciary. Likewise, 
they reflect how mestizaje narratives have impacted the discussion of race relations in Latin America, as 
documented in previous literature.374 The myth of mestizaje dictates that miscegenation among European 
colonizers, indigenous peoples, and enslaved Africans has erased the distinctions among such groups over 
time. This doctrine states that miscegenation led to the creation of a mestizo identity that is distinct from, 
but inclusive of all, the previous ethno-racial identities.  
Mestizaje has historically been used as a rationale for not recognizing racial tensions in Latin 
America. Tanya Hernandez explains that the cultural model of mestizaje has permitted states to defend the 
idea that, in the region, racial classifications are difficult to use,375 and has encouraged people not to classify 
themselves on racial terms, as racial classifications are deemed divisive and unwarranted.376 Likewise, 
Tianna Paschel explicates that the mestizaje narratives were a tool used to deny the existence of racial 
discrimination and inequality in this region.377  
Some argue that the mestizaje discourses provided an egalitarian façade for racial domination and 
that they allowed Latin American national elites to create a system of racial inequality that would last longer 
than those of South Africa and the United States.378 As an example, in the context of Brazil, despite the 
clear racial stratification of society, the lack of a state definition of race prevented for a long time Afro-
descendants from developing a group consciousness with the potential to move onto collective action.379 
Similar situations have taken place in other Latin American countries, too. In Ecuador, discussions about 
 
374 See WADE, supra note 27; WADE, supra note 166; PASCHEL, supra note 33; HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 33; Marisol 
De La Cadena, Reconstructing Race: Racism, Culture and Mestizaje in Latin America, 34 NACLA REP. AM. 16–23 
(2001); MILLER, supra note 268. 
375 Hernández, supra note 149 at 1107–1108. 
376 Id. at 1107–1108. 
377 PASCHEL, supra note 33 at 7. 
378 Id. at 7. 
379 HTUN, supra note 297 at 12. 
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racial and ethnic discrimination have turned into a controversial issue, as the idea that everybody is mestizo 
has precluded a substantive debate around this topic.380 Thus, it is not atypical that certain courts had used 
mestizaje narratives to minimize the relevance of the low level of Afro-descendant representation in 
Colombia's judicial institution. 
A Tianna Paschel explains, in Colombia, the idea of mestizaje has been more welcoming to the 
indigenous heritage than to its African component.381 This condition has contributed to the erasing of Afro-
descendants from country's history, their invisibilization in the national memory, and their geographic 
confinement.382 Because of this, it is not strange that, at evoking mestizaje narratives in their answers, 
certain courts emphasized the indigenous component in the Colombian racial mix, disregarding the Afro-
descendant legacy. 
 
3.2. The broad acknowledgment of race during the interview process 
 
 A different type of judicial discourse about race offered by the courts is the one that recognizes it 
as a condition that shapes social relations. This type of narrative appeared to be more prevalent in the 
interview process. On several occasions, the participants referred to different instances at which race 
seemed to shape social relations. A judge in a city of the Andean region of Colombia mentioned that many 
of the cases before her court that involved Afro Colombian persons related to aspects such as the protection 
of the constitutional rights of forcibly displaced persons and the recognition of social security benefits and 
labor rights for construction workers. The judge mentioned that “behind great civil constructions there is a 
vast Afro population, because […] the men are dedicated in a very protagonist way to activities that only 
 
380 Scott H. Beck, Kenneth J. Mijeski & Meagan M. Stark, ¿Qué Es Racismo?: Awareness of Racism and 
Discrimination in Ecuador, 46 LAT. AM. RES. REV. 102–125, 102–103 (2011). 
381 PASCHEL, supra note 33 at 41. (Noting that: “mestizo Colombia largely excluded blacks from the national discourse. 
Rather, the mixture of European and Indian blood came to signify what it was to be Colombian”). 
382 Id. at 41–42. 
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they [Afro-descendant men] do.”383 Another judge mentioned that labor law litigation concerning domestic 
workers' rights tended to include Afro-descendant women because "as a general rule, you see many Afro-
descendant domestic workers.”384 A third one enumerated several industries in which Afro-descendants 
were commonly engaged in, such as restaurants, construction, postal services, security, and other manual-
labor jobs.385 Similarly, another judge described that it was noticeable to him that Afro-descendants tended 
to be a large number of those processed by the criminal justice system in the Caribbean coast region.386 
Some judicial employees also emphasized that Afro-descendants comprise a significant portion of the 
victims of the internal armed conflict and those appearing before transitional justice mechanisms.387  
I believe that these comments reflect that judicial servers are aware of how Colombian society is 
stratified based on race. They can see that certain types of social issues affect Afro-descendant communities 
more strongly than others or even provide accounts of the racialization of certain occupations. These 
accounts seem to convey awareness about the relevance of race and the existence of racial inequality in 
society, by contrast to the apparent race-less narratives that the courts tended to provide in the responses to 
the rights of petition. Moreover, as I will explain in the following chapters, interviewees were also aware 
of the lack of diversity in judicial institutions in Colombia, and even discussed racial tensions present inside 
the judicial system and in the interactions that take place inside of courtrooms.  
 I think that there are several reasons for why race was discussed differently in the responses of the 
rights of petition and the interview processes. In the responses to the rights of petition, the courts were 
providing written responses to a citizen's inquiry. During the interview process, the participants were 
providing individual—confidential—responses to a researcher’s questionnaire. Furthermore, given the 
composition of the high courts and intermediate tribunals, it is likely that the responses to the rights of 
petition were prepared by white-mestizo judicial servers who could have more hegemonic views on race 
 
383 Interview 3. 
384 Interview 41. 
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387 Interviews 10, 11, 15, 18 and 23. 
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relations. In contrast, Afro Colombian judges, judicial employees, and attorneys, composed most of the 
study's sample. Interviewees might have experiential knowledge about racial inequalities. Despite the lack 
of a definitive explanation for these differences, it was apparent that there were critical contrasts in how 
race was treated at different moments of the research process. 
In the following pages, I will discuss the existing data on the composition of the legal profession 
and judicial institutions in Colombia. 
 
4. Data on the composition of the legal profession 
 
According to the National Registry of Attorneys, by November 22nd, 2018, in Colombia, there were 
approximately 304,705 attorneys with valid licenses and 13,340 without valid licenses registered before the 
Superior Council of the Judicature. If we consider that, according to the National Administrative 
Department for Statistics’ preliminary data on the 2018 census, Colombia’s population is estimated to be 
approximately 45,500,000 individuals, Colombia has approximately 445 validly licensed attorneys per 
every 100.000 persons.388 
 
4.1. Gender distribution 
 
Of the total number of attorneys with valid licenses, approximately 149,449 were women, which 
means that women account for approximately 49.047% of the total number of attorneys with valid licenses. 
If we consider that women are approximately 51.4% of the country’s population, then it is possible to assert 
that women appear to be only slightly underrepresented in the pool of licensed attorneys.389 
 
388 DANE--Información para todos. Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 2018, Colombia, ¿CUÁNTOS SOMOS? 
(2020), https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/demografia-y-poblacion/censo-nacional-de-




[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
4.2. Ethno-racial distribution 
 
The National Registry of Attorneys does not collect data on ethno-racial identity. The registry did 
not provide further explanation regarding why the database could account for the gender breakdown but 
not for the ethno-racial breakdown. It only mentioned that the requested information is not included in the 
format (template) for the inscription before the registry. 
 
4.3. Regional distribution 
 
 I also requested data regarding the number of licenses issued before every sectional council of the 
judicature. Since these institutions are located in different parts of the national territory, the data about the 
application request is relevant since it may suggest regional variances regarding where in the country 
attorneys are applying for their licenses. 
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
The National Registry of Attorneys' data indicates that central regions of the country, such as 
Cundinamarca, Antioquia, and Valle del Cauca, tend to account for higher percentages of attorney licenses 
issuance than other regions. This distribution could indicate that these regions might also have high 





















































5. Data on the composition Colombian judicial institutions 
 
5.1. The composition of the high courts  
 
There are four high courts in the Colombian judiciary: The Constitutional Court, the State Council, 
the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Superior Council of the Judicature. In addition to these judicial bodies, 
my analysis also includes the SJP. In order to explain these results with more clarity, I separately refer to 
the data on magistrates (high court judges), auxiliary magistrates, and judicial employees. 
 
5.1.1. High court magistrates 
 
 
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
According to the answers that the courts provided, 134 magistrates serve in the four high courts 
and the SJP. I noted that the courts’ report on the number of magistrate seats and the number of those that 
women occupy contradicted the number of magistrate seats that the Superior Council of the Judicature 
reported. As an example, in the case of the State Council, that court reported that there was a total number 
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Judicature reported for that court a total number of 30 magistrate seats, 9 of which were occupied by women. 
Since these reports do not seem to match (possibly due to seat vacancies or communication issues), I 
decided to use, whenever possible, the numbers that the courts reported about their composition. I assume 
that the information that the courts reported about themselves is likely to be more accurate, given the 
proximity between the institution providing the information and the object that information refers to. 
 
5.1.1.1. Gender composition 
 
 
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
 According to the answers that the courts provided, women occupy 47 out of the 134 Magistrate 
seats in the high courts and the SJP. They account for 35% of the total of magistrates. Although generally 
underrepresented among the high courts, women magistrate' numbers are better (and reach parity level 
when compare to the total number of judges) in the SJP (19 out of 38), than in the Superior Council of the 
Judicature (5 out of 13), the Constitutional Court (3 of 9), the Supreme Court of Justice (14 out of 47) and 
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5.1.1.2. Ethno-racial composition 
 
 Only the Constitutional Court and the SJP provided data about their ethno-racial composition. 
These two courts seem to represent two opposite realities about Afro-descendants and indigenous persons’ 
representation in judicial institutions. Of the 38 magistrates in the SJP, 4 are indigenous persons, and 4 are 
Afro-descendants. Each group accounts for approximately 10.53% of the magistrate seats on this court. 
Furthermore, there are three Afro-descendant women and two indigenous women serving on this court, 
which means that 7.89% of the court’s magistrates are Afro-descendant women, and 5.26% are indigenous 
women. In contrast, in the Constitutional Court, there is not a single judge who is indigenous or Afro-
descendant. 
Since Afro-descendants and indigenous persons compose approximately 10.62% and 3.43% of 
Colombia’s National Population,390 Afro-descendants Magistrates in the SJP appear to have achieved parity 
representation levels between these two metrics. Indigenous magistrates have tripled their level of 
representation when compared to their share of the national population.  
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
390 ASTRID HERNÁNDEZ ROMERO, La visibilización estadística de los grupos étnicos colombianos 56 (2005), 
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
5.1.2. High court auxiliary magistrates 
 
I obtained data regarding the number of auxiliary magistrates in the SJP and all the high courts, 
except the Supreme Court of Justice. In these institutions, there is a total of 295 auxiliary magistrates, with 
the State Council having the highest number of them, and the Constitutional Court having the lowest. 
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5.1.2.1. Gender composition 
 
 Out of the 295 auxiliary justices whose gender was informed, 133 were women, accounting for 
45.08% of the total number. Although women are underrepresented when compared to their share of the 
national population, they are more numerous in the State Council (60 out of 125), than in the Constitutional 
Court (13 out of 28), the Superior Council of the Judicature (36 out of 83) and the SJP (24 out of 59). 
 
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
5.1.2.2. Ethno-racial composition 
 
 The high courts and the SJP did not provide information regarding the ethno-racial composition of 
their auxiliary magistrates, except in the case of the Constitutional Court, where there is not a single Afro-
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5.1.3. Other judicial employees 
 
 In the case of judicial employees that are not auxiliary magistrates, the high courts and the SJP 
reported a total of 1,832 employee positions unevenly distributed among the different courts. The Supreme 
Court of Justice did not inform data regarding judicial employees. 
 
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
5.1.3.1. Gender composition 
 
Women occupy 1,010 of the 1,832 employee positions reported for the high courts and the SJP. 
They comprise 55.13% of the employees working for these courts. In consequence, women are not 
underrepresented when compared to their share of the national population at this level of the judiciary. They 
surpass the level of representation that men have. Women’s numbers are particularly high in the case of the 
Constitutional Court (143 out of 227), followed by the State Council (384 out of 674), the Superior Council 
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
5.1.3.2. Ethno-racial composition 
 
In the case of judicial employees, only the Constitutional Court provided the requested information. 
Indigenous persons and Afro-descendants do not occupy a single one the 227 employee positions reported. 
 
5.1.4. Participants’ perceptions of Afro-descendant and indigenous 
representation on the high courts 
 
 During the interview process, participants agreed that, leaving aside the SJP, Afro-descendants are 
virtually absent from the high courts.391 One of the interviewees, an Afro-descendant woman who works 
as a judicial employee in a city of the Andean region, described the situation as follows:  
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If one goes to the other high courts, the situation is not like that [comparing it to the SJP]. They are 
white people, they are men, and men from Bogotá and that attended the best universities in 
Colombia. Then, I would say that, in general terms, excluding the SJP from the scene, to access a 
good position in a high court, one must have specific credentials apart from being a good lawyer, as 
coming from privileged contexts392 
 
Some participants highlighted the low level of Afro-descendant representation on the 
Constitutional Court (which has a reputation of being politically progressive in the country), with one of 
them stating that no black person had ever been appointed as a tenured magistrate to that court.393 However, 
another participant questioned this perceived absence of Afro-descendants at this court. He posed doubts 
about the information provided by the court in this regard and asserted that if one used phenotype to assess 
representation, one would find at least some Afro-descendants working at this institution.394  
In different interviews, participants named particular Afro-descendant persons that worked or used 
to work for this court as evidence of at least a certain level of Afro-descendant presence. However, the 
names that participants referred to tended to be the same.395 From my perspective, the fact that a singular 
black person (or few black people) were always mentioned when discussing Afro-descendant presence at 
this space, instead of being proof of inclusion or diversity, seems to evidence tokenism, or the fact that the 
number of persons of this ethno-racial group is so low that people can typically refer to "the one" or “the 
few” black persons at the institution. 
 In the case of the other high courts, the situations seem to be similar. An interviewee (who had 
previous experience working at the high courts) estimated that out of 150 judicial employees working at 
one of the Supreme Court of Justice's chambers only two were Afro-descendants. He also mentioned that 
he could not remember seeing more than three Afro-descendants among the entire court's staff, which the 
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interviewee estimated in between 500 and 600 judicial employees.396 Likewise, others mentioned that the 
lack of Afro-descendants might be affecting the institutions’ interns as well, with one interviewee 
mentioning that very few of the high courts’ interns are black,397 and another one, who worked as an intern 
for one of the high courts, mentioned that during the time she spent there, she was one of only two black 
interns working for that court.398 
 
5.1.5. The particularities of the SJP 
 
As some of the interviewees pointed out, the SJP is an exception to the trends in the composition 
of the high courts in Colombia.399 Women occupy half of the tenured magistrate positions and Afro-
descendants and indigenous persons have a level of representation that matches their share of the national 
population or exceeds this percentage, respectively.  
There are particular explanations for the exceptionality of the SJP in this respect. As I previously 
stated, the SJP is a transitional justice mechanism created as a result of the peace process between the 
government of Colombia and the FARC-EP (a leftist guerrilla group).400 The Legislative Act 01 of 2017, a 
constitutional reform that legally structured the SJP, ordered that: “The jurisdiction shall be conformed 
according to criteria that allow the fair participation between men and women, guarantees non-
discrimination, and respects the ethnic and cultural diversity.”401 Moreover, the Presidential Decree 587 of 
2017, which regulates the creation of the selection committee for the judges for the newly formed 
jurisdiction, mandates: "The Tribunal and each one of its chambers shall be formed with gender equality 
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400 Acuerdo Final de Paz Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera, Capítulo 
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criteria and respect for the ethnic and cultural diversity.”402 As a result, the institutional design of the SJP 
considered that ethnic and cultural diversity factors in the magistrate selection. This difference seems to be 
the main reason for the higher levels of Afro-descendant and indigenous persons’ presence at that level of 
the SJP. 
As I previously stated, the SJP did not provide data on its ethno-racial composition beyond the 
magistrate level. Different interviewees mentioned that the level of Afro-descendant representation at the 
judicial employee level is higher in this judicial institution than in other high courts. Although, some of 
them were careful to mention that, despite the significant level of presence, Afro-descendants are still 
underrepresented at the SJP. One interviewee, who has significant experience working at this jurisdiction, 
commented: "But I would not say that we are 100% represented at the SJP […] there is an appropriate 
margin of representativeness, but it is not the same that I would say that is adequate concerning this 
institution. Nevertheless, there is a little more [presence].”403 Similarly, another described that at an open 
meeting of the institution, which most employees attended, no more than 20 black persons [including all 
types of positions] could be counted,404 and a third one mentioned that, to the best of his knowledge, none 
of the auxiliary justices of the SJP was Afro-descendant,405 which seems to indicate that the level of Afro-
descendant presence at this institution might not be as high among judicial employees as it is among the 
group of magistrates. 
Ethnic communities took additional steps to guarantee that the representation of indigenous and 
Afro-descendants in this institution was not confined to the group of magistrates. During the free, prior and 
informed consultation process undertaken to approve the statutory bill that would make the SJP operative, 
the representatives of black communities asked the government to add an article to the bill that 
operationalized the SJP that stated that the SJP's employees would be appointed based on several criteria, 
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including "gender equity [and] cultural and ethnic diversity." They also asked to add ethnic inclusion 
language, mentioning that “At the conformation of the SJP’s staff, the inclusion of persons of ethnic peoples 
and communities with knowledge and expertise about the fundamental rights of ethnic groups shall be 
guaranteed.”406 Although the first reference (consideration of gender equity and ethnic and cultural 
diversity in the selection of the staff) was included in several provisions of the resulting statutory law, the 
second one (specifically calling for inclusion measures for members of those communities) was excluded 
from the final text of the law.407 
These fair representation clauses in the legal instruments that crafted the composition of the 
jurisdiction were the result of the mobilization effort of the indigenous and Afro-descendant movements. 
Ethnic leaders worked tirelessly for the introduction of an ethnic chapter in the peace accords. They also 
bargained for the appointment of minorities to positions in the transitional justice institutions.408 One of the 
interviewees, who had significant experience working with the Afro-descendant ethnic movement, 
mentioned that, amid the peace negotiations, ethnic organizations lobbied for the inclusion of Afro-
descendant and indigenous persons in the SJP. Ethnic leaders successfully argued that, since these 
populations were some of the most harshly affected by the internal armed conflict in Colombia, they should 
be present inside the institutions created to resolve the conflict.409 
The distinctive character of the SJP does not end with its composition. It also applies to its 
institutional design and procedures.410 The peace accords did not only secure the inclusion of an “ethnic 
perspective” into this institution’s work,411 but also the SJP’s magistrates contributed to this process by 
using the institution’s internal regulations to create an ethnic commission, which has the purpose of 
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408 Interviews 9 and 19. 
409 Interview 9. 
410 Interview 12. 
411 Acuerdo Final de Paz Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera, Capítulo 
Étnico. Signed between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP on Nov. 12, 2016. 
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guaranteeing the implementation of the ethno-racial perspective in this transitional justice mechanism.412 I 
emphasize that the SJP magistrates who belong to ethnic groups are automatic members of this commission, 
along with other functionaries of the jurisdiction.413 
 
5.2. Data on the composition of intermediate tribunals 
 
In the case of intermediate tribunals, I will divide the assessment into two segments, referring, first, 
to the situation of the magistrates and, second, to the situation of the judicial employees. 
 
5.2.1. Superior tribunals of judicial district 
 
 There is a total of 33 superior tribunals of judicial district in Colombia, distributed across the 
national territory. According to the data of the Superior Council of the Judicature, these tribunals represent 
a total of 467 magistrate positions. I could obtain data about 345 magistrates’ gender and about 264 
magistrates’ ethno-racial identity. These last figures are the ones that I will use as the point of comparison 
for our assessment of gender and ethno-racial composition, respectively. The number of registries about 
gender is lower than the total number of magistrate seats. The Superior Tribunals of Barranquilla, 
Bucaramanga, Manizales, Popayán, Santa Marta, Valledupar, and Villavicencio either did not respond to 
the rights of petition or did not provide the required information about the gender composition. In the case 
of ethno-racial identity, this number is even lower since the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá (which has 81 




412 Acuerdo 001/18, marzo 9, 2018, Jurisdicción Especial de Paz. [J.E.P.] (Colomb.) art. 103.  




Magistrates’ numbers vary drastically from one court to another, with the biggest court having a 
total of 81 Magistrates and the smallest courts having only three. 
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5.2.1.1.1. Gender composition 
 
In the superior tribunals of judicial district, women occupy 117 out of the 345 seats we could obtain 
gender information about, accounting for 33.91% of all magistrates. In consequence, women appear to be 
significantly underrepresented in these tribunals. They are a little more than 50% of the national population, 
and a similar share of the number of attorneys with valid licenses. 
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 112 
 
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
5.2.1.1.2. Ethno-racial composition 
 
 I obtained data about the ethno-racial identity of 245 magistrates. Of these, 9 were Afro-
descendants, with 5 of them being Afro-descendant women. Afro-descendants represented around 3.67% 
of all the magistrates I have registries about, being significantly underrepresented in this level of the 
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census. Afro-descendant Magistrates are present in Superior Tribunals of Arauca (1 out of 3), Buga (2 out 
of 14), Medellín (1 out of 54), Quibdó (1 out of 3), San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina (3 out of 
3), and Sincelejo (1 out of 5). Interestingly, Afro-descendant women are slightly more numerous than Afro-
descendant men. There is an Afro-descendant magistrate in each of the Superior Tribunals of Arauca, Buga, 
Quibdó, San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, and Sincelejo. 
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
Regarding the ethno-racial breakdown of superior tribunals of judicial district’s magistrates, not a 
single tribunal informed having indigenous magistrates, which indicates that indigenous persons may be 
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5.2.1.2. Judicial employees 
 
 In the case of judicial employees, the superior tribunals of judicial district reported a total of 797 
judicial employee positions. In addition to the tribunals that did not provide data about their composition, 
the superior tribunals of Bogotá and Pasto did not report on the gender and ethno-racial identity of the 
judicial employees that occupy these positions. The Superior Tribunal of Cali (which has 58 judicial 
employee positions) provided data on the ethno-racial distribution of judicial employees but did not include 
the data on the total number of women judicial employees. In conclusion, I had information about the 739 
judicial employees' gender and 797 judicial employees' ethno-racial identity. 
 
5.2.1.2.1. Gender composition 
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Out of the 739 judicial employee positions whose gender was reported, 407 were informed to be 
women. Women comprise approximately 55.07% of judicial employees in the Superior tribunals of judicial 
district, having surpassed gender parity levels.  
 
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
5.2.1.2.2. Ethno-racial composition 
 
 According to the answers that the courts provided, 28 Afro-descendant judicial employees are 
working for the superior tribunals of judicial district. Afro-descendants are approximately 3.51% of the 
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the national population (10.62%). Of those 28 Afro-descendant judicial employees, 20 are women. Afro-
descendant women are approximately 71.42% of all Afro-descendant judicial employees working in these 
tribunals. Only four Superior Tribunals reported having Afro-descendant judicial employees: Cali (11 out 
of 58), Medellín (1 out of 165), and Quibdó (8 out of 12) and San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina 
(8 out of 10). Only two tribunals reported having Afro-descendant men judicial employees: Cali with 6, 
and San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina with 3 of them. 
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
Finally, only a tribunal reported having an indigenous judicial employee, who was also a woman. 
One indigenous judicial employee is occupying a position out of 797 reported. 
 
5.2.2. Administrative tribunals 
 
 There is a total of 26 administrative tribunals in Colombia, distributed across different regions of 
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courts. I obtained gender and ethno-racial data about 110 of these magistrates, which will be the total 
number to compare the ethno-racial composition of Administrative tribunals' magistrates. The 
administrative tribunals of Atlántico, Chocó, Nariño, Quindío, and Risaralda either did not respond to the 
information requests or did not provide the requested data. The Administrative Tribunal of Cundinamarca 
only reported data about the composition of some of the judges and their staff members. Since the data was 
incomplete and it was not suitable for analysis, I excluded it. I will, first, present the data regarding 




 Regarding the number of magistrates per court, the biggest court in our analysis had 15 Magistrates 
and the smallest only three. 
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5.2.2.1.1. Gender composition 
 
 Women occupy 34 out of 110 judicial magistrate seats in the administrative tribunals, accounting 
for 30.9% of the total number of magistrates. Women appear to have less representation in the magistrate 
positions in administrative tribunals than in similar positions of the superior tribunals of judicial district 
(33.91%). 
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
5.2.2.1.2. Ethno-racial composition 
 
Out of the 110 magistrates we could obtain ethno-racial data about, only three of them were Afro-
descendant. The Administrative Tribunal of Magdalena has one Afro-descendant magistrate (who is also a 
woman) out of four. The Administrative Tribunal of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina has two 
Afro-descendant magistrates out of the three that compose the entire panel (one of them is a woman, and 
the other one is a man). Thus, Afro-descendants comprise about 2.73% of Administrative magistrates, being 
significantly underrepresented in this part of the judiciary if one considers that they comprise 10,62% of 
Colombia's national population. This representation level is even lower than the one they had for the group 
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
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 As it happened with the superior tribunals of judicial district, indigenous persons appear to have no 
representation at all in the group of magistrates of the administrative tribunals. 
 
5.2.2.2. Judicial employees 
 
 The administrative tribunals informed a total number of 525 judicial employee positions, unevenly 
distributed among the different tribunals. The Administrative Tribunal of Magdalena did not report data on 
judicial employees, and the Administrative Tribunal of Valle del Cauca only reported data about judicial 
employees working in the magistrates' chambers. Since the number of employees working in chambers is 
usually higher than those working for other parts of a tribunal, I decided to include the data reported for the 
Administrative Tribunal of Valle del Cauca. 
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5.2.2.2.1. Gender composition 
 
Women accounted for 326 of the total number of judicial employees reported in the administrative 
tribunals (525), which translates into a percentage of women representation of 62.1%. Similar to what 
occurs in the superior tribunals of judicial district, where 55.07% of judicial employees are women, women 
seem to be overrepresented among administrative tribunals' judicial employees. 
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
5.2.2.2.2. Ethno-racial composition 
 
The information requests' responses indicate that there are 13 Afro-descendant judicial employees 
in the administrative tribunals. Since the total number of judicial employees reported was 526, the 
percentage of Afro-descendant representation among administrative tribunals' judicial employees is roughly 
2.47%. Afro-descendants are significantly underrepresented among this group. They are also more 
underrepresented among judicial employees of Administrative tribunals than among judicial employees in 
superior tribunals of judicial district. Only four administrative tribunals reported having Afro-descendant 
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(7 out of 13), and Valle del Cauca (2 out of 36). Of the 13 Afro-descendant judicial employees reported in 
the different Administrative tribunals, 9 of them are women, and they work in all four tribunals who 
reported having Afro-descendant judicial employees. 
 
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
Finally, none of the administrative tribunals informed having indigenous judicial employees, which 
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
5.2.3. Data on the general composition of the judiciary 
 
As I mentioned before, I did not send information requests to the lower courts (circuit and municipal 
courts). However, the Superior Council of the Judicature provided additional information concerning the 
composition of the Colombian judiciary in terms of gender and type of appointment disaggregated by 
judicial sectional (a geographical administrative subdivision). The additional information did not provide 
disaggregated data on an ethno-racial basis. According to Superior Council of the Judicature, as of October 
10, 2018, there was a total of 32,298 judicial servants in all judicial sectionals (this information excludes 
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5.2.3.1. Magistrates and judges 
 
In the case of functionaries (magistrates and judges), there was a total of 5,354 judges and 
magistrates in the intermediate and lower courts of Colombia, of which 2,780 (51.92%) were women and 
2,574 men (48.08%). The total number of career judges and magistrates was 2,880 (53.79%), the number 
of those in provisional positions was 2,412 (45.05%), and there were 62 (1.16%) in temporary positions. 
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
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When the gender and the type of appointment are crossed, women occupy 42.67% of the career 
magistrate and judge positions at these levels, 54.10% of the provisional positions, and 64.51% of the 
transitory positions. In contrast, men occupy 57.33% of the tenured magistrate and judge positions, 45.89% 
of the provisional positions, and 35.48% of temporary positions. Conversely, 47.75% of women judges and 
magistrates in these levels of the judiciary occupy career positions, 50.70% occupy provisional positions, 
and 1.55% occupy temporary positions. 
 
5.2.3.2. Judicial employees  
[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
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There was a total of 26,944 judicial employees in these levels of the judiciary, of which 12,174 
were men (45.08%) and 14,797 were women (54.92%). The total number of career judicial employees was 
11,949 (44.35%). The number of those in provisional positions was 14,273 (52.97%). There were 722 in 
temporary positions (2.68%). When gender and type of appointment are crossed, women occupy 52.21% 
of career judicial employee positions, 56.87% of provisional positions, 60.80% of temporary positions. In 
contrast, men account for 47.79% of career judicial employee positions, 43.11% of provisional positions, 
and 39.2% of temporary positions. Conversely, 42.16% of women judicial employee positions in these 
levels of the judiciary occupy career positions, 54.88% occupy provisional positions, and 2.97% occupy 
temporary positions. 
 
5.2.4. Interviewees’ perceptions on the level of Afro-descendant 
representation in the Colombian judiciary 
 
Some respondents manifested their perceptions about the level of representation that Afro-
descendants have in the Colombian judiciary. Interviewees commented that, even though levels of Afro-
descendant presence can vary from one region to another, across the country, Afro-descendants are scarce 
in judicial institutions. Some respondents assessed their level of representation as void.414 An Afro-
descendant judge, mentioned: "I do not want to speak only about the judiciary. I think that in the different 
branches of government, in essence, [our presence] es minimal; this is, the percentage of Afro population 
in these places continues to be very low.”415 Another one, an Afro-descendant judicial employee, suggested 
that there are very few Afro-descendant judges in the country, especially when compared to the number of 
litigants of the same ethno-racial background.416 Similarly, some of the indigenous participants also 
 
414 Interviews 8 and 9.  
415 Interviews 15 and 17 
416 Interview 16. 
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reported a similar situation in the case of indigenous persons, whose presence in the country’s courts was 
qualified as “very low.” 417  
Perhaps one of the best ways to dimension the low level of representation that Afro-descendants 
have in judicial institutions in Colombia is a comment made by one of the interviewees (an Afro-descendant 
judge with several years of judicial experience). She mentioned: "[a judicial employee] asked if I knew 
Afro representatives in the judiciary of Cartagena. She asked me yesterday. I fell asleep thinking about 
whom I knew in the judiciary who was Afro, and I do not know, I mean, I could not name any, I could not 
remember [any].”418  
 
5.3. Preliminary conclusions 
 
Based on the data gathered through the interview process and the site visits, it is possible to 
conclude that Afro-descendants seem to be underrepresented among Colombia's judicial institutions. 
Furthermore, this country's judicial system seems to take the shape of a stratified structure according to 
ethno-racial and gender factors.  
From the gender perspective, the Colombian judicial system can be described as a pyramid, in 
which women’s level of representation in judge and magistrate positions is less significative at the higher 
courts and increases as one goes down onto the base of the pyramid (glass ceiling). Although women 
represent approximately half of attorneys with valid licenses in the country, they comprise only 35% of the 
high court magistrates. They are underrepresented in all high courts except in the SJP. At the intermediate 
level of the judiciary, women are still underrepresented, but less so than in the higher courts. In the superior 
tribunals of judicial district they are 33.9% of magistrates, and in the administrative tribunals 30.9% of 
magistrates. When the intermediate tribunals are considered jointly with the lower courts, women represent 
 
417 Interview 12. 
418 Interview 26. 
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51.92% of magistrates and judges in the intermediate and lower levels of the judicial pyramid, which 
indicates that they may even be a majority among the lower court judges. Women magistrates and judges 
in the intermediate and lower levels of the judiciary tend to occupy positions that are less stable in terms of 
the continuity of the jobs, as only 46% of them are in career positions, whereas 50.70% are in provisional 
and 1.6% are in temporary positions, respectively. 
In the case of judicial employees, the situation is similar. According to the data that the courts 
reported, women account for 45% of auxiliary magistrate positions and 55% of high court judicial employee 
positions in the high courts—this last percentage does not include the SJP. At the intermediate level, women 
occupy 55% of superior tribunals of judicial district’s judicial employee positions, and 62% of 
administrative tribunals judicial employee positions. Furthermore, when the intermediate tribunals and the 
lower courts are considered jointly, women comprise approximately 55% of all judicial employees in these 
levels of the judiciary. As it happened with women judges and magistrates, women judicial employees tend 
to have more precarious jobs in terms of the type of appointment. In these levels of the judiciary, only 
42.6% of women are in career positions, whereas 54.88% are in provisional positions, and 2.97% are in 
temporary positions. In conclusion, women tend the have lower levels of representation at the higher ranks 
of the judicial pyramid, have a more robust level of representation as judicial employees than among judges. 
Also, they occupy provisional positions at a higher rate than tenured positions. 
From the ethno-racial perspective, despite data being scarcer than in the case of gender, it is possible 
to conclude that Afro-descendants are, in general, significantly underrepresented in Colombian judicial 
institutions. Unlike in the case of women, whose presence in the judicial institutions tends to increase as 
one goes down to the lower levels of the judiciary, the available data seems to suggest that the Afro-
descendant level of representation tends to remain steadily low in the high and intermediate levels of the 
judiciary. Not a single Afro-descendant person was reported in the group of magistrates, auxiliary 
magistrates, and judicial employees in the constitutional court. Interviewees tended to agree that in the other 
high courts (except for the SJP), Afro-descendant magistrates were only a few, as it was also the case of 
black judicial employees. At the intermediate level, Afro-descendants were reported to comprise 3.67% of 
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magistrates and 3.51% of judicial employees in the superior tribunals of judicial district; and 2.73% of 
magistrates and 2.47% of judicial employees in the administrative tribunals.  
The SJP is a particular case. In this court, Afro-descendants have attained a level of representation 
similar to that of their share of the national populations, and indigenous peoples have surpassed it. Although 
there is no significant data on the ethno-racial composition of the lower courts, my impression is that Afro-
descendants account for only a dearth the total number of magistrates and judges in Colombia. Although 
they might be more common among judicial employees, they could still be underrepresented among this 
group. Outside of the SJP, I could only find information concerning a single indigenous person working at 
a high or intermediate court, which seems to indicate that indigenous peoples are almost entirely excluded 
from the judicial institutions in Colombia.  
With this preliminary conclusion, I will proceed to discuss the impact of geography on the 
composition of judicial institutions in Colombia. 
 
6. The impact of geographic location on the composition of judicial institutions in Colombia 
 
I will comment on how geographical location impacts, and even conditions, the representation of 
Afro-descendants in the judicial institutions of different regions of Colombia. In order to accomplish this 
goal I will provide an introduction to the relationship between race and region in Latin America, introduce 
the research findings on the relationship between the ethno-racial composition of courts and geography, 
and analyze regional differences in the ethno-racial composition of courts in Colombia. 
 
6.1. An introduction to the relationship between race and region in Latin America 
 
Afro-descendants are asymmetrically distributed across the Latin American region. Not only the 
number of people of African ancestry varies from country to country, but also from one region to another 
within the same country. 
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Hebe Clementi asserts that the current geographic distribution of the black population in Latin 
America can be traced back to colonial times, as their current location within the region tends to correspond 
with the production sites that used enslaved African workforce.419 Sugar, cacao, tobacco, and cotton were 
some of the industries that more heavily relied on enslaved work, and therefore, regions hosting these 
industries tend to have larger Afro-descendant populations.420 Furthermore, nation-specific historical 
processes also contributed to the unequal distribution of Afro-descendant populations. The significant 
presence of Afro-descendants in parts of the Caribbean coast of Colombia is commonly believed to be a 
consequence of the tradition of cimarronaje (African enslaved persons' escape from slavery) and the 
existence of palenques (free enclaves for cimarrones) during the colonial time.421 
Source: Colombia, Ministry of Culture.422 
 
419 Clementi, supra note 145 at 37. 
420 Id. at 37. 
421 VAN COTT, supra note 204 at 43–44. 
422 AFROCOLOMBIANOS, POBLACIÓN CON HUELLAS DE AFRICANÍA, 13 4 (2010), 
https://www.mincultura.gov.co/areas/poblaciones/comunidades-negras-afrocolombianas-raizales-y-
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The construction of mestizaje in Colombia has been central to the development of the national 
identity. Mestizaje has not unfolded homogeneously across the country's regions either. Since colonial 
times, differences in demography, geography, and socio-economic context influenced the process of racial 
mixing and the narratives around it.423 Peter Wade writes: 
 
What this amount to is that in the process of Colombian society constituting itself spatially, or 
becoming concrete in space, regions were created, and these had very different racial mixes. In short, 
at the very general level, race became regionalized. The Andean highlands emerged as a white-
mestizo region with Indian-white mixtures being common. The Pacific coast became a mainly black 
region. The Caribbean coast developed a tri-ethnic mix with strong black and Indian heritage in the 
lower classes and some pure black and Indian enclaves. And the Amazon region remained 
predominantly Indian. There is a distinctive spatial pattern to the overall structure of Colombian 
nationhood and its racial order.424 
 
In addition to demographic differences, as Nancy Applebaum notes, spatial frontiers in Latin 
America tend to correlate to "racialized ideas of progress and modernity.”425 Applebaum argues that 
regional differences in Latin America are racialized. Certain racial groups are concentrated in specific areas. 
The regions where indigenous peoples of Afro-descendants live are often considered backward when 
compared to those that are inhabited by “whiter” populations.426 As an example, Barbara Weinstein 
describes how, in Brazil, the region São Paulo and its inhabitants, commonly known as “Paulistas,” are 
associated with the ideas of industriousness, development, progress, and whiteness.427 This narrative tended 
 
palenqueras/Documents/Caracterización%20comunidades%20negras%20y%20afrocolombianas.pdf (last visited Mar 
10, 2020). 
423 WADE, supra note 166 at 54–56. 
424 Id. at 57–58. 
425 Appelbaum, Macpherson, and Rosemblatt, supra note 25 at 10. 
426 Id. at 10. 
427 Barbara Weinstein, Racializing Regional Difference: Sao Paulo versus Brazil, 1932, in RACE AND NATION IN LATIN 
AMERICA 237–262 (Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, & Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt eds., 2003). 
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to downplay the role of Afro-descendants in the history of this Brazilian state. The discourse that argued 
for the Paulista superiority was particularly intense from 1931 to 1932, during the Getúlio Vargas 
provisional government, coinciding with the 1932 revolution.428 During this period, São Paulo intellectuals 
and political leaders publicly exalted the virtues of Paulistas, which they deemed superior to the inhabitants 
of other regions of Brazil, and especially those of the North-East, where many Afro-descendants live.429 
In the particular case of Colombia, Peter Wade explains that the country developed a “cultural 
topography of race,”430 in which region served as a proxy for race. Regional differences and identities often 
work as forms of expressing cultural and racial hierarchies in a formally colorblind manner, while 
concealing race’s meaningful and material effects. Tianna Paschel asserts that: 
 
Colombia's highlands were widely considered the place of beauty, industriousness, and whiteness, 
while its coasts were associated with laziness and hypersexuality. Such entanglements between race 
and region reflected not only a symbolic national imaginary but also an underlying material reality 
in which black Colombians found themselves disproportionately in the poorest of regions. To be 
sure, the states that were largely abandoned by the state were also the ones with higher 
concentrations of black Colombians, such as the Chocó. Today these remain the poorest in the 
country. Nevertheless, these regional inequalities are often naturalized, seen as a reflection of moral 
and intellectual differences between the people who inhabit them rather than as a consequence of 
racialized state policies.431 
 
In Colombia, as in other countries of Latin America, naming regional differences is a coded form 
for the naming of race. Regional stereotypes often disguise racial stereotypes, and racial hierarchies are 




430 WADE, supra note 166. 
431 PASCHEL, supra note 33 at 43. 
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race seem to interact concerning Afro-descendant representation in judicial institutions. First, I will discuss 
some of the regional gradations of race that I found during my data collection process in Antioquia, Chocó, 
San Andrés, Bolívar, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño. Second, I will provide some preliminary conclusions in 
this respect. 
 
6.2. Medellín, Antioquia 
 
Antioquia is a region located in northwest Colombia. The majority of its territory is situated in the 
Andean section of the country, with a smaller part (Urabá) extending onto the coastal regions.432 Antioquia 
is the second most populous region of Colombia, only led by Bogotá, the capital of the country. According 
to the 2005 census, the region has approximately 5,600,000 inhabitants.433 10.59% of the population is 
Afro-descendant.434 Its capital is Medellin, a city of approximately 2,343,000 people.435 According to the 
2005 census, 6.5% of Medellin’s population is Afro-descendant, and 0.1% is indigenous; the rest is 
primarily white/mestizo.436 Antioquia’s economy represents a significant share of the national GDP, The 
region hosts some of the largest companies in the country.437 The provision of public services is adequate. 
Medellín hosts several higher education institutions, some of which occupy the top positions of the national 
 
432 Datos de Antioquia, GOBERNACIÓN DE ANTIOQUIA, UNIDOS (2020), 
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433 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), supra note 31. 
434 AFROCOLOMBIANOS, POBLACIÓN CON HUELLAS DE AFRICANÍA, supra note 422 at 4. 
435 BOLETÍN CENSO GENERAL 2005: PERFIL MEDELLÍN ANTIOQUIA, 6 1 (2010), 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/05001T7T000.PDF (last visited Mar 10, 2020). 
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437 Cuentas nacionales departamentales: PIB por departamento, DANE: INFORMACIÓN PARA TODOS (2020), 
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university rankings.438 There is a multiplicity of law schools with different levels of quality and cost in 
Medellín.439 
 According to the interviews and the site visit that I conducted in this region, Afro-descendants are, 
in general, absent from the judicial institutions of Antioquia and, particularly, Medellín. According to the 
data collected through the rights of petition, only 1 of the 85 magistrates of the Superior Tribunal of 
Antioquia, the Superior Tribunal of Medellin, and the Administrative Tribunal of Antioquia was reported 
as Afro-descendant. Similarly, one of the attorneys that I interviewed in the city of Medellín mentioned: 
“The Palace of Justice of Medellin has 26 floors, and in those 26 floors I think you cannot find 20 Afro-
descendants working for the judiciary, and if you do find them working for the judiciary, if you find a judge, 
which I am still to do, I think that would be too many.”440 This comment represents not only the generalized 
perception that Afro-descendants are virtually nonexistent in courts of this region, but also that when they 
are present, they usually occupy judicial employee stations, instead of judge positions. Another respondent 
warned that at a party held for the magistrates and judicial employees of one of the city’s tribunals, she 
could only count 4 Afro-descendant persons within a group of over 100 attendees.441 A third interviewee, 
with several years of experience in the criminal law litigation, commented that he could only remember 
two Afro-descendant judges in the group of approximately 30 in circuit courts for the criminal jurisdiction 
in Medellín. Furthermore, he declared that he had not met a single Afro-descendant judge in the group of 
approximately 40 criminal municipal courts of the city.442 This impression was later corroborated by 
another interviewee, who affirmed that he knew that there was only one Afro-descendant judge in all the 
municipal criminal courts of the city.443 
 
438 Carlos Roberto Peña / SRG CEO, Ranking de las mejores universidades de Colombia 2019 | U-Sapiens, SAPIENS 
RESEARCH GROUP (2020), https://www.srg.com.co (last visited Mar 17, 2020). 
439 Las mejores universidades en derecho en Colombia 2018, DINERO, May 24, 2018, https://www.dinero.com/edicion-
impresa/caratula/articulo/las-mejores-universidades-en-derecho-en-colombia-2018/258791 (last visited Mar 17, 
2020). 
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 During my visit to the judicial complex in the administrative center of La Alpujarra, which hosts a 
large number of courthouses, I could see by myself that Afro-descendant judges are scarce in Medellín. 
Although Afro-descendants are more common in the judicial employee positions, they still account for just 
a few per floor. This situation contrasted with the quantity of Afro-descendant lawyers, detainees, and users 
of judicial services, which were more numerous.  
Some of the respondents explained the limited number of Afro-descendants on this region’s courts 
based on demography. One of the interviewees expressed that she had encountered only a few Afro-
descendant judicial employees at the courthouses, which could be attributed to the numeric minority 
condition that Afro-descendants have in the country.444 Another one, a judge with several years of 
professional experience, expressed that it was regional, rather than national demographics, which explained 
this level of Afro-descendant presence on Antioquia's courts. She mentioned: "What happens is that I am 
located in the city of Medellin, and in the city of Medellín, the Afro population is not the majority anyway. 
I do not know what the answer would be if you were doing this interview, perhaps, in the Pacific, in Valle 
del Cauca, or maybe in Chocó.”445 A third respondent mentioned that during his tenure as a judge in 
Medellín, he could only remember 4 or 5 Afro-descendant litigators and immediately mentioned that he 
considered that this was: “a low number because, even though this is a region that comes from a majority 
of white people, Chocó is very close by.”446 Likewise, another interviewee, while referring to the ethno-
racial composition of the legal profession in this city, declared: "In relation to the lawyers, there are very 
few, very few Afro-descendants in this part of the country where I work. Isn´t that right? Contrary to what 
happens in Chocó, where the great majority is Afro-descendant.”447 
An issue that I see in the demography argument is that judicial selection processes are held at a 
national level. Candidates from all over the country may apply to judgeships in any region of the country. 
 
444 Interview 2.  
445 Interview 3.  
446 Interview 5. 
447 Interview 6. 
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In general, there is no residence requirement. Furthermore, even though the Afro-descendant population in 
Antioquia, and particularly Medellin, is not as high as it is in other regions, it is not as low as these answers 
might suggest since approximately 10.59% of Antioquia's population is Afro-descendant. I think that these 
answers also convey the projection of a stereotype concerning the ethno-racial identity of Antioquia's 
population, especially when compared to the region of Chocó. Unlike Chocó and other coastal areas that 
are often described as black people's land (tierra de negros), Antioquia is typically considered to be the 
opposite: A land with a strong mestizo identity. The use of demography to justify Afro-descendant absence 
from positions of power is not endemic to Colombia either. In her empirical study about race relations in 
Brazil, France Twine described how participants in her study explained the absence of black persons from 
positions of power in their community by referring to demography. They alleged that since whites were the 
majority in the specific locations where they lived, it was foreseeable that they would occupy the power 
positions.448 
This idea of racialized regions also comes attached to other more prescriptive racial stereotypes. 
While the coastal regions are often thought of as the land of depravity, backwardness, and poverty within 
national discourses about the regions, Antioquia is often portrayed as a land of progress, productiveness, 
and entrepreneurship. I want to stress that I believe that demography is, of course, a significant part of the 
explanation of the regional variances in Afro-descendant presence in judicial institutions in Colombia. 
However, I also think that the low levels of presence that this group has on Antioquia's courts cannot be 
explained solely on this basis. The comparison that is often made between Antioquia and other regions (and 
especially concerning Chocó) is not only cemented on demographic distinctions; it is also the affirmation 
of a racial stereotype.  
Antioquia is labeled as a region of mestizaje and its deterministic advantages. In contrast, Chocó is 
characterized as a region of blacks and its subsequent misfortunes. In this respect, Peter Wade contrasts 
how the regions of Chocó and Antioquia are often described as two opposite sides of a coin concerning the 
 
448 FRANCE WINDDANCE TWINE, RACISM IN A RACIAL DEMOCRACY: THE MAINTENANCE OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN 
BRAZIL 74 (1998). 
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depiction of racial identities and hierarchies in the country. Although both regions present high levels of 
racism, in the case of Chocó, racism tends to be materialized through the oppression of a black majority by 
a white minority. In Antioquia, racism was present thorough the "denial of blackness." This trait was 
symbolically erased from the imaginaries on the region's identity and character and physically erased by its 
absorption by the general population.449 
 
6.3. Quibdó, Chocó 
 
The region of Chocó is located on the Pacific coast of Colombia, near the border with Panamá. 
Claudia Mosquera et al. explain that the alienated space that Afro-descendants have occupied in Colombia 
forced them to develop different strategies for survival, including their migration (starting in the 18th 
century) to parts of the national territory that the elites, located at the center of the country, did not 
control.450 This migration took place primarily along the Pacific coast of the country.451 Over time, Afro 
Colombians founded small villages at the riverbanks and near mining areas of the Pacific basin. In these 
places that the state deemed unexplored territories, Afro-Colombians developed their own culture, 
traditions, and ways of economic production,452 with a distinct black ethnic identity emerging as soon as 
the early 19th century.453 In the 20th century, the Pacific coast attracted substantial economic interests, 
predominantly concerning extractive industries,454 which endangered Afro Colombian’s possession over 
the territories they had now occupied for decades, but over which they had no legally recognized rights 
until the enactment of the 1991 Constitution.455 
 
449 WADE, supra note 166. 
450 Mosquera, Pardo, and Hoffmann, supra note 60 at 16. 
451 Id. at 16. 
452 Id. at 16. 
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In contrast to Antioquia, Afro-descendants comprise a significant portion of Chocó's judicial 
servants. Although the Administrative Tribunal of Chocó did not provide information in this regard, the 
Superior Tribunal of Quibdó reported having that one-third of the magistrates (1 of 3), and two-thirds of 
judicial employees (8 out of 12) of that court were Afro-descendant. Moreover, as I could observe during 
my site visit to the Palace of Justice of Quibdó, Afro-descendants have a significant presence in the region's 
courts. This impression was corroborated by the interviewees, who affirmed that Afro-descendants' 
presence in the courts of Chocó is substantial,456 with some even qualifying it as “very high.”457 However, 
indigenous presence in this region is as low as in the intermediate tribunals and the majority of high 
courts.458 
From my perspective, the level of Afro-descendant representation at the tribunal level is still low 
if one considers that approximately 73% of the inhabitants that Chocó had in 2005 were Afro-descendants 
(285,964 out of 388,476).459 Moreover, I believe it conveys a specific racial stratification in the region's 
judicial institutions. The higher positions in Chocó's judicial systems continue to be occupied by white-
mestizo persons in a region where the majority of the population is black. Some of the interviewees 
highlighted this situation. One of them asserted, with a sense of strangeness: "I know, for example, that the 
Magistrates of the Tribunal of Quibdó are White."460 This assertion emphasized the contrast between the 
ethno-racial composition of the region and that of the tribunal. Another participant described the 
stratification of the judicial institutions by using the expression "managing the ghetto,” to describe how, in 
Chocó, Afro-descendant judges are often found in the low level of the judiciary and the most remote 
areas.461 
 
456 Interviews 6, 13, 17, 34, 35, 39, 40 and 44.  
457 Interview 22. 
458 Interview 36. 
459 AFROCOLOMBIANOS, POBLACIÓN CON HUELLAS DE AFRICANÍA, supra note 422 at 4. 
460 Interview 3. 
461 Interview 23. 
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Some participants suggested several explanations for the sizable level of representation that Afro-
descendants have inside this region’s judicial institutions. One of them asserted, for example, that judges 
prefer to stay in their native regions and that, the case of judicial employees, most of the persons who apply 
to merit section processes come from the region where the vacancies are located.462 
Another aspect that appears to be relevant is the possibility of accessing higher education in Chocó. 
Unlike other majority-Afro-descendant regions of Colombia, in Quibdó there is a public university that 
hosts a law school.463 This aspect noticeably facilitates access to legal education in this region when 
compared to other Afro-descendant areas. Some interviewees from Chocó mentioned that they graduated 
from this university. Nevertheless, some participants stressed that, although they had access to legal 
education, the quality of such education was not particularly good.464 Also, according to the participants, 
the costs of studying law in Chocó were higher than in other public universities in Colombia.465 
A striking feature of Chocó is the idea that the high level of representation that this group has in 
judicial institutions is, at least in part, a consequence of the undesirability of this region for people coming 
from the central part of the country.466 In simpler terms, interviewees suggested that there is a high number 
of Afro-descendants working in judicial institutions in Chocó because white-mestizo people from the 
interior of the country do not want to work there. Several participants used the expression “punishment” to 
reflect how white-mestizo judges from the interior of the country thought of the idea of living in Chocó.467 
In this respect, one of the interviewees stated: 
 
Another determinant factor is that many judges and magistrates from the center of the country do 
not want to go to these areas, because they are far, the access is difficult, [and] they have their 
 
462 Interviews 6 and 13. 
463 Universidad Tecnológica del Chocó, Diego Luis Cordoba, DERECHO (2020), 
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families. Then, there are experiences of many magistrates that have been appointed for the Superior 
Tribunal of Quibdó but were not capable of adapting there, or they found that [this place] is very 
complicated and end up asking to be reassigned to another location. Then, because of that, vacancies 
are much more open and available for locals.468 
 
The undesirability of Chocó seems to manifest in other ways as well. An Afro-descendant judge, 
with several years of experience working in this region, mentioned that it was widely known that judges 
who came from other regions to work in Chocó preferred not to settle in this region. Instead, they commonly 
flown back-and-forth from their places of origin, sometimes even seeking accommodation in Quibdó by 
days. They do not have a permanent residence in Quibdó.469 These “traveling judges,” were referenced not 
only in Chocó but also in other places such as Tumaco and San Andrés.470 Besides, similar practices were 
reported to occur in other public institutions, besides the judicial branch.471 
 These findings seem to fall in line with previous research on racial relations in Chocó. Peter Wade 
describes this region as being at the bottom of the Colombian racial order, as it is commonly seen as a place 
characterized by scarcity, geographic isolation, and blackness.472 Chocó is commonly imagined as a place 
where nature is rough. Humidity, copious rain, high temperatures, and the jungle ecosystem create 
conditions that make survival difficult and the living conditions miserable.473 Wade also explains that 
besides poverty and geography, blackness is often seen by Colombians as another hardship of Chocó.474 
All of these circumstances have historically made Chocó an undesirable place to live for most Colombians, 
and especially for those living in the White-mestizo regions of the Andean highlands. Wade writes about 
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how Europeans did not settle in Chocó in significant numbers during the colonization process, but rather 
approach to this territory with particularly extractive purposes:  
 
Chocó was, for them, unpleasant and unhealthy; for their purposes, impermanent settlement sufficed 
for mining enterprises, and settlement in the area's small urban centers was sufficient since they 
could engage in lucrative commerce without having to invest much in infrastructure or public 
service of any kind. The blacks remained there precisely to avoid the whites and because colonial 
society outside the area was unaccepting of them as blacks as they were unprepared for it after years 
of slaving in the mines.475 
 
Because of these imaginaries, Chocó is often perceived as the “natural place for blackness” in 
Colombia. Thus, the region is usually targeted by racism disguised as regionalism. As Tianna Paschel 
explains referring to her fieldwork in Colombia: 
 
Because I am African American and Colombians saw me as black, people would typically guess 
that I was from the southern Pacific Coast or the Atlantic Coast, two regions are known for having 
a black population. However, neither region was seen –as the Chocó was—as the space of original 
or pure blackness. When I would ask why they hadn’t guessed of Chocó, countless cab drivers, 
doormen, shop-keepers, and friends of friends would explain to me that my facial features were "too 
refined" (finos) or my skin color too light for me to be from the Chocó. These were meant, of course, 
as compliments, that I was supposed to gracially accept.476 
 
Because of all of these reasons, it is not strange that white-mestizo judicial servers from the interior 
of Colombia might see Chocó as an undesirable place to live or work. This undesirability contributes to the 
significant level of Afro-descendant representation on this region’s courts. I should emphasize that 
 
475 Id. at 105. 
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situations of direct racial discrimination seem to be rare in Chocó, something that interviewees explained 
as a result of demography. Since the majority of the population of Chocó is black, the perception of 
prejudice tends to be lower.477 Instead, people from Chocó experience structural discrimination in their 
region and overt discrimination when they travel to other areas where Afro-descendants are less 
numerous.478 This divide might explain why Paschel's experience in the taxicab occurred in the city of 
Bogotá, which has a small Afro-descendant population. 
 
6.4. The Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina 
 
  The Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina is a group of islands located on 
the Caribbean sea, approximately 720 Km off the coast of Colombia and 110 Km off the coast of 
Nicaragua.479 The Archipelago has nearly 68,200 habitants, of which roughly 18.7% self-identify as black, 
mulatto, Afro-descendant, or Afro Colombian, and 35.7% self-identify as Raizal.480 The Raizal (native 
Afro-descendant population) presence in the archipelago is the result of the English colonization of these 
islands, as West African and black population from Jamaica were brought in the condition of slavery to 
work in this area.481 The Raizal people developed a particular type of culture that is defined by the Protestant 
religion, the English creole language, and traditions that include elements of the British, Caribbean, and 
African populations.482  
The case of San Andrés is an exception to the general rule of Afro-descendant underrepresentation 
on Colombian courts. As several of the interviewees mentioned, and I could also observe directly during 
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my visit to the San Andrés, Afro-descendants are a significant portion of the total number of judges, 
magistrates, and judicial employees in the archipelago. According to the data provided by the courts, Afro-
descendants occupy all the magistrate positions (3) and 80% of the judicial employee positions (8 out of 
10) of the Superior Tribunal of San Andrés; and 66.66% (2 out of 3) of the magistrate positions and 53.85% 
of judicial employee positions in the administrative tribunal of this region (7 out of 13).  
One of the judges I interviewed, who had been actively engaged in different professional activities 
with the majority of the judges in the archipelago, calculated that out of a total number of 22 judges and 
magistrates seats in the region, Raizals occupy approximately 12, which is slightly more than 50%.483 
Similarly, according to what I could witness during my visit to the main courthouse of the island, Afro-
descendants also occupy a majority of the judicial employee positions in this region.484 This significant 
level of Afro-descendant presence on courts seems to be relatively recent.485 One of the interviewees 
mentioned that before the 2000s-decade, Afro-descendants only exceptionally occupied judge positions on 
the island. After this period that their number started to grow until it reached significant levels. This 
comment about the recent change in the composition of San Andrés' courts seems to corroborate previous 
reports on the issue. In 2004, a report from the CEJA had stated that: 
 
on the island, of a total of eight judges (with common jurisdiction) and six magistrates (with special 
or appeals jurisdiction), one can only find in San Andrés’ Municipal Court a half-native woman (on 
her father’s side). Also, not one of the seven prosecutors working on the island was of Raizal origin. 
Finally, in the Center for Technical Investigation (CTI –a Prosecutor agency that carries out judicial 
investigations) from a total staff of approximately five people, only one was Raizal.486 
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Despite the significant number of Afro-descendant—and specially Raizal—judges and judicial 
employees in the archipelago, it is essential to mention that there is still a considerable number of white-
mestizo judges in this region, most of which came from the continent. According to the participants, it is 
not rare practice that judges coming from the central areas of the country do not resettle themselves in San 
Andrés (similarly to what happens in the region of Chocó). This situation creates several problems from 
the perspective of the interviewees. In general, they questioned the efficacy and legitimacy of the 
administration of justice in these areas. 
Among the different reasons that explain the significant level of representation that Afro-
descendants have in the judicial institutions in San Andrés, the creole language proficiency requirement is, 
perhaps, the most salient. Article 310 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution determined that San Andrés 
would have a specific law to govern different aspects of the life of the archipelago, including limitations 
for circulation and residence, controls of population density, the protection of the cultural identity of the 
region’s native communities, among others.487 In fulfillment of this constitutional mandate, the Colombian 
Congress issued Law 47 of 1993488, which is commonly known as the “Special Statute of San Andrés.” 
Article 42 of this law establishes that in San Andrés, both English, which is commonly spoken by the native 
communities of the Archipelago, and Castilian (Spanish), the language of the majority of the Colombian 
population, shall have the status of official languages. Additionally, article 45 of the statute declares that: 
“Public employees who exercise their functions within the territory of the Archipelago department and have 
a direct relationship with the public, must speak the Spanish and English languages.”489 This particular 
requisite of being proficient in English (which some respondents interpret as having to be creole English 
specifically) also applies for judges and judicial employees. In general, the participants of the study seemed 
to agree that this unique language requisite was partially responsible for the higher level of representation 
that Raizals have in the judicial institutions of San Andrés. This requirement gives native people of the 
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region a particular advantage for accessing positions within the judiciary. Nevertheless, the interviewees 
also mentioned that the public authorities do not strictly enforce the language requirement in the 
archipelago. Some judges from the continent are in their positions despite not speaking English, much less 
creole English.490 Some participants affirmed that seating judges had been removed from their positions 
for failing to meet this requirement in the past. However, participants agreed on the fact that this requisite 
is continuously overlooked.491 
Albeit being located in San Andrés, the judicial institutions in this region are in many aspects 
administratively dependent upon the judicial administration of the region of Bolívar, which is situated in 
the continent. This type of administrative dependency from institutions located in other regions is not 
uncommon in areas with high levels of Afro-descendant population, and it can also be found in other 
institutions besides the judiciary. San Andrés' dependency upon institutions located in the continent creates 
discomfort among some native judges in the archipelago. Locals allege to have experienced contempt from 
judicial administrators in Cartagena because of their origin.492  
Another reason why the hierarchical structure and administrative dependency is relevant for this 
research is because of how provisional judges are selected. The institution that selects the judges has a 
significant influence on who will fill out a vacancy. The selection of provisional magistrates in the superior 
and administrative tribunals of San Andrés fall within the competencies of the Supreme Court of Justice 
and the State Council, respectively, located in Bogotá. The participants' perception is that the selection of 
white-mestizo magistrates to intermediate tribunals leads to the selection of non-native judges to lower court 
vacancies in the archipelago. This effect occurs because magistrates are in charge of selecting provisional 
judges for the lower courts. Therefore, the center-periphery relations are of particular significance in this 
regard.493 
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 Judicial employees, in addition to the language requirement, also need to comply with a residency 
requirement to serve in the archipelago’s courts. Since San Andrés has specific migration and population 
density controls, people who are not from the archipelago need to meet a number of requirements to move 
to this region. A directive from the Superior Council of the Judicature—Administrative Chamber (Acuerdo 
No. 574 of 1999) established that the persons who wish to apply to positions in courts located in the 
Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina, need to prove that they speak English. This 
requirement is additional to residing in this region, which must be proved with a certification issued by the 
Office for the Control of Circulation and Residency of San Andrés (OCCRE).  
The residency requirement applies to judicial employees, but not to judges. The Constitutional 
Court's ruling C-530 of 1993 declared that the specific norms incorporated in Legislative Decree 2762 of 
1991 (which regulates the population density of the archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa 
Catalina) should apply with restrictions in the case of the national public servants that exercise jurisdiction 
or public authority. This exception includes judicial authorities who enter the islands to exercise their 
functions, in which case the temporary resident card has a function of a mere registry, instead of population 
control.494 This means that judges who are not San Andrés’ residents do not need to comply with the 
temporary residency card requirement.  
An additional factor that helps to explain the significant level of representation that Afro-
descendants have in the judicial institutions of San Andrés is undesirability of this region as a place to work 
for people of the interior of the country. One of the interviewees, while referring to San Andrés, mentioned 
that many people from other areas of the country were not interested in occupying positions in judicial 
institutions in San Andrés, given the restricted nature of public services and recreational activities in the 
archipelago.495 Another participant mentioned how the high costs of residing on the island also deterred 
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people from other places from coming to San Andrés to reside.496 A third explained that San Andrés 
possesses the good attributes of a Caribbean island, but also has significant difficulties, especially for people 
who are not used to the living conditions of the island.497 San Andrés does not possess aqueduct or sewerage 
systems for the entire region.498 According to some respondents, the government's priority has been to 
improve the necessary infrastructure in tourist areas.499 Most people in the archipelago use rain as the 
primary source of water supply and have septic tanks to deal with drainage.500 
Similarly, another aspect that is relevant for understanding the unusual situation of San Andrés 
regarding Afro-descendant representation in the judicial system is the absence of law schools in the 
Archipelago. San Andrés does not have a single law school on its territory and that the only option to study 
law is to leave the region and move to cities in the continent.501 This alternative is often only available for 
individuals who come from families that have the economic capacity to relocate their children to a major 
city and to cover the tuition and other educational costs. My impression is that the people of San Andrés 
face some of the most significant challenges to access legal education in Colombia, given their geographical 
location and the costs associated with traveling between San Andrés and major cities in Colombia. I think 
that that the reason why the difficulties in accessing legal education do not seem to have a sensible impact 
on the level of presence of Afro-descendants in the judiciary of this region is that the size of the judiciary 
in San Andrés is significantly small. Furthermore, there are some affluent residents of the archipelago who 
can afford to send their children to universities on the continent. 
Another aspect that needs to be considered is that, except for the SJP, San Andrés is the only context 
in which I could find any form of social mobilization regarding the issue of Afro-descendant representation 
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on judicial institutional in particular, and in the public sector in general. In San Andrés, this mobilization 
has extended for decades and has had different demands at different points in time. In the late 1990s, 
attorneys from the archipelago requested the Superior Council of the Judicature to allow them to sit for the 
judge-selection exam in the archipelago. Until that point, they had to travel to the continent to take the 
test.502 Their efforts were fruitful. Since then, lawyers who wish to take the eliminatory exam to become 
judges can do so without having to leave the region.503 
Different interviewees mentioned that around the 2000s-decade, San Andrés' lawyers requested the 
Superior Council of the Judicature to select local judges to fill out court vacancies in the region. In their 
view, this is the leading cause of the significant level of Afro-descendant presence on the courts of San 
Andrés.504 One participant mentioned that:  
 
In the country, [Afro-descendant representation on courts] it is deficient, but in San Andrés is high. 
That is the product of a fight that years ago some leaders, lawyers, undertook, as they appeared 
before the Superior Council to request that native people were allowed to become judges, and not 
only to occupy judicial employee positions but also of functionaries [judges and magistrates].505 
 
Before this moment, Afro-descendants were working for the courts, but in low-rank positions.506 
This social mobilization consisted of protests before the courthouses, petitioning before central 
governmental and judicial authorities, meetings with representatives of the Superior Council of the 
Judicature, marches, demonstrations, among other actions.507 According to the participant’s accounts, the 
 
502 Interviews 26, 28 and 29. 
503 Interview 26. 
504 Interviews 26, 27, 28 and 29. 
505 Interview 25. 
506 Interview 24. 
507 Interview 27. 
 153 
result of these efforts was the designation of native people in provisional magistrate positions in the 
tribunals of the archipelago, which, in turn, designated natives as provisional judges in the lower courts.508 
These mobilization actions that can be framed within a broader type of social mobilization aimed 
at protecting the natives' cultural traditions and rights, including the use of their creole English language. 
In this respect, some of the interviewees mentioned that teachers, religious leaders, students, and the general 
population have also participated in the marches since it is a social concern that is was not limited to judicial 
institutions nor judicial servants.509  
I consider that, in addition to protecting the cultural rights of the native population, mobilization 
efforts are also a manifestation of a deeper fight over resources and, particularly, employment opportunities 
in a region where stable high-earning jobs are not always for grasp. This situation became clear to me after 
finding out that public demonstrations took place immediately after it was announced that several locals 
that occupied judicial employee positions in the archipelago were going to be replaced in their jobs by 
people coming from the continent. This decision led, according to her account, "for judicial employees to 
come together and have a powerful protest, demanding that the local people's right to work and the special 
norms were respected. At that time, the Council of the Judicature did not follow up with its decision to 
remove them [the locals] from their positions.”510 
 
6.5. Cartagena, Bolívar 
 
The region of Bolívar is located in the Caribbean region of Colombia. According to the 2005 
census, Bolívar was the third region of Colombia by the percentage of the Afro-descendant population, only 
behind Chocó and Valle del Cauca. 26.75% of Bolívar’s population (1,836,640 inhabitants) was Afro-
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descendant.511 Cartagena is the region’s capital and a special administrative district. The city is located in 
the northern part of the region. Cartagena is a major domestic and international tourist destination. 
According to the 2005 national census, Afro-descendants comprise 36.1% of the city’s population, which 
means that they are more numerous in the city than in the region as a whole.512 This figure might be a low 
estimate, given the census limitations to collect ethno-racial data in this region and across the country.513 
The University of Cartagena, which is public, has a law school.514 Moreover, several other institutions offer 
law programs of different quality levels.515 
In the data obtained through the rights of petition, not a single magistrate of the Superior Tribunal 
of Cartagena or the Administrative Tribunal of Bolívar was reported as Afro-descendant. When considered 
together, only 2.72% (3 of the 110) judicial employees in both of these courts were counted as Afro-
descendant. The lack of Afro-descendant representation among the group of judges seems to extend to other 
municipalities in the region of Bolívar and into the lower courts of Cartagena.516 One of the interviewees, 
who used to work for one of the courts in this city, commented that he “sees with awe the absence of Afro-
descendant persons in the judiciary, at least in Cartagena,”517 which he described as a "Ciudad de negros" 
(city of blacks), and mentioned that Afro-descendants are scarce even in judicial employee positions in the 
city’s courts.518 Likewise, another interviewee, who attended the judicial formation course in Cartagena, 
mentioned that she could not remember any Afro-descendant persons in her judicial preparation course.519  
Despite these accounts, my reading of the situation of Afro-descendant representation in the city’s 
courts was slightly different. I visited different judicial buildings in the city’s historic center. Although 
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Afro-descendants were far more numerous on the streets than inside courthouses, they had a certain level 
of presence on the courts. During my visit to the intermediate tribunals, I could see several Afro-descendant 
judicial employees working in these courts, at least more than the three that were reported by the courts in 
their response to the rights of petition. I think that my perception of greater Afro-descendant representation 
on Cartagena’s courts, when compared to the perception of the interviewees and the courts, could be due to 
the complexities of racial self-identification in Cartagena.520 I ponder that when the interviewees (and 
potentially the judicial servants who responded to my right of petition) described the low levels of Afro-
descendant presence in these courts, they were making specific reference to those that self-identify as such. 
One of the participants emphasized that: 
 
One can go and watch, and take a walk by the courthouses, and see that the judges, at least that self-
identify as Afro, are very few, very few the ones we see. They are mostly judges that do not have 
practically any form of ethnic connection as such or that self-identify as part of a particular ethnicity, 
which indicates that it is very low the level of people working as judges that are, that self-identify 
as Afro, Raizal, and Palenquero.521 
 
Furthermore, he added: "We can see a couple of cases at least in the tribunal’s labor or 
administrative chambers, I have seen [some], but I haven't seen that they had self-recognized as such"522 In 
contrast, during my visit to the courthouses, my reading of courts' ethno-racial compositions did not depart 
from their staff's self-identification, but rather from hetero-identification based on phenotypical identifiers 
vis-à-vis skin color. I think that differences in the method for identifying Afro-descendancy (self-
identification v. hetero-identification) were partly to blame for this diverging assessment. 
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In my experience, self-identification in Cartagena is particularly complex when compared to other 
regions of Colombia. Despite the high Afro-descendant population in this region, the mestizaje and 
blanqueamiento narratives seem to be exceptionally resilient. People who are clearly labeled as Afro-
descendants are those who have particularly marked black phenotypical features (darker skin, tight hair), 
or who have a clear black ethnic identity. This is the case of the Palenquero people, situated in the proximity 
of the city.523 As a participant from this city mentioned: “The impression that it creates in me is that being 
black [in Cartagena] is to be darker.524 
I should clarify that, despite these differences in the appraisal, I concur with their overall impression 
that Afro-descendants do not have an adequate level of representation in Cartagena's courts, at least when 
compared to their share of the city's population. This situation becomes evident when one considers that 
the 36.1% figure (that according to the census corresponds to the percentage of Afro-descendant population 
of Cartagena) also departs from self-identification, which possibly means (as experience dictates) that the 
number of Afro-descendants in Cartagena might be much higher.525 Some interviewees seem to coincide 
with this reading, as one of them affirmed that “if we stick to phenotypical traits, the representation is not 
very high,” while referring to the situation of both judges and judicial employees.526 
 
6.6. Cali and Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca 
 
Valle del Cauca is located in Western Colombia. Part of this territory lies in the Pacific Basin. 
Another part is located in the Andean region of the country. According to the 2005 census, 26.75% of the 
population of this region is Afro-descendant (1,090,943 out of 4,052,535).527 Cali, Valle del Cauca’s 
capital, is located in the Andean part of the region and is the third-most populous city in Colombia with 
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2,244,000 inhabitants in 2005.528 Cali hosts a high number of businesses and services, being an epicenter 
for commerce and industrial production. In Cali, 26.2% of the population self-identified as Afro-descendant 
in 2005.529 In addition to Cali, during my fieldwork, I also visited the city of Buenaventura, located on the 
coast of Valle del Cauca. Buenaventura is the principal seaport of Colombia. A majority of goods imported 
to Colombia and exported to other countries pass through this city. Buenaventura is, just as Cartagena, a 
“city of blacks.” According to the 2005 census, 88.5% of the 362,000 residents of this city are Afro-
descendant.530 
In the data collected through the rights of petition, the Superior Tribunal of Cali reported having 
zero Afro-descendant magistrates in the group of 37 that seat on that court, and 11 Afro-descendant judicial 
employees in a group of 58 (19%). The Superior Tribunal of the neighboring city of Buga, in the same 
region, reported 2 Afro-descendant magistrates in a group of 14 that compose that institution (14.29%). 
Paradoxically, this same tribunal reported not even a single Afro-descendant in the group of 58 judicial 
employees that serve on that court. In the case of the Administrative Tribunal of Valle, none of the 12 
magistrates was reported as Afro-descendant, and only two of the 36 judicial employees were counted as 
part of that group (5.56%). 
One of the interviewees, who has experience working for the judiciary in this city, mentioned that, 
as an example of the low level of Afro-descendant representation on courts in Cali, only 3 out of 21 
administrative judges in the city fell in this category,531 a figure that a second interviewee confirmed.532 
Another participant estimated that only three of the 18 circuit labor judges, and one of six small labor 
conflict judges were Afro-descendant. He added that there could even be certain types of specialized courts 
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that do not have any Afro-descendant judges serving in them.533 A third one mentioned that, despite having 
a more substantial presence than in most cities in Colombia, Afro-descendants' presence in Cali's courts 
was still low.534 The low Afro-descendant presence in Cali’s courts appears to extend even into the group 
of judicial employees, as one of the interviewees remarked the limited number of blacks occupying this 
type of position.535 Despite the little representation that at the judge-level Afro-descendants seem to have 
in Cali’s judicial institutions, some of the participants manifested their perception that Afro-descendants 
seem to have better opportunities in Cali than in other cities of Colombia.536 
In the case of Buenaventura, the situation seems to be similar.537 One of the participants narrated 
that, approximately 4 or 5 years ago, many of the judges in the city were not from Buenaventura (also 
implying that they were also not black).538 Another one, an attorney, with several years of experience 
litigating in the city, mentioned that in Buenaventura:  
 
[The situation] is regrettable. I do not know any Afro-descendant judges. I do not know any. I have 
been litigating there for years, and I have not seen the first. A few years ago, I started seeing black 
[judicial] employees, but it is very little; sporadic the Afro-descendant participation. You see, per 
court, a maximum of two Afro-descendant persons. The rest are mestizo, the majority named by 
finger [expression meaning nepotism]. I imagine that recently some [positions] were filled out by 
merit selection and well, in that case, it does not matter who the person is. It should be the one who 
wins the process. However, the situation in Buenaventura is unfortunate. Imagine that […] the 
majority of the staff is mestizo, being an Afro-descendant territory, with a majority of Afro-
descendant population, the majority of judges are mestizo, the employees are mestizo, and they do 
not live in Buenaventura.539 
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It appears that in Buenaventura, there is a significant division in the ethno-racial composition of 
the group of judges and judicial employees. One participant warned that Afro-descendants occupied judicial 
employee positions and mestizos coming from other cities occupied judge positions.540 Another interviewee 
suggested that this situation is related to how provisional appointments are made in this region. The Superior 
Tribunal of Buga, located over 100 Km away, can provisionally appoint judges to fill out vacancies in 
Buenaventura. Participants believe that this type of appointment limits the possibilities of local attorneys 
to occupy judge positions in this municipality.541 From the participant’s perception, the Superior Tribunal 
of Buga has favored non-residents at filling out vacancies, which impacts black presence at these 
institutions.542 Another one agreed with this opinion. He stated that the reason for this preference towards 
mestizo candidates was because the inner circle of the tribunal magistrates was mostly mestizo, which meant 
that the people they knew and decided to appoint also shared this identity.543 However, another interviewee 
had a different reading on this aspect. He mentioned that it was not due to the provisional positions, but 
rather the tenured positions, which could explain the low level of Afro-descendant representation among 
Buenaventura's judges. In his view, people who passed the merit selection process chose Buenaventura as 
their place of work.544 
The fact that power positions, such as judgeships, in majority-black towns happen to be occupied 
by whites is not surprising if one considers previous literature about this topic in Latin American cities. In 
the case of Ecuador, for example, Beck et al. (reverberating the work of Whitten) mention that even in 
towns where the majority of the populace was black, "whites, mestizos, or mulattos ran all the 
administrative and commercial centers, and the only elected black officials were rural police.”545 
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An important aspect to consider about Cali is that the leading public university of the city, the 
University of Valle, does not have a law school.546 Many respondents considered that access to high-quality 
legal education was more difficult in this region than in others.547 The lack of an adequate public education 
offer meant that only those who could afford to attend a private university could have access to high-quality 
legal education. A similar situation takes place in Buenaventura since the two leading universities with a 
presence in the city (the University of Valle—Pacific branch, and the University of the Pacific) do not offer 
law programs.548 
In the city of Buenaventura, just as it happens in Quibdó, there were also reports about “traveling 
judges." These judges decide not to resettle in Buenaventura, but rather maintain their residences in Cali or 
Tuluá, and only come to Buenaventura during the week for work.549 This situation was problematic for the 
interviewees. They interpreted it as a sign of contempt for the city and its people. One of them commented 
that the mestizo judges from outside of Buenaventura do not move to this city because: 
 
They do not like the black [way] of organizing. They do not like Afro traditions. They are there 
because they have an economic opportunity, that is because they have a chance to go [there] and 
make a good salary, good benefits. However, they hate it there […] They see of Buenaventura: the 
corruption, the ugly streets, the dirty streets, the lousy food, everything that is bad about 
Buenaventura. I am not from Buenaventura, but I am an Afro-descendant. I have had a strong 
connection with that place, and I am troubled to find out about the comments [that judges make].550 
 
 
546 Pregrado UNIVERSIDAD DEL VALLE / CALI, COLOMBIA (2020), https://www.univalle.edu.co/formacion/pregrado 
(last visited Mar 17, 2020). 
547 Interviews 15, 16, 18, 38 and 42. 
548 Sede Pacífico UNIVERSIDAD DEL VALLE / CALI, COLOMBIA (2020), http://pacifico.univalle.edu.co/ (last visited Mar 
17, 2020); Universidad del Pacífico UNIVERSIDAD DEL PACÍFICO (2020), 
http://www.unipacifico.edu.co:8095/web3.0/inicio.jsp (last visited Mar 17, 2020). Interviews 38 and 43. 
549 Interview 39. 
550 Id. 
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 Moreover, one of the interviewees also mentioned that mestizo judges who come to work in 
Buenaventura tend to dissociate themselves from the local population, as "when they arrive at that territory 
they only meet with their people, among them.”551 
 
6.7. Tumaco, Nariño 
 
The last region that I visited in fieldwork was Nariño, located in the southwestern part of Colombia, 
on the border with Ecuador. Just as in the case of Valle del Cauca, part of Nariño's territory is located on 
the pacific coast, and another part in the Andean region of the country (la sierra). This division sharply 
marked the distribution of the population according to race and ethnicity. Although in Nariño 18.05% of 
the population was reported as Afro-descendant in the 2005 census (270,433 of the 1,498,234 
inhabitants),552 in Pasto, the region’s capital city located on the Andean portion of the region, the percentage 
of Afro-descendants was only 1.6% of the total population. In contrast, the largest Afro-descendant 
municipality in Nariño is Tumaco, located on the coast, in which 88.8% of the 179,000 residents were 
reported as Afro-descendants.553 In this city, I conducted my final site visit and concluded my fieldwork.  
 According to the data collected through the rights of petition, none of the 11 magistrates of the 
Superior Tribunal of Pasto are Afro-descendants, and the court did not provide information concerning the 
ethno-racial composition of its staff. Likewise, no data was reported on the Administrative Tribunal of 
Nariño, also located in Pasto. Respondents concurred in that there are very few Afro-descendant judges in 
Tumaco. One participant, who has significant knowledge of the composition and work if the judiciary in 
this city, mentioned: “Yesterday, when you called me and told me the topic of your research, I started 
thinking: How many Afro-descendant judges do I know here, in Tumaco? And I continued to think, and I 
 
551 Id. 
552 AFROCOLOMBIANOS, POBLACIÓN CON HUELLAS DE AFRICANÍA, supra note 422 at 4. 
553 BOLETÍN CENSO GENERAL 2005: PERFIL TUMACO, NARIÑO, 6 (2010), 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/52835T7T000.PDF (last visited Mar 10, 2020). 
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do not remember any.”554 Moreover, the respondent also pointed out that, despite the number of local Afro-
descendant lawyers in Tumaco, a similar situation occurs with judicial employee positions, most of which 
(but not all) are occupied by professionals from Pasto. This answer implied that they are white or mestizo.555 
I could see this directly during the site visit I conducted to the courts in this city, as most of the judicial 
employees and judges I could see in this building were white or mestizo, unlike the majority of Tumaco’s 
inhabitants.  
 Just like in Buenaventura, in Tumaco, there is not a single university that offers a law program. 
The leading university with a presence in the city (the National University of Colombia—Tumaco branch) 
does not offer this type of academic program, which limits the possibility of the local population to access 
legal education or positions in the judiciary.556 
Similarly to the situation of Quibdó, Tumaco and other municipalities of Nariño's coast seem to be 
locations where people from the interior of the country do not want to go and work. These municipalities 
struggle with the lack of resources, infrastructure, services, and also with the significant impact of the 
internal armed conflict. The internal armed conflict has been particularly hard in this region because of its 
strategic location near Colombia's southern border, which makes them strategic points to the 
narcotrafficking business.557 One of the interviewees, who worked as a judge in one of these municipalities, 
mentioned that she chose to work there in a provisional post because nobody else wanted to work there.558 
Moreover, she narrates that the position that she ended up occupying had been offered to several of her 
colleagues at the court where she used to work as a judicial employee, but: 
 
Everybody said: ‘No, I will not go. What will I do over there? No, it is bad. How can you even think 
about it? […] that faraway place, distant from the hand of the lord…’ And I said: ‘I will go!’ and 
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555 Id. 
556 Sede Tumaco, Sede Tumaco, UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA (2020), http://tumaco-pacifico.unal.edu.co/ 
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effectively, I went to work to a municipality that has […] that has horrible roads, that has an electric 
grid, but where there are black-outs all the time, that does not have [running] water, that has illegal 
mining, in which the river water has mercury in it… in some horrible conditions and it was because 
nobody else wanted to go there.559 
 
In Tumaco, the presence of "traveling judges" was also reported. One of the interviewees described 
that the judges of Tumaco: "Do not live here. They do not know our realities. They do not feel the issues 
of this place. They feel that they come to deliver a service because they have to. Because they got an 
opportunity, but with the aspiration of one day moving back to Pasto."560 Moreover, just as in Chocó, 
participants mentioned the idea that working in Tumaco is a type of punishment.561 
  
6.8. Analyzing regional differences in the ethno-racial composition of courts in 
Colombia 
 
As we could see in the previous sections, there are a significant number of ways in which 
geographical location and race intertwine to help to create regional differences on the ethno-racial 
composition of Colombia's judicial institutions. Some of the most relevant are: 
 
6.8.1. Demographic differences among the country’s regions 
 
As I previously mentioned, ethno-racial groups are not evenly distributed across the different regions 
in Colombia. Therefore, it is natural for the demographic differences in terms of the ethno-racial 
composition of the country's regions to have a sensible impact on the composition of the judicial institutions 
 
559 Id. 
560 Interview 37. 
561 Interview 43. 
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therein located. Afro-descendants seem to have a sizeable level of representation on the courts of regions 
such as Chocó, where 73.6% of the population share this ethno-racial identity, but lack a significant 
presence in the courts of Antioquia, an Andean region where only 10.59% of the population was reported 
to be Afro-descendant.562 
Additionally, other demographic differences, such as the presence of ethnic-Afro-descendant 
population, also influence the level of representation that this group possesses in the judicial institutions of 
a particular region. In certain parts of the country, such as the archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and 
Santa Catalina, legal instruments for the protection of ethnic groups, may have the effect to secure, at least 
to a certain extent, Afro-descendants’ representation on the courts of some regions. 
 
6.8.2. The institutional dependency relations between central and peripherical 
areas of the country 
 
Geographic location is also essential for discussing the issue Afro-descendant representation on 
Colombian courts because of the administrative dependency of peripherical regions upon central regions. 
Regions with high levels of Afro-descendant population are, in most cases, peripherical areas. This status 
is not the exclusive effect of their location within the national territory. It is also due to their weight in the 
nation's economy, politics, and government presence. Due to these conditions, regions with large Afro-
descendant populations have historically had a relation of administrative dependency not only with the 
country’s capital (Bogotá) but also with other regions where the institutional presence of the state is 
sufficient. These regions, which I describe as central, host state institutions in which decisions impacting 
peripherical regions are often made. This relation of dependency between central and peripherical areas of 
the country influences the ethno-racial composition of the courts since the designation of judges that will 
 
562 AFROCOLOMBIANOS, POBLACIÓN CON HUELLAS DE AFRICANÍA, supra note 422 at 4. 
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serve in the periphery of the country is made by institutions located in central regions. Moreover, institutions 
tend to privilege candidates that are not local nor Afro-descendants for filling out judicial vacancies. 
 
6.8.3. Regional differences in access to services and structural discrimination 
 
Access to certain services and structural discrimination also seem to play a significant role in explaining 
the regional differences in the Afro-descendant representation on courts. As I explained before, regions that 
have high levels of Afro-descendant population are commonly located in peripherical areas of the country, 
where the provision of specific goods and services is scarce. This is the case of education and, particularly, 
legal education. Certain regions with a high concentration of Afro-descendants do not have universities 
hosting law programs. Also, as some of the interviewees stressed, the quality of higher education in these 
areas is significantly lower than in the big urban areas located in the Andean (mostly white-mestizo) section 
of the country. Having a law degree is indispensable to become a judge and, in some cases, to occupy 
certain judicial employee positions. Thus, regional differences in terms of access to education have a 
sensible impact on black representation in courts. 
Paradoxically, the deficiencies in certain essential services in regions that Afro-descendants 
densely populate seem to be a factor that, under certain conditions, could enable higher levels of access to 
judicial positions for Afro-descendants. In this respect, people from the interior of the country often reject 
working in peripherical areas of the country due to the severe living conditions in these areas. Also, many 
interviewees mentioned the idea that people from the central part of the country (mostly white-mestizo 
areas) being sent out to work in regions such as Chocó was seen as a type of punishment that should be 
avoided at all costs. In synthesis, the lack of interest of white-mestizo people from the interior of the country 
to occupy court positions in neglected areas seems to have the effect of enabling Afro-descendants to hold 
positions that they usually cannot occupy in other areas of the country. 
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6.8.4. The conflation of racial and regional identities, and the persistence of 
racial stereotypes 
 
Another aspect that helps to explain the regional differences in the access to judicial positions for 
Afro-descendants is how regional and racial identities get conflated within the national public discourse, 
and how racial stereotypes are commonly masked as—allegedly acceptable—regional stereotypes. Given 
the uneven presence of the Afro-descendant population in Colombia, race, and region and inextricably 
intertwined. This is the reason why, for example, it is not uncommon to hear that Afro-descendants who 
live in Andean cities are often questioned about their regional origin. It also explains why regional identities 
are often used as a coded way for the naming of race. Subsequently, regional stereotypes are also commonly 
conflated with racial stereotypes. Some regional stereotypes, such as those that accuse people of the coastal 
regions of being lazy or corrupt, are charged with racial undertones. In these areas of the country, a 
significant part of the population in Afro-descendant. These racial and regional stereotypes play a 
significant role in determining not only who can have access to a particular judicial position, but also where. 
For example, in Antioquia, where blackness is commonly depicted as foreign and disconnected to the 
identity and demographic composition of the region, Afro-descendant presence was minimal. 
 
6.8.5. Lack of self-identification among the Afro-descendant population in 
certain regions 
 
An additional condition that seems to contribute to the regional differences in the ethno-racial 
composition of judicial institutions in Colombia is the way racial self-identification appears to be less 
prominent among the Afro-descendant population of specific regions. In this respect, as I commented when 
discussing the specific situation of Cartagena, some Afro-descendant persons who are working inside 
judicial institutions do not self-identify as such. This situation is closely linked to the particularities of 
ethno-racial identities in Latin America. The lack of self-identification restricts the conversation about 
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Afro-descendant representation on courts and, I believe, can be a vital element to consider at explaining the 
apparent low levels of Afro-descendant presence in the courts of some regions. 
 
6.8.6. Social mobilization around Afro-descendant representation on courts 
 
A final aspect that needs to be considered is the impact that, in certain instances, social mobilization 
has had on the level of representation of Afro-descendants in judicial institutions. As I explained concerning 
San Andrés, several interviewees seemed to connect the high levels of Afro-descendant presence on the 
courts with the activism displayed by the region's leaders before the Superior Council of the Judicature and 
other state institutions. According to the participants, social mobilization calling for a more inclusive 
judiciary is one of the leading causes for the presence of Raizals in San Andrés' courts. A similar situation 
seems to happen in the SJP, although not from a geographic perspective. The sizable level of presence that 
indigenous persons and Afro-descendants have in this court appears to be, at least in part, the consequence 
of the social mobilization efforts of the ethnic movements to attain representation in the transitional justice 
mechanism. In contrast, the lack of social mobilization around the issue of Afro-descendant presence on 
the courts in other regions could also help to explain the limited level of Afro-descendant presence in these 
areas. 
In the following chapter, I will discuss some of the factors that are potentially responsible for the 









III. “We need to prove we are capable; despite the fact we are black”: Factors contributing 
to Afro-descendant underrepresentation on Colombia’s courts and the stratification of 
the judicial system 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss some factors contributing to Afro-descendant underrepresentation and the 
stratification of the judicial system in Colombia. My purpose is not to present a "list of causes" of Afro-
descendant underrepresentation on the courts of Colombia. Such a taxonomical process would require a 
multiplicity of interdisciplinary studies that exceed the scope of this dissertation. Rather, my purpose is to 
explore a group of conditions that might help to explain the low level of presence that Afro-descendants 
have in judicial institutions in this country, which should be further analyzed and tested in future research 
endeavors on this matter. 
I will refer to the following aspects: The statistical invisibility of Afro-descendants; the overlapping of 
race and class forms of oppression in the Afro-descendant population; the inequalities and difficulties to 
access education and, particularly, higher education; the interaction of race- and gender-based forms of 
oppression; the influence of race, color, and identity; the inequalities and disparate impacts of judicial 
selection mechanisms; and the systemic racial discrimination within judicial institutions and in the legal 
profession. 
 
1. The statistical invisibility of Afro-descendants 
 
A factor that seems to be closely linked with the low level of Afro-descendant presence on judicial 
institutions in Colombia is the absence of data on this regard and, more extensively, the great challenge that 
statistical invisibility represents for the equality claims of subordinated ethno-racial groups. The lack of 
ethno-racial data concerning the composition of the Colombian judiciary is an element that contributes to 
the Afro-descendant representation on the courts because it facilitates the concealment of this problem. The 
limitations in data collection on ethno-racial identities in the judiciary facilitates that the racial homogeneity 
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of the judicial system continues to go unnoticed and unchallenged. Ethno-racial statistical invisibility is a 
powerful tool to maintain racial subordination. The lack of ethno-racial statistics empowers the 
misperception that race is not an issue that needs to be researched in the mestizo nation. This understanding 
leads to a vicious cycle: Statistic invisibility hides racial disparities in Latin American countries, which, in 
turn, justifies the lack of data collection on race and ethnicity. 
Regarding the impact of statistical invisibility on ethno-racial groups, Hugo Ñopo mentions that 
the absence of data is partially to blame for the lack of more substantive research on income inequality 
affecting minorities in Latin America. Ñopo affirms that the lack of census data disaggregated by ethnicity 
and the under-registry of people belonging to ethnic minorities in public records and identity documents “is 
a sign of the inferior situation in which ethnic minorities often live”.563 Likewise, Rita Segato suggests that 
acknowledging race in Latin America should be considered as a form of decolonial action.564  
During the interview process, several participants made references to statistical invisibility and the 
deficiency in reliable data on ethno-racial identities in the judiciary as problem to establish Afro-descendant 
representation on the courts. One of them sustained that ascertaining the level of Afro-descendant 
representation on the courts was difficult due to the lack of data collection on the ethno-racial composition 
of the courts.565 Others noted that there was also an absence of race-related data concerning the people who 
came before the courts to resolve conflicts, which represented a significant barrier for establishing whether 
the justice system similarly treats Afro-descendant and not-Afro-descendant litigants.566 
The problem of Afro-descendant statistical invisibility is not either new, particular to Colombia, or 
exclusive of the judicial sector. This situation is rooted in a long-lasting tradition present in the region of 
excluding minorities and rendering them invisible. Mara Loveman explains that modern states use 
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population classifications to know and understand those who are part of the societies they govern, as well 
as to impose burdens and grant benefits.567 In Latin America, ethno-racial classifications’ use in censuses 
has depended on large scale socio-political coordinates related to the construction of modern national 
states.568 Loveman remarks that most national censuses that took place in the region after independence 
included questions about race or color.569 Most countries included race-related questions in at least one of 
their censuses in the first part of the 20th century, too.570 In this period, "Latin America's census reports 
often equated national progress with racial progress. In turn, racial progress meant the 'whitening' 
populations."571 Thus, censuses of this period tended to emphasize aspects such as immigration and 
mestizaje rates, which were believed to be good indicators of demographic improvement.572  
The second half of the 20th century saw a rapid decline of race or color questions in the Latin 
American national censuses.573 Loveman describes that, unexpectedly, the exclusion of racial classification 
questions from national censuses in this period seems to be linked to the decline of ideas that served as 
grounds for collecting data on race. These decaying ideas included the validity of concept of race and the 
belief that a country's racial composition is connected to its national progress.574 In this period, Afro-
descendants became invisible in the national census. In contrast, indigenous people, continued to be 
classified based on their cultural difference.575 Due to this situation, "by the 1960s only two countries 
(Brazil and Cuba) still included racial variables in their censuses."576  
Mala Htun mentions that “though Brazil and Cuba had collected data on race/color for many 
decades, only in the 1990s did an additional country—Colombia—begin to collect data on 
 
567 LOVEMAN, supra note 64 at 1–5. 
568 Id. at 1–5. 
569 Id. at 208. 
570 Id. at 208. 
571 Id. at 209. 
572 Id. at 209. 
573 Id. at 209. 
574 Id. at 209. 
575 Id. at 210. 
576 AFRO-DESCENDANTS IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF INCLUSION, supra note 138 at 17. 
 171 
Afrodescendancy.”577 It took until the last decades of the 20th century for Latin American countries to 
reintroduce questions about race in their censuses and to provide visibility to their Afro-descendant 
populations once again.578 In recent years, social and political changes in the region led to the constitutional 
recognition of new rights for Afro-descendant populations.579 This change has contributed to greater 
visibility of this group in different countries. In the 2000s decade, approximately half of the countries of 
the region had included ethno-racial variables in their national censuses.580 
Despite this shift towards Afro-descendant statistical visibility, Álvaro Bello & Marta Rangel 
express that assessing the population numbers for this group is not an easy task in Latin America.581 Even 
recently, many countries' national censuses do not collect information on this variable. Furthermore, in 
countries where this information is collected, "the response of the interviewee is conditioned by a number 
of factors, such as income and education levels, awareness of negritude, and the need for ‘whitening.'"582 
The World Bank suggested that there are considerable challenges in the collection of data about Afro-
descendants in the Latin American region. Many countries in this part of the world deny ethno-racial 
discrimination and block the collection of data on this population.583 The mestizaje's description of Latin 
American countries as both racially homogenous and racially harmonious has been used to assert that 
collecting data on Afro-descendant populations could constitute an act of racial discrimination in and of 
itself.584 
Edward Telles remarks that, in Latin America, race and ethnicity have a multi-dimensional nature. 
The measurement of such characteristics in the region's population depends on different aspects: "How 
ethnoracial questions are worded, which categories are used, and who answers the question."585 Telles urges 
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Latin American states to consider using tools that do not only depend on self-identification for monitoring 
racial inequality and discrimination since a person's race is often determined through perception.586 
Moreover, he asserts that two people who self-identify as members of the same racial group (e .g. mestizo, 
negro, indígena) could face unique situations of discrimination based on skin color differences.587  
In the case of Colombia, Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea mention that, following the enactment 
of Law 70 of 1993, the 1993 national census included a question on ethnic identity.588 This question 
intended to solve the problem of statistic invisibility of Afro Colombians, using the territorial and cultural 
characteristics that would define an ethnic group as a way of counting them. However, the census of 1993 
ended up undercounting Afro Colombians.589 Even the governmental agency in charge of conducting the 
census—DANE—recognized that the ethnic question had a bias that benefited indigenous peoples. Many 
respondents declared that they belonged to an ethnic group without specifying to which one, which made 
it very difficult to differentiate between Afro-descendant and indigenous respondents.590 Moreover, this 
census's ethnic question did not ask people to report on their skin color. The lack of a color question was a 
problem because, as the government later declared, many Afro Colombians did not see themselves as being 
part of an ethnic group, which in the end explains why only 1.52% of the national population was counted 
as black.591 In conclusion, as Barbary and Urrea explain, it is unlikely that Afro Colombians can be made 
statistically visible under the concept of ethnic groups since the idea of ethnicity is still artificial and 
unknown for many of them. The category of race is still the one that has a more significant impact.592 
The problems affecting the 1993 census seem to persist even today. In November 2019, the 
Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics—DANE—released the preliminary results of 
the 2018 national census, which presented a dramatic decrease in the number and percentage of the Afro-
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descendant population in the country when compared to the 2005 census.593 According to the DANE, 
whereas, in 2005, 4,311,757 persons counted as Afro Colombians in the census, in 2018, this number was 
only 2,982,224, which represents a decrease of approximately 30.8% of the counted Afro Colombian 
population.594 This decrease is not due to external factors, such as mass migration or deaths. The DANE 
recognizes that the geographical reach of the census, the difficulties with the application of the ethno-racial 
question, and the low self-identification levels among the Afro Colombian population are likely causes for 
this decrease. The astounding decline in the counted number of Afro-descendants provides an example of 
the problem of statistical invisibility of this group and the difficulties that arise when one tries to collect 
data on ethno-racial identity in this context. Furthermore, Edward Telles mentions that the estimates of the 
Afro-descendant population in Colombia jump dramatically depending on the type of mechanism used for 
counting them: 
 
Estimates based on PERLA data varied from 19.4 percent obtained by asking the 2005 census 
question on self-identification, 18.6 percent using the open-ended question on racial identity, and 
15.1 percent based on the number of respondents who claimed to have black or African ancestors. 
Given the size of the data set, there is about a 3 percent range of error, but the relative sizes using 
these three criteria remain.595 
 
Likewise, Tianna Paschel describes that there are different official estimations regarding the 
percentage of the national population that is Afro Colombian, with some as low as 1.52% and some as high 
as 26%.596 Differences in the estimations are partially a consequence of the lack of consistency of ethno-
racial data collection in national censuses: "Between 1,905 and 2,005, only four of Colombia's eleven 
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national censuses included a question aimed at counting its black population."597 All these censuses 
provided significantly different measurements about the share of the national population that is Afro 
Colombian. The censuses of 1912 and 1918 concluded a 6% of Colombians were Afro-descendants. The 
1993 census concluded that only 1.5% were so, while the 2005 census delivered a percentage of 10.5%. 
These radical changes seem to be the effect of situations such as reclassification, shifts on the definitions 
of who counts as Afro Colombian, as well as changes in the census question about ethno-racial identity.598  
 In conclusion, there is a significant problem of statistical invisibility affecting Afro-descendants in 
Colombia and, more extensively, Latin America. I consider that the lack of reliable data on the ethno-racial 
composition of judicial institutions and the Colombian society is a relevant factor that might help to explain 
the problem of Afro-descendant representation on judicial institutions and the racial hierarchization of the 
judicial system. The lack of data in this respect prevents public officials, civil society, and academia from 
engaging in an informed conversation about the limited presence that minorities have on the court system, 
which, in turn, limits potential actions to address the situation.  
 
2. The overlapping of race and class forms of oppression in the Afro-descendant population 
 
Socio-economic inequality is the second aspect that helps to explain the low level of Afro-
descendant representation in judicial institutions. More precisely, the correlation between subordinated 
ethno-racial identities and low-class status. The ECLAC has pointed out that race and class are two forces 
that shape the hierarchization of Latin American societies.599 A person’s class status may result from the 
accumulation of race-based privileges or burdens throughout the years—or even across generations.600 
Mala Htun states that in most Latin American countries, race and class divisions tend to overlap with each 
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other. This phenomenon leads to the racial dimensions of inequality to remain invisible since they are 
explained as class differences that, some argue, can and should be resolved through universal social 
programs.601 
Discussions about class issues and socio-economic inequality were prevalent during the interview 
process. Participants were outspoken about how Afro-descendants faced significant levels of poverty across 
the country and were located in the lowest ranks of the socio-economic system.602 Class factors were 
relevant at characterizing the experiences that interviewees had in their access to the legal profession and 
at attaining positions within judicial institutions. Participants pointed out that socio-economic disadvantage 
undermined Afro-descendants' access to high-quality legal education.603 
Afro-descendant participants were candid about their own experiences of class inequality, with 
several of them describing that they grew up in low-income families and that had to work and study to be 
able to attend college. Many were the first professionals in their families, had to go into debt to pay for 
school, and faced financial limitations that severely conditioned the selection of their professions and the 
universities they attended. Some feared they could not finish school due to a lack of funding or had to study 
at night. Most of them grew up in impoverished neighborhoods that have severe limitations in access to 
public services. Some reported that their parents were illiterate or employed in manual labor positions. Most 
of their peers became technicians instead of professionals.604 Scholarships and other forms of academic 
awards played a decisive role in the access to education for many of these professionals. Some of them 
explained that this was, perhaps, the only way in which they could have had access to higher education.605  
Several of the accounts also described situations of inter-generational economic disadvantage and 
how these conditions shaped their paths toward education and employment. This issue was noticeable, for 
 
601 HTUN, supra note 297 at 21. 
602 Interview 1. 
603 Interviews 1, 3 and 17. 
604 Interviews 4, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44 and 45. 
605 Interviews 13 and 17.  
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example, in how many of the respondents mentioned that their parents were teachers,606 which is a type of 
position that Afro Colombians commonly use to climb up the socio-economic ladder, or in the different 
accounts in which the participants referred to low-class experiences as a source of motivation to attain the 
highest possible level of education: A participant mentioned: 
 
When I had four years of age, I already know how to read. I do not remember myself before I could 
read. That is because of my mom. When she was little, she lived in a town on the Pacific coast of 
Nariño called [name of town]. My mom was born in a rural area of the municipality of that town. I 
mean, she lived there a big part of her infancy. Later on, she left that town and went working as a 
domestic worker in Cali. She arrived at that house to be a domestic worker, but at that time, it was 
a truly rough time in which domestic work was very similar to slavery. However, she did get to a 
family that, when they found out she did not know how to read, registered her at night school. My 
mom was also very insistent about that. She wanted to go because she wanted to study. She wanted 
to learn how to read. My mom learned how to read when she was 15 years old. Then, she was 
obsessed with the idea that she was going to die, and her daughters would be left out without having 
learnt how to read. Because of that, all of my games were with letters. While everybody else had 
building blocks to play with, I had letters to learn, so I learned how to read since I was very young. 
My mom taught us how to read to my sister and me. She had this obsession that we had to know 
how to read. She was obsessed with the idea that we had to finish high school and then go to college. 
I mean, it was like neurolinguistics on the go. My sister and I studied. We studied a lot.607 
 
Alvaro Bello and Marta Rangel mention that many Afro-descendants in Latin America do not 
possess means of production and have been forced to leave their ancestral territories to find better economic 
opportunities.608 Likewise, Sérgio Costa and Guilherme Leite note that “on average, Afro-Latin Americans, 
 
606 Interviews 23, 26, 32, 39, 40 and 41. 
607 Interview 18. 
608 Bello and Rangel, supra note 6 at 40–41. 
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in particular women, have a shorter life expectancy, live in poorer conditions, have lower levels of formal 
education, and have more limited access to public services than the Latin American population as a 
whole.”609 In 2017, the ECLAC issued a report on the rights situation of Afro-descendants in Latin 
America, in which it verified the situation of structural inequality that this population faces in the region.610 
The institution highlighted Afro-descendant women's particular concerning condition. Black women face 
particular challenges in the enjoyment of their rights when compared to other women.611  
The ECLAC also pointed out that Afro-descendant populations in Latin America tend to be located 
in urban areas.612 The indicators of poverty and extreme poverty are higher among Afro-descendants than 
among the non-Afro-descendant population.613 This situation of deprivation seems to be correlated with 
the types of employment and compensation they receive in the labor market.614 Similarly, In 2018, the 
World Bank released a report in which the institution asserted that despite the importance of Afro-
descendant inclusion for the future of the Latin American region: 
 
Afro-descendants are disproportionately represented among the poor. In Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Panama, Peru, and Uruguay combined, Afro-descendants represent 38 percent of the total 
population, but about half of all the people living in extreme poverty. They also have fewer years of 
education and are more often victims of crime and violence. Despite their growing visibility, they 
are still vastly underrepresented in decision-making positions, both in private and in the public 




609 Costa and Leite Gonçalves, supra note 128 at 54. 
610 UNITED NATIONS: ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, supra note 127. 
611 Id. at 45. 
612 Id. at 56. 
613 Id. at 74. 
614 Id. at 74. 
615 Id. at 15. 
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The World Bank recognizes that there has been a significant poverty reduction among the Afro-
descendant population in the region during the last decade. Nevertheless, this institution also highlights that 
Afro-descendants have beneficiated less than whites and mestizos in terms of poverty reduction rates.616 
Because of this gap in the poverty reduction rates, the World Bank stated that “poverty is over twice as high 
for Afro-descendants in Brazil and three times higher in Uruguay, and over 10 percentage points higher in 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.”617 Therefore, children born in Afro-descendant families in the region are 
more likely to be poor, which decreases their opportunities in life.618 Additionally, Afro-descendants have 
fewer chances of social mobility than other ethno-racial groups, as "they are 2.5 times more likely to be 
chronically poor."619 This situation creates a "poverty trap" that Afro-descendants can hardly scape. Other 
aspects worsen this condition of vulnerability, such as rural-urban divide and gender inequalities.620 
The dreadful perspective on Afro-descendant socioeconomic status is shared by Hugo Ñopo, who 
asserts that ethnic groups in Latin America are significantly disadvantaged when compared to white 
persons. According to Ñopo, Afro-descendants have higher poverty rates, lower access to public services, 
do not have adequate political representation, encounter difficulties for accessing employment, and face 
significant discrimination.621 Likewise, Tianna Paschel and Mark Sawyer emphasize that Afro-descendants 
are among the most economically disadvantaged groups in Latin America, a region with very high levels 
of poverty.622 
 
616 AFRO-DESCENDANTS IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF INCLUSION, supra note 138 at 21. (The report 
warns: "Thus, although Afro-Peruvians and Afro-Uruguayans saw extraordinary annualized poverty decreases of 7 
percent and 10 percent respectively in the 2005– 15 period, non-Afro-descendants experienced annualized decreases 
of 9 percent and 14.5 percent respectively, widening the relative distance between the two groups in each country.") 
617 Id. at 21. 
618 Id. at 22. 
619 Id. at 22. 
620 Id. at 22. 
621 ÑOPO, supra note 563 at 6. 
622 Tianna S. Paschel & Mark Q. Sawyer, Contesting Politics as Usual: Black Social Movements, Globalization, and 
Race Policy in Latin America, 10 SOULS 197–214, 201 (2008). (Noting that “In addition to state repression, Black 
populations have also faced the problem of poverty. Afro-descendants are among the poorest in the Americas, a region 
with more inequality than any other region in the world. While activists are frequently middle class, the mass of the 
population struggles for everyday survival. Most Latin American countries have very small Black middle classes that 
might support sustained mass racial social movements., at the same time, scholars—Black and otherwise, from Latin 
America and abroad—have played an essential role in supporting social movements”). 
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Despite the significant overlapping of race and class subordination, I should mention that a part of 
the participants of the study seem to come from privileged backgrounds. 25% of respondents who provided 
data about the institutions where they completed high school informed that they graduated from private 
schools. 75% declared that they graduated from public school. If one uses this information as a proxy for 
class, this could mean that least a quarter of them seem to have grown up in middle-class or above contexts.  
Nevertheless, certain participants who came from middle and upper-middle-class families indicated 
that they were exceptions to the general condition of socio-economic exclusion that prevents Afro-
descendants from accessing legal education and judicial employee positions.623 The impact of class 
privileges was also sensible in individual accounts. A woman Afro-descendant judicial employee described 
a sensible difference in the treatment that Afro-descendant judges receive in comparison to other less-
affluent people with the same ethno-racial identity. The participant mentioned: "When you are a judge, and 
eventually become a magistrate, people see you differently. Yes, you are black, but you are seen differently. 
When a magistrate arrives in certain places, he arrives with his bodyguards. I arrive with my backpack, and 
let's say that things change a little."624 In contrast, some participants affirmed that they had experienced 
discrimination because they were presumed to be due to their ethno-racial identity.625 
The overlapping of racial subordination and low-class status seems to be one a reason for Afro-
descendant underrepresentation in judicial institutions. Afro-descendants have, in general, less access to 
good-quality education, fewer employment opportunities, and more restricted professional networks. These 
conditions ultimately limit their chances to become judges and judicial employees—I will discuss some of 
these aspects in greater detail in the following sections. Similarly, class status seems to be a factor to 
consider not only to assess whether Afro-descendants have adequate access to judicial positions, but also 
which Afro-descendants do. As I could observe during the interview process, a high-class status undeniably 
facilitates Afro-descendants' access to judicial institutions since class privileges can help to remove some 
 
623 Interviews 1, 23, 24, 25 and 42. 
624 Interview 16. 
625 Interview 1. 
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of the race-based obstacles that they experience when they try to reach such positions. Thus, race and class 
intertwine to define the stratification of judicial institutions in Colombia. 
 
3. Inequalities and difficulties in accessing education and, particularly, higher education 
 
Deeply connected to the previous element, another aspect that was very prominent in the 
interviewee's accounts concerning the potential reasons for Afro-descendant underrepresentation in the 
judicial system was the multiple difficulties that this group experiences in accessing education and, 
especially, high-quality legal education. Afro-descendant access to legal education is another field in which 
the problem of statistical invisibility presents significant challenges to my research. As described in chapter 
1 of the manuscript, I submitted an information request to the Ministry of Education. I asked for data 
concerning the number of law programs authorized to function in the country and of students in each one 
of these programs disaggregated by gender and ethno-racial identity. I inquired about the total number of 
graduates in the past five years disaggregated according to the same identity characteristics and also asked 
about affirmative action programs for women, indigenous persons, and Afro-descendants.  
In response to my petition, the Ministry provided information concerning the number of active law 
programs, currently enrolled students, and graduates from the 2013-2017 period, and even presented 
disaggregated data by gender for the number of enrolled students and graduates. However, as it happened 
in the case of the judiciary, no data was provided regarding ethno-racial identity in higher education 
institutions. The Ministry of Education declared: 
 
With respect to the ethnic identification data, we indicate you that the information report of the 
population by ethnic group is based on self-recognition and self-identification processes, and the 
completion and reporting of the variable before the information systems of the National Ministry of 
Education is responsibility of the higher education institutions in accordance with article 7 of the 
Decree 1767 of 2006. Currently, the ethnic identity variable shows a high level of underreporting 
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by the institutions. In consequence, the statistics that are obtained from this variable do not represent 
the totality of the attention of this population in the country's higher education system. 
 
The Ministry recognizes that even though the data collection instrument does include an ethnic 
identity variable, universities are failing to comply with their duty to report this information, which, in turn, 
leads to a general underreporting of the ethno-racial composition of higher-education institutions. No 
additional information was provided about why the universities did not provide such information, nor 
concerning whether the Ministry has taken any action to increase compliance of this reporting duty. 
Given the lack of data, I also submitted information requests directed to a group of universities 
located in different cities of the country to try to obtain at least some data concerning the composition of 
the student body and faculty. The criteria for selecting these institutions was that they had graduated 
Constitutional Court magistrates. I sent these rights of petition to the Externado de Colombia University, 
the University of Medellín, the University of the Andes, the National University of Colombia, Javeriana 
University, the University of Antioquia, Our Lady of the Rosary University, the Free University of 
Colombia, the University of the Atlantic, the University of Caldas, the Latin American Autonomous 
University, and the University of Cartagena. The University of Medellín, Javeriana University, the 
University of the Atlantic, and the Latin American Autonomous University did not respond to the petition. 
Besides, only the University of Cartagena, Our Lady of the Rosary University, Externado de Colombia 
University provided data about the ethno-racial composition of the student body in their law programs.  
In all the institutions that reported data, Afro-descendant students appeared to be scarce. This 
assertion that seems to be equally true for the University of Cartagena, located in a Caribbean coast city 
where a significant portion of the population (36.1%) is Afro-descendant,626 and in Our Lady of the Rosary 
University and Externado de Colombia University, both located in Bogotá, where the Afro-descendant 
 
626 BOLETÍN CENSO GENERAL 2005: PERFIL CARTAGENA, BOLÍVAR, supra note 512 at 2. 
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population is low (1.5%).627 Despite the differences in demography, the level of Afro-descendant presence 
among the law student body in all three universities looks to be lower than the one corresponding to their 
share of the population in the city where they are located. Furthermore, the University of Caldas provided 
data concerning the ethno-racial composition of the law school faculty, asserting that Afro-descendants or 
indigenous persons occupied none of the 35 faculty positions in the university's law school (including full-
time and partial-time faculty). 
 
Ethno-racial composition of law student body [2018-2019] 

























925 544 (58.81%) 51 (5.51%) 23 (2.48%) 13 (1.41%) 4 (0.43%) 














12 (0.69%) 8 (0.46%) 12 (0.69%) 5 (0.27%) 
[ Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation] 
 
Many participants referred to the limited number of Afro-descendant students at higher education 
institutions as well.630 Several of them pointed out that during their time in law schools, the number of 
Afro-descendant students was in very low, with some of them even stating that they had the experience of 
being the only ones in their respective classes.631 A similar situation happened in the case of indigenous 
interviewees, who described the experience of being “the only indigenous person” in their class.632 An 
 
627 BOLETÍN CENSO GENERAL 2005: PERFIL BOGOTÁ, BOGOTÁ, 6 2 (2010), 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/11001T7T000.PDF (last visited Mar 10, 2020). 
628 BOLETÍN ESTADÍSTICO 2018, 56 20 (2019), 
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/19887/Boletin%20Estad%C3%ADstico%202018.pdf?seq
uence=1 (last visited Mar 10, 2020). 
629 Id. at 20. 
630 Interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 22, 24, 26, 27, 29, 33, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44.  
631 Interviews 9, 12, 24, 41. 
632 Interview 11. 
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Afro-descendant judge who attended a private law school in a majoritarian Afro-descendant city in the 
Caribbean region, mentioned: 
 
I think I was the only Afro-descendant in my class. I refer to brown people (gente morena). 
Obviously, among the Afro-descendants, some of us have more melanin than others. However, in 
my class, and I tell you, that is a good question, during the five years I attended [law school], I think 
I was the only Afro. The darkest in the classroom.633 
  
However, the actual number of Afro-descendant persons enrolled in law schools could be higher 
than the one that participants report since n this context, too, self-identification becomes a limitation to 
assess representation.634  
The World Bank has declared that there has been significant progress regarding Afro-descendants' 
access to education across the Latin American region. This improvement has benefited the general 
population in Latin American countries. However, noteworthy access barriers persist.635 Afro-descendants 
still have considerably worse educational accomplishment levels than other groups (64% of Afro-
descendants versus 80% of non-Afro-descendants at primary level).636 This disparity persists regardless of 
socio-economic status.637 Education gaps are more prominent in secondary and tertiary education and had 
not been reducing in recent years.638 Afro-descendants not only have higher secondary education dropout 
rates but also account for only 12% of the people with tertiary education degrees, despite representing a 
quarter of the population over 25 years of age in the region.639 
 
633 Interview 5. 
634 Interview 33. 
635 AFRO-DESCENDANTS IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF INCLUSION, supra note 138 at 23. 
636 Id. at 23. 
637 Id. at 23. 
638 Id. at 23. 
639 Id. at 23. 
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The limited number of Afro-descendant students in law schools seems to be concerning in public 
and private universities alike, and particularly severe in "elite" institutions.640 In the case of private 
universities and particularly expensive private universities, the low level of Afro-descendant presence 
seems to be directly linked to the elevated tuition costs. In the case of public universities, the low Afro-
descendant access appears to be connected to the law school admission processes. In public universities, 
applicants' selection tends to heavily rely on standardized tests that, some participants believe, play against 
candidates who graduated from public schools, where the quality of education is perceived to be worse.641 
One of the participants mentioned: “Well, I was admitted to a public university, which is, contrary to what 
one might think, pretty hard for a public school student to study in a public university. Those who can pass 
the test are those coming from good schools."642 
There are exceptions to the general perception of Afro-descendant absence from law schools in 
Colombia. Some participants mentioned that a significant portion of their law school class was Afro-
descendant.643 The lack of statistical data in this respect does not allow me to identify these universities 
fully. Nevertheless, my perception is that these institutions tend to be private universities located in areas 
with particularly numerous Afro-descendant populations. According to participants, in these institutions, 
the quality of education is not good.644  
Regarding the quality of higher education that Afro-descendants receive, some respondents pointed 
out that this was, in general terms, of inferior quality, given the economic restrictions to attend high-quality 
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[Afro-descendants face] all the difficulties, all the difficulties, because the universities from which 
they graduate are not the best. They do not attend [name of prestigious private university]; they are 
not those prestigious universities. They do not attend [name of prestigious private university]. They 
are universities with deficient academic standards. Above all, in many private universities in 
Cartagena, on the [Caribbean] coast, we are just a few black persons who can attend the [name of a 
prestigious private university]. For example, due to the high cost of these universities. Then, we are 
forced to attend to low-quality universities, where the cost of the semester is 2 or 3 million pesos, 
which is easier to cover.646 
 
Another participant declared: 
 
I attended a university in the province. It was a university that educates legal professionals. In that 
respect, in that context, I acknowledge that the conditions in which our university educates students 
are not the best. That is not only my case, but the case of all communities located on the outskirts 
of the country. Of course, there are Afro Colombians that can have access to great opportunities and 
attend outstanding universities, the best in the country. However, probably the economic position 
of their parents that facilitates such a situation, or their academic performance allows them to find 
someone to fund them. That is not the common denominator. The common denominator is to attend 
a university in a province that offers average, almost low, quality of education, and with those skills 
go out into the professional world to try to defend everybody’s interests.647 
 
 Most Afro-descendants in Latin America do not have access to high-quality education, much less 
to institutions of education that consider culture, language, and religious particularities of Afro-descendants 
 
646 Interview 32. 
647 Interview 35. 
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who have a particular culture.648 In 1992, only 2% of the students at the University of São Paulo were 
black.649 Also, in Brazil, Afro-descendant children:  
 
have greater difficulty in entering, remaining in and progressing through the educational system and 
keeping up to the standards set for their age group. They also attend worse-quality schools, the result 
of all this being that they are more likely to be failed or to fall behind the standards set for their age 
group than are white students.650 
   
 Parallelly to the issue of the quality of education, some participants noted that Afro-descendants 
have limited access to institutions that are known for graduating lawyers who later occupy positions in the 
judiciary.651 They asserted that certain law schools have contact networks or specific profiles that enable 
their alumni to enter the judiciary.652 Some suggested that there are informal hierarchies that play out at the 
Colombian courts’ recruitment practices and personnel selection.653 The universities that seem to have these 
particular connections with the judicial branch appear to be, in a majority of cases, high-cost private 
institutions.654  
Class status heavily conditions Afro-descendants’ access to higher education. Given the high cost 
generally associated with legal education, and the limited resources that most Afro-descendants possess, 
some of the participants referenced having to work and study to be able to afford attending university, 
which, in many cases, forced them to study at night or under conditions that delayed their graduation.655  
 
648 Bello and Rangel, supra note 6 at 60. 
649 Id. at 60. 
650 Id. at 50. 
651 Interviews 4, 14, 17, 29, 30 and 37. 
652 Id. 
653 Interview 14. 
654 Interview 37. 
655 Interviews 4, 21, 31 and 42. 
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Scholarships, fellowships, and affirmative action programs played a significant role in enabling 
access to higher education for certain Afro-descendants and facilitated their access to postgraduate 
programs.656 Some participants declared that without these types of awards, it is unlikely they could have 
been able to become lawyers.657 A similar situation happens with public universities, in which the costs of 
attendance are more accessible for low-income students.658 Nevertheless, scholarships were sometimes 
partial, which led to some Afro-descendant law students to use loans or other forms of funding to cover 
their education costs.659  
In the field of affirmative action programs, several Latin American countries have made significant 
progress to better guarantee access to education for Afro-descendant populations. The most notable 
example is Brazil, where Law 12,711 of 2012 put in place a system of quotas for public federal universities 
for Afro Brazilians.660 The program takes into consideration different criteria and reserves 50% of seats for 
students graduating from public schools and who come from low-income backgrounds. Within this 
percentage, it creates a quota for Afro-descendant and indigenous students, corresponding their share of the 
population in the respective state.661 Following this law, some universities established independent 
affirmative action measures for graduate programs.662 These initiatives are also independent of the benefits 
established in Law 11,096 of 2005, which establishes scholarships for students from low-income families 
to attend private universities.663 
In the case of Colombia, affirmative action and scholarship programs for Afro-descendants have 
been modest. Decree 1627 of 1996 established a special system of education loans for low-income Afro 
Colombians with outstanding academic performance and educational achievement.664 Additionally, some 
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664 D. 1627/96, septiembre 10, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
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universities have established independent affirmative action programs. However, most of them are 
relatively limited in their scope.665 In this regard, although according to the Ministry of Interior, 
approximately 60 Colombian universities and institutions of higher education offer scholarships and other 
incentives for Afro-descendant students, these tend to provide only partial funding or, in the case of quotas, 
only reserve a few seats per academic program or department.666 
The urban-rural division and the geographic location condition effective enjoyment of the 
education service. As I explained in chapter 2, some regions that concentrate large Afro-descendant 
populations (e.g., San Andrés, Tumaco, and Buenaventura) do not have any law schools, which constitutes 
a significant obstacle for the group's access to legal education. A judge from an Andean city of Colombia 
commented: 
 
If you are in a city like Medellín, you can quickly get a postgraduate degree after another. In a few 
years, you can get a post-graduate degree in family law, in administrative law, in civil law, in 
criminal law. You can get 5 or 6 postgraduate degrees. In the end, every one of them gives you a 
score [in the selection process]. If you are living in a region that does not offer postgraduate degrees, 
if you are working there, if you have your initial degree, some postgraduate degrees you did online, 
or are traveling to other cities, if that is where you are living and have your professional activity, 
that supply, that supply of knowledge, and the supply of this type of studies are not available.667 
 
This comment exemplifies how inequality in access to legal education constrains the possibility of 
some Afro-descendants to acquire the academic credentials necessary to have access to judicial positions. 
As I explained in chapter 2, Afro-descendants comprise a significant part of the population in peripherical 
 
665 Id. 
666 Ministerio del Interior, Listado de Universidades que Otorgan Descuento a las Comunidades Negras, 
Afrocolombianas, Raizales y Palenqueras, 
https://dacn.mininterior.gov.co/sites/default/files/listado_de_universidades_que_aplican_descuento_mayo_2018.pdf 
(last visited Mar 10, 2020). 
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areas of the country, which means that they often lack an adequate provision of services, including 
education. In this respect, an interviewee declared: 
 
It is known that there are vast differences between an alumnus of the University of the Pacífico or a 
university in Barranquilla or Cartagena, and an alumnus of the University of Antioquia, EAFIT or 
the University of Medellín. The opportunities are different. Maybe because of the conditions of 
development of those cities and the peripherical conditions of ours. Therefore, we do not have the 
same training, nor the same opportunity to, for example, having similar conditions to compete for 
those positions, at least through a merit-selection process.668 
 
 The barriers to access higher education often leads to forms of migration.669 Many of the 
participants asserted they had to leave their cities and regions of origin because they could not receive 
higher education there. I call this phenomenon "educational migration.670 One of them mentioned: "My 
process to become a lawyer started by having to leave my city of origin [name of the city], in the region of 
Chocó, because by the time I was in school there were no universities in that geographic area that offered 
a law program."671 In certain situations, these experiences of educational migration are inter-generational. 
Some participants explained that their parents underwent migration processes due to this same reason.672 
Most of the migrating students move to central cities of the country, such as Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, or 
Cartagena, where the educational offer is robust.673 As one might expect, class status often conditions the 
possibility of migrating to study in other cities due to the significant costs associated with educational 
expenses, relocation, and establishment in a new city.674 A participant mentioned: 
 
668 Interview 35. 
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In San Andrés, access to education is not easy because of the costs. It is an economic matter, and 
well, also social. For youths, everything is fast. However, financially, it is very demanding because 
the parents had to create another home [in a different city] to send their child to. Even if it is to a 
dormitory, they have to cover the room, board, tuition, and additional expenses. That is tough.675  
 
Likewise, class status also conditions the destinations of educational migrants. In some cases, 
middle-income families send their children to cities where they can reside with family or friends, or where 
their older siblings have already relocated to. This decision lowers the costs associated with this practice.676 
Furthermore, many Afro-descendants who become educational migrants face significant financial 
hardships to cover their maintenance and school-related costs.677 They also undergo processes of uprooting, 
given the difficulties to afford the costs associated with visiting their families and the cultural clash they 
experience in their new homes. An Afro-descendant woman judge in a Caribbean city of Colombia stated: 
 
The students, thanks to the great effort of our parents, had to go for the entire year because we did 
not have the opportunity to come back home in June. At that time, there were not the same 
communication alternatives that you see today, much less the transport systems that you see today, 
with lower fares. At that time, it was costly. Our parents had to send us away in January, and we 
could come back in December to spend Christmas with our families.678 
  
A final element to consider is discrimination in this specific setting. Although I will refer more 
extensively to the issue of racial discrimination within judicial institutions and the legal profession in the 
final section of this chapter, I would like to highlight some aspects regarding racial discrimination 
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677 Interview 20, 33 and 36. 
678 Interview 26. 
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experiences in the context of higher education. Participants pointed out not only to situations of structural 
discrimination and socio-economic inequality,679 but also to events to overt racial discrimination during 
their time at law school.680 In this respect, a woman Afro-descendant judge living in the city of Bogotá 
described that while she was a law student, she experienced multiple situations of discrimination from 
faculty, which ultimately led her to transfer to another university. She mentioned that:  
 
The last straw was that one day I had a final exam, in which we delivered a group paper, and that 
was the final grade. When they returned our paper, next to the names, there were the grades. 
Nevertheless, she [her partner] got a five, and I got a four. I said: 'this must be a mistake' because it 
was only one paper, there was not oral defense, just the paper. Then I went to talk to the professor 
with my classmate and we told him: 'We think that there was a mistake, because you gave her a five, 
and you gave me a four'. The answer that the professor gave me was: 'you should be thankful that I 
gave you that grade because you know that at this university black people do not study [enough], 
and what they do is to lean on white people to be able to pass the classes, so you should thank me I 
gave you a 4.' At that moment I knew I was in the wrong place and that I needed to leave.681 
 
The discriminatory language was a collective experience in the lives of Afro-descendant students. 
One of them mentioned that during her time in law school, other students called her “pelo de alambre” 
(wire hair),682 another participant described how even faculty tended to call her "Negrita" (little black 
girl),683 and a third one referred to the frequent use of racially biased expressions in the classroom that 
tended to go unnoticed, to the point of describing how one of her classmates, a white-mestizo attorney 
working on human rights law, during one of the classes said:  
 
679 Interviews 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 25, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 
45. 
680 Interviews 2, 6, 12, 15, 16, 19, 27, 33, 40 and 42. 
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Excuse me! [there were three Afro-descendant students in the same class, including the participant], 
but I have always believed that the people from the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts complain a lot. 
If they are poor is because they are lazy. They do not want to work and decide to cry over it instead. 
Black people only like parties and buzz.684 
 
Several participants, particularly women, had experiences in which they were confused with 
cleaning services employees at their places of education, due to their gender and race.685 Discrimination 
manifested through the denial of Afro-descendant’s contributions to knowledge and society, too. One of 
the interviewees described that when he proposed to have a seminar on African philosophy at the university 
where he studied, the school administrators replied by denying that African philosophy existed at all.686 
The participant commented that: "In education, the exclusion of knowledge, history, and contributions of 
black people is widespread.”687 Moreover, participants coincided that they did not receive any sort of 
training regarding ethnic rights or Afro-descendants' rights while they were in law school since such 
academic offer did not exist.688 Participants suggested that experiences of discrimination undermined their 
academic performance and affected their relationships with their peers, to the point of not being able to say 
their names in class without fear.689  
I consider that racial discrimination in education plays an essential role in explaining the situation 
of Afro-descendant underrepresentation in the judiciary. Experiences of discrimination do not only exclude 
people from educational settings; they block their access to different positions and impair the development 
of their academic potential in institutions of higher education. The World Bank has asserted that the 
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differential educational outcomes between Afro-descendants and non-Afro-descendants in Latin America 
are, in part, the effect of ethno-racial discrimination: 
 
Discrimination plays a vital role in explaining some educational gaps and outcomes. Education 
systems across the region fail to promote the recognition of Afro-descendant identities; on the 
contrary, they contribute to promoting stereotypical and folklore-driven representations. Lack of 
public funding, inadequate facilities and class materials, and unsupported faculty are other factors 
that have been found to limit the performance of Afro-descendant youths and children. Afro-
descendant families also face obstacles in covering school-related expenses, including tuition, 
transportation, and school supplies.690 
 
In conclusion, the role of education inequalities, racial discrimination in education, and the 
difficulties in accessing higher education are factors that appear to be contributing to the 
underrepresentation of Afro-descendants in Latin American courts. Additional research efforts should 
analyze the relative weight that this variable has on this problem. 
 
4. The interaction of race- and gender-based forms of oppression 
 
Similarly to what occurs with class dynamics, gender directly influences the issue of racial 
stratification of judicial institutions in Latin America. Gender subordination played a sensitive role in the 
participants’ responses (particularly of women’s responses) concerning the ethno-racial composition of 
Colombian judicial institutions and in the answers offered to the rights of petition. This entanglement of 
race and gender is not surprising. As Peter Wade asserted, these two categories have historically been 
 
690 AFRO-DESCENDANTS IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF INCLUSION, supra note 138 at 23. 
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intertwined.691 This bond between race and gender in Latin America is deeply related to the mestizaje 
narratives. During colonial and post-colonial periods, the mestizo nation project demanded the acceptance 
of a specific type of interracial relations (those involving white men and indigenous and black women) and 
the rejection of others (the relations between black and indigenous men and white women).692 Furthermore, 
Tianna Paschel remembers that the cult of mestizaje has also created a smokescreen behind which the sexual 
coercion and violence against African and indigenous women hide.693 Because of this historical relation, 
Wade asserts that, in Latin America, race and sex, instead of being seen as categories that intersect, should 
be understood as conditions that mutually constitute one another.694 He argues that in social orders where 
race is used as a form to stratify society based on ancestry, the control of human sexuality and, mainly, 
women's sexuality is critical to maintaining such stratified order in place.695 
There are two main ways in which race and gender seemed to interact during the data-collection 
process: The intersectionality of race and gender discrimination and the differences in the judicial 
institutions’ treatment of race and gender. 
 
4.1. Intersectional race and gender discrimination 
 
Afro-descendant women participants narrated how their gender and race placed them in a position 
of considerable disadvantage in the legal profession and within judicial institutions. An Afro-descendant 
judge stressed the differences in life experiences that Afro-descendant men and women encounter in their 
lives. These differences shape their access to the legal and judicial positions. She mentioned that: "It is not 
the same, it is not the same, for an Afro man judge than for an Afro woman, I believe that these are also 
 
691 Peter Wade, Debates contemporáneos sobre raza, etnicidad, género y sexualidad en las ciencias sociales, in RAZA, 
ETNICIDAD Y SEXUALIDADES: CIUDADANÍA Y MULTICULTURALISMO EN AMÉRICA LATINA 41–66, 50 (Peter Wade, 
Fernando Urrea Giraldo, & Mara Viveros eds., 2008). 
692 Id. at 50. 
693 PASCHEL, supra note 33 at 5–6. 
694 PETER WADE, RACE AND SEX IN LATIN AMERICA 2 (2009). 
695 Id. at 58–59. 
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different fights. For being women, we are seen as weak for this type of position."696 Some Afro-descendant 
women participants had specific burdens since an early age. An Afro-descendant woman judicial employee 
remembered that, during an informal conversation with a professor she had in law school, he told her: "you 
have three problems: you are a woman, you are poor, and you are black. You need to study much more than 
these other women [referring to her classmates]". This assertion came to her as a shock, but she eventually 
agreed with her professor: 
 
After some time, I realized that those three things that he had said were wisdom because being a 
woman had already a burden, but being a black woman had an additional burden, and coming from 
a family that has been socially climbing, but that still has not reached a certain [socio-economic] 
level, had other complications.697 
 
Moreover, participants tended to emphasize that black women's work and accomplishments are 
consistently overlooked or underestimated.698 In this respect, one of the participants commented that: 
"Being a black woman is a barrier in other people's minds to believe what I am, or to associate my profession 
to my ethnic and gender condition".699  
A particular area in which indigenous and Afro-descendant women tended to make visible the 
specific burdens they face due to the interaction of their gender and racial identities was in the way in which 
they needed to reconcile their family responsibilities with their work.700 Maternity was also a particularly 
visible aspect, not only in the participants' narratives but during the interview process itself. During a couple 
of interviews, I noticed that Afro-descendant women interviewees had brought their children to work or 
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had specific time restraints associated with their parental responsibilities. In contrast, Afro-descendant men 
appeared not to have this type of responsibility. 
Certain stereotypes concerning black women also appeared evident during the interviews. 
Participants mentioned how they were commonly confused with domestic workers and general services 
personnel or felt that they could be stereotyped as such, as black women are commonly associated with this 
type of labor.701 One of the participants explained that stereotypes make their way into the work 
environment, which puts Afro-descendant women in an awkward position in professional spaces. She 
mentioned: "The black woman [is seen] as the domestic worker, or as a woman that is very humorous or 
sexually active. In the end, it is challenging that, once you move to a professional setting, you can transform 
that imaginary".702 In certain instances, black men were the ones who engaged in stereotyping and 
discrimination against black women.703 In the case of indigenous women, they also made references to how 
they faced significant gender-based barriers in the interior of their communities. For example, they were 
excluded from the possibility of participating in their traditional justice systems.704 
These reinforced experiences of discrimination faced by Afro-descendant women (and indigenous 
women) seem to be supported by previous research on intersectional discrimination in Latin America. The 
ECLAC has pointed out that, in Latin America, gender, race, class, and ethnicity interact and alter how 
different types of women experience discrimination and inequality.705 Social indicators, when 
disaggregated in terms of sex and race/ethnicity, show that Afro-descendant and indigenous women fare 
worse in different social metrics than other groups of women.706 These differences might indicate that race 
could play a more determinant nature than gender at explaining their disadvantageous place in society.707 
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The specific challenges and burdens that Afro-descendant and indigenous women face in the legal 
and judicial professions were, sometimes, mentioned as a condition that motivated women to join judicial 
institutions. These women acknowledged the symbolic relevance that their presence in these positions of 
power could have for young Afro-descendant women and girls and the black women's social movement.708 
I should state, however, that Afro-descendant women appear to be in similar, and sometimes, 
slightly better positions than Afro-descendant men in terms of presence in the judiciary. Out of the 9 Afro-
descendant magistrates reported for the superior tribunals of judicial district, 5 were women, and 2 out of 3 
magistrates reported in this same category for the administrative tribunals were also Afro-descendant 
women. In the case of judicial employees, 20 of the 28 Afro-descendant judicial employees reported for the 
superior tribunals of judicial district were women, and 9 of the 13 Afro-descendants reported in these same 
positions in the administrative tribunals were women. A similar situation takes place in the case of the SJP, 
where 3 of the 4 Afro-descendant magistrates are also women.  
However, interviewees' accounts seemed to emphasize the specific barriers that Afro-descendant 
women face (when compared to Afro-descendant men) working in the judicial system. One could interpret 
that these barriers manifest not as an aggravated barrier for Afro-descendant women to access positions in 
the judiciary, but as specific situations of discrimination and exclusion in their lived experiences as legal 
and judicial professionals. Also, although Afro-descendant women seem to be in a slighter better position 
than Afro-descendant men in terms of access to positions inside judicial institutions, they also appear to be 
heavily underrepresented in judicial institutions, as the general Afro-descendant population is. 
 
4.2. Different treatment of race and gender by judicial institutions 
 
Another aspect that I should mention is how race and gender compare to one another within judicial 
institutions and the legal profession. There were several ways in which the different treatment of race and 
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gender by judicial institutions became evident during the data collection process. The most palpable was, 
perhaps, the dissimilarities in the available data concerning each identity category. The Superior Council 
of the Judicature had data on the composition of the Colombian judiciary disaggregated by gender, the 
National Registry of Attorneys had pre-existing data on the gender composition of the legal profession, 
certain courts, such as the State Council, provided data concerning the gender composition of the institution. 
However, these same institutions failed to provide similar data disaggregated by ethno-racial identity. 
Besides, in their responses to the rights of petition, courts seemed to be more willing to discuss issues of 
gender than issues of race. As an example, the Administrative Tribunal of Santander sustained: "The 
corporation has always seen as vital the participation of women in the different positions [of the institution], 
which materializes in the number of women that currently work in the institution, regardless of the existence 
of a program or inclusion policy." At the same time, the tribunal avoided any mention of indigenous or 
Afro-descendant persons. 
 In addition to these asymmetric treatments of race and gender, inclusion policies based on gender 
have been more effective than ethno-racial inclusion policies in Latin American judiciaries in specific ways. 
This greater effectiveness of gender inclusion policies is patent in aspects such as the establishment of a 
gender commission for the Colombian judiciary, which publishes reports and promotes the inclusion of 
gender perspectives into judicial decision-making.709 Another example is the gender quota law, which seeks 
to guarantee a minimum level of women's representation (30%) in high-level state positions, including the 
high courts.710 
Similarly, respondents revealed different instances in which judicial institutions treated gender and 
race differently. As an example, one of the participants described how, in the SJP, the idea of granting a 
significant level of representation for women among the group of judicial employees faced less opposition 
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that the idea of adopting similar policies for Afro-descendants and indigenous persons.711 This different 
treatment was justified on the basis that it was easier to find qualified women to occupy positions at this 
institution than it was to find qualified indigenous or Afro-descendant candidates for the same type of 
positions. According to the interviewee: "… the matter is that many of the magistrates that were appointed, 
when the ethnic topic was mentioned, [they] left the negotiation table when the characteristics of the 
[auxiliary] justices were being discussed."712 
This different treatment of race and gender inclusion claims seems to be consistent with previous 
literature on this topic. Regarding the interactions between ethno-racial and gender-based social movements 
in Latin America, Mala Htun describes how countries in the region have opted for an array of mechanisms 
to guarantee these groups’ inclusion at an institutional level.713 The preferred options have depended on 
factors such as country-specific political traditions and institutional designs, but also on the structural 
characteristics of the groups that were trying to be included in society and public institutions.714 Htun asserts 
that the easier it is to define the boundary of a group, the simpler it is “for political institutions to target 
benefits and sort voters by group. When group boundaries are more ambiguous the application of group-
specific policies–whether on political inclusion or access to higher education–poses practical 
difficulties.”715 The author targets a significant difference between ethno-racial groups and women in Latin 
America. The boundaries used to differentiate between women and men tend to be (at least traditionally) 
easier to mark than ethno-racial boundaries. Ethno-racial limits are more difficult to demarcate given the 
extended levels of miscegenation, the complexities of racial classifications, and the history of race 
relations.716  
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Htun identifies several significant differences between the path that women and ethno-racial groups 
in Latin America have taken in order to conquer political inclusion policies.717 She mentions that since 
class and race divisions tend to overlap in this part of the world profoundly, race-based affirmative action 
measures may appear threatening to national ruling elites. These policies could introduce new class interests 
into the democratic debate, in contradiction to the elite’s wishes.718 This threat is not present in affirmative 
action policies for women. Gander based policies do not experience similar class conflicts with men, as 
their inclusion in political institutions does not necessarily lead to the incorporation of perceived 
destabilizing class interests in these areas.719 
In conclusion, the interactions of race and gender forms of oppression are fundamental to 
understand the racial stratification of Latin American judicial institutions. This relation exceeds 
intersectional analysis and the aggravated forms of discrimination that Afro-descendant women experience 
since Judicial institutions' dissimilarly treat ethno-racial and gender identities. Courts appear to be more 
receptive to produce information and engage in action to accommodate women's inclusion than Afro-
descendant and indigenous' inclusion. Nevertheless, I should also be clear to assert that this differential 
treatment may be negligible, if one considers the significant challenges that women inclusion and gender 
justice face in the judicial system. 
 
5. The influence of race, color, and identity 
 
There were instances in which participants discussed the relevance of skin color and other physical 
characteristics in their experiences in judicial institutions. As I explained in chapter 1, authors such as Anani 
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Dzidzienyo,720 Eunice Aparecida de Jesus,721 Hebe Clementi,722 Edward Telles and Tianna Paschel,723 
Tanya Hernandez,724 Elisa Larkin Nascimento,725 Peter Wade,726 and many others coincide in that skin 
color plays a determinant role in the construction of racial subordination in Latin America. This role is so 
essential that some of them have used the concept of pigmentocracy to define racial relations in this 
region.727 Edward Telles expresses that in the case of Colombia, skin color and other phenotypic identifiers 
seem to be more determinant (or a better predictor) of social status and the benefits and burdens associated 
with it than racial self-identification.728 This situation repeats in other countries in Latin America, except 
for Brazil, as "in all the PERLA countries, skin color was a more reliable predictor of racial inequality, with 
the exception of Brazil, where identity and appearance tend to be more correlated."729 In this sense, racial 
discrimination in Latin America appears to be more aligned with color differences than with ethno-racial 
identity differences. 
Some of the participants stressed that darker skin colors and other prominent physical traits commonly 
associated with Afro descendancy are factors that can increase the risk of suffering discrimination.730 The 
darker the skin, the higher the risk of being excluded or discriminated against, and conversely. A participant 
described how one of her law school classmates seemed to inflict different forms of racial discrimination 
based on phenotype against black persons. The interviewee described that: 
 
We had a classmate who was also Afro [descendant], then that guy [the bully] believed that we came 
in tones—not all blacks are the same—her hair color was similar to [the color of] petroleum, then 
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that guy came and said to her: 'that black blouse, you cannot even tell the difference.' That was how 
he rolled. And I used to tell him: 'but I am also black.' And he replied: 'No, you are not so black' 
[referencing her lighter skin color]. Or certain things happened, like [he said]: 'No, you are black, 
but you are smart; you are black, but you are pretty.731 
 
Some participants also seemed to note that lightness in skin color not only allows for some degree 
of racial privilege but could also facilitate whitening. Afro descendants who have lighter skin can more 
easily transit into one of the mestizo racial categories and self-identify as non-Afro-descendant. People with 
darker skin tones do not have such a possibility.732 On certain occasions, Afro-descendant interviewees 
mentioned that specific facts (such as being light-skinned or coming from higher socio-economic 
backgrounds) made them question the authenticity of their experience as Afro-descendants in the legal 
profession and in their personal lives. A light-skinned upper-middle-class Afro-descendant woman attorney 
living in an Andean city of Colombia stated: 
 
When I was born, I was living in Laureles [name of an upper-middle-class neighborhood], and that 
was it. So I feel bad saying that I am an Afro-descendent because I have not suffered it. I feel that 
when [one] self-identifies before public authorities is to receive a benefit or something, and I do not, 
for my economic position nor in esthetic terms [referencing her light-skin], manifest that. 
 
I find particularly interesting about this account that the participant seems to directly connect the 
"authenticity" of the Afro-descendant identity with a low-class status vis-à-vis equating being Afro-
descendant to being poor. This narrative exemplifies the idea that "money whitens" that some scholars have 
documented.733 The participant also acknowledged that her lighter-skin allows her to evade certain forms 
of race discrimination, which appears to suggest that lighter skin Afro-descendant can more easily transit 
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into intermediate racial categories. In this respect, the discussion about color discrimination is part of a 
broader conversation about the self-recognition of the Afro-descendant population and the mobilization of 
black identities. 
 As I had previously discussed, self-identification is a significant issue among Afro-descendants in 
Latin America. Despite being racialized as black, many Afro-descendants will not identify with any Afro-
descendant identity. Some respondents seemed to understand that the lack of self-identification as Afro-
descendants was a form of avoiding further experiences of discrimination,734 while others read it as a 
manifestation of shame and internalized racism. One of the participants used the expression “negros 
vergonzantes” (shameful blacks) as a way to refer to Afro-descendants who actively seek not to be 
referenced as black or try to underemphasize this part of their identities.735 In the respondent's views, the 
origin of this "shame," is related to the meaning that blackness has in Colombia's history. He asserted that 
to acknowledge one's African heritage is also to recognize the legacy of slavery and that, as the same 
participant described it, "you came here in chains.736 Moreover, several interviewees discussed individual 
trajectories towards self-recognizing as Afro-descendants and their battles amid this process.737 
The embracement of Afro-descendant identity limits the debate about Afro-descendant 
representation in the courts in different ways. For example, in the case of Cartagena, many Afro-
descendants that work for the judiciary do not self-identify as such. Hence, the process of assessing the 
level of representation that Afro-descendants have on the courts is more difficult, given the lack of self-
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6. Inequalities and disparate impacts of judicial selection mechanisms 
 
There has been limited research on the issue of Latin American judiciaries’ gender and ethno-racial 
composition, including on how selection mechanisms influence certain groups’ access to judicial posts. In 
the context of the U.S., however, several scholars have studied the impact of judicial selection mechanisms 
on the composition of courts at the state and federal levels. Before referring to the specific findings attained 
concerning judicial selection mechanisms influence on group representation on courts, I will briefly 
summarize the U.S. literature on this topic. Despite the apparent differences in the judicial selection 
mechanisms used in this national context vis-à-vis Latin America, I believe that this literature may 
illuminate particular challenges that ethno-racial minorities face in their access to the bench. 
 
6.1. U.S. literature on judicial selection mechanisms and their impact on women and ethno-
racial minorities representation on the judiciary 
 
One of the most salient points of academic debate regarding group representation on U.S. courts is 
the relationship between minorities' presence in the judiciary and judicial selection mechanisms employed 
to fill out vacancies. The question about whether certain judicial selection mechanisms create better 
conditions for increasing the number of non-traditional judges has led to significant debate. Some authors 
have criticized the use of particular selection mechanisms, such as merit selection, under the belief that 
these mechanisms could make it more difficult for women and minorities to attain a seat on the bench.739 
They argue that non-white-male judges "are not a part of the prior status quo or do not have the same 
experiences or opportunities as do other judicial candidates, which militates against their chances of being 
selected."740  
 
739 Mark Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Diversity in State and Federal Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity 
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 A paper published by Mark Hurwitz in 2010 argues that, although differences in judicial selection 
mechanisms used to play a significant role in judicial diversity on courts, such effect has been vanishing 
over time.741 The paper, based on a previously published work,742 suggests that, although in 1985 minority 
judges had higher chances to sit on state appellate benches if judges were appointed by the state governor 
instead of selected by a merit commission, by 1999 and 2005 minorities had the same chances of becoming 
judges if a merit selection plan, a governor's appointment, or a judicial election mechanism was employed 
fill out vacancies.743 The research, which looked at the composition of state appellate courts at different 
points in time, concluded that "while there once may have been some correlation between selection system 
and diversity, there no longer is any such relationship."744 
Despite this, Sherrilyn Ifill objects to the benign nature of different judicial selection mechanisms 
to enhance minority representation in the judiciary. In her view, empirical studies analyzing the effect of 
different systems of judicial selection have produced conflicting results and have exclusively focused on 
the number of women and minorities on the bench, disregarding the importance of structural impartiality—
different ideas and life experiences—to assess judicial diversity.745 Due to the controversial nature of this 
topic, I will examine the relationship between the mechanisms used for judicial selection at the federal and 
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6.1.1. Federal courts 
 
In the case of article III judges, the process for selecting a judge to fill a vacancy consists of two 
main steps: presidential nomination of the candidate, followed by a confirmation process before the 
Senate.746 According to Sheldon Goldman, since the late 1970s, the confirmation of federal judges has 
become increasingly contentious.747 The so-called "confirmation wars" are the result of a clash between 
liberals and conservatives in Congress. Both groups are trying to ideologically align with their views on the 
role of the judicial system to address politically divisive issues, such as sexual and reproductive rights, 
crime, the bill of rights, among others.748 Kevin Johnson warns about how the polarization around judicial 
confirmations is likely to continue in the future. Johnson points out that the ideological divisiveness 
surrounding the confirmation processes will likely have a particularly harsh impact on minority judicial 
nominees.749 He asserts that the ideological divisions in the confirmation processes have harmed minority 
representation on the federal bench. Johnson argues that to select candidates who generate fewer 
controversies in the Senate, the President will be inclined to nominate traditional candidates to the bench, 
which could translate into a more homogenous judiciary.750 
In the case of federal courts, non-white-male nominees have faced complicated confirmation 
processes in the Senate, which some allege are the consequence of the legislature's discomfort with women 
and minorities serving as judges.751 In the context of the Supreme Court justices' confirmation processes, 
Kevin Johnson notes: “The process for a minority Supreme Court Justice has been nothing less than a 
ritualized hazing of people of color that sends a clear message to the greater national community that racial 
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minorities should be the subject of suspicion.”752 As an example, in the case of Sonia Sotomayor, Johnson 
explains how, despite her outstanding credentials and history of moderation as a judge, she was the target 
of accusations of engaging in judicial activism and holding anti-white bias.753 In his view, the confirmation 
process before the Senate tends to be particularly harsh on minority nominees because the Senate uses the 
confirmation as a way to determine whether or not the candidate has “assimilated into mainstream values 
on race and civil rights.”754 Similarly, Linda Green remembers that the difficult confirmation process of 
non-traditional nominees seems to be a constant, using Thurgood Marshall—the first African American 
justice—and Louis Brandeis—the first Jewish justice—as examples of this situation.755 
Regarding the confirmation process of Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, Theresa Beiner 
describes how it is likely that their diverse views on issues of public interest—such as race discrimination 
and sexuality—led to difficult confirmation processes in the Senate. In the case of Sotomayor, the 
difficulties arose due to her much-publicized "wise Latina" comments.756 In the case of Kagan, they were 
the result of her views on LGBTQ rights, and especially her opposition to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't 
Tell" policy during her tenure as Harvard Law School's dean. Some used these positions as the basis to 
describe Kagan as anti-military and even suggested she might be a lesbian.757  
Theresa Beiner’s concern about Kagan and Sotomayor's confirmation processes are based on the 
apparent contradiction between the political support for the idea of diversifying the judiciary—which is 
partially based on the idea that women and minorities could bring new ideas to the bench—, and the 
Senators attacks against non-traditional candidates because of their diverse opinions.758 Ultimately, Beiner 
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asks whether the Senate's acceptance of women and minority nominees could come as a prize for non-
white-male appointees' who do not openly support the agendas of historically discriminated groups.759  
 Discussing federal judges more broadly, Beiner claims that there has been "extended scrutiny of 
female appointees,”760 and other non-traditional judicial nominees during their confirmation processes 
before the U.S. Senate. During the Clinton presidency, white-male nominees for district court judgeships 
required an average of 6 weeks less from the moment of their nomination to the moment when they were 
granted a hearing before the Senate. They also needed 46 days less on average from the time of their 
nomination to be confirmed as judges.761 This gap was even more significant in the case of appellate court 
nominees, as white-males needed an average of two months less to be granted a hearing since their 
nomination, and 146 days to be confirmed, counted from the same date.762 A similar situation took place 
during the confirmation processes of George H.W. Bush’s judicial nominees, in which the Senate 
democratic majority also delayed the confirmation of women nominees.763 According to Beiner, this 
situation seems to have the effect of forcing the President to appoint women and minorities to the bench 
that have a more traditional career path or more conservative political views, especially in the case of 
democratic presidents.764 
Similarly, Sylvia Lazos Vargas affirms that the performance of a racial identity that can make 
members of Congress feel uncomfortable is a factor that may hurt the confirmation chances of minority 
candidates, as it could trigger negative racial stereotypes in the senators' minds.765 Moreover, Lazos Vargas 
argues that these conditions could lead to a situation in which minority candidates who conform to white 
behavior have higher chances of being confirmed to the bench than those who do not. This difference could 
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result in the exclusion of critical voices of color—those that do not conform to expectations about how 
racial identity should be actively performed—from the federal judiciary.766 In this scenario, according to 
the Lazos Vargas, the substantive benefits of diversity are lost, since the presence of non-traditional judges 
comes to the cost of leaving aside their perspectives.767 Furthermore, she criticizes how the discord in the 
confirmation processes is limiting the presence of voices of color in the judiciary, both liberal and 
conservative, which may ultimately limit the quality of the judicial decision-making process.768 
 Likewise, Lee Epstein et al. criticize the custom of requiring prior judicial experience for judicial 
appointments to the United States Supreme Court.769 According to the authors, this type of selection 
requirement reduces the level of career path diversity—which is highly influential in judicial decision-
making. It also limits the ability of women and minorities to become justices, as their access to job positions 
that give candidates an advantage to be appointed as judges is highly constrained when compared to white 
men.770 Hence, they suggest that if the President were to consider appointing highly qualified lawyers that 
had different work experiences, the pool of potential women and minority candidates would expand.771 
Regarding the access of minority women to the Supreme Court, April Dawson states that, in past 
decades, more non-ideological de facto requirements have been established for candidates who want to 
become justices of the highest court in the country.772 These requirements include having a law degree from 
an Ivy League school, possessing previous judicial experience at the federal appellate level, and even having 
clerked for a Supreme Court justice. According to the author, the reiterated use of these requirements to 
select Supreme Court candidates has had the effect of reducing the pool of potential candidates for this 
court. Such reduction has particularly had a strong effect on women minority candidates due to conditions 
 
766 Id. at 1474. 
767 Id. at 1525–1526. 
768 Id. at 1550. 
769 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for 
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CALIF. LAW REV. 903–966 (2003). 
770 Id. at 905. 
771 Id. at 958–959. 
772 Dawson, supra note 301. 
 210 
of discrimination in the legal profession. These candidates are less likely to fulfill these requirements than 
white men.773 The author proposes specific alternatives to increase the likelihood of minority women to 
become Supreme Court justices, such as including state court judges among the potential nominees for 
these positions and using merit selection commissions to recruit potential candidates and ensure diversity 
in the judiciary.774 
Likewise, Carl Tobias has emphasized that the use of nominating commissions could have 
facilitated the increasing women representation on the federal bench, as such instrument allowed greater 
outreach to a larger pool of candidates for judicial positions.775 However, he also acknowledged the 
importance of ideology during the nomination and confirmation process.776  
 
6.1.2. U.S. State Courts 
 
 One of the main difficulties of studying the relationship between judicial selection mechanisms at 
the state level comes from the fact that virtually every state in the U.S. has a different process for selecting 
judges. K.O. Myers explains that:  
 
The judicial selection system is, for all intents and purposes, unique in each state. Both across and 
within states, different methods are used to select (1) appellate judges and trial judges; (2) statewide 
and local judges; (3) candidates who are eligible for initial terms; (4) judges who are eligible for 
retention; (5) judges to fill seats at the end of a regular term; and (6) judges to fill interim vacancies 
on the bench. In some states, like in Indiana, the selection method differs by county.777 
 
 
773 Id. at 214–219. 
774 Id. at 214–219. 
775 Carl Tobias, The Federal Judiciary Engendered, 5 WIS. WOMENS LAW J. 123–126, 125 (1990). 
776 Id. at 124–125. 
777 K.O. Myers, Merit Selection And Diversity On The Bench, 46 INDIANA LAW REV. 46–57, 47–48 (2013). 
 211 
 Regarding the selection of state supreme court judges, Kathleen Bratton & Rorie Spill studied the 
influence of judges’ selection mechanisms on women’s representation on courts of last resort.778 Their 
research used data regarding the selection of state supreme court judges from 1980 to 1996. It concluded 
that "women are significantly more likely to be selected to a state high court when initially appointed."779 
The authors suggested that appointive systems for judge selection tend to be better at securing gender 
diversity on state supreme courts. Furthermore, such an effect was more salient when the appointive 
governor was a democrat and when an all-male benches were to receive their first woman judge.780 They 
also established that under appointive selection systems, "women are much more likely to be appointed to 
an all-male court than to a gender-diverse court."781  
Writing about the judicial selection in Virginia and South Carolina, Constance Anastopoulo & 
Daniel Crooks suggest that the lack of transparency of judicial selection mechanisms, low wages, and the 
politicization of judicial institutions make it more difficult for minorities to be represented in the judiciary. 
These conditions discourage qualified minority lawyers from becoming candidates for judgeships.782 In the 
case of the states that they examined—in which the entire process of judicial selection is in the hands of the 
legislature—the authors argue that the legislature-controlled selection mechanism has turned out to be 
reasonably effective at increasing minority representation levels in the judiciary.783 To improve such 
situation, the authors suggest reducing the participation of legislators on merit-selection commissions; 
determining a reasonable number of names sent to the ultimate selection organism; requiring merit-selection 
commissions to consider decisions of a tribunal of ethics concerning candidates; and to allow participation 
of the state bar association in the process of judicial selection.784 
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From a different perspective, Sherrilyn Ifill opposes to the idea of states changing elective systems 
of judicial selection for appointive systems. She explains that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,785 in which the court decided to strike down a provision of the 
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that prevented judicial candidates from publicly expressing their views 
on controversial issues, a heated debate arose on whether judicial elections could be reconciled with the 
idea of judicial impartiality. There were also concerns about whether the court's decision in the case 
mentioned above should be interpreted as an endorsement of appointive systems over elective systems of 
judicial selection.786 Ifill suggests that, instead of moving away from elective systems, states should try to 
introduce modifications to make judicial elections more compatible with the ideas of diversity and structural 
impartiality.787 The author rejects the widespread implementation of appointive systems, arguing that such 
judicial selection mechanisms could decrease the leverage that black communities have on the election of 
judges. She believes that, in certain states in the South, this could mean that judicial election would not be 
subjected to federal oversight under the Voting Rights Act.788 Moreover, she argues that such change could 
further provoke dilution of the minority voting power, while not guaranteeing the retention of minority 
judges in certain states.789  
K. O. Myers asserts the need to improve merit commissions as a way to increase diversity on the 
bench.790 According to the author, merit-selection systems have similar potential to create diverse 
judiciaries than other judicial selection methods, such as judicial elections. Besides, merit-selection has a 
particular advantage as it is possible to include diversity criteria for screening of candidates.791 The author 
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suggests that diversifying the composition of merit-commissions themselves could have a positive impact 
on improving diversity on the bench.792 
Similarly, Leo Romero emphasizes the need to guarantee the legitimacy of judicial selection 
mechanisms and particularly of merit-selection commissions.793 In his view, nominating commissions, 
despite having significant control over the list of candidates to judgeships, are bodies that, for the most part, 
lack accountability to the public.794 Therefore, the author proposes that appointive systems guarantee 
minority and women's representation in the composition of nominating commissions and in the evaluation 
and selection of candidates. Likewise, he argues that the selection process should be made as transparent 
as possible in order the secure equal opportunity for different types of candidates.795 Finally, the system 
should have accountability mechanisms to enforce the respect of diversity and transparency principles.796 
Clara Torres-Spelliscy conducted an empirical study and interviewed members of nominating 
commissions in different states.797 Her results indicate that although members of nominating commissions 
are usually opened to the idea of increasing diversity in judicial institutions, “nonetheless, top candidates 
from diverse backgrounds are not applying for, being nominated for, or being appointed to judicial openings 
in proportionate numbers.”798 In her view, implicit bias could be the condition that prevents the appointment 
of non-traditional judges to reach higher numbers.799 In order to increase the levels of political minorities' 
representation in the judiciary, the author proposes several good practices, including acknowledging and 
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taking action to neutralize implicit bias in nominating commissions; the active recruitment of potential 
minority and women candidates to fill judicial vacancies; to include provisions in the statutes and laws 
regulating nominating commissions that specify the role of diversity in the nominating process; 
guaranteeing transparency in the process of receiving applications and formulating nominations; providing 
commission members with training to better fulfill their recruitment and nominating task; introducing the 
figure of "diversity ombudsman;" changing the law to guarantee diverse nominating commissions; 
demanding nominees to have high standards of quality; raising judges' wages to attract better candidates; 
and maintaining data of past applicants to keep track of the progress in the process of diversifying the 
judiciary.800  
In the particular context of state trial court judges, Linda Merola & Jon Gould published a 
qualitative study in which they expressed that minority judges tend to emphasize the impact of networking, 
mentorship, politics, and access to different types of resources in their success to be selected as judges.801 
John Brittain & Kenneth Chandler arrived at similar conclusions regarding the factors driving successful 
candidacies.802 The involvement of the candidate in political activities (partisan and not partisan), 
campaigning activities, political networking, fundraising events, public image management, and even 
advertising, as well as receiving political support from prominent figures in the legal or political systems 
(e. g. bar associations, legislators, high court judges), were identified to have a significant roles in the 
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6.1.3. Conclusions of the U.S. Literature 
 
From the debates on judicial selection mechanisms and its relationship with minorities and 
women’s representation on U.S. courts it is possible to reach certain conclusions: 1) Although at some point 
in the past certain judicial selection systems—such as appointive systems—performed better at facilitating 
the presence of women and minority on courts when compared to others, currently, different judicial 
selection mechanisms may produce similar results in this respect; 2) in the context of the federal judiciary, 
women and minorities nominated for article III courts have historically faced significant challenges—in 
comparison to white-males—in their confirmation processes before the Senate; 3) the difficulties that 
women and minorities encounter during congressional confirmation have worsen due to the increasing 
partisanship amid the confirmation processes; 4) most authors agree in the need to reform existing judicial 
selection mechanisms at the state level to improve the level of women and minorities’ representation on 
courts, as well as the impartiality, transparency, and accountability of current judicial selection systems; 5) 
transforming current judicial selection mechanisms may not lead by itself to improve women and 
minorities’ representation on courts, as their level of representation if connected to other institutional, 
social, economic and political factors, such as mentorship, networking and political capital. 
 
6.2. Study findings on the impact of judicial selection mechanisms in Afro-descendant 
representation in Colombian judicial institutions 
 
Amid the qualitative data analysis, several findings arose concerning the impact of judicial selection 
mechanism on Afro-descendant presence on Colombian courts. In order to convey these findings in an 
orderly fashion, I will divide them according to the different types of judicial positions/judicial selection 




6.2.1. High court magistrates 
 
A common denominator in the accounts of participants regarding high court magistrates is the 
emphasis on the political nature of selection mechanisms used for filling out vacancies.804 As I explained 
in the preceding chapter, although different high courts have different selection processes and minimum 
requirements for their magistrates, these are not career positions. In general, the selection process is not 
particularly tailored to select the "most qualified" applicant. In words of one of the participants: “It is a 
highly politicized process, in which it is required to have contacts or to belong to our society's power groups 
[in order] to have access to those positions.”805 Similar to what happens in the case of U.S. Supreme Court 
appointments, the high strata of successful candidates to high court magistrate positions in Colombia means 
that Afro-descendants are virtually barred from the possibility of accessing such positions. This limitation 
is a consequence of their lack the adequate connections and social capital necessary to be successful in the 
selection process.806 In the case of potential magistrate candidates who live in the periphery of the country, 
this situation can be aggravated by distance, as they rarely have access to the venues where the lobbying 
for the selection of the final appointment takes place.807 
The participants' generalized perception is that class status, political influence, a privileged 
education, and elitism are forces that shape the selection process for high court magistrates. A process in 
which, as a participant asserted: "There is not a selection power of the ethnic subjects.”808 An exception to 
this reality is the SJP. In this particular court, ethnic identity was a specific criteria for the appointment of 
the magistrates, which allowed ethnic organizations to participate in the conformation of the court 
actively.809 One of the interviewees confirmed this intuition. The participant claimed that, despite having 
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adequate credentials to occupy a high court magistrate positions, once he applied to fill out a vacancy, he 
was not selected. In his view, this was the case because "the names [of those nominated] had been 
previously selected.”810 Another interviewee described that in a previous process to fill out vacancies at a 
high court, there were several Afro-descendant candidates but not a single one was even shortlisted for the 
ultimate selection.811 
The perception of nepotism in the high court magistrate selection is more concerning due to the 
apparent lack of transparency. Not only the selection process is, in many cases, not completely visible to 
the public, but also there is a deficiency of specific reasons to justify the selection of a candidate over 
others.812 This worry resembles the apprehension that some U.S. scholars, such as Anastopoulo & 
Crooks,813 have shown regarding transparency in the judicial selection process at the state level. Although 
the works of these authors refer to the U.S. context, I believe they are relevant for the Colombian context 
because of the similarities of both countries regarding the lack of public oversight and transparency over 
judicial selection processes.  
 
6.2.2. Career magistrates, judges, and judicial employees 
 
In general, interviewees appeared to have a better impression of the merit selection process than of 
other selection mechanisms.814 Since the career judge selection process normally involves an exam, 
participants see it as more objective. Some of the Afro-descendant participants working for the judiciary 
stressed the impression that if it were not for the use of merit selection, it is unlikely that they would have 
had access to their positions.815 An Afro-descendant judge in an Andean city of Colombia declared: "If 
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there had not been a merit contest, I think I would have never become a judge or a magistrate because I am 
a person that do not have many interpersonal relations with people that handle those types of appointments 
directly."816  
Certain participants, who attained their positions through merit selection processes, appeared to 
display a particular type of pride for having accessed their positions that way since they believed it stressed 
that their paths to the courts were transparent.817 Furthermore, some interviewees suggested the existence 
of merit selection processes was a condition that enabled a greater level of representation for Afro-
descendants in the judiciary, although my research is inconclusive in this regard.818 An Afro-descendant 
judge in an Andean city declared: “Within the organs that do not have a [merit] contest, Afro-descendant 
participation is void. It is zero because there is discrimination and, even if you demonstrate outstanding 
skills and capacity, they do not stop seeing you as what it is: A black person, an Afro-descendant."819 
Despite this situation, several participants manifested their distrust of the merit selection process to 
fill out career position vacancies.820 The most common aspects subjected to criticism were the thematic 
contents and abilities that were evaluated in the exam component of the merit selection process and the 
issues related to the lack of mechanisms that secured judges’ cultural competency to deliver justice in ethnic 
territories.821 Several participants argued that the contents and professional skills assessed in the exams had 
little connection with those that one might expect from a competent judge.822 Some respondents also 
criticized the definition of merit in these selection processes. They believed that the facially-neutral 
definition of merit concealed a racialized conceptualization of this value.823 One of the participants asserted: 
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Well, from the point of view, let’s say of career positions, we can say that the selection is based on 
merit. However, we both know that merit is a subjective category. It is presented that way, but really 
[having] merit is to be a white man. Everything you call merit is being a white man. And well, being 
a white man is attending such university, of such characteristics. Generally, what they call having 
merit is to be a white man, and, lately, with the strength that the [gender] equality aspect has 
acquired, it can mean being a white woman, too.824 
 
Participants also named invisible barriers to participate in the merit selection processes that appear 
to affect Afro-descendant candidates disproportionately.825 Some of them asserted that access to the judicial 
exam could be a problem for people living in rural areas and small cities, as candidates need to travel to be 
able to sit for the test. Likewise, some participants also asserted that those who pass the test faced the reality 
of having to constantly travel during a period of up to a year to participate in the course-contest phase of 
the selection process, as courses are held in a few major urban centers of the country.826 The centralized 
selection process creates significant obstacles for candidates living in peripherical regions and rural areas, 
who need to travel to attend the classes and cover all costs related to transportation, lodging, and food.827 
They receive no funding or financial support.828 In this respect, one of the participants, a mestizo judge in 
an Andean city highlighted that while she was completing her merit selection process, she could observe 
that: 
 
People from Quibdó [a city with a majority of Afro Colombian population], for example, had to 
complete the course in Medellín. This meant that they had to stay [in Medellín] Friday, Saturday, 
Sunday, and Monday. They came from Chocó by plane since Friday. They stayed here from Friday 
until Monday, attend the course, and then dealt with their chamber's affairs in Quibdó, once they 
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went back, with all the difficulties of the financial costs that come with it, in a clear and notorious 
disadvantage when compared to those of us who lived in Medellín.829 
 
 These costs can be very burdensome for many Afro-descendant lawyers, especially those who do 
not have high incomes. A participant even asserted that he had to permanently relocate to another city to 
participate in the course-contest phase of the merit selection process, given the costs and inconveniences 
associated with the attendance to classes.830  
Likewise, there have been reports of exams questions being discarded after applied in the test and 
exams being wrongfully graded. This situation happened, for example, with the merit selection processes 
undertaken to fill out judicial vacancies in the year 2018.831 Due to a mistake, the questions' order was 
altered and then graded with a wrong answer key. The mistake led to several questions of the test being 
incorrectly marked.832 Due to situations such as the formerly described, it is common that a high number 
of lawsuits against the judiciary are initiated following the merit selection processes.833 These issues 
ultimately make merit selection processes excessively long and extenuating for participants. According to 
some of our interviewees, different administrative delays caused the merit selection processes through 
which they became career judges to take as long as 5 or 6 years to conclude.834 
Another common complaint had to do with situations of corruption and meddling in the merit-
selection process.835 Several participants manifested that they believed that the merit selection processes 
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were not transparent and that corruption situations occurred with a certain frequency. One of the 
interviewees, an Afro-descendant judicial employee, mentioned: "We cannot say that all merit contests are 
tainted, but contacts are the most important part, let's say, in the reality of how things move."836 Another 
one described a case involving his business partner who, after obtaining very high scores in the exam and 
the course-contest components of the judicial selection process, was unable to become a judge. The 
candidate received a low score in the interview component. Such low score, according to the interviewee, 
seemed to be related to situations of corruption since the interview component is the one that can be more 
easily manipulated.837 In this respect, several corruption scandals in all levels of the judicial pyramid have 
shocked the Colombian judiciary in recent years, including cases of corruption affecting the merit selection 
process for magistrates, judges, and judicial employees.838  
I consider that this widespread perception of corruption is relevant for understanding Afro-
descendant representation in judicial institutions because it can deter people from participating in the 
selection process. Candidates believed that they would not stand a fair chance of being selected due to their 
lack of connections and being outsiders to the circles of nepotism.839 For example, an Afro-descendant 
judge in an Andean city of Colombia mentioned that she almost did not participate in a judge-selection 
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6.2.3. Provisional magistrates, judges and judicial employees 
 
 In the case of the provisional magistrate, judge, and judicial employee positions, participants were 
emphatic to highlight that nepotism played a decisive role in the filling out of provisional positions in the 
judiciary.841 This aspect is not minor if one considers that by October 10th, 2018, approximately 45% of all 
magistrates and judges and 53% of all judicial employees working at the intermediate tribunals and lower 
courts were in provisional positions. According to the information that the Superior Council of the 
Judicature provided, these positions account for nearly half of the judicial branch (excluding the high courts 
and the Attorney General's Office). Although provisional appointments are expected not to last long, people 
can occupy these positions lengthy periods. I could verify this reality during the interview process. Several 
participants commented that they had been in provisional posts for years.842  
I should emphasize that the Constitutional Court has issued several rulings aimed at decreasing the 
level of discretion that judges and magistrates have the appointment of provisional judges and judicial 
employees.843 However, in certain situations (e.g., when the eligibles’ list has been exhausted or expired), 
the level of discretion of nominating authorities increases.844 These events open the door to nepotism. 
Likewise, not all judicial authorities in charge of provisionally filling out vacancies might follow the 
parameters that the constitutional court established. Some participants suggested that several nominating 
judicial authorities knowingly decide to disregard these guides to benefit individual judicial servers.845 In 
this respect, one of the participants mentioned:  
 
 
841 Interviews 1 and 2.  
842 Interviews 5 and 27.  
843 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 15, 2008, Sentencia C-713/2008 Gaceta de la Corte 
Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colomb.). Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 27, 2015, Sentencia 
SU-553/15, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colomb.). 
844 Interview 40. 
845 Interview 39. 
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Some positions are occupied due to vacancies, and for those vacant positions, in most cases, [the 
selection process] is if one knows a tribunal magistrate, if one knows a judge, if one knows someone 
that can recommend you to have access to those spaces, which are, in many cases, very closed, very 
scarce. Many times it is not necessarily contingent upon qualifications because there are many 
highly qualified persons, but they do not know someone who can recommend them. They find it 
very hard.846 
 
The significant role that personal, familiar and professional relationships play in the selection of 
provisional magistrate, judges, and judicial employees, seems to have a negative influence on Afro-
descendant applicants in most cases, given their lack of the adequate contact networks for such endeavor.847 
Moreover, as I had mentioned when I discussed regional variances of race, geographic location also plays 
a vital role in this regard, as some participants stated that nominating judicial authorities, sometimes, tended 
to prefer appointing people coming from their close circle to these positions,848 despite the fact that these 
candidates were not from the geographical area or had any ties or experience in the places where they would 
be sent out to work.849 
 
6.2.4. Free appointment and removal judicial employees 
 
In the case of judicial employees that occupy positions of free appointment and removal, personal 
and professional connections play a determinant role in their selection, as the deciding factor for the 
appointment to one of these positions is the will of the nominating judge or magistrate.850 Low-class status 
and racial segregation seem to be significant barriers in the access of Afro-descendant professionals to these 
 
846 Interview 13. 
847 Interviews 18 and 42.  
848 Interview 41. 
849 Interviews 28 and 38.  
850 Interview 15. 
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positions since they lack the adequate social, professional, and personal connections that generate strategic 
advantages to access these posts.851 In this respect, a mestizo judge in an Andean city described that she 
had never hired Afro-descendants to work in her chambers because she selected her staff members from 
the pool of recently graduated law students from the university where she served as an adjunct. Since the 
number of Afro-descendant students at that institution was minimal, she never had an Afro-descendant 
student to whom she could offer a job.852 Another interviewee suggested that one of the reasons why there 
were so few Afro-descendants working as judicial employees for the high courts is because many of the 
people who occupy these positions had previously served as ad honorem interns at these institutions. 
Internships allowed them to gain visibility and develop networks that would later open the gates of judicial 
employment.853 In the case of many Afro-descendant law students, this is not a possibility since they might 
have studied in peripherical areas of the country and could not afford to move to Bogotá to undertake an 
internship.854 
 The significant role that personal and professional connections play in the selection process for this 
type of position also seemed to be confirmed by the fact that several of the interviewees that occupy these 
jobs describe that previous personal relationships were determinant in their selection for such positions,855 
and by the mentions that some interviewees made about how they found out about potential employment 
opportunities at the high courts through their college friends, university professors, former employers, and 
social contacts.856  
A participant mentioned that, in the case of high courts’ free appointment and removal posts, the 
potential appointment of more Afro-descendant magistrates could open the door for other Afro-descendants 
to become judicial employees.857 He described this effect as a “rosca legítima” (an expression meaning 
 
851 Interviews 10 and 15.  
852 Interview 3. 
853 Interview 15. 
854 Id. 
855 Interviews 13 and 21. 
856 Interviews 7, 9, 16, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 35, 37, 40 and 41.  
857 Interviews 13 and 22. 
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legitimate nepotism).858 Another participant mentioned that at the court in which she serves, the arrival of 
an Afro-descendant judge opened the door for other Afro-descendants to start working at this institution as 
judicial employees. The new judge decided to appoint them to free appointment and removal positions.859  
In conclusion, diverse problems affecting different selection mechanisms appear to be contributing 
to Afro-descendant underrepresentation in judicial institutions. Among all the factors mentioned above, I 
would like to stress the role that professional and personal networks have in the process of finding 
employment in Colombia's judicial institutions. This situation appears to work against Afro-descendant 
candidates significantly, given the impact that residential segregation, class inequality, and discrimination 
has on their ability to acquire the proper connections for these positions, regardless of the type of selection 
mechanism used to fill out vacancies.  
 
7. Racial discrimination within judicial institutions and in the legal profession 
 
The last factor that I consider relevant for explaining the low level of Afro-descendant 
representation in judicial institutions in Colombia is the situations of racial discrimination at the interior of 
the judicial system. Racial discrimination is a crucial aspect of this debate because it excludes people from 
positions in the judiciary. Furthermore, discrimination influences the experiences of the Afro-descendants 
already present in these types of professional settings and helps to keep the racial stratification of the judicial 
system in place. 
So far, I have discussed some instances in which judicial servers experience discrimination because 
of their ethno-racial identity (e.g., in education) and how factors such as low-class status and the 
intersectionality of race and gender transform these situations of exclusion for certain Afro-descendants. In 
 
858 Id. 
859 Interview 3. 
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the following pages, I will expand on this component of my research to present an image of the way racial 
exclusion manifests within the courts and the legal profession.  
 
7.1. Racial discrimination: From the streets to the bench 
 
Before I introduce the findings concerning the issue of race discrimination against legal 
professionals and judicial servers, I should state that, although race discrimination situations inside judicial 
institutions and the legal profession are of particular interest for my research agenda, these expressions of 
white supremacy are in a continuum with similar practices taking place outside of the courthouses. For 
Afro-descendants, race discrimination does not start (nor end) at the doorsteps of the courthouses or law 
firms. As I could attest from the interviews, Afro-descendant magistrates, judges, and judicial employees 
face discrimination based on race inside of the courts as much as they do outside of them.  
Participants were outspoken about the role that racial discrimination has played in their lives. Afro-
descendant attorneys, judges, and judicial employees narrated experiences of racism against themselves 
and their relatives:860 They were subjected to ridicule for being the offspring of interracial couples,861 they 
were denied housing they could afford because the potential landlord was “not convinced” of their 
credentials,862 they were questioned about why black men would refuse to dance at a party,863 they 
experienced being the object of suspicion by strangers in the street despite having done nothing wrong,864 
they have difficulties hailing taxis in the cities,865 and endure entire soccer games hearing “well-
intentioned” expressions like “¡vamos mi negro!” (come on, my black man!) or worse,866 they have been 
 
860 Interview 2. 
861 Interview 7. 
862 Interview 13. 
863 Interview 23. 
864 Interviews 24 and 32.  
865 Interview 39. 
866 Interviews 23 and 37.  
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called foreigners in their own land,867 and been the object of racially-charged regional stereotypes.868 While 
in school, they were forced to clean the classrooms three times more often than their peers,869 and today, 
as parents, they have to assert their children’s rights to wear their natural hair.870 In the case of women, race 
discrimination also meant to be continuously labeled as domestic workers because of their skin color,871 
being introduced to hair-straightening from an early age, sometimes under the argument that curly hair was 
not hygienic.872 Some indigenous interviewees narrated similar episodes of discrimination, such as being 
stopped by strangers on the street who asked for photos with their traditional attires,873 being questioned 
about whether or not they used underwear,874 and even presumed to have supernatural abilities.875 
Racist expressions were, perhaps, the most common type of discriminatory experience among 
participants, as many of them expressed that hearing phrases such as “Negro ni el teléfono” (Black not 
even for the phone),876 “eres negra, pero bonita” (You are black but beautiful),877 “¡negros tenían que 
ser!” (You had to be black!), “negro que corre es ratero, blanco que corre es atleta” (a black who runs is 
a thief, a white who runs is an athlete),878 “negro que no la caga a la entrada, la caga a la salida; pero la 
caga” (a black person who does not fail at the beginning, fails at the end; but they fail),879 or simply being 
called “black” instead of their names, was a recurrent experience in their lives.880 As previous literature on 
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869 Interview 32. 
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871 Interviews 10 and 27.  
872 Interviews 10 and 33. 
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this topic has documented, situations of race discrimination, and particularly racist language, are common 
in Latin America.881 In this regard, Tanya Hernandez mentions that: 
 
In Latin America, where Jim Crow state-mandated exclusion never existed, racist speech about 
Afro-descendants is ubiquitous and facilitates the social exclusion of Afro-descendants. In addition 
to the term “negro” (black/negro) being derogatory, Afro-descendants are stereotyped and referred 
to as inherently criminal, intellectually inferior, overly sexual, and animalistic. Because the 
racialized stereotypes of Afro-descendants are pervasive, they are commonly understood to smell 
like animals and, in particular, monkeys.882 
 
Beyond listing situations of discrimination that Afro-descendants experience on a daily basis, the 
point that I would like to emphasize is that, by the time they arrive at their positions inside judicial 
institutions, these professionals have already undergone a lifetime of racist episodes. Some are small, and 
 
881 Tanya Kateri Hernández, Hate Speech and the Language of Racism in Latin America: A Lens for Reconsidering 
Global Hate Speech Restrictions and Legislation Models, 32 UNIV. PA. J. INT. LAW 805–841 (2010). 
882 Id. at 816–818. (Hernández also notes: “In addition to the commonalities in anti-black expression in Latin America, 
each country has also developed its own subset of derogatory phrases for blacks and blackness. In Argentina, ‘negro 
de mierda’ (“shitty negro”) is a popular expression, and ‘negro’ is viewed as the worst of insults. As a result, even 
children’s songs in Argentina are replete with anti-black references. In Brazil, Afro-descendants are referred to as 
‘macaco’ (monkey), ‘besta’ (animal), ‘vagabundo’ (bum), ‘filho de puta’ (son of a whore), ‘safado’ (insolent person), 
‘ladrao’ (thief), and ‘nega fedorentas’ (stinking nigger). In fact, the Brazilian insults are viewed as being coterminous 
with blackness. This also is unfortunately manifested in Brazilian primary school textbooks in which black people are 
consistently depicted as animal-like, as socially subordinate, and in other stereotyped manners. In Colombian 
newspapers, even the polluted air of Cali is blamed on the presumed dirtiness of blacks. In Costa Rica, blacks are 
typically described as ‘pigs,’ ‘stinking,’ ‘unkempt,’ and ‘ugly.’ In Cuba, ‘doing things like a black person’ is a common 
expression to describe a poorly done task or acts of delinquency. In fact, the Cuban Academy of Sciences found in 
2003, that dozens of Cuban phrases are used to connect blacks with delinquency and inferiority. This is best 
exemplified by the popular phrases ‘it had to be a negro’ and ‘there is no such thing as a good black or a sweet 
tamarind.’ In Ecuador, an often-repeated joke is that ‘a black person running is a thief, a white person running is an 
athlete.’ This helps to account for the 2009 survey findings in Ecuador, demonstrating that five out of seven 
Ecuadorians harbor racial prejudice against blacks. In Mexico, Afro-Mexicans respond to the stereotypes that they are 
‘ugly’ and ‘dark’ with the focus on marrying lighter-skinned partners in the Latin American hope to lighten and thus 
“improv[e] the race” of their progeny. In Nicaragua, the phrase ‘100 negroes for one horse’ ties to how blacks are 
viewed as drug addicts and drunks. In Peru, the common statements about blacks are that they are criminals, can only 
work in low-level positions, that they only think until midday, that they are delinquents and live badly, that they are a 
leisurely race, and that black women are prostitutes. A study of Peruvian newspapers from 2008, found a total of 159 
different racist adjectives for describing Afro-descendants. In Venezuela, despite the national pride in being a mixed-
race ‘café con leche’ (coffee with milk) society, the plethora of racist sayings commonly iterated includes the phrase 
‘kill a negro and live a Pepsi [enchanted] day.’.”) 
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some are big, but all, in conjunction, condition how they deal with discrimination in the workplace and 
inside predominantly white-mestizo institutions. Moreover, due to the multiplicity and repetition of these 
racist experiences, they tend to be naturalized and commonly go unnoticed, even by those who experience 
them. 
Participants described similar situations of racial discrimination inside the courthouses and the legal 
profession as those described in everyday life. In this respect, Afro-descendant judicial employees narrated 
episodes of judicial employees saying phrases like: "They [Afro-descendants] are the ones who put on their 
chains,”883 "there are people who are here because of affirmative action,”884 “it is good to know you got 
assigned the case of the blacks,”885 “[they work at] the Caribbean rhythm,”886 “they [Afro-descendants] are 
lazy and don’t like to work,”887 or calling colleagues “negrito” (little black man),888 or “india” (Indian 
woman).889 Additionally, they also recounted situations in which judicial employees were confused with 
cleaning services staff at the courthouse,890 white-mestizo judicial employees touched black judicial 
employees' hair without their consent,891 magistrates had difficulties receiving their government cars 
because those responsible for supplying them did not believe a black woman could have attained such high 
station,892 a judge baptized a law firm integrated mainly by Afro-descendant lawyers as “the darkest law 
firm in Cali,”893 and Raizal judicial employees were forbidden speaking English Creole at the courts in 
their territories.894 
 
883 Interviews 10, 14 and 16. 
884 Interview 16. 
885 Interview 22. 
886 Interview 24. 
887 Id. 
888 Interviews 13 and 17. 
889 Interview 22. 
890 Interviews 13 and 19.  
891 Interview 23. 
892 Interview 13. 
893 Interview 16. 
894 Interview 25. 
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Participants emphasized the idea that most situations of discrimination were subtle, trying to 
highlight the fact that they consisted of micro-aggressions or in the use of racially charged language that 
often goes unnoticed or is deemed irrelevant by most Colombians.895 The subtle nature of racism in Latin 
America means that it is often difficult to identify, even for the people who are directly affected by it, and 
even more difficult to prove.896 This subtleness is particularly true in cases in which differential treatment 
on account of race is not verbally linked to the victim's ethno-racial identity.897 In this respect, one of them 
asserted that: 
 
One feels it, but I would not dare to say: 'I can give you proof' because it is very subtle. Because it 
sometimes is very camouflaged, very hidden in shape and even more, I insist, sometimes it is very 
unconscious how it occurs. However, how can it be perceived? The person does not deal with you 
the same way, that they make you wait, that the first reaction they have when you talk to them is the 
voice tone in which they address you, see, the initial rejection, like that initial undermining. I 
perceive it. I have seen it many times.898 
 
Moreover, given the frequency of this micro-aggressions, some participants appeared to describe a 
sensation of numbness that led them to allow these types of situations to continue to go unnoticed. One of 
them asserted: “It comes a moment at which one wants to let it pass through to stop processing and 
rationalizing it all the time because it makes you unhappy. However, when you understand it and learn how 
to read it, you can hardly live calmed with it."899 
Regarding the inconspicuousness of racism in Latin America, Tanya Hernandez sustains that 
racism in Latin America is pervasive, commonly excused, and naturalized.900 Racial stereotypes and slurs 
 
895 Interviews 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 27, 30, 34, 37 and 42.  
896 Interviews 7 and 13.  
897 Interview 8. 
898 Interview 4. 
899 Interview 14. 
900 HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 33 at 18–26. 
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are commonly used in everyday interactions, with people continually denying their discriminatory 
content.901 Sometimes racist language is justified in the idea that it was used the intention to flatter or 
compliment the person it is directed at, as if the benign intention could compensate from any harms arising 
from it. Hernandez characterizes this belief as a remembrance of “slavery paternalism.”902 Moreover, when 
extremely abhorrent cases of race discrimination take place, they are usually portrayed as if they were 
isolated incidents that cannot be representative of the tolerant ethos of Latin American societies.903  
Hernandez has also points out that despite Afro-descendants being historically marginalized and 
excluded from social and public life, the prevailing narrative in the region denies the existence of racial 
discrimination.904 Discrimination is frequently denied appealing to the idea of mestizaje, as a condition that 
prevents the existence of racial discrimination, or by alleging that the region did not experience legally 
mandated segregation as U.S.905 Several of the participants also used the U.S. history of racism to compare 
it to the types of discrimination lived in Colombia, sometimes to minimize the seriousness of this problem 
in their national context.906 
As an example of the racial discrimination denial in Latin America, many Ecuadorian intellectuals 
denied the existence racism in that country despite the pervasive idea of inferiority that was imposed upon 
Afro Ecuadorians during the second part of the 20th century.907 Intellectuals sustained that, unlike in the 
U.S. and South Africa, the black persons in Ecuador could enjoy public spaces and accommodations 
without any limitations. In theory, they could even become high ranking public officials. Discrimination in 
Ecuador, some intellectuals believed, could be a matter of class, but not of race.908 However, in Ecuador, 
the work of social scientists has proven over time that “there are numerous stereotypes about black 
 
901 Id. at 18–26. 
902 Id. at 22. 
903 Id. at 22. 
904 Id. at 14–15. 
905 Id. at 14–15. 
906 Interviews 2, 8, 15, 31 and 42. 
907 Beck, Mijeski, and Stark, supra note 380 at 105. 
908 Id. at 104. 
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Ecuadorians that persist, such as a natural proclivity toward laziness, violence, and crime, as well as abilities 
in music and sports.”909 Congruently, Marisol De La Cadena mentions that, in Latin America, racist 
practices tend to coexist with a denial of racism, as racism is not perceived as such because it is not based 
on phenotype but in cultural difference.910 Also, Peter Wade describes that, in Colombia, people tend to 
repudiate the idea that the country has a severe race discrimination problem, especially one affecting the 
Afro-descendant population.911 
Previous literature has documented the many ways in which Afro-descendants face discrimination 
and exclusion in the context of employment and public life.912 Limitations in access to education for Afro-
descendants in Latin America translate into disadvantages for this group in the employment market.913 The 
World Bank has pointed out that Afro-descendants join the job market unevenly when compared to other 
racial groups, due to factors such as limited education and lower return of their education investments. 
Because of this situation: “Afro-descendants have higher levels of unemployment in all countries, and 
among those employed, a larger share of them work in low-skilled occupations.”914  
Besides, Afro-descendants also face significant income gaps, which are related to a lower 
remuneration in their jobs when compared with similarly qualified non-Afro-descendant colleagues. The 
members of this group encounter glass ceilings in their occupations and are commonly denied 
promotions.915 Regarding income inequality, Hugo Ñopo asserts that, even though earning gaps between 
men and women and ethnic-minorities and majorities have been decreasing over time, “the pace at which 
 
909 Id. at 104. 
910 De La Cadena, supra note 374 at 16. 
911 WADE, supra note 166 at 3. 
912 Bello and Rangel, supra note 6 at 50. 
913 Id. at 50. 
914 AFRO-DESCENDANTS IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF INCLUSION, supra note 138 at 22. 
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 233 
they are doing so, however, does not seem commensurate with the pace at which women, indigenous people, 
and Afro-descendants have been acquiring education and human capital.”916 
Discrimination in employment is prevalent in Latin America. In the case of Brazil, Graziella Da 
Silva & Elisa Reis conducted a study in which they evaluated the perceptions of discrimination of black 
professionals in Rio de Janeiro.917 The authors conducted a total of 80 semi-structured interviews with 
black and brown (pretos e pardos) professionals in that city between the years of 2007 and 2008. The 
interviewees in the study narrated situations that the researchers would later describe as “generalized 
prejudice” and “particularized universalism.”918 These two phenomena refer to the fact that, even though 
there are high levels of prejudice, people are more likely to identify discrimination in anonymous/public 
interactions than in the context of private/personal relationships, in which racism remains invisible or 
cannot be talked about.919 Moreover, the study accounted for some of the difficulties that respondents faced 
when they tried to address racism in the context of Brazilian society and that they felt that their experiences 
of injustice are more associated with race than class status.920 However, Da Silva & Reis also describe that 
respondents did not believe that these incidents of discrimination impacted their social mobility since 
participants considered that their situation was similar to that of lower-class white persons, being the result 
of their class status.921 
 
7.2. Presumption of incompetence and the requirement of extra effort 
 
One of the most visible ways in which racial discrimination against Afro-descendants manifest itself 
inside judicial institutions is through a presumption of incompetence. This expression refers to the feeling 
 
916 ÑOPO, supra note 563 at 304. 
917 Graziella Da Silva Moraes & Elisa P. Reis, Perceptions of Racial Discrimination Among Black Professionals in 
Rio De Janeiro, 46 LAT. AM. RES. REV. 55–78 (2011). 
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919 Id. at 56. 
920 Id. at 56. 
921 Id. at 76. 
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of distrust in their capacities, credentials, and the value of their work that many Afro-descendant 
professional experiences, despite their personal accomplishments, professional achievements, and 
contributions. The concept of presumption of incompetence had already been used in previous scholarly 
works. Angela P. Harris & Carmen G. González coined this term to describe the experiences of women of 
color and low-income women in academia.922 The term refers to the many ways in which they are 
disadvantaged because they do not meet the "distinctly white, heterosexual, and middle- and upper-middle-
class" demographics and culture that dominates academic settings.923 
According to several participants, this lack of trust in Afro-descendant aptitude for work and 
intellectual capacity was manifested in different behaviors and instances.924 One of the participants, who is 
acquainted with the put in march of the SJP, mentioned that during the debates at the interior of this judicial 
institution, magistrates showed their discomfort with the idea of adopting special measures to secure Afro-
descendant presence at this court.925 These magistrates had the impression that there were few qualified 
minority candidates to fill out positions at the SJP. The participant mentioned that:  
 
Hence, the inclusion of ethnic personnel has faced many more obstacles than the gender aspect. 
Why? Because there is an idea that the positions are available, but there are no qualified candidates. 
That was one of the big discussions we had even with some auxiliary magistrates that said that 
'There should not be an ethnic quota because the ethnic [candidates] are not qualified. The gender 
quota, of course, there is plenty of qualified women, but the ethnic aspect that would be to do them 
a favor.' I cannot tell you more because I could get fired.926 
 
 
922 Angela P. Harris & Carmen G. González, Introduction, in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE 
AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA 1–14, 3 (Gabriella Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. eds., 2012), https://eds-b-ebscohost-
com.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/eds/ebookviewer/ebook/ZTAwMHhuYV9fNDg5NzAwX19BTg2?sid=3ba78d87
-15fd-42d3-8abf-d1c2f5e5f3e9@pdc-v-sessmgr03&vid=2&format=EB&rid=3 (last visited Feb 25, 2020). 
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Like other forms of racial discrimination, the presumption of incompetence is a type of 
disadvantageous treatment that accompanies Afro-descendant attorneys during most of their professional 
lives.927 An attorney I had the opportunity to interview mentioned that, while he was working as an in-
house lawyer for a company, his colleagues distrusted his capacities for the position he was occupying 
despite being found the most competent person for the job.928 Likewise, he also mentioned that during the 
time that he worked as a litigator, he would be hired over phone-call to litigate cases. On a few occasions, 
when his clients met him in person for the first time, they would manifest their surprise about the fact he [a 
black man] was the lawyer someone had recommended to them.929 Other participants also referred to 
similar situations in which people would appear incredulous about the fact that they were attorneys,930 or 
in which Afro-descendants were restricted in their access to positions due to the belief that they were not 
competent because of their race.931 This happened to some Afro-descendant attorneys who studied law in 
peripherical regions of the country but decided to practice in central areas of Colombia. These professionals 
found significant obstacles finding employment due to the common belief that they were not well-qualified 
despite not existing any proof about it.932 In this respect, regional and racial stereotypes seem to be conflated 
in order to exclude Afro-descendant attorneys form legal practice.933 
The presumption of incompetence appears to be an issue not only for staff selection but also in less 
visible aspects, such as the surprise shown by people whom Afro-descendant professionals had interacted 
with once they found out they were attorneys or judges934 Their race was, apparently, in contradiction with 
their profession. This occurred to a participant who heard one of her colleagues saying that Afro-descendant 
and indigenous lawyers do not know how you write well because they were better for orality.935 Such 
 
927 Interview 36. 
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comment did only disregard black and indigenous professionals' academic credentials but also assumed that 
their ethnicity made them unfit for the written word. Furthermore, the distrust in Afro-descendants’ skills 
may also significant impacts in aspects such as promotions, as it was manifested by an Afro-descendant 
woman working in the Caribbean region of Colombia, who asserted that she underwent difficulties climbing 
up positions in her work of judicial employee because a mestizo magistrate (who was not from that region) 
distrusted her abilities.936 
In the case of indigenous participants, exoticism accompanies the presumption of incompetence.937 
One interviewee affirmed that although her presence at the judicial institutions was consistently celebrated, 
she felt her colleagues treated her more as an exotic symbol of inclusion than as a valuable member of the 
team that could make substantive professional contributions.938 She described this experience as “epistemic 
discrimination" due to the value that was given to certain types of knowledge above others.939 
In my view, the presumption of incompetence is inextricably linked with racial stereotypes 
concerning the intellectual capacity of Afro-descendants and the activities they are good at. One of the 
participants also shared this position: 
 
I believe that such an idea, such pigeonholing that exists about blacks being suitable only for 
physical activities, for activities, for activities that require strength, but not for cognitive tasks, is a 
historical stereotype. Many people will tell you: 'I have never thought such thing,' but at teatime is 
a barrier that it has not been [broken]940  
 
Furthermore, in Latin America, labor is racialized. Underprivileged ethno-racial groups tend to 
have occupations that either reflect stereotypes or that offer low remunerations for arduous work. 
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Concerning Brazil, for example, Álvaro Bello and Marta Rangel mention that at the turn of the 21st century, 
"about 60% of black and mulatto men carry out manual work in industry, against 37% of white men. While 
some 40% of black and mulatto women work as domestic servants, the figure for white women is just 
15%.”941 Likewise, Carlos De la Torre describes how Afro-Ecuadorian men tend to have easy access to 
employment positions that require physical strength, like construction, agriculture, or security guard 
positions. In the case of Afro-Ecuadorian women, many of them work as domestic workers, and it is not 
uncommon that several female members of the same family are domestic workers.942 
My impression is that Afro-descendant legal professionals, judges, and judicial employees are 
contradicting a deeply rooted stereotype concerning black intellectual inferiority by their mere presence in 
judicial forums. Black bodies are transcending beyond the traditionally accepted occupational activities 
(cleaning services, security services, the arts, the sports) and physical spaces (the rural areas, the poor 
neighborhoods, prisons) in which blackness is allowed to exist. They are invaders of spaces and roles that 
were a fortress for whiteness. Hence, this type of racial discrimination deeply connected to the subversive 
act of refuting racial stereotypes.  
This act of invasion can be burdensome for Afro-descendants in the judiciary and the legal 
profession. The transgression can create the sensation of feeling like an “intruder,”943 due to the lack of 
connection with the elite that has traditionally dominated such spaces. Likewise, in many cases, Afro-
descendant presence in these “white spaces” is limited to just one or perhaps a few persons of this ethno-
racial identity, which can produce a sense of isolation in the pioneers.944 The first Afro-descendant in a 
university, a law school, a court, a tribunal, or a high court.945 
 
941 Bello and Rangel, supra note 6 at 50. 
942 Carlos De La Torre, Afro-Ecuadorian Responses to Racism: Between Citizenship and Corporatism, in NEITHER 
ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS: LATINOS, BLACKS, AFRO-LATINOS 61–74, 64 (Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler eds., 
2005). 
943 Interviews 4, 9 and 10.  
944 Interviews 14, 15, 16 and 37. 
945 Interviews 1, 2, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 25, 28, 29, 36, 37 and 43. 
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In addition, several participants manifested that they felt they had to do extra work (that was not 
required for their colleagues) in order to counteract the presumption of incompetence that lay on top of their 
work.946 A participant asserted that in order to be considered for positions, Afro-descendant applicants had 
to present, in general, superior credentials to the ones of other applicants, as additional proof that would not 
be required of a white or mestizo person.947 This "higher scrutiny" of their work is felt by judges and judicial 
employees in aspects such as the double or even multiple reviews of their written documents by their 
superiors,948 being frequently asked about which law school they attended, and even when inquired about 
their law school grades.949 In this respect, a woman Afro-descendant judge mentioned: 
 
What I am saying is that it is evident that for us [Afro-descendants] to get to those positions, we 
need to do a superior academic and professional effort to the one that a mestizo person needs to do. 
Then, what does need to be done? I would tell Afro-descendant persons that after they realize that 
they need to make a more significant academic and professional effort, 'you are clear,' as we use to 
say. You cannot measure yourself with the same bar you measure mestizos.950 
 
One of the areas in which the Afro-descendant extra effort can be seen is in their aesthetics as legal 
professionals and judicial servers.951 Several participants mentioned the need to be overly careful about the 
way they dressed, wore their hair, and, in general, physically presented themselves, as this was one of the 
most obvious ways in which they were scrutinized or treated unfairly.952 In this respect, the idea of having 
to "play the part" of a judge, judicial employee or even attorney was widespread among participants, since 
the failure to do so might mean facing uncomfortable or even discriminatory situations.953 For example, a 
 
946 Interviews 1, 8, 10, 15, 16, 21, 24, 27, 28 and 44. 
947 Interview 10. 
948 Interview 10. 
949 Interviews 15 and 16. 
950 Interview 15. 
951 Interviews 16 and 18. 
952 Interview 16. 
953 Interview 18. 
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participant reminded that while she was working as a judge in a small municipality on the Pacific coast, she 
had to be very careful about how she dressed.954 On several occasions, people assumed that white people 
present at the courthouse were the judges since they did not initially consider the possibility of a black 
woman to occupy a judicial post, even in a majority-black community like the one in which the participant 
lived.955  
It is essential to highlight that the type of aesthetic requirements for Afro-descendants that I am 
talking about exceeds those corresponding to the habitus of judicial servers or legal professionals. Perhaps 
the most evident case I could find was the one of a participant who, while working as notificador –which 
is one of the lowest-ranked judicial employee positions in the judiciary—praised himself of being “the only 
notificador of any courthouse in Cali that wore a tie all the time,”956 since this was a practice that allowed 
him to receive a “different treatment” from that dispensed to others in a similar position.957 Furthermore, 
on some occasions, this aesthetic requirements for Afro-descendants consist of disguising or diminishing 
the salience of their ethno-racial identity, as an interviewee in the city of Cartagena pointed out when she 
mentioned: "You will not see a judge with curls in the judiciary. If she has curls or has an Afro, she will 
smooth her hair.”958 
In conclusion, Afro-descendant participants are presumed to be incompetent at their roles in the 
judiciary and the legal profession. They are also subjected to double standards in the appraisal of their work. 
These issues forced them to do extra work to be treated or valued in the same way as their colleagues. These 
experiences can be synthesized in the word of an Afro-descendant judge, who asserted: "We need to prove 





956 Interview 21 
957 Id. 
958 Interview 33. 
959 Interview 17. 
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7.3. Mechanisms to cope with racial discrimination within the judiciary and the legal 
profession 
 
 A final element that I would like to discuss regarding situations of race discrimination within 
judicial institutions and the legal profession is how Afro-descendant lawyers, judges, and judicial 
employees deal with such a problem and, correspondingly, how judicial institutions address these situations. 
Before discussing this aspect, I should stress that the very discussion of racial discrimination in Latin 
America is often avoided. Robin Sheriff sustains that in the case of Brazil, racism is silent.960 She describes 
that the absence of discussion about race discrimination within families and among friends can be described 
as a form of cultural censorship, which occurs across racial lines and social classes.961 Some authors also 
link this refusal to debate racism to ignorance about the types of practices that could be cataloged as racist. 
In this respect, Beck et al. report that, even though Ecuadorians are significantly aware of racial differences 
among the population, a large percentage of Ecuadorians do not know what racism, race discrimination, or 
racial prejudice are.962 Finally, as Tianna Paschel and Mark Sawyer describe, in Latin America, it is 
common that people who claim to be the victims of race discrimination are often stigmatized as racist 
themselves. They are often accused of "creating racism where it did not previously exist,” if they dare to 
render discriminatory practices visible. Stigmatization contributes to the lack of denunciation and public 
debate about racist practices.963 
Participants referred to several mechanisms they used to deal with situations of racial 
discrimination within judicial institutions. Paradoxically, one of the most common consisted of either 
disregarding these situations or trying to refute the racist stereotypes with their behavior.964 In this respect, 
 
960 SHERIFF, supra note 180 at 62. 
961 Id. at 62. 
962 Beck, Mijeski, and Stark, supra note 380 at 120. (Noting that "slightly less than half of the respondents—and by 
extension, half of all Ecuadorians—claimed not to know what racism was, slightly less than two-thirds said they did 
not know what racial discrimination was, and almost 70 percent claimed not to know anything about racial prejudice.") 
963 Paschel and Sawyer, supra note 622 at 199. 
964 Interviews 1, 12, 23 and 40. 
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several participants seemed to enunciate the idea according to which they prevented being in a position in 
which they could be discriminated against by excelling at their work or doing additional work.965 Some of 
them went as far as to assert that “I am never discriminated against, but because I do not allow it to happen 
to me,”966 implying that they had the power to prevent discriminatory situations from occurring to them by 
using their high-quality work as a shield against prejudice.967 
Some participants mentioned that they had rendered visible discriminatory acts. Also, in fewer 
cases, institutional mechanisms had been activated to address these events.968 However, in a majority of 
cases, the institutional channels failed to deal with the situation effectively, and those responsible 
experienced little accountability.969 One of the interviewees mentioned that: 
 
Not much has happened [with the discrimination reports] because usually the issue of 
discrimination, although today we have a criminal statute, well, it is still seen as a very subjective 
matter. I mean, that 'you imagined [the discrimination act],' that it is a mere opinion and that he [the 
attacker] has a right to express himself.970 
 
Due to the difficulties of making situations of race discrimination visible, and the apparent 
inefficacy of the institutional mechanisms to address these situations, institutional responses to address 
situations of racial discrimination appear to be equally week. An exception to the lack of institutional 
response seems to be, once again, the SJP. Although several participants reported acts of racial 
discrimination within this court, they also mentioned that there appeared to be a good faith effort of the 
institution to address these situations and to prevent them in the future.971 Some participants referred to 
 
965 Interviews 1, 2, 4, 9 and 14.  
966 Interview 17. 
967 Interviews 17, 21, 28, 32, 40 and 43. 
968 Interview 8. 
969 Interviews 8, 15, 24, 28 and 32.  
970 Interview 8. 
971 Interview 15. 
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how this institution tried to train their staff on non-discrimination practices in the workplace, and some 
senior staff members have publicly addressed specific racial discrimination events in this court.972 Although 
additional actions could be undertaken inside the SJP to address situations of race discrimination, I consider 
it important to recognize that there appears to be some institutional effort in that direction. 
As a conclusion for this section, I would like to stress that racial discrimination practices appear to 
have a decisive role in explaining the low level of representation that Afro-descendants have in judicial 
institutions in Colombia. Racism appears not only to be creating obstacles for Afro-descendant legal 
professionals to access positions within judicial institutions but, once they are inside the courts, it also 
impacts the experiences and work of these professionals. With this conclusion, in chapter 4 I will discuss 
















972 Interviews 10, 13, 15 and 16. 
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IV. The foundations of Afro-descendant representation in judicial institutions 
  
In the preceding chapters, I introduced the debate on Afro-descendant underrepresentation in 
Colombia's judicial institutions. I conveyed my empirical study findings on the level of presence that this 
group has on the country's courts. Besides, I presented a list of conditions that, prima facie, seem to be 
influencing the limited level of Afro-descendant presence on Colombian courts. In this chapter, I will 
present the grounds for minority representation on courts, with a particular emphasis on Afro-descendants. 
I will engage in answering two questions: What are the principal rationales invoked for calling for minority 
representation in judicial institutions? What might be the potential effects of increased Afro-descendant 
representation in judicial institutions? In order to accomplish this goal, first, I will present the grounds for 
supporting ethno-racial and gender representation in judicial institutions. Second, I will discuss the potential 
impact that excluded groups’ representation on courts might have on judicial decision-making. Finally, I 
will debate on the particular aspect of whether strengthened Afro-descendant representation might have an 
impact on diminishing racial discrimination in the judicial system.  
In this chapter, I will introduce the participants' perception of the foundations of Afro-descendant 
representation on courts and the perceived impact that women and minority presence in judicial institutions 
may have on judicial decision-making. Additionally, I will reconstruct, in some detail, the central 
theoretical debates in the U.S. academic literature about the reasons for group representation on courts to 
analyze the participants' perceptions. I should make two clarifications in this respect. The first is that while 
the participant perspectives are useful for understanding the current state of the debate about group 
representation on Colombian courts, these views should not be determinative of a society's inclination to 
lobby for excluded groups’ representation on courts. The citizenry's opinion is the one that should matter 
in this respect since the population's perspectives are the ones that are decisive at assessing the legitimacy 
of judicial institutions.  
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The second is that I delve into the particularities of the scholarly debates because the qualitative 
study’s participants presented several rationales that have been previously invoked in this academic 
literature. Reconstructing these academic debates is essential because the study participants presented 
similar contradictions and diversity of perspectives than scholars. Therefore, the academic sources might 
help to theorize on the tensions arising from debating on minority representation in courts. 
Although my dissertation focuses on the Latin American context, in this chapter, I will be referring 
primarily to the U.S. academic literature in order to account for these scholarly debates. The reasons for 
using U.S. sources as the main point of reference is twofold: First, U.S. jurisprudence has been significantly 
influential on foreign courts—and especially Latin American Courts.973 Thus, the debates on group 
representation on U.S. courts might influence future debates about women and minorities’ representation 
in the Latin American judiciaries. Second, by contrast to the Latin American context, minority 
representation on courts have been the object of extensive research and debate in the U.S. legal and social 
science academia. Consequently, a large portion of the evidence and arguments produced in this area have 
been based on the U.S. experience. 
Before I begin, I shall also iterate a terminological clarification. For the most part, academic debates 
about the presence of women and minorities in judicial bodies have been held under the conceptual 
framework of "diversity." The expression "judicial diversity" has become a paradigm to enunciate the 
inclusion of women and minorities on courts. A judiciary is diverse when the numbers of women and 
minorities on courts reach meaningful levels. Some authors use this term to also encompass other types of 
subordinate identity groups (e.g., LGBTQ persons, persons with disabilities, religious minorities) and 
individuals with career paths that most judges have not traditionally pursued before their appointment to 
the bench. Despite the traction of the judicial diversity terminology, I consider that this framework is 
inadequate for my inquiry since it separates the debate of subordinated groups' underrepresentation from 
its historical roots. This framework ignores the conditions of discrimination and inequality that led to the 
 
973 Phanor J. Eder, The Impact of the Common Law on Latin America, 4 U MIAMI REV 435 (1950). (Noting the 
influence of U.S. and English law on Latin American legal systems). 
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exclusion of traditionally marginalized persons from public and private institutions. As Athena Mutua 
explains: 
 
The concept of diversity, as many critics have noted, is deeply problematic as currently 
conceptualized because it disconnects diversity from historical racial and gender injustice, among 
other things. In addition, in practice, few of the many who pledge loyalty to the idea, seem 
committed to doing the hard work of reorganizing social and institutional priorities to ensure 
diversity or even to tracking any potential progress where changes have been made. This is 
undoubtedly the case in the context of "diversifying the judiciary," particularly among the state 
judicial benches.974 
 
Thus, while many scholars use the concept of “judicial diversity” at explaining minority presence 
on courts, I will use the framework of representation to refer to their studies. When I use the word 
representation, I will be referring to the presence of a particular group in an institution or group of 
institutions. This idea of representation corresponds to Hanna Pitkin's explanation of the concept of 
descriptive representation.975 Descriptive representation ensues when the composition of a representative 
body corresponds to that of the represented group; when the representative mirrors the represented, as it is 
an act of "standing for."976  
 
1. The foundations of ethno-racial and gender representation in judicial institutions 
 
In this section, I will analyze the different grounds identified by participants and found in the 
preexisting literature for justifying gender and ethno-racial representation in judicial institutions. Several 
 
974 Athena Mutua, Disparity In Judicial Misconduct Cases: Color-Blind Diversity?, 23 AM. UNIV. J. GEND. SOC. 
POLICY LAW 23–105, 30–31 (2014). 
975 PITKIN, supra note 21. 
976 Id. 
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rationales have been used to argue for the need to increase minority representation in the judiciary. I will 
try to differentiate among them. However, I must warn the readers that study participants and scholars 
usually subscribe to several types of justifications at once, as these are not mutually exclusive. Besides, 
different types of rationales tend to intertwine with others, making it difficult to distinguish among them 
clearly.  
 I could identify three main grounds for women and minority representation in judicial institutions: 
Role model rationales, altered or improved decision-making rationales, and fairness and legitimacy 
rationales. Additionally, during the qualitative study, I identified an additional rationale: Equality in access 
to resources. I will move on to explain the content of each one of these. 
 
1.1. Role Model Rationales 
 
Some participants of the qualitative study endorsed the idea that Afro-descendant representation in 
the judicial institutions was necessary due to the symbolic value of their presence in judicial institutions. 
This rationale was evident, for example, in an interview with an Afro-descendant judicial employee. She 
discussed how black women in a particular community were very excited to meet a black woman magistrate 
that visited their neighborhood since they had not met any black woman judge before.977 The participant 
underlined the importance of these types of appointments for dismantling racial and gender forms of 
prejudice: “It is a chance to break stereotypes: that blacks do not think, that they cannot be in academic 
spaces.”978 Likewise, another participant stressed the symbolic effects of Afro-descendant representation 
on courts with regards to the image of the country, mentioning that the lack of black judges portrayed 
Colombia as a country that did not have a black population.979 
 
977 Interview 14. 
978 Id. 
979 Interview 27. 
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 Furthermore, an Afro-descendant woman magistrate sustained that she decided to become a judge 
because other black women had asked her to do it since there were very few people like her in similar 
positions. She asserted that the symbolic role that an Afro-descendant woman serving as a magistrate might 
have on younger black women and girls was decisive for her decision.980 Another participant, an Afro-
descendant attorney, also stressed the relevance of this rationale, by mentioning that she decided to become 
a lawyer following the steps of another Afro-descendant attorney that served as her career inspiration.981 In 
summary: According to participants, role model rationales are important grounds for women and minority 
representation on the courts, given the symbolic nature of the judicial function in society.  
Analogously, in the academic literature, the importance of judges as role models for lawyers, 
specific communities, and the society is one of the most invoked—and less controversial—rationales to 
justify gender and ethno-racial inclusion policies in the judicial system. Theresa Beiner explains that: 
“Diversity on the bench also ‘provides role models for those historically excluded.’ Women judges 
themselves agree that they serve as positive role models for women attorneys. These judges also have 
encouraged other women to become judges.”982 Non-traditional judges fulfill a symbolic role, encouraging 
members of the community to overcome obstacles and pursue leadership positions in public service. Like 
Anna Blackburne-Rigsby asserts: “Minority role models in the judiciary are symbolically important to 
encourage other individuals with diverse backgrounds to join the bench.”983 
Sylvia Lazos Vargas articulates the role model rationale for diversifying the judiciary in terms of 
symbolic representation. In her view: “In appointing minorities or women with ‘rags to riches’ stories, the 
appointing executive makes a statement about his or her values, more specifically, the executive's belief 
that leadership in American government should be accessible to all citizens, regardless of their 
background.”984 Nevertheless, Lazos Vargas warns that symbolic representation, which usually acquires 
 
980 Interview 15. 
981 Interview 42. 
982 Beiner, supra note 19 at 117–118. 
983 Anna Blackburne-Rigsby, The Importance Of A Diverse Judiciary To Closing The Historic “Health” Gap Between 
Blacks And Whites, And President Obama’s Legacy, 60 HOWARD LAW J. 641–662, 644 (2017). 
984 Lazos Vargas, supra note 765 at 1430. 
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most relevance when the first non-traditional judges are appointed to a particular court, tends to be used as 
a way to deny the need for structural changes in the judicial system.985 Token appointments are presented 
as proof of the effectiveness of the merit system already in place. 
An obvious critique of this type of rationale is whether or not the idea of minority and women 
judges as role models is—by itself—sufficiently powerful to justify state action to ensure a certain level 
representation for these groups in the judicial system. Some might argue that the mere symbolic effects of 
having more women and minority judges are not enough to justify special measures, unless other types of 
benefits could come out of such representation. 
 
1.2. Altered or improved judicial decision-making rationales 
 
Altered or improved decision-making rationales assert that an increase in minority representation 
on courts could lead to a transformation in the content of judicial decisions. Several participants articulated 
various versions of the altered or improved decision-making rationales.986 Interviewees asserted that the 
lack of Afro-descendant presence on Colombia’s courts might prevent the development of actions to 
address social inequality in the country,987 and that an increase in the number of Afro-descendant judges 
might bring new perspectives to the bench on social justice issues.988 
In some cases, participants suggested that these potential changes in the judicial decision-making 
process might be the result of a better capacity of Afro-descendants to empathize with people in unfavorable 
social conditions since they might have personally experienced them.989 Nevertheless, in general, 
participants rejected the idea that Afro-descendants are different as judges when compared to individuals 
 
985 Id. at 1431–1432. 
986 Interviews 8 and 9.  
987 Interview 1. 
988 Interviews 7 and 8.  
989 Interviews 1, 2, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 24, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41 and 44. 
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from other ethno-racial groups.990 Interviewees commonly articulated anti-essentialist narratives, relying 
on principles of formal equality, or naming the judicial activity’s impartiality duty.991 As a response to my 
question concerning the interaction between his ethno-racial identity and his role in the judiciary, a high 
ranking Afro-descendant judicial employee, responded with the phrase: “The law has no color.”992 Despite 
this assertion, participants appeared to be well-aware of jurisprudential and legal theory debates about the 
issue of judicial discretion in the decision of cases.993 
Some respondents were careful to explain that while they believed the judicial system could 
beneficiate from having more Afro-descendant judges, such benefits would not stem from their identity but 
from the use of their experiences and perspectives in their roles within the judiciary. In this respect, one 
interviewee mentioned:  
 
I believe that the ideologic, political pluralism that the judiciary has can also be expressed in that 
way, and it can be, let’s say, enriched that way. Not because the Afro-descendants must have a 
certain [x] ideology. What I believe is that in those social contexts, I think, the life experience that 
one has conditions in many forms how one sees life, sees things, understands the law, sees social 
conflicts. Then, those people may contribute a lot. We could say the same of the white or mestizo 
races, or of any other person. I believe that in that sense, there must be an important balance.994 
 
Likewise, it is interesting that some participants appeared to be more receptive to the idea that 
gender might influence judicial decision-making than they were to the same idea about race. As an example, 
an Afro-descendant attorney living in an Andean city of Colombia asserted that, while he did not think that 
the race of the judge could influence judicial decision-making, gender might. He believed that cases in 
 
990 Interviews 3, 5, 6 and 45. 
991 Id. 
992 Interview 21.  
993 Interviews 6, 8, 9, 17, 1, 22 and 23. 
994 Interview 4. 
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which women judges or prosecutors were involved in criminal cases involving certain types of crimes 
(possibly violent crimes committed against women), they might act differently from men judges or 
prosecutors.995 
In the case of indigenous participants, they seemed, in general, more skeptical about the potential 
influence that ethnic identities could have on judging.996 They stressed the fact that, in the majority of cases, 
judges with ethnic identities are not in their positions because of that reason and that the formalistic and 
regulated nature of the judicial activity would prevent them from relying on their ethnic identity for the 
execution of their functions.997 Nevertheless, an indigenous participant acknowledged that, in some areas 
of the law—as the newly created SJP—, there could be a more significant opportunity for ethnic identities 
to impact judicial decision-making. In their view, this effect might be a consequence of the significant 
presence of Afro-descendant and indigenous magistrates and judicial employees on this court and the 
thematic nature of this jurisdiction (apparently referring to the specific impact that the internal armed 
conflict had had on ethnic communities in Colombia).998  
An essential element to consider in the case of indigenous participants is that, prima facie, they 
seemed less inclined than Afro-descendant participants to subscribe to the idea that they are representatives 
(in the substantive sense) of their ethnic group. This difference is significant. Indigenous participants 
asserted that their role within the judiciary is not to “channel the perspective” of their people, but rather to 
open doors and facilitate dialogue between traditional indigenous authorities and the majoritarian system 
of justice.999 As an example, an indigenous participant declared: “One could tell: ‘Oh wow, I am the 
representative of the indigenous peoples.' [But] One is not the representative, one belongs to a people and, 
 
995 Id. 
996 Interview 11.  
997 Id.  
998 Id. 
999 Interviews 11 and 12.  
 251 
with dignity, will continue to strengthen that here. However, there are the [traditional] authorities there. 
One must open ways for their active participation and coordination." 1000 
In the specific case of the SJP, which is the high court with the highest level of minority 
representation in the country, even though the magistrate selection process was sensible to gender and 
ethnic diversity criteria, in compliance with the Legislative Act 01 of 2017, the Constitutional Court, in the 
ruling C-080 of 2018, clarified that: 
 
In consequence, although the magistrate selection responded to 'equitable participation between men 
and women criteria, non-discrimination guarantees, and respect for ethnic and cultural diversity' 
(section 11 of transitory article 7 of the Legislative Act 01 of 2017), these do not represent the 
populations to which they belong to, despite their gender, ethnicity or culture had been considered 
in their selection. As judicial authorities, they are subjected only to the rule of law and the 
Constitution.1001 
 
The former means that, at least in the legal sense, the transitional justice magistrates should not be 
considered representatives of their identity groups, due to the need to guarantee judicial independence. 
However, the former does not preclude the possibility that magistrates incorporate in their decisions the 
knowledge and values that, under the rule of law, might respond to their lived experiences as women, Afro-
descendants or indigenous persons.  
Given the diversity of opinions concerning this rationale, it is crucial to analyze it through the lenses 
of the existing literature on this topic. Altered judicial decision-making rationales have been—without any 
doubt—the ones that have received more considerable attention, and have been the main object of critique, 
in scholarly debates. Although some authors have suggested that the effects of more women and minority 
 
1000 Interview 12. 
1001 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 15, 2018, Sentencia C-080/2008 Gaceta de la Corte 
Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colomb.).  
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representation in the judiciary on case outcomes could be understood out of common sense, others have 
stressed the need for empirical verification of such causation. As I will explain in the next section, social 
scientists have carried this endeavor.1002  
Assessing the impact of women and minorities' representation on judicial decisions has 
implications. Perhaps the most visible is that they might further demystify the judicial function. Traditional 
understandings of the judicial role claim that judges decide cases bound to neutrally apply legal norms. 
There is a prohibition of using personal values in the decision of cases instead of the law.1003 As Theresa 
Beiner describes, the assumption is that "if all judges should theoretically apply neutral principles alike, 
then admitting that there is a difference in how judges vote based on background factors such as their race 
and gender undermines the entire myth (or, perhaps, goal) of a neutral and impartial judiciary."1004 
Jeffrey Segal & Harold Spaeth discuss three models of judicial decision-making for predicting the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: The legal model, the attitudinal model, and the rational 
choice model.1005 The legal model is a spectrum of theoretical positions that share "the belief that, in one 
form or another, the decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light of 
the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the framers, and/or precedent.”1006 The 
archetypical example of the legal model is the mechanical jurisprudence school of thought, according to 
which judges are supposed to act as operators who apply legal rules in an almost mechanic fashion.1007 In 
contrast, the attitudinal model defends the idea that “the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts 
of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of justices.”1008 Finally, the rational-choice model 
encompasses a broad set of approaches that perceive judges as rational actors. This model rests on two 
 
1002 Beiner, supra note 756 at 116–117. 
1003 SEGAL AND SPAETH, supra note 236 at 44. 
1004 Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New Millennium, 36 U C 
DAVIS REV 597–618, 598 (2003). 
1005 SEGAL AND SPAETH, supra note 236. 
1006 Id. at 48. 
1007 Id. at 48. 
1008 Id. at 86. (Noting that it would be ideological differences rather than legal instruments and the facts of a case that 
would ultimately govern the outcome of cases on courts) 
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assumptions: First, judges may come out with a fluid hierarchy of preferences at deciding cases. Second, 
judges would choose from their available options aiming to obtain as much satisfaction as possible from 
their decision-making.1009 In addition to the three models already discussed, Theresa Beiner explains that, 
recently, some academics have incorporated in their analysis the effects of institutional factors on decision-
making by using strategic theory in their study of judicial behavior.1010 According to this approach, which 
builds on rational-choice theory, internal and external factors and actors have the potential to influence 
judges' decisions on legal disputes.1011 
A part of the literature that has adopted altered or enhanced decision-making rationales for 
increasing minority representation on the bench have taken Segal & Spaeth's attitudinal model as a point of 
reference,1012 under the belief that such a model is compatible with the legal realism and critical legal 
studies' approaches to judicial decision-making.1013 In this sense, Theresa Beiner suggests that racial and 
gender representation could also lead to ideological inclusion, as life experiences—which are mediated by 
race and gender—have the potential to influence political ideology.1014 
However, both legal scholars and political scientists have elevated sharp critiques against the 
attitudinal model. Some believe that the evidence supporting the model has focused on the Supreme Court's 
decisions, which cast doubts about the model's effectiveness for predicting lower court's judicial decisions. 
Likewise, others have accused the model of oversimplifying the judicial decision-making by concentrating 
their analysis on case outcomes instead of analyzing the judicial process more broadly.1015 
It is necessary to keep in mind that legal scholars' use of the attitudinal model as a point of reference 
has not meant that they have ultimately rejected the use of the legal model of judicial decision-making. 
 
1009 SEGAL AND SPAETH, supra note 236. (To describe the rational choice model, Segal and Spaeth adopt William 
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1012 SEGAL AND SPAETH, supra note 236; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
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1013 Beiner, supra note 756 at 130. 
1014 Id. at 130. 
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Hybrid models of judicial decision-making are widely used. Moreover, the legal model continues to be 
dominant in the teaching of law and judges public accounts case decisions in the U.S. Ultimately, the debate 
on how broad or narrow is judicial discretion remains as one of the most debated issues in jurisprudence,1016 
with some asserting that: 
 
Many judges attempt to use the legal method in resolving cases. The research of Ashenfelter, 
Eisenberg, and Schwab supports this and suggests, contrary to findings of political scientists, that 
in the average case judges use the traditional legal method-look at precedent, and follow it in the 
case at hand. The result is that case outcomes are relatively consistent. This does not mean that the 
judge's identity has no impact on the outcome of a particular case or on the law itself. Instead, it 
suggests that, at least in certain types of cases, outcomes are reasonably predictable.1017  
 
Just as some participants suggested, some scholars have claimed that increased women and 
minority representation on courts could have specific impacts on certain areas of the law. Theresa Beiner 
argues that increased diversity in the judiciary has the potential for improving the enforcement of civil 
rights legislation by the courts.1018 Following some legal scholars and political scientists who affirm that 
increased presence of women and minorities on courts could lead to the consideration of additional 
viewpoints in judicial decision-making.1019 Beiner asserts that descriptive representation in the judiciary 
could also lead to substantive representation, which, according to Hanna Pitkin, refers to "acting for others,” 
or the defense and procurement of somebody’s interests.1020 
In this same line of argument, Anna Blackburn-Rigsby proposed that a diverse judiciary could help 
narrow down the health-gap between whites and blacks in the United States.1021 In her view, the 
 
1016 Edited by David Kennedy, The Canon of American Legal Thought, 52 AM. J. JURISPRUD. 319 (2007); Duncan 
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1018 Beiner, supra note 756. 
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diversification of the judiciary could have a positive impact on closing the health gap between racial groups, 
as judicial leadership is necessary to increase legal aid for underserved communities, which could ultimately 
reflect upon minorities' access to the health system.1022  
Analogously, Joy Milligan argues that the diversification of the judiciary could open the path to 
improved judicial decision-making in the field of political morality.1023 According to her theory, race and 
ethnicity are factors that inform the public's perception of issues of political morality and that, in such cases, 
judges should consider all available points of view before making decisions. Milligan argues that a higher 
level of minority representation in the judiciary could potentially enable the judiciary to consider additional 
perspectives on public morality because minority judges could be better positioned to seriously take into 
consideration perceptions that are held within their communities.1024 The interaction and deliberation 
between majority and minority judges could lead to new or better judicial decisions, as:  
 
Openness to alternative legal resolutions prevents us from discarding meritorious resolutions out of 
hand, provides us with new information about the contours of the legal problem, and potentially 
produces new and better answers based on compromise. Most significantly, the collective 
experience of living with alternative moral solutions may be the surest way for us to agree on which 
solutions are the correct ones.1025 
 
Likewise, Sylvia Lazos Vargas affirms that a more diverse judiciary could be an avenue for courts 
to achieve an enhanced understanding of racial tensions, which could finally translate into a rule of law that 
is inclusive of the narratives of the majority and the minorities.1026 She asserts that increased minority 
representation on courts could foster a conversation about the roles and purposes of using race as a category 
 
1022 Id. at 662. 
1023 Joy Milligan, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions about Political Morality, 
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1025 Id. at 1212. 
1026 Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does A Diverse Judiciary Attain A Rule Of Law That Is Inclusive?: What Grutter V. 
Bollinger Has To Say About Diversity On The Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE LAW 101–152 (2004). 
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in U.S. law. Lazos Vargas is careful to warn that “it is a fallacy to equate descriptive minority representation 
with the substance of a deeper racial dialogue on problematic constitutional issues,”1027 as “greater minority 
representation on the bench only increases the chances that a racial dialogue can be developed.”1028 In this 
respect, the complexities of judging turn the descriptive representation of excluded groups into a condition 
that facilitates cross-identity debates on racial issues but does not guarantee such viewpoint exchange.  
Other authors have focused on the importance of minority representation on courts for specific 
ethno-racial groups. Some scholars have asserted that the presence of certain racial groups on courts could 
lead to better judicial decision-making due to the particular life experiences attached to different racial 
identities. In the case of Asian Americans, Pat Chew & Luke Kelley-Chew seem to suggest a potential 
connection between the low levels of representation of this racial group in the judiciary with their 
difficulties to be successful plaintiffs in workplace racial harassment cases.1029 According to their findings, 
Asian American plaintiffs were successful litigants in only 19.4% of these type of cases, and, along with 
African Americans, had the highest dismissal rate among all racial groups in this type of litigation.1030 
Furthermore, Chew & Kelley-Chew argue that Asian Americans experience discrimination in a different 
way than other racial groups and that the members of this group may have a particular racial perspective 
on this issue. Ultimately, the authors argue that increasing the number of judges that share this ethno-racial 
identity may enrich the judicial decision-making process in this particular type of case, beneficiating not 
only Asian American plaintiffs but the general public.1031 Serafin Tagarao et al. also endorse this position 
in the case of Filipino-Americans.1032  
 
1027 Id. at 152. 
1028 Id. at 152. 
1029 Pat Chew & Luke Kelley-Chew, The Missing Minority Judges, 14 J. GEND. RACE JUSTICE 179–197 (2010). 
1030 Id. at 185. 
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Similarly, Josh Hsu wonders whether the identity and experiences of judges of this group could 
influence their perspective on specific legal issues.1033 He studied Asian American judges’ decisions and 
biographies and concluded that “some judges have explicitly stated that their Asian American identities 
affect their analyses, while in other instances, language in their opinions suggests the same. Statistical 
evidence alone, however, has not supported these claims.”1034 
In the case of Native Americans, Paige Hoster affirms that an increased level of representation of 
this group in the judiciary could enhance judicial decision-making, as a diverse judiciary is better situated 
to approach with empathy to different legal disputes.1035 According to Hoster, sufficient Native American 
representation on the federal bench is crucial for this group's interests, as the judicial system tends to 
downplay claims regarding Native interests. Hence, increased representation could translate into a fairer 
study of Native American cases before U.S. courts.1036 Similarly, Robert Saunooke states: "We 
underestimate profoundly the impact of the lack of diversity within the judiciary—especially the impact of 
the void caused by the dearth of Native Americans in the federal judiciary."1037 
 In the case of Latinos/as, Kevin Johnson argued–before the confirmation of Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor–that having a Latino justice in the Supreme Court could potentially benefit the court as an 
institution, the community of Latinos/as, and the country as a whole.1038 In his view, a Latino/a justice could 
bring new approaches to the court; enriching its decision-making process on a range of issues, including 
constitutional law and civil rights.1039 Also, he asserted that the appointment of a Latino/a to the Supreme 
Court could also send a powerful message of inclusion for this segment of the country’s population.1040 
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 Likewise, concerning African Americans, Kevin Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer stressed the 
impact that Thurgood Marshall had on the Supreme Court during his tenure as an associate justice. They 
explain that “other justices on the Court credited him with adding much to the Court's deliberations due to 
his experiences as an African American civil rights activist in the days of great upheaval and enduring 
change to the social fabric of the United States.”1041 Even more conservative justices, such as Anthony 
Kennedy and Sandra Day O’Connor, have acknowledged Marshall’s influence on the court and its 
members, especially on issues related to social justice and criminal law.1042 
I should note that some black scholars have been among the most consistent supporters of altered 
decision-making rationales as foundations for minority representation on the bench. As an example, 
Sherrilyn Ifill argued that the main benefit of granting representation to minorities in the judiciary is to 
include an array of voices that have historically been excluded from courts. She sustained that these voices 
have the potential to improve the quality of judicial decisions due to the interaction of different 
perspectives.1043 Carl Tobias has also supported this idea concerning the prospective impact of LGBT 
judges on courts' decisions.1044  
Ifill trusts that minorities' representation may also lead to the substantive representation of 
minorities' values and points of view. She believes that racial identities influence how minorities in the U.S. 
perceive in the world,1045 and that those racial identities could also inform judges’ legal analysis, their 
interpretation of the law, and their decisions on legal disputes.1046 The author recognizes that some people 
could find it problematic to overtly acknowledge the use of personal experiences in judicial decision-
making—due to the need to guarantee judicial impartiality. Nevertheless, she argues that in the case of 
judges, individual impartiality should not require judges to leave aside their life experiences and principles, 
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but rather to have an openness of mind when deciding particular cases.1047 Nonetheless, Ifill’s focus on the 
decision-making effects also means that she does not believe that descriptive representation will be 
sufficient—or even necessary—to accomplish such purpose.1048 She asserts: “Minority judicial candidates 
who are explicitly promoted to fulfill diversity objectives, however, must offer more than their racial ‘face’ 
to demonstrate that they can bring diversity to the bench”1049, discarding the idea that any minority candidate 
for a judicial vacancy could serve the purpose of diversifying the bench. Furthermore, she goes as far as to 
assert that, in some instances, white candidates could be functional as "diversity candidates" if they are 
capable and willing to serve as representatives of minority points of view.1050 
The idea that descriptive representation is a precondition for substantive representation has 
certainly been controversial in the political science scholarship. Jane Mansbridge asserts that descriptive 
representation is not always the best alternative for minorities, as in a representative democracy, the core 
concern of representation involves the deliberation about substantive interests.1051 Nevertheless, she also 
affirms that there are conditions under which descriptive representation could be beneficial for traditionally 
excluded groups,1052 including when the interests at stake are unclear, there is distrust among the parties, or 
the institutions' legitimacy is low, or there is longstanding political subordination in society.1053 
Similar to Sherrilyn Ifill’s position, Angela Onwachi-Willig affirms that the transformation of the 
judiciary in terms of race and gender—as well as class, religion, sexuality, and other categories—will lead 
to the introduction of a variety of voices that will enhance the judicial decision-making process.1054 
Furthermore, she introduces a proposal to increase the number of justices that compose the Supreme Court 
of the United States from 9 to 15, in order to allow different demographic groups to achieve representation 
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in the highest level of the federal judiciary.1055 In her proposal, she highlights the negative effect of tokenism 
in the judiciary. She notes that "once one minority is on the bench, the politicians who hold the 
responsibility of appointing people to the bench believe their job is done, and they have little political 
incentive to create further diversity on that court.”1056  
It is essential to highlight that Onwachi-Willig does not assert that the diversification of the 
judiciary will necessarily mean that these judges will be of a liberal or progressive line of thought. As an 
example, she interprets Justice Thomas’ votes on cases involving racial issues as being an expression of 
black conservative thinking in the U.S.1057 According to the author, experiences of racial subordination in 
the life of Clarence Thomas have possibly influenced his role as a judge, but in a way in which they have 
made him a voice speaking a narrative of black conservatism. She believes that Justice Thomas's voice is 
also a diverse voice with the potential to enrich the judicial decision-making processes.1058 
A similar debate to the one concerning the impact of minorities on judicial decision-making has 
taken place regarding women representation in the judiciary, especially given the influence that the work 
of the psychologist Carol Gilligan has had on feminist legal theory.1059 As Jilda Aliotta describes:  
 
Feminist legal theorists have also argued that women judges will speak with a ‘different voice.’ 
Several of these theorists find their inspiration in the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan, who 
argues that women’s styles of reasoning and approaches to problem solving differ from those of 
men. According to Gilligan, while men tend to view the world atomistically and to search for 
abstract principles to resolve moral problems, women are more likely to see the world as 
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interconnected and to perceive most moral problems as requiring an accommodation between self 
and community.1060 
 
Aliotta explains that this current of thought believes that the American legal system is constructed 
from a male perspective, as it rests heavily on individualistic values, and it seeks to resolve cases based on 
abstract principles. Hence, increasing the number of women judges could have the potential for introducing 
new perspectives to judicial decision-making, as women might behave differently from men on how they 
approach the legal analysis of cases.1061 Other authors such as Shirley Abrahamson, who has acknowledged 
that her gender has played a significant role in her work as a judge, also support this position.1062 
Some authors, such as Sue Davis, have tried to empirically assess the theory of a distinctive 
women’s voice in the context of the judiciary by trying to identify it in specific judicial opinions.1063 Davis 
concludes that, sometimes, women speak in a different voice; at other times, they do not.1064 She asserts 
that sometimes men can speak in a different voice, too. Hence, regarding the results of her research, she 
affirms that these “do not provide empirical support for the theory that the presence of women judges will 
transform the very nature of the law.”1065 In contrast, regarding the question about the potential feminine 
voice of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Jilda Aliotta argues that it is not possible to find such a voice in the 
opinions of this specific justice. Moreover, she disputes the existence of significant evidence supporting the 
idea that men and women, as a general rule, would reach different decisions in their role as judges.1066  
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Another form in which women's presence in the judiciary might impact judicial decision-making 
could be thorough the use of feminist legal methods. Katharine Bartlett explains that feminist legal methods 
include an array of non-traditional approaches to the creation of law, which seek to uncover aspects of the 
legal system that tend to be left unnoticed in traditional legal doctrine and epistemology.1067 These methods 
include tools such as asking the woman question, feminist practical reasoning, and consciousness-
raising.1068 Although some of these methods are not of exclusive use of feminists or even women, she 
believes that it is reasonable to think that an increase in women's representation in the judiciary could open 
the doors for broader use of feminist legal methods in judicial decision-making. 
In opposition to Bartlett’s view, Michael Solimine & Susan Wheatly argue against the idea of 
increasing the number of women judges over the basis of their alleged impact on judicial decision-
making.1069 The authors argue that the idea that women judges will be able to use feminist legal theory in 
their work is problematic since the feminist theory is not a single coherent current of thought.1070 
Furthermore, there are no reasons to believe either that women judges would use feminist methods while 
acting as judicial decision-makers, or that men could not use them if situated in an analog position.1071 
Therefore, the authors argue that more women judges could be desirable from the perspective of intuitive 
fairness, as evidence about the impact of gender in judging is still inconclusive.1072 
Perhaps one of the contexts in which altered judicial decision-making rationales acquired public 
visibility was during Sonia Sotomayor's confirmation as a Supreme Court Justice. Sotomayor was criticized 
for having stated in public: "I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences 
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life."1073 
Regarding this episode, Pat Chew identifies that the core of the critiques against Sotomayor was based both 
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on her acknowledgment that identity informs judicial decision-making, as well as on the idea that her 
identity could lead to non-impartial judicial decisions.1074 Chew beliefs that it is true that judges' race and 
gender affect their decision-making and uses political science evidence to support such association. 
However, she disputes the idea that women and minority judges would be biased or prejudicial in their 
judicial role. Chew affirms that this would mean that white-male judges' perceptions are not to be 
understood as the standard for impartiality.1075 Moreover, when judges exchange opinions with other judges 
with different racial and gender identities, this could lead to an in-depth analysis of legal disputes, which 
could be beneficial for judicial decision-making as a whole.1076 
 Regarding the modified decision-making rationales, perhaps the question is so much not whether 
descriptive representation will lead to substantive representation for women and minorities, but rather under 
what conditions such effects may arise. In this regard, the theories of representative bureaucracy could have 
some answers.1077 According to Lael Keiser et al., some factors influence the transformation of a type of 
representation into another, including "discretion, the gendering of a given policy issue, 
mission/socialization, hierarchy, stratification, critical mass, and professionalization.”1078 
 Authors such as Maya Sen have argued that, even in modern times, when the educational and career 
backgrounds of women and minority judges tend to be becoming similar to those of white-male judges, 
women and minorities still tend to be more liberal than traditional judges.1079 This a significant change 
since, as Elliot Slotnick & Mary Clark explain, years ago, the career paths of non-white-male judges and 
traditional judges were noticeably different.1080 Sen's research indicates that in recent years, women and 
minority judges have acquired similar career paths and education to white-male judges, including access to 
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legal education in top law schools and previous judicial experience. In her view, this situation could 
potentially allow us to assert that “the interests of women and minorities are being represented, even as the 
professional and educational profiles of female and minority judges appear to slowly be converging toward 
the Ivy League, private-practice oriented experience of white male judges."1081 
I should mention that the most common criticism of post-modern legal theorists against the idea of 
using descriptive representation as an instrument to achieve substantive representation in the judiciary is 
that it could be based on essentialism.1082 As Theresa Beiner explains: "Indeed, the very idea that, for 
example, women will decide a certain way in 'women's cases' is essentialist. It assumes a commonality of 
perspective among women that is likely unjustified."1083 Although Beiner recognizes that certain empirical 
studies have concluded that gender and racial identities may influence judicial decision-making, she 
acknowledges that in most circumstances, traditional and non-traditional judges will decide cases 
similarly.1084  
In conclusion, the academic literature concerning altered or improved decision-making as grounds 
for minority and women representation on courts has a similar diversity of opinions and analog 
contradictions than the participant responses invoking this type of rationale. In the next section, I will 
present a specific finding in the participants’ responses concerning the impact of the race-ethnicity divide 




1081 Sen, supra note 1079 at 396–397. 
1082 Mansbridge, supra note 252 at 637–638. (Mansbridge explains that: “Essentialism involves assuming a single or 
essential trait, or nature, that binds every member of a descriptive group together, giving them common interests that, 
in the most extreme versions of the idea, transcend the interests that divide them. Such an assumption leads not only 
to refusing to recognize major lines of cleavage in a group but also to assimilating minority or subordinate interests in 
those of the dominant group without even recognizing their existence.") 
1083 Beiner, supra note 756 at 116–117. 
1084 Id. at 116–117. 
 265 
1.2.1. The race-ethnicity divide’s effect on the altered decision-making 
rationales as a foundation for Afro-descendant representation on 
Colombian courts  
 
An aspect that became noticeable in the participant’s undertaking of the potential effects of Afro-
descendant presence on courts concerning judging is their differential treatment of Afro-descendant identity 
in its racial and ethnic dimensions. In general, interviewees were more open to endorse altered or improved 
judicial decision-making rationales when they were discussing the contributions of Afro-descendant judges 
that have a distinct ethnic identity (a cultural identity that is different from majoritarian society) to judicial 
decision-making, than when they referred only to Afro-descendants as a racial group (a form of difference 
that is asserted based on discrimination experiences that follow phenotype).1085 In this respect, an Afro-
descendant judge stressed that while racial identities should not have a significant impact on judicial 
decision-making, cultural identities, since the judges that have stronger ties to the Afro-descendant 
community (which he named as judges that are “more Afro”) could contribute to debates with a view that 
those who are not “as Afro” might not provide. Likewise, an Afro-descendant woman who works as a 
judicial employee for a high court, while answering to the question of whether being an Afro-descendant 
was a circumstance that impacted her role within this institution, mentioned that: 
 
Yes, just as I was telling you. Just because of the way you have a vision on the collective, even if 
you are not an ethnic person. Then, I do not know, a case of rape, a theft, a murder, a person who 
was killed by their husband. What happened to that family? What injuries did it suffer? How was 
the community affected by it? The neighborhood? Let's say that the answers will only come from 
the idea of the collective, which is very ethnic.1086 
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Furthermore, in response to a question about whether increased Afro-descendant representation on 
courts might beneficiate the judicial system, this participant declared:  
 
I think that it depends on the type of Afro-descendant. Then, I do not know if you are familiar with 
the concept of ‘oreo.' These are black [people] in the outside, but white [people] in the inside. Then, 
they have been raised as a mestizo person, and they are only identified based on their skin color. 
Then, having a person like this, that has a way of thinking openly like a mestizo, then, what 
difference does it make? Only the color of the skin. It is different from having an Afro-descendant 
with cultural background, with ethnic background, that will have a perspective, a different type of 
analysis. Then, here the matter is not only about skin color but about identity and cultural 
recognition. Then, what would be the gain be?1087 
 
I believe this interview is revealing because it shows that some participants believe in the existence 
of specific "black" and "mestizo" ways of seeing the world. Likewise, I find intriguing the differential 
relevance that the participant gives to ethnic difference, in contrast to racial difference. 
Some less essentialist perspectives verbalized such asymmetry in terms that were closer to the idea 
of cultural competency: Asserting that the lack of knowledge about the traditions and ways of living of 
ethnic communities could lead to injustice in judicial decision-making.1088 More than the ethnic identity 
itself, participants underscored the relevance of knowledge of their cultures, territories, conditions of 
structural disadvantage.1089 I should note, however, that other participants defended a different position, 
explicitly naming as a stereotype the idea that an Afro-descendent person might be proficient on issues of 
Afro-descendant rights just because of their identity, ethnic or not.1090  
 
1087 Interview 9. 
1088 Interview 13. 
1089 Interviews 16, 20, 24, 26, 35 and 43. 
1090 Interview 10. 
 267 
I consider that the heavier weight that participants give to the ethnic Afro-descendant identity for 
judicial decision-making when compared to the racial aspect of it is deeply related to how ethnicity has 
trumped race as the acceptable framework to acknowledge the ethno-racial difference in Colombia. 
Regarding the ethnic and racial divide, Peter Wade mentions that the concept of race is commonly used to 
describe conditions such as biology, phenotype, ancestry, descendance, or an “, internal natural essence of 
some kind,”1091 whereas ethnicity is commonly used to refer to a distinctive cultural or historical origin that 
is not anchored in biology or nature.1092 Wade emphasizes that the use of racial classifications emerged in 
particular historical coordinates: Those of the European colonization enterprise. Race was used to classify 
colonized non-European groups.1093 In this respect, “the concept of race is even more surely linked into a 
European history of thinking about difference, rather than a concept describing an objective reality that is 
independent of a social context."1094  
Álvaro Bello & Marta Rangel mention that the term ethnicity is of more modern usage than the 
term race,1095 and Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea explain that term ethnic group has been used in the 
anthropological sense to refer to native Amerindian populations (indigenous peoples) that inhabited the 
continent before the arrival of the Spanish colonizers, and whose descendants can be distinguished from 
the majority of the population due to their cultural characteristics.1096 The authors also elucidate that in 
Colombia, the substitution of the term race by the term ethnicity, and the shift of focus from phenotype to 
cultural difference, are not ideal for resolving the issues involving minority populations. This limitation is 
a consequence of how the cultural the phenotypical dimensions of these identities are intertwined and of 
the risk of essentializing cultural differences.1097  
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Similarly, Shane Greene highlights the necessity of considering both race and ethnicity as two 
objects that are inextricably related. The author asserts that instead of unlinking race from ethnicity, “we 
need to think in terms of the complex inter-dependency between race and ethnicity, phenotypical and 
cultural designators of social identity.”1098 Moreover, he suggests that "the race versus ethnicity contrast, 
when drawn too sharply, implicitly overlooks something extremely important in terms of the historical 
relationship between affirmative action, civil rights, and multiculturalism,”1099 as it disregards the historical 
processes that the policies based on these rationales seek to address. Greene also declares that it is necessary 
to “rethink approaches that draw too simple a contrast between the apparently ethnocultural 'rootedness' of 
indigeneity and the apparently racialized 'rootedness' of Afro-descendants in every context."1100  
Similarly to Greene, Bettina Ng'weno argues that race and ethnicity are co-dependent notions.1101 
While the idea of ethnicity as a form of cultural difference dependent upon a particular relationship with 
the land has been widely established in international law instruments and national Constitutions, the idea 
of race as a factor contingent on phenotype has been less relevant in recent years.1102 The perception of race 
as a category that is closer to Afro-descendants and ethnicity as a concept closer to indigenous peoples is 
not new. It is a condition that has been essential at defining which groups could have access to certain types 
of rights in multicultural states, particularly in Latin America. Ng'weno mentions that in the case of 
Colombia, for example, Afro-descendants who are recognized as ethnic groups have access to particular 
legislation that guarantees them certain collective rights, including territorial rights over their ancestral 
land.1103 In contrast, non-ethic Afro-descendants (those who are not part of culturally distinct cultural 
groups) are not protected by similar legislative measures.1104  
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Similarly to Ng'weno, Juliet Hooker affirms that theorists have provided two main justifications 
for granting collective rights to minority groups. The first refers to the need to protect minorities’ distinctive 
culture, language, and practices, which ultimately calls for permanent measures to secure these values. The 
second goes back to the idea of past discriminatory treatment and the need for reparations, which calls for 
the establishment of temporary measures targeted at evening the playfield for the harmed groups. Hooker 
argues that, in Latin America, indigenous peoples have been more successful than Afro-descendants at 
attaining new rights through recent reforms, since the first type of justification for collective rights has been 
the most widely accepted in this region: 
 
In almost every case of multicultural reform in the region, indigenous groups have been much more 
successful in gaining collective rights from the state than have Afro-Latinos. Of the fifteen Latin 
American countries that have implemented some type of multicultural citizenship reform, only 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua extend (some) collective rights to 
Afro-Latinos. Even when Afro-Latinos were granted collective rights, however, in almost no 
instances did they gain the same rights as Indians. In fact, there are only three countries in Latin 
America where Indians and Afro-Latinos have exactly the same collective rights: Honduras, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. Moreover, only a small subset of Afro-Latinos - generally rural 
communities descended from escaped slaves - has been able to win collective rights under Latin 
America's multicultural citizenship reforms.1105 
 
Instead of considering that this asymmetry in the success of indigenous peoples and Afro-
descendants in Latin America is the mere result of differences in population sizes, in mobilization efforts 
around collective rights, or levels of organization among the two social movements, Hooker attributes this 
situation to the fact that "collective rights are adjudicated on the basis of possessing a distinct group identity 
defined in cultural or ethnic terms. Indians are generally better positioned than most Afro-Latinos to claim 
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ethnic group identities separate from the national culture and have, therefore, been more successful in 
winning collective rights."1106 Hence, the author warns that granting collective rights to minority groups 
based on the distinctiveness of their cultural identity could have the negative effect of creating incentives 
for these groups to mobilize around the issues of cultural recognition rather than around situations of race 
discrimination.1107 
Shane Greene seems to agree with Hooker’s view, as he points out that Afro-descendant 
populations are commonly encouraged to present themselves as more indigenous (ethnification), in order 
to become more visible.1108 Although in practice this has not necessarily led to Afro-descendants to be 
granted fully ethnocultural recognition, when such recognition has been given to Afro-descendants, it has 
been usually targeted to groups that are rural communities, usually descendant from groups of cimarrones, 
and communities that are claiming ancestral-like rights.1109 In this respect, Greene declares:  
 
This may mean that those Afro-descendants who do gain ethnocultural recognition are not becoming 
so much 'like' indigenous peoples as they are becoming the only Afro-descendants who are semi-
recognizable as semi-sovereign pueblos, as 'legitimately' Afro-American peoples (i.e., the most 
'Africanized' peoples in the 'Americas'). Those who survived through slavery, those who navigated 
within slavery, those who purchased their way out of slavery and, of course, those who helped build 
what were originally sovereign 'criollo' nations (long before they became ‘mestizo’ nations) are—
not unlike the re-routed and re-rooted cholos—in a position much more difficult to recognize.1110 
 
My reading of the participants' greater receptiveness to discuss altered decision-making rationales 
when framed in terms of ethnicity than in terms of race is that this is closely linked to how multicultural 
discourses have unfolded in Colombia. In this country, multiculturalism has recognized Afro-descendant 
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difference under the condition that it is framed in terms of cultural difference by opposition to narratives 
that stress the discrimination aspect of the Afro-descendant position in society. Moreover, some participants 
incurred in a contradiction by alleging that it was essentialist to sustain that race might influence judging 
but that asserting the same about ethnicity would not fall into the same quandary. I consider that this 
contradiction could be the effect of the Colombian multicultural model (shared by several Latin American 
countries), which has censored the use of race as a category of legal and social analysis, while at the same 
time has promoted the acknowledgment of cultural difference 
I conclude that participants gave significant weight to altered decision-making rationales as a basis 
for Afro-descendant representation on courts. Ethnic identities were, in many respects, the primary source 
for the idea that an increase of this group's presence in Colombian judicial institutions may lead to a different 
type of judicial decision-making.  
 
1.3. Fairness and legitimacy rationales 
 
In general, fairness and legitimacy rationales sustain that the minority underrepresentation in the 
judicial system could lead to substantive illegitimate results in the practice of adjudication, negatively 
impacting the members of excluded groups who come before these courts. These rationales tend to intermix 
with altered decision-making rationales, especially with those that assert that these types of enhanced 
decision-making could better align with the interests of excluded groups. The specificity of fairness and 
legitimacy rationales vis-à-vis altered decision-making rationales is that the former stress particular 
substantive values (legitimacy, fairness) as foundations for women and minority representation on courts. 
Some participants articulated fairness and legitimacy rationales as grounds for enhanced Afro-
descendant representation in judicial institutions.1111 For example, a participant mentioned that with more 
significant minority presence, “courts also gain more legitimacy. The population feels closer to the people 
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that are making decisions for them. And the understanding of situations also changes the realities and 
issues."1112 Another one stated that a more significant Afro-descendant presence in judicial institutions 
would not only be beneficial for the judicial system but would be necessary, referring to the multicultural 
character of the Colombian state as declared in the National Constitution.1113 A third participant suggested 
that the lack of Afro-descendant judges, and judges with specific knowledge of the particularities of Afro-
descendant territories, played against certain types of litigants, due to the current judges' lack of knowledge 
of their context.1114 Besides, the participant mentioned that some residents perceived Afro-descendant 
underrepresentation on the courts in geographic areas that Afro-descendants traditionally populate as 
evidence of racism against the black population.1115  
All of these aspects are deeply connected to fairness and legitimacy rationales for Afro-descendant 
representation on the courts, as they emphasize the citizenry's perceptions of the trustworthiness and 
substantive fairness of the judicial system. Despite its importance, fairness and legitimacy rationales 
received less attention from participants than other types of rationales. Perhaps, some participants assumed 
that altered decision-making rationales might, in and of themselves, entail fairness and legitimacy rationales 
as foundations for a more significant minority presence on Colombia's courts. 
In the academic literature, Sylvia Lazos Vargas affirms that viewpoint diversity may promote three 
valuable principles for the judicial system: Improved decision-making, credibility in the rule of law, and 
the inclusion of underrepresented points of view.1116 Similarly to Sherrilyn Ifill and Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, Lazos Vargas uses the concept of voices of color, female voices, and queer voices to account for 
how experiences of discrimination may lead to the creation of a particular perspective of social reality 
endemic to discriminated groups.1117 Lazos Vargas underlines the idea that there is not a single legitimate 
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voice of color, but rather a multiplicity of them exist, all of which have equal legitimacy, as experiences of 
discrimination may be particular to each individual. Likewise, she argues that what unites minorities' voices 
under this concept is that “life is different for them than for white America.”1118 Lazos Vargas is an excellent 
example of fairness rationales because she argues that the inclusion of diverse points of view may work as 
a protection against bias in the judicial system.1119 Such bias could occur if only one particular viewpoint—
the majoritarian—takes over judicial decision-making. Viewpoint diversity, she argues, could also prevent 
the loss of credibility in the judicial system arising from a perceived lack of impartiality.1120 Analogously, 
Deseriee Kennedy questions whether a court in which minorities are underrepresented is well-positioned to 
decide cases involving the interests of excluded groups fairly.1121 
Sherrilyn Ifill goes a step further and argues that diversifying the judiciary is a constitutional 
imperative.1122 While discussing state trial judges, and using the Supreme Court decision on League of 
United Latin American Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clementss as evidence, she asserts that judges fulfill 
a representative function. In Ifill’s view, the impartial judge provision in the 14th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution should be interpreted to require not only individual impartiality from judges but also structural 
impartiality from the judiciary. A representative role of judges would be a consequence not only from their 
leadership positions but also of their function as representatives of their communities' values, as they use 
such values in adjudication.1123 Moreover, like Barbara Graham,1124 Ifill notes that describing judges as 
representatives is a position that is usually ill-received in the legal scholarship, due to the common idea 
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that, as they need to be impartial, judges cannot fulfill a representative role.1125 In this sense, recognizing a 
representative role in the judiciary is perceived to have the potential to undermine judicial impartiality and 
independence.1126 
Ifill notes that, as a general rule, the limited representation of racial minorities in the judiciary is 
rarely questioned from a legal or constitutional perspective, but rather deploying the language of desirability 
and public policy.1127 In her view, the structural impartiality of the judiciary is constitutionally mandated. 
According to her thesis, structural impartiality “exists when the judiciary as a whole is comprised of judges 
from diverse backgrounds and viewpoints.”1128 This allows different perspectives to interact in the legal 
debate, preventing a single one from governing judicial decision-making. 
Ifill identifies two types of foreseeable objections to her argument. The first is that arguing for 
structural impartiality would essentialize the viewpoints of white and minority judges. The second is that 
such a claim could lead to a potential demand for minority judges to be the ones who decide cases involving 
minority plaintiffs. Regarding the first objection, Ifill declares that promoting racial diversity in the 
judiciary does not require to identify any particular judge's position as biased based on race, but simply to 
acknowledge that "the possibility of bias is increased by an all-white bench uninformed by the 'varieties of 
human experience,' as compared to that of a racially diverse bench."1129 Concerning the second objection, 
she explains that structural impartiality would not require minority judges to hear minority litigants’ cases, 
but only that the pool of judges that may potentially decide such cases mirrors the community in terms of 
identity.1130  
Furthermore, Ifill responds to an additional objection, according to which recognizing judges as 
representatives could be problematic because judges would be required to decide cases according to the 
wishes of their constituents. She explains that "to conceive judges as representatives does not mean that 
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judges must adhere to the views of the public in judicial decisions. Instead, a representative-even a 
legislative representative-need only offer her constituents the opportunity to have their views translated into 
public policy.”1131 
Equally, Stacy Hawkins affirms that the gap between the racial composition of the governmental 
institutions and the governed is problematic from a political and a constitutional perspective. She 
understands that the representation gap does not only clash with basic pluralist democracy principles, but 
also with the right to equal protection of the laws.1132 In her view, pluralism is not only a mediating principle 
of the right to equal protection of the laws but also an idea that informs the doctrines of the deliberative and 
the political processes.1133 Thus, it is problematic that minorities do not have representation in government, 
as this is a limitation to the possibility of participating in the deliberative process of public decision-
making.1134 
Legitimacy rationales emphasize the idea that an enhanced presence of women and minorities on 
courts could make the judicial system to appear as more legitimate and, therefore, deserving of obedience, 
particularly in the eyes of excluded groups. Theresa Beiner binds of descriptive representation of excluded 
groups on the bench with the goal of enhanced legitimacy for the judicial system. In her view, as different 
groups gain access to positions of power within the judicial system, people will perceive the judiciary as 
more legitimate.1135 Likewise, Marla Greenstein stresses the importance of courts’ perceived legitimacy for 
the judicial system and argues that the low levels of women and minorities’ representation in the judiciary 
affect such legitimacy in the eyes of the public.1136 She states: “Several articles in this issue connect the 
composition of the courts and juries with the confidence that participants in court proceedings have in the 
impartiality of the ultimate judicial decision.”1137 Furthermore, Greenstein does not only argue in favor of 
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diversifying the body of judges, which she deems as just the face of judicial institutions, but also the court’s 
staffs and jury pools, in order to make them more similar to the communities they serve.1138 
 Fairness and legitimacy rationales are deeply intertwined. Constance Anastopoulo & Daniel Crooks 
sustain that one of the potential benefits of judicial diversification is an improvement of courts’ perceived 
legitimacy, as the citizens could see this as an indicator of impartiality and fairness in adjudication.1139 In 
the same line, Ming Chin asserts that the perceived legitimacy of the legal system is as important as its 
actual fairness.1140 If courts' legitimacy is lost in the eyes of the public, these institutions face the risk of 
being deemed irrelevant or labeled as tools for oppression.1141 Finally, Josh Hsu claims that the absence of 
perceived legitimacy may have substantial effects on the functioning of the judicial system.1142 
Although the idea that greater women and minorities' representation in the judiciary could improve 
the fairness of the judicial process and the legitimacy of courts has been, in general, well received in 
scholarly debates, some sectors could see these rationales as problematic. Nancy King elucubrates that, if 
the peremptory challenge was implemented in a particular jurisdiction—allowing a litigant to demand a 
change of judge assigned to a case without meaningful justification—, the parties could use it to disqualify 
judges from deciding cases based on race. For example, minority judges could be perceived as unfair solely 
because of their identity.1143  
In an analogous context, the use of the recusal motion—allowing litigants to ask judges to remove 
themselves from a case due to lack of impartiality—to address cases of judicial bias has also been put into 
question in academic debates since the race of the judge has been used as a reason to suspect lack of 
impartiality of the judge to decide particular legal disputes.1144 Frank McClellan suggests that the recusal 
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motion is not an adequate instrument to address racial bias in the judicial context. Such motion should only 
be used in the most extreme cases, when the use of words makes it evident that the judge will act in a 
prejudicial way based on race.1145 In such cases, McClellan proposes that the lawyer of the affected party 
is professionally obligated to use the recusal motion and should initiate the procedures for the removal of 
the judge from the bench. However, he also warns that in cases in which a lawyer initiates the recusal 
motion against a judge for racial bias solely based on the judge's racial identity—or without having 
sufficient evidence of the impropriety—sanctions should be imposed on the lawyer.1146 
 
1.4. Equality in access to resources 
 
A final type of rationale for women and minority representation in judicial institutions is the idea 
of equality in access to resources. This rationale considers that judgeships and judicial employee positions 
are not only functionally important, but also as a means to attain access to resources (salaries, employment 
benefits, prestige). Thus, a new foundation for women and minority representation on the bench is allowing 
these groups to access these resources and benefiting from them as dominants groups in society do it. In 
general, this rationale has not been debated as much as others in the U.S. academic literature. However, I 
should note that there have been interesting debates in the U.S. concerning the idea that the government 
should be a model employer, which includes the government duty of not discriminating its workers.1147 The 
significant level of attention that the participants gave to the equality in access to resources rationale might 
be due to the fact, as I will explain next, it tends to gain relevance in areas where the legal market is small 
and in which judicial positions are more profitable than other types of legal employment.  
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Several participants appeared to embrace equality in access to resources rationales as foundations 
for Afro-descendant representation in judicial institutions. A participant suggested that one of the factors 
influencing the limited access of Afro-descendants to high-ranking positions within the judiciary is the 
competition over access to resources. He mentioned that the significantly high salaries of intermediate 
tribunals and high court magistrates led to a stiff rivalry for these positions, and that “for a black man to 
earn 25 million pesos a month, [in one of these posts] a lot has to happen.”1148  
My impression is that the equality on access to resources rationales appear to be more present in 
locations where the legal market is more reduced, such as peripherical areas of the country and rural areas. 
In many of these places, public employment is one of the few types of employment that offers competitive 
salaries, full-benefits, and stability to employees. Due to the lack of prospects, many people find it unfair 
that the few desirable jobs in the legal market in these areas are given to people coming from other regions 
and who tend to be mestizos, while, at the same time, the local Afro-descendant lawyers struggle to make 
a living.1149 Despite the complexities that this rationale entails, participants mentioned in several occasions 
that this, too, should be considered in the debate about equitable access to judicial positions, since it 
acknowledges the economic and material aspect of this debate for legal professionals.1150 A paradigmatic 
example of this situation is the archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina. Given its 
isolated nature, this region has a very reduced legal market, in which judicial positions are sought after.1151  
Mary Clark points out that among the different types of rationales that justify the need for increased 
women and minorities' representation in the judiciary, the one that has received the least attention has been 
"the significance of women’s judicial appointments stems from the importance of applying equal 
opportunity/anti-discrimination principles.”1152 From her perspective, the appointment of women to the 
bench should be deemed as necessary mainly because "equality of opportunity is achieved when women 
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are considered for the same percentage of judgeships as they constitute in the pool of interested and 
qualified candidates."1153 
Another aspect that makes part of the equality in access to resources rationale is its collective 
dimension. As I explained in chapter 2, there are certain are in regions in Colombia that are of majority 
Afro-descendant population and in which judicial positions tend to be occupied by white-mestizo 
professionals coming from other regions of the country. According to participants, on some occasions, 
people coming from central areas of the country to occupy these positions do not resettle in the cities where 
they work. Instead, they maintain their primary residence in their regions of origin, traveling back-and-forth 
between the two places. The existence of traveling judges is problematic from the perspective of the equality 
in access to resources rationale since, according to some participants, the lack of resettlement of these judges 
means that local economies benefit little from their incomes since they do not invest their earnings or inject 
money into the local markets. As one participant explained, traveling judges "do not leave anything to the 
region’s economy. They do not leave anything! They do not rent an apartment—they rent out rooms in 
family houses. They do not spend a weekend here, do not hire a housekeeper, do not generate 
employment.”1154 Considering the already limited size of local economies, this “lost income” is another 
reason to increase (local) Afro-descendant representation in the judicial system in the eyes of the locals. 
 
1.5. Preliminary conclusions  
 
 Regarding the different types of rationales that serve as foundations for women and minorities’ 
representation in the judiciary, it is possible to reach the following conclusions: 1) I identified four 
commonly used foundations for supporting women and minority representation on courts: The idea of non-
traditional judges as role models for the legal profession, marginalized communities and society as a whole; 
the altered or enriched judicial decision-making process that would be follow an increase of representation 
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of women and minorities on courts; the idea that these groups’ representation on judicial institutions is a 
condition for fairness in judicial-decision making and for the legitimacy of the judicial system; and the idea 
that women and minority representation on courts a way to secure equal access to resources for persons 
belonging to these groups; 2) the symbolic effect of minority representation is perhaps the less contentious 
rationale for justifying the diversification of the judiciary, but there are questions about the relevance and 
potential benefits of stressing the role of symbolic representation in the judiciary; 3) the fairness and 
legitimacy rationales are deeply intertwined with altered judicial decision-making rationales, as enriched 
decision-making resulting from a wide range of viewpoints and values is understood to be correlative with 
judicial impartiality and, therefore, fairness in judging, which in turn increases the legitimacy of the justice 
system; 4) altered decision-making rationales have received, overall, more attention by participants and 
scholars than other types of justifications for increasing women and minorities representation in the 
judiciary; 5) enriched decision-making effects of women and minority representation in the judiciary tend 
to be controversial, as some understand that they essentialize points of view on the basis of racial or gender 
identities; 6) in case of Colombia, the race-ethnicity divide presents an additional layer of complexity to 
the debates about altered decision-making rationales as grounds for minority representation on courts; 7) 
equality in the access to resources emerged as an additional rationale for women and minority representation 
on courts in Colombia, given the precariousness of the legal markets in some areas of the country. 
I believe that minority representation in courts can be better defended using fairness and legitimacy 
rationales. These rationales emphasize the implications that the racial homogeneity of judicial institutions 
can have in countries with models of representative democracy or that have embraced multiculturalism as 
a formal state policy, such as Colombia. Furthermore, I consider that in a country with a genuine 
commitment to the principles of equality and non-discrimination, it is objectionable that the apparatus of 
the state is built in the absence of historically discriminated groups.  
In the following section, I will concentrate on examining the available evidence concerning the 
impact on case outcomes of women and minorities' representation on courts.  
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2. Empirical evidence on the impact of women and minorities’ representation on judicial 
decision-making 
 
As I previously stated, there have been no previous studies regarding the impact of race in judging 
conducted in Latin America, perhaps due to the incipient Afro-descendant and indigenous representation 
in judicial institutions. Nevertheless, participants often invoked altered decision-making rationales as 
reasons for increasing Afro-descendant presence in the judiciary.  
Several interviewees asserted that there were specific cases in which they considered that the ethno-
racial identity of judges and judicial employees had a significant impact on the outcome of cases. An Afro-
descendant woman judicial employee affirmed that the introduction of Afro-descendant and indigenous 
judges to the SJP had facilitated the consideration of aspects such as the right to prior consultation of ethnic 
groups, inter-jurisdiction coordination with indigenous justice systems, and the depositions of indigenous 
ex-combatants before the transitional justice jurisdiction.1155 Another participant, an Afro-descendant 
women judge, asserted that having a distinctive Afro-descendant ethnic identity facilitated her work on 
issues related to lands and territorial rights, as there is a significant difference between the role that property 
legal institutions have in the majoritarian society and some ethnic communities.1156 A third interviewee 
stressed how judges with ethnic identities might be better situated to decide on specific family law issues, 
such as those revolving around marriage arrangements in Afro descendant ethnic communities.1157 
Similarly, another participant, an Afro-descendant man judge, asserted that his ethnic identity and territorial 
knowledge facilitated his comprehension of certain criminal cases in the place where he worked.1158 The 
same occurs concerning language barriers in territories where the Afro-descendant population speaks a 
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language different than Spanish since the domain of the native language (which is commonly spoken only 
by members of the ethnic groups) is an asset for the undertaking of judicial functions.1159 
 Given the multiplicity of testimonies that affirmed the ethno-racial identity of judicial servers might 
significantly influence judicial decision-making, it is essential to discuss the trajectory of the academic 
debates regarding the effects of race and gender on judging. Although in Latin America there has been little 
research on this topic, in the United States, for over 40 years, there has been a growing body of research 
focusing on the effects that the increased presence of women and minority judges have on judicial decision-
making. This branch of political science has received the name of judicial behavioralism.1160 
As I will discuss later, evidence about the type of impact and degree of influence that minority and 
women’s representation in the judiciary has on the process of adjudication is, to an extent, inconclusive. 
The lack of certainty of these empirical studies' results may be attributed to the vast number of variables 
that can influence a judge's perception of a case. In this respect, Theresa Beiner explains that: 
 
The problem with political science data is that a single study cannot account for all the variables 
that may impact an individual judge’s view of the law or reality. It is much more complex and 
involves many categories of information, including such variables as sex, race, religion, upbringing, 
political partisanship and ideology, judicial ideology, appointing president (where applicable), 
socio-economic background, region of the country in which the judge was raised or lives, among 
others.1161 
 
Moreover, research on judicial behavioralism has been the object of diverse critiques from social 
scientists and legal scholars alike, due to the limitations in the different types of experiments and models 
that have been used to estimate the influence of judges' identities on adjudication. Beiner has criticized that 
most empirical studies on the impact of judges' identities on judicial decision-making have not considered 
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how legal procedures and substantive law influence adjudication. Therefore, ignoring relevant variables 
that could have a determinant effect on how judges decide cases.1162 Likewise, Sherrilyn Ifill has pointed 
out that, as many of these studies recognize, the size of the samples used for these studies were—in some 
cases—very small and is doubtful that their conclusions could be generalized to other cases.1163 
Furthermore, she argues that these studies are quite limited as “most studies only focus on case outcomes, 
not the process of judicial decision-making itself,"1164 ignoring aspects such as judicial deliberation and 
substantive law. Equally, Josh Hsu has critiqued that empirical studies in this area have tried to isolate 
identity characteristics—such as sex and race—from other elements influencing judicial decision-making. 
This approach disregards some relevant aspects of the conflict, including the facts of the case, the applicable 
legal rules, and the sociological aspects of the decision-making process.1165 More broadly, the studies that 
I will refer to are also the object of a more profound critique about methodological flaws in empirical 
research for the study of issues regarding racial and gender identities’ issues.1166  
Despite these critiques, I still consider that it is worth it to engage with this academic literature 
since it provides significant evidence on how women and minority judges impact judicial decision-making 
in the U.S. This literature could illuminate paths to explore this relationship in the Latin American context 
in the future. Besides, this type of research has been treated as deeply relevant in the work of scholars 
working on issues related to group-representation on courts.  
In order to present the information in the most precise form possible, first, I will refer to the studies 
regarding the influence of race on judicial decision-making. Second, I will present those studies referring 
to the effects of gender on judging. Third, I will introduce the studies that encompassed both race and 
 
1162 Id. at 149. 
1163 Ifill, supra note 249 at 453. 
1164 Id. at 453. (Noting also that “other important indicators might include changes in the culture of the courthouse, 
the diversity of court personnel, and the fair treatment of women and minority litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and 
observers in the courtroom.”) 
1165 Hsu, supra note 1033 at 101. 
1166 Deborah Jones, Constructing Identity In Law And Social Science, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 731–745 (2001). 
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gender variables. Lastly, I will reference a few studies on the influence of ethnicity on judging that were 
conducted outside of the U.S. 
 
2.1. Studies concerning the influence of race on judicial decision-making 
 
As soon as 1978, Thomas Uhlman published one of the first studies on the influence of race on 
judging, in which he compared judicial decisions on felony cases made by a group of 16 trial court black 
judges with those of 75 white judges.1167 His research found that there were small differences between the 
behavior of black and white judges, as black judges declared defendants guilty in 55.5% of the cases 
analyzed, while white judges did the same in 61.1% of cases.1168 The study also found that:  
 
There are no essential differences between white and black judges' treatment of white and black 
defendants. Black judges convicted 56.7 percent of black defendants and 50.5 percent of white 
defendants, for a difference of 6.2 percent, White judges convicted 63.0 percent of black defendants 
and 53.8 percent of white defendants, for a difference of 9.2 percent1169  
 
The author explained that the differences found could be explained by the individual behavior of 
the judges, rather than as a consequence of the judges’ race. 
About a decade later, Susan Welch et al. published another study on the influence of race in judicial 
decision-making in the context of criminal cases.1170 The research used a sample of 3,418 convicted felons 
from 1,968 to 1,979 in a large city in the Northeast of the U.S. It found that white and black judges treated 
black defendants similarly. However, black judges tended to send white defendants to prison more often 
 
1167 Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 884–895 
(1978). 
1168 Id. at 888. 
1169 Id. at 888. 
1170 Susan Welch, Michael Combs & John Gruhl, Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 126–
136 (1988). 
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than white judges. The authors explained that “black judges tend to treat black and white defendants alike, 
while white judges are more severe with blacks, compared with white, defendants.”1171 They also found 
that black judges, in general, give shorter prison sentences to defendants than white judges, and also give 
lighter sentences to black defendants than white judges.1172 
In 1990, Cassia Spohn published another study on the effect on the judges’ race on the decisions 
regarding criminal cases.1173 The research analyzed judicial decisions on violent felony cases in the city of 
Detroit from 1976 to 1978. It suggested that black judges were only slightly less likely to incarcerate 
defendants than white judges. The study found differences between the two groups of judges regarding the 
minimum sentence they ordered for defendants,1174 and concluded that, rather than deciding according to 
their racial identity, “judges' sentencing decisions are determined, first and foremost, by the seriousness of 
the crime committed by the offender and by the length of the offender's prior criminal record-factors of 
explicit legal relevance to the sentence.”1175 The data also showed that, although white judges are more 
likely than black judges to sentence black-male defendants to prison,1176 both groups of judges sentenced 
black defendants harsher: “For both black and white judges, adjusted incarceration rates for black offenders 
were seven percentage points higher than for white offenders.”1177 
 In the context of criminal justice, in 1996, Malcolm Holmes et al. published a study in which they 
compared Anglo (non-Hispanic white) and Hispanic judges’ decisions on non-capital felony cases in the 
county of El Paso, Texas.1178 Their results suggested that Hispanic judges sentenced Hispanic and Anglo 
defendants similarly. In contrast, Anglo judges seemed to sentence Hispanic defendants similar to Hispanic 
 
1171 Id. at 133. 
1172 Id. at 133. 
1173 Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities, 24 
LAW SOC. REV. 1197–1216 (1990). 
1174 Id. at 1206. 
1175 Id. at 1206. 
1176 Id. at 1206. 
1177 Id. at 1206. 
1178 Malcolm D. Holmes et al., Judges’ Ethnicity and Minority Sentencing: Evidence Concerning Hispanics, 74 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 496–506 (1993). 
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judges, but they were more lenient toward Anglo defendants, which appears to suggest a preference of 
Anglo judges for defendants of their same racial identity.1179 
Five years later, Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester Britt published a study on the differences in 
sentencing decisions of black and white judges.1180 Their research analyzed sentencing decisions imposed 
by men judges from 1991 to 1994 in four Pennsylvania counties. By using logit models, the authors 
concluded that although white and black judges similarly evaluated cases, black judges were more likely 
than white judges to impose prison sentences to defendants regardless of their race.1181 
In a study published in 2009, Chris Bonneau & Heather Rice tried to established weather white and 
African American judges made different decisions at deciding criminal cases.1182 Their research was based 
on a sample of state supreme court non-unanimous decisions on criminal cases' appellate decisions taken 
between 1995 and 1998. It suggested that white and African American judges make different decisions 
depending on the institutional design of the judiciary. The evidence showed that "African American judges 
are more sympathetic to those convicted of crimes, but only in states with no intermediate appellate 
court."1183 
Outside of the context of criminal justice, in the year 2000, Pat Chew and Robert Kelley published 
a study, made with a sample of randomly selected racial harassment cases decided in six federal circuits 
that ranged from the years 1981 to 2003, that compared the decisions of African American and white federal 
judges on cases of racial harassment in the workplace.1184 While plaintiffs in racial harassment cases have—
in general—slim chances of winning in court, Chew and Kelley’s research showed that they had a better 
chance of success if an African American judge decided their cases. The authors stated that “plaintiffs are 
 
1179 Id. at 501–502. 
1180 Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L. Britt, Judges’ Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black Judges Sentence 
Differently?, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 749–764 (2001). 
1181 Id. at 761. 
1182 Chris W. Bonneau & Heather M. Rice, Impartial Judges? Race, Institutional Context, and U. S. State Supreme 
Courts, 9 STATE POLIT. POLICY Q. 381–403 (2009). 
1183 Id. at 398. 
1184 Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment 
Cases, 86 WASH U REV 1117–1166 (2009). 
 287 
successful in 46% of their cases before African American judges but less than half as often before White 
judges; logistic regression analysis indicated that on average, plaintiffs before African American judges are 
3.3 times more likely to win than before White judges.”1185 Chew and Kelley recognized that when multiple 
factors (e.g., the political affiliation of the judge and facts of the case) are jointly taken into consideration, 
the role of race tends to lose preponderance. Nevertheless, their research still suggested that white and 
African American judges differ on how they understand this type of case.1186 
Almost a decade after that, the same authors published a new study on the influence of judges and 
plaintiffs' race on racial harassment cases' outcomes.1187 Their research used a database "of all reported 
racial harassment cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the federal district courts of six 
representative circuits between 2002 and 2008."1188 According to their findings, racial harassment plaintiffs 
were successful in only 22.2% of the 473 analyzed cases,1189 with Hispanics having a higher success rate 
(37.3%) and Asian Americans (4.3%) and African Americans (20.7%) having the lowest. African 
Americans accounted for over 70% of all racial harassment complaints.1190 Regarding the judge's race, the 
study found that the plaintiffs who appeared before white judges, which accounted for nearly 80% of the 
judges in the cases under scrutiny,1191 had a success rate of only 20.6%, which was lower than when they 
appeared before African American judges (42.2%), but higher than when they did so before Hispanic judges 
(15.6%).1192 The study also suggested that the race of the judge and the plaintiff interact with each other, as 
judges tended to be, in general, more lenient to plaintiffs of their same race.1193 As an example: African 
 
1185 Id. at 1156. 
1186 Id. at 1161. (The authors assert: "However, one message is clear from the data: race matters in judicial decision 
making. It affects outcomes even when we take into account the judge's political affiliation or case characteristics. 
While we might have intuitively expected the judge's race to make a difference, this study provides empirical proof."). 
1187 Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The Realism of Race in Judicial Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis of 
Plaintiffs’ Race and Judges’ Race, 28 HARV J RACIAL ETHN. JUST 91–116 (2012). 
1188 Id. at 96. 
1189 Id. at 98. 
1190 Id. at 100. 
1191 Id. at 103. 
1192 Id. at 103–104. 
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American judges had a higher success rate when judges of their same race decided their cases (47%) than 
when White (19%) or Hispanic (9.5%) judges were the decision-makers.1194 
In 2014, Jason Morin published a study on the U.S. Courts of Appeals' minority judges' decisions 
on Title VII employment discrimination cases between 2001 and 2009.1195 The research found that in this 
type of case, African American judges were, on average, more supportive of the claimant: "As the 
percentage of favorable votes among African American judges is about four percentage points greater than 
White judges."1196 He also concluded that African American judges were nine percentage-points more likely 
to rule in favor of African American claimants than White judges.1197 However, he also established that 
Latino judges were, in general, more averse than white and black judges to the claimants. The author stated: 
"The proportion of favorable rulings among Latino judges is about nine percentage-points less than White 
judges and more than 13 percentage-points less than African American judges."1198 
Adam Cox & Thomas Miles published a paper regarding the influence of judges’ characteristics 
on judicial decisions regarding the Voting Rights Act, in which they studied “every published federal case 
decided under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act since 1982.”1199 Their research suggested that democrat 
judges and African American judges tend to be more likely to find liability under section II of the Voting 
Rights Act, when compared to republican judges and white judges, respectively. In the case of race, which 
authors found to be more preponderant than political affiliation, they concluded: 
 
African-American judges are, on average, more than twice as likely as white judges to find that 
minority citizens’ voting rights were violated under section 2. African-American judges vote in 
favor of liability more than half the time, while judges who are not African-American do so only 
about one-quarter of the time. Moreover, a judge’s race substantially affects the votes of his 
 
1194 Id. at 107–108. 
1195 Jason L. Morin, The Voting Behavior of Minority Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Does the Race of the 
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1196 Id. at 47. 
1197 Id. at 47–48. 
1198 Id. at 47. 
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colleagues on a panel. Both Republican and Democratic appointees are substantially more likely to 
vote in favor of liability when they sit with an African-American judge than when they do not.1200 
 
In 2013, Jonathan Kastellec published a study in which he measured the impact of race on the U.S. 
courts of appeals’ decisions in affirmative action cases.1201 The research sample was composed by courts 
of appeals’ decisions on race-based affirmative action cases from 1971 to 2008 and used statistical models 
to assess the effects of race on case outcomes. According to his results, non-black judges had a probability 
of between 56% and 65% to vote in favor of affirmative action policies, depending on the model used. By 
contrast, black judges had a probability of about 90% of voting in favor of affirmative action policies.1202 
They also found that black judges seem to influence the votes of their colleagues. The probability of a non-
black judge voting in favor of affirmative action policies was about 50% when the panel was all non-black 
but rose to 20% when a black judge was part of the decision panel.1203 
 
2.2. Studies concerning the influence of gender on judicial decision-making  
 
In the early 1980s, John Gruhl et al. published a study in which they assessed the impact of judges’ 
gender on the decisions of criminal cases.1204 The authors analyzed the convicting and sentencing decisions 
of men and women trial judges in over 30,000 felony cases from 1971 to 1979 in a metropolitan area in the 
Northeast of the U.S. The study evidenced that women judges were more likely to sentence women 
defendants to prison than men judges, as women judges gave prison sentences to about 20% of the convicted 
women. In contrast, men judges did so to only 12% of them.1205 
 
1200 Id. at 48–49. 
1201 Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 167–
183 (2013). 
1202 Id. at 177. 
1203 Id. at 177. 
1204 John Gruhl, Cassia Spohn & Susan Welch, Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 23 AM. J. POLIT. 
SCI. 308–322 (1981). 
1205 Id. at 318. 
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Also, in the criminal justice context, Darrel Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert published a study in 
which they tried to establish whether or not men and women judges approached and decided criminal cases 
similarly.1206 The research used a database of the sentencing decisions in Pennsylvania from 1991 to 1993. 
The study found that gender seems to impact criminal case outcomes. Women judges were 10% more likely 
to incarcerate defendants than men judges. They also tended to impose sentences that are, on average, five 
months longer than those determined by their male counterparts.1207 Women judges appeared to be 
especially tough when sentencing black defendants who were repeated offenders.1208 Nonetheless, the study 
also found that men and women tend to value criteria for similarly establishing sentences.1209 
In a different context, David Allen & Diane Wall published a study in which they evaluated the 
behavior of women judges in state supreme courts to establish whether they conformed to the points of 
view of men judges—behaving as tokens—or presented extreme voting conduct—behaving as outsiders.1210 
The voting record of 14 women judges sitting on 14 different high courts on cases concerning women 
issues, criminal cases, and economic liberties were analyzed.1211 The study found that in all three areas, 
women judges presented extreme voting habits, as they were very liberal in the first policy area, and either 
very liberal or conservative in the other two.1212 Later on, the authors expanded their research and published 
another article in which they studied the behavior of 24 women justices in 21 states.1213 This study arrived 
at similar conclusions: "Women justices tend to: (1) act as the most pro-women member of the court on 
issues of immediate concern to women, (2) occupy positions at the extreme liberal and conservative ends, 
and (3) tend to engage in both extreme and isolated dissenting behavior in criminal and economic cases.”1214 
 
1206 Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge’s Gender Affect the 
Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SOC. FORCES 1163–1196 (1998). 
1207 Steffensmeier and Britt, supra note 1180 at 1181–1182. 
1208 Steffensmeier and Hebert, supra note 1206 at 1186. 
1209 Id. at 1186. 
1210 David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court Justices: Are They Tokens or 
Outsiders, 12 JUSTICE SYST. J. 232–246 (1987). 
1211 Id. at 235. 
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 In 1993, Sue Davis et al. presented a study in which they analyzed gender differences in judicial 
decision-making in the U.S. courts of appeals.1215 The study tracked judges’ voting in three areas of interest: 
Employment discrimination, criminal procedural rights, and obscenity from 1981 to 1990.1216 The research 
found that in employment discrimination cases, women voted for plaintiffs 63% of the time. In comparison, 
men did so in only 46% of cases. In search and seizure cases “women judges were more likely than their 
male colleagues to support the claims of criminal defendants.”1217 Finally, in obscenity cases, no significant 
gender differences were found.1218 A year later, the same authors published another study in the same 
area.1219 They concluded that judges' gender did not seem to make a difference in how they approached 
search and seizure or obscenity cases. However, gender had a significant in cases of employment 
discrimination: “The probability that a male judge will cast a liberal vote is 38% while the estimated 
probability of a liberal vote by a female judge is 75%. Thus, the impact of gender appears to be quite 
substantial.”1220 
In 2000, Phyllis Coontz published a study in which she analyzed the influence of the judge and the 
litigant’s gender on case outcomes.1221 The research was conducted using a survey containing hypothetical 
cases, which was completed by a sample of 195 state trial judges in Pennsylvania.1222 After evaluating the 
results, the study found that the characteristics of the litigants in the hypothetical cases did not seem to 
influence judges' decisions. However, it concluded that men and women judges showed differences in how 
they decided the cases. In nearly half of the decisions, statistically significant differences arose between 
men and women judges.1223 
 
1215 Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Ronald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 
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That same year, Linda Maule published a paper in which she assessed the impact of the gender 
composition of the Minnesota State Supreme Court, which was the first high court in the country where 
women hold the majority of seats.1224 The study, which considered about 1250 opinions 1985 to 1994, 
concluded that in that particular court: “the female justices were more willing to dissent once more females 
were appointed. Furthermore, the female justices, despite holding different political orientations, evidenced 
a higher level of agreement (even more so than the court generally) when deciding family law cases.”1225 
 In 2004, Sarah Westergren published a study on the effects of gender on case outcomes at the 
federal appellate level.1226 The research aimed to find gender differences in how judges decided a sample 
of sex discrimination cases between 1994 and 2000. The study found that there was no statistically 
significant difference in how men and women judges voted on sex discrimination cases. However, the 
political affiliation of the judged seems to have a more substantial statistical impact.1227 
In 2005, Jennifer Peresie published an article about her research on the impact of gender in judicial 
decision-making in the federal appellate courts.1228 Her research was based on the analysis of all federal 
courts of appeals' decisions on Title VII disputes concerning sexual harassment and sex discrimination from 
the years 1999 to 2001. 54 women and 273 men judges were included in the study. Her research found that 
plaintiffs lost in about 75% of sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases. Nevertheless, the presence 
of a woman judge in the decision panel seemed the increase the likelihood of a victory for the plaintiff. 
Although women were part of the panels in 38% of cases in which the plaintiff lost, they were also present 
in 62% of panels in cases in which the plaintiff won.1229 The study also found that both gender and political 
ideology seemed to play a significant role in how judges voted on cases: “Female judges ruled for plaintiffs 
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more often that did male judges, and judges appointed by Democratic presidents found for plaintiffs more 
often than did Republican appointees.”1230 In addition to personal effects, the study also found that the 
presence of women judges seemed to have panel effects. The addition of a woman judge to a panel increased 
from 16% to 35% the chances that men judges would favor the plaintiff in a sexual harassment case and 
increased from 11% to 30% the likelihood that men judges would do the same in sex discrimination cases. 
This panel effect was similar among liberal and conservative men judges.1231  
 In 2010, Christina Boyd et al. published a paper in which they measured the effects of sex in judging 
both at the individual and panel levels by using a matching methodology of judges and assessing the 
differences in 13 different areas of the law.1232 The results of the study showed that, at the individual level, 
in most areas of the law, men and women judges tend to arrive at similar decisions, with one exception: 
"Female and male judges differ significantly in their treatment of Title VII sex discrimination suits. On 
average, the probability of female judges voting in favor of the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case is 
around 0.10 higher than it is for male judges.”1233 The same was valid in the case of panel effects, in which 
judges' gender differences seem to play a significant role in sex-discrimination disputes, as: "The likelihood 
of a male judge ruling in favor of the plaintiff increases by 12% to 14% when a female sits on the panel.”1234 
That same year, Paul Collins et al. published a study in which they tested the critical mass theory 
on the U.S. district court judges.1235 Their research "analyzes final case rulings in 38,639 cases handed down 
by 1,310 judges over a 24-year span, from 1977 to 2000.”1236 They found that, in some instances—such as 
criminal law and civil rights cases, women do present a different behavior when the city in which the district 
court is located has attained a critical mass of women judges.1237 
 
1230 Id. at 1769. 
1231 Id. at 1778. 
1232 Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. 
POLIT. SCI. 389–411 (2010). 
1233 Id. at 401. 
1234 Id. at 406. 
1235 Paul M. Collins, Kenneth L. Manning & Robert A. Carp, Gender, Critical Mass, and Judicial Decision Making, 
32 LAW POLICY 260–281 (2010). 
1236 Id. at 266. 
1237 Id. at 274. 
 294 
Finally, a year later, Pat Chew published a meta-study in which she synthesized the previous 
empirical research on the effects of gender on case outcomes in employment discrimination cases.1238 After 
reviewing the existing literature, the author concluded that:  
 
First, considerable evidence supports the hypothesis that the gender of the judge does make a 
difference in sex discrimination cases. Female judges are more likely than male judges to hold for 
the plaintiffs, and a mixed-gender appellate panel is more likely to hold for the plaintiff, suggesting 
that female judges do influence male judges in their decision making. Second, in studies of 
employment discrimination cases in general (studies that include a range of discrimination claims, 
including sex discrimination), the pattern of gender differences is also the consensus. It may be, 
however, that the sex discrimination cases in those studies drive this result. A third pattern supports 
this possibility: in the few studies with employment discrimination cases that were not gender-
related, including race discrimination and racial harassment cases, the gender of the judge did not 
appear to make a difference. In other words, male judges were as likely as female judges to hold for 
the plaintiffs. No evidence of a significant difference in their decision-making patterns surfaced.1239 
 
2.3. Studies concerning the influence of both race and gender on judicial decision-making 
 
In 1983, Jon Gottschall published a paper in which he examined judicial decisions from July 1st, 
1979 to June 30, 1980, of the U.S. courts of appeals. The study looked at decisions on issues of criminal 
procedure, sex discrimination against women, and race discrimination against minorities, after these courts 
had just received a significant number of women and minority judges appointed by President Carter.1240 
The study found that Carter's white-women judges tended to be more liberal than white-men judges. They 
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favored plaintiffs on sex discrimination cases in 66% of the cases and preferred plaintiffs in race 
discrimination cases in 64% of the cases, in comparison to white men who sided with plaintiffs in 57% and 
59% of cases, respectively. No difference in terms of gender was found regarding criminal cases.1241 On 
the impact of race, the study found that Carter’s black men judges tended to side with the plaintiff in 79% 
of criminal cases, by comparison to 53% of Carter’s white men judges. Black men judges also supported 
sex discrimination plaintiffs in a higher percentage (65%) that white men judges. However, they did not 
support race discrimination plaintiffs in a higher percentage (57%) than white men judges (59%).1242 
 Two years later, Thomas Walker & Deborah Barrow published a study in which they examined the 
impact of Carter’s non-traditional judges on the federal judicial decision-making.1243 The authors used a 
pairing methodology to study women and minority district court judges’ decisions in different areas of the 
law. According to their research, men judges supported personal rights claims 55% of the time, while 
women judges did so 37% of the time.1244 Racial comparisons were inconclusive in this regard, as 
differences were not statistically significant.1245 In the criminal law context, women judges favored 
defendants 44% of the time, compared to men judges who favored them 51% of the time. Racial differences 
were, again, insignificant. However, in both cases, the authors warned that these findings might be the result 
of chance.1246 In the field of economic regulation, women judges supported federal economic regulation 
73% of the time, while men judges did so only 53% of the time. Racial differences were also negligible.1247 
In areas of particular interest for women, women judges and men judges did not show significant 
differences.1248 In areas of particular interest for minorities, men judges sided with minorities 69% of the 
time, while women judges did so only 48% of the time. Both in areas of particular interest to blacks as of 
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particular interest to non-black minorities: “Black judges supported the minority position at only a 
marginally higher rate than did the white judges.”1249 
 Almost a decade later, Jennifer Segal published a study on the decision making of President 
Clinton's non-traditional judges.1250 The research was conducted by pairing up a group of 24 judges of 
different race and gender and analyzing: “Decisions published in the Federal Supplement through July 
1996,”1251 pertaining a variety of areas. The research found that black judges supported claims involving 
the interests of black claimants or black communities in about 50% of the cases, by contrast to white judges 
who only supported such claims in about 10% of the cases. A similar trend was found in cases involving 
women's interests, which black judges supported in 9 out of 15 cases, by comparison to white judges, who 
only did so in 5 of 14 cases. In other areas such as criminal rights, state economic regulation, and individual 
liberties, no differences were found. In the case of women judges, 50% of the decisions they wrote were 
supportive of the interests of minorities, by comparison to decision authored by men, which supported 
minorities in less than one-third of the cases. No differences were found involving women judges deciding 
cases involving women's issues.1252 The authors concluded: “Our analysis of policymaking by the race of 
the judge consistently revealed no substantial differences between white and black jurists,"1253 unlike in the 
case of women, which in specific policy areas, did present significant differences from their male 
counterparts.  
In 1998, Gregory Sisk et al. published a paper in which they used the Sentencing Guideline Crisis 
of 1988 to explore how the facts of the case, in conjunction with other variables, influence judicial reasoning 
and decision-making.1254 Their research analyzed district court judges' decisions regarding the 
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines of 1988 and tried to identify differences in judges' decisions 
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based on a group of variables, which included race and sex. The researchers found that the gender of the 
judge had minimal effect on how they decided cases involving the constitutionality of the guidelines: 
"Although female judges rejected the constitutionality of the Guidelines at a slightly greater rate than male 
judges (64% versus 61%), this difference was not statistically significant."1255 A similar finding took place 
regarding the race variable: "Although minority judges invalidated the Guidelines by a larger percentage 
than white judges (71% versus 60%), this difference was not statistically significant."1256 Notwithstanding, 
the study found a significant difference when the particular rationale of violation of due process–the denial 
of the defendant’s right to have an independent judge to dictate an individual sentence–was used to argue 
against the unconstitutionality of the law. In these cases, minority judges invalidated the guidelines in 90% 
of the cases, as compared to all the judges, who only ruled them invalid in only 58% of the cases.1257 
A year later, Nancy Crowe presented her doctoral dissertation in which she tried to assess the effects 
that gender has on judicial politics.1258 Her research used a database containing all non-unanimous decisions 
taken by U.S. courts of appeals on employment discrimination cases, both based on race and gender from 
the years 1981 to 1996. Although her analysis was focus on issues of gender, she also included race as a 
variable. The study describes that, overall, judges favored employment sex discrimination plaintiffs in 48% 
of their votes. Women judges voted for plaintiffs on 69% of the time, and men judges 46% of the time. 
African American judges favored plaintiffs with 85% of their votes, by contrast to white judges, who gave 
them 45% of their votes.1259 Regarding employment race discrimination cases, Crowe's study describes that 
judges voted for plaintiffs 45% of the time, with African American judges voting for plaintiffs in 90% of 
the times, compared to White judges' 41%. By contrast, gender did not seem to make a difference, as men 
judges voted for plaintiffs 45% of the time vs. 48% of women judges.1260 These results seemed to suggest 
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that although African American judges were, in general, more supportive of sex discrimination plaintiffs 
than white judges, women judges were not significantly more supportive of race discrimination plaintiffs 
than men judges.1261 Finally, Crowe also analyzed whether the composition of the decision panel influenced 
how the judges that compose that panel vote. The study suggested that white men are more likely to vote 
for race discrimination plaintiffs when they sit on a panel composed exclusively of white males, as 
compared to panels including African American judges.1262 
 In 2000, Elaine Martin and Barry Pyle published a study in which they assessed the effects of race, 
gender, and political affiliation on Michigan Supreme Court's non-unanimous decisions on discrimination, 
divorce, and feminist issues from 1985 to 1998.1263 The authors found marked influences of gender on how 
divorce cases were decided. Likewise, they concluded: “African American Democratic justices were the 
most liberal in two out of three issue areas examined.”1264 Nevertheless, they determined that political 
affiliation was the characteristic that had the most relevance on judges’ voting in that specific court. 
That same year Jennifer Segal published a study assessing the representative effect of Clinton’s 
first term appointees to the U.S. district courts.1265 The research paired up a group of 39 judges that differed 
from each other in terms of race or gender and comparing the judges' rulings on a variety of issues from 
1994 to 1999. The study found that "for all intents and purposes, black judges are not significantly different 
from their white counterparts in their support of a variety of issues before their benches. Most notable is 
the absence of any race differences for black issues; black judges are clearly no more supportive of black 
claims than white judges.”1266 Regarding gender, Segal's study found that even though men and women 
judges presented differences in their treatment of cases involving women's issues, it was men who were 
more supportive of women's interests. Hence, the study concluded that "President Clinton's black and 
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female district court appointees are no more likely to serve the policy interests of their own communities 
than are his white and male appointees."1267 
In 2003, Carol Kulik et al. published a study on the influence of judges' characteristics on sex 
discrimination cases' outcomes.1268 The authors used a database of 143 sex discrimination cases heard by 
U.S. courts between 1981 and 1996. Although the authors found that characteristics such as age and political 
affiliation played a significant role in how judges decided cases, they did not find evidence that either 
gender or race had a sensitive impact on case outcomes. However, they warned that their “inability to find 
differences based on gender and/or race may be a function of low statistical power with respect to these 
variables.”1269  
 One year later, Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro published a study regarding the influence of 
women and minority judges on federal three-judge panels’ decisions on especially sensitive issues from the 
perspective of race and gender.1270 Their research, which used “a random sample of 400 published federal 
Court of Appeals employment discrimination cases decided in 1998 and 2000,”1271 concluded that men 
judges are more likely to vote for the plaintiff when there is a woman in the panel of judges deciding over 
the case by about 19 percentage points. Regarding race, the differences in judges' decisions were not 
statistically significant.1272 
In 2005, Max Schanzenbach published a paper on the effects on race, gender, and political 
affiliation in prison sentences at the district level.1273 His research, which was based on the data collected 
by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, concluded that “there is little impact on average sentences from having 
a greater proportion of female, Democratic, or black judges.”1274 Nevertheless, the article also concluded 
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that the proportion of women judges in the district seems to be in direct correlation with the length of 
women’s prison sentences, as “the greater the proportion of female judges on the district's bench, the longer 
the sentences received by female offenders,”1275 and also found that “having more black judges on the bench 
results in lighter sentences for women and Hispanics.”1276 
 In 2008, Todd Collins & Laura Moyer published a study in which they evaluated the effects of 
intersectional identities in judging, by using minority women judges as an example, instead of focusing 
solely on the judge’s gender or race.1277 The study analyzed criminal cases decided by the U.S. courts of 
appeals between the years 1977 and 2001 and found that judges who were minority women tended to 
support the defendant's claims more often than those who were Caucasian men, Caucasian women, or 
minority men,1278 as “female-minority judges were approximately between 6 to 10 percent more likely to 
support a liberal outcome than males or Caucasian females.”1279 
 
2.4. Non-US studies concerning the effects of ethnicity on judicial decision-making  
 
Up to this point, the empirical studies we have referenced inquired for race or gender differences 
in judging in the United States of America. However, in Israel, there have also been efforts to assess the 
impact of identity on judicial decision-making. In this respect, Oren Gazal-Ayal & Raanan Sulitzeanu-
Kenan published a study about the effects of ethnic identities on judicial decision making in Israel.1280 In 
their study, they compared Jewish and Arab judges' decisions in first bail hearings of Arab and Jewish 
suspects.1281 Their results showed that the judges in the study had in-group preferences for suspects of their 
 
1275 Id. at 74. 
1276 Id. at 75. 
1277 Todd Collins & Laura Moyer, Gender, Race, and Intersectionality on the Federal Appellate Bench, 61 POLIT. 
RES. Q. 219–227 (2008). 
1278 Id. at 225. 
1279 Id. at 224. 
1280 Oren Gazal-Ayal & Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Let My People Go: Ethnic In-Group Bias in Judicial Decisions—
Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment, 7 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 403–428 (2010). 
1281 Id. 
 301 
same ethnic background: "Arab suspects are 6.3 percent more likely than Jewish suspects to be released by 
an Arab judge, while Jewish suspects are 10.4 percent more likely than Arab suspects to be released by a 
Jewish judge."1282 However, they found no differences in judges' authorized length of detention based on 
ethnic identity.1283 
 Likewise, Guy Grossman et al. published a study regarding the panel effects of ethnicity in criminal 
cases in Israel.1284 The study, which looked at criminal cases decided by appellate courts between 2007 and 
2011, found that panel composition (all Jewish or mixed Jewish-Arab) did not seem to have an impact on 
the type and severity of the punishment for Jewish defendants. However, panel composition did affect the 
case of Arab defendants, which were 14% to 20% less likely to be incarcerated and had sentences 15% to 
26% shorter when mixed ethnic panels decided they cases than when they faced all-Jewish panels.1285 
 
2.5. Preliminary conclusions 
 
 Regarding the existing empirical evidence concerning the impact of judges’ race and gender on 
judicial decision-making, it is possible to reach the following conclusions: 1) Political science research on 
judicial behavioralism has been the object of critiques from both political scientists and legal scholars, due 
to methodological limitations and the focus that some studies adopted for assessing understand the effects 
of identity on adjudication; 2) there is no consensus on how influential the judges’ race and gender may be 
in the context of judicial decision-making, as empirical evidence is still–in many ways–inconclusive; 3) it 
seems that in certain areas that are particular sensitive from a gender or race perspective (e.g. sexual and 
racial harassment in the workplace, sex discrimination, and affirmative action policies), the gender and race 
of the judge could play a significant role in the outcome of the cases; 4) certain studies concerning the 
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impact of judges’ race and gender appear to contradict the idea that minorities and women are–in general–
more liberal in their decision-making than white men, as some studies found that minority judges and 
women judges voted in a more conservative fashion than white or men judges; 5) the potential effects of 
gender and race in judging may not be restricted to the individual votes or decisions of women and minority 
judges, as some studies found that the presence of women or minority judges could have the potential to 
influence the votes of other (traditional) judges sitting in the decision-panel, in situations of collegiate 
judicial decision-making; 6) some studies also found that the effects of judges’ identity in judicial decision-
making tended to be stronger in situations in which there was a critical mass of non-traditional judges in a 
particular court or jurisdiction; 7) a portion of the studies found that different types of minorities (e.g. 
African Americans v. Hispanics) may have different patterns of judicial decision-making; 8) some studies 
also found that the impact of race or gender on judging may differ vis-à-vis the gender or the race of the 
litigants; 9) there are studies that have found evidence of different judicial decision-making on the basis of 
the judges’ ethnicity outside of the U.S. context. 
As I stated at the beginning of this section, although there is no hard evidence concerning the 
impacts of Afro-descendant representation on Colombian courts on case outcomes, there is anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that the ethno-racial identity of the judge might play a meaningful role in the judicial 
decision-making process. Since engaging in a more detailed discussion about this topic would exceed the 
purposes of this dissertation, I consider that future studies, ideally in the field of political science, should 
conduct an empirical analysis to test this hypothesis. 
In the next section, I will discuss the issue of racial discrimination in the Colombian justice system 
and whether a higher representation in this country's courts might help to tackle this problem. 
 
3. Racial discrimination in the Colombian justice system 
 
In this section, I will examine the potential of Afro-descendant representation in judicial institutions 
to counter situations of bias and discrimination in the Latin American judicial systems. In previous sections 
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of the manuscript, I discussed situations of racial discrimination affecting judicial servers. I will now focus 
on discrimination against attorneys and the general public when they interact with judicial institutions and 
their representatives. 
A particular aspect of the law’s role in the construction of racial stratification in Latin America is 
how the justice system has been used for preserving racial inequality. Significant evidence to support this 
claim can be found in Brazil. In this country, there have been several studies about the judicial system 
institutions' treatment of race that have found that public institutions, including the judiciary, have 
historically treated Afro-descendants, the poor, and other unprivileged groups unfairly.1286  
Likewise, participants in the qualitative study were outspoken about experiences of discrimination 
that they lived or witnessed in the Colombian justice system. One of the participants remarked: “I have 
witnessed the judicial treatment towards Afro Colombians, and it is not the same that a white or mestizo 
person receives in our society.”1287 Other participants complained about the treatment that Afro-
descendants and poor people receive by the justice system. These groups often face unjustified delays in 
their procedures, are treated disadvantageously by judicial servers, or have to endure different forms of 
subtle discrimination.1288 As a participant declared, these forms of discrimination come from all the sides 
present in the courtrooms: Judges, judicial employees, attorneys, the parties, and state institutions alike.1289 
However, the perception of discrimination in judicial institutions tends to be more acute in geographical 
areas in which Afro-descendants are a minority.1290 
In the case of the criminal justice system, some participants shared their perception of the high (and 
perhaps excessive) number of incarcerated Afro-descendants. They also sustained that, on occasion, law 
enforcement personnel and judicial authorities use stereotypes in the fulfillment of their duties.1291 An Afro-
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descendant woman judicial employee even affirmed that a prosecutor actively acknowledged to her that 
when he was assigned cases in which the defendant was black, he was particularly severe, given his dislike 
of Afro-descendants. According to the participant, this revelation occurred because the prosecutor did not 
see the participant as an Afro-descendant, given her light-skin color.1292 This participant also recalled that, 
when working as an attorney with family members of forcibly disappeared Afro-descendant persons, it was 
not uncommon that the district attorney's office would refuse to investigate these cases. Prosecutors 
believed that the victims were not missing, but rather "partying out" somewhere.1293 Likewise, the 
participant suggested that Afro-descendant defendants appear to be treated more ruthlessly by the criminal 
justice system, for example, by being subjected to pre-trial detention for even minor offenses.1294  
During my direct observation exercises, I had the opportunity to witness a situation that, in many 
ways, corresponds to similar forms of discrimination in the criminal justice system that participants 
reported. While I was visiting the courthouses in the city of Medellín, I ran into a black young man that was 
surrounded by a group of mestizo penitentiary officers in one of the judicial complex's corridors. The 
prisoner was handcuffed and was holding a transparent plastic bag with some food items inside. Since 
criminal hearings in Colombia are, as a general rule, public, I decided to stay and observe the hearing. 
While I was waiting for the custodial officer to allow the public in, I saw that there was a group of people, 
a majority of whom were black women, waiting outside of the courtroom. From their interactions, I could 
tell they were the romantic partners of the men that were facing trial. A few minutes after, two groups of 
prisoners—one of 5 and another of 6 detainees—arrived in the courtroom handcuffed to each other. None 
of the 12 defendants appeared to have reached the age of 25. 11 of them were black men, one was a black 
woman, and the remaining one was a mestizo man (I made this assessment based on their skin color). A 
moment later, the custodial officer (a mestizo man) showed up. With a loud and unfriendly voice, he warned 
the four black women waiting to enter the courtroom that they had to turn off our cellphones and seat still, 
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and that if they were loud during the hearing, he would remove them from the courtroom: "You have to 
behave well"—the custodial officed said.  
Although the courtroom was large and all the benches were empty, the custodial officer ordered 
the black women (and me) to sit in the back of the room, as far away as possible from detainees, leaving a 
significant distance between the detainees and us empty. Minutes after, the judge presiding over the case 
arrived. she was a light-skinned mestizo woman with dyed blond hair. I took a look around, and all the 
people present in the courtroom at that moment (the judge, the police officers, the judicial employees) were 
either white or mestizo. The exceptions were the prisoners, their families, and me. 
Later on, I learned that the prisoners were on trial for the crime of aggravated robbery (hurto 
calificado y agravado) and conspiracy to commit a crime (concierto para delinquir). All of the detainees 
had a public defender arguing for them, except for one that had a private attorney. When the counselors for 
the defense had to identify themselves and introduced their clients, they read out their client names out of 
the case file. They did not know any of them out of memory, perhaps because of the high number of cases 
that public defendants have assigned. When it was the turn of the detainees to identify themselves, many of 
them did not seem to be able to remember their addresses, which prompted their family members to pass 
small pieces of paper on to them with the addresses written on them. From the addresses and neighborhoods 
that they provided, I could tell (as I had anticipated) that all of them came from some of the poorest 
neighborhoods in the city of Medellin, such "El Popular,” “Moravia,” and “Parte Alta de Robledo.” 
Sometime later, the victims of the alleged crime arrived at the courthouse, all of which were white and 
mestizo.  
A few minutes after the hearing began, the prosecutor and defense attorneys announced to the judge 
the defendants’ intention to accept charges so they could receive a reduction of their sentence. This practice 
is allowed under Colombian law. This situation reminded me that a few moments before the hearing began, 
I saw the prosecutor and the defense attorneys meeting in the courtroom located across the hall, apparently 
discussing the case. Since the judge accepted the motion, the hearing lasted for no more than 15 minutes in 
total. 
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I consider that this hearing exemplifies many forms of discrimination and inequality that 
participants in the study mentioned during the interview process: The lack an adequate defense of poor 
Afro-descendant detainees, the incentives for criminal defendants to plead guilty in exchange of sentence 
reduction, and the many forms of subtle discrimination that detainees' loved-ones face in the criminal justice 
system (like having to sit in the back of the room). 
Moreover, the narratives of the study participants and my own experiences in the courthouse in 
Medellin seem to parallel the existing literature concerning the treatment of Afro-descendants by the 
criminal justice systems in Latin America. This evidence is, sometimes, historical. Sueann Caulfield studied 
the role that race played in the judicial decisions on sex-crime cases brought before the courts of Rio de 
Janeiro during the first part of the 20th Century.1295 In her study, Caulfield found evidence suggesting that 
color played a significant role in the decisions that judges made on sex-crime cases. The author mentions 
that: “When both the victim and defendant were in the same category, there was no discernible difference 
in rates of indictment or conviction for black, pardo, or white men. However, indictment and conviction 
were less likely if the woman was darker than the man and more likely if she was lighter.”1296  
More recently, Sérgio Adorno conducted a study on race discrimination in the criminal justice 
system of the state of Sao Paulo.1297 His research concluded that there is no significant difference in the 
potential for violent crime among blacks and whites in Brazil. However, the criminal justice system tended 
to give black defendants a severer treatment, which manifested in aspects such as a higher persecution rate, 
more considerable obstacles to access the criminal justice system, and more difficulties in exercising their 
right to an adequate defense.1298 The author concludes that in this country, "color is a powerful instrument 
of discrimination in the distribution of justice."1299 Similarly, Peter Fry points out that, in certain Brazilian 
states, such as Sao Paulo, Afro-Brazilians are disproportionately present in prisons, are significantly more 
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likely to be killed by police than whites, and are, in general, more affected by the criminal justice system.1300 
Likewise, after examining data from 1988, Michael Mitchell & Charles Wood concluded that in Brazil, 
black men were more likely than other men to be the objects of physical assault and suffering police 
aggression.1301  
However, the evidence on this topic does not stop in Brazil. In the case of Ecuador, Carlos De La 
Torre argues that black people are commonly racialized as criminals. A stereotype often used to justify 
police violence. De La Torre mentions different cases of police brutality against black individuals in 
Ecuador. He sustains that, despite being reported and made public, nobody has been held accountable for 
these actions.1302 Likewise, Rita Segato asserts that, in general, it is difficult to discuss the racial dimension 
of the criminal justice system in Latin American academic forums because: 
 
Trying to enunciate what one sees when entering prison, make reference to the face of the 
incarcerated people, is not easy because it hurts the sensibility of various hegemonic actors: of the 
traditional and academic left, as it requires to give bone and flesh to the mathematics of class, 
introducing color, culture, ethnicity and, in sum, difference; it hurts the sociologic sensibility 
because the numbers on that topic are scarce and very difficult to precise with objectivity due to the 
complexities of racial classification; and it hurts the sensibility of the law operators and the forces 
of legality because it suggests institutional racism.1303 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of obtaining reliable data on the racial breakdown of inmates, 
Segato indicates that the available information suggests that indigenous and Afro-descendant persons are 
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more often the object of criminalization policies and face worse detention conditions than other population 
groups in the region’s prisons.1304 
Additionally, language discrimination is particularly concerning in criminal cases. There were 
some accounts of defendants who did not speak Spanish and, due to the judge's lack of native language 
proficiency and the absence of translators, could not fully understand what has happened in the courtroom 
while they were on trial.1305 As I explained in chapter 3, language discrimination was an issue in areas in 
which Afro-descendant populations speak a language other than Spanish, as some judicial servers who are 
proficient in the native languages often reject non-Spanish communication.1306 While most language 
discrimination cases that I have mentioned so far involved Raizal persons, this is not the only Afro-
descendant group that does not have Spanish as their first language. Other groups, such as the Palenqueros, 
are also language minorities and, therefore, also have language barriers when they interact with the 
majoritarian justice system, including the criminal justice system.1307 
As it has been registered in the existing academic literature, some participants pointed out that 
racial discrimination cases were challenging to litigate. Judicial servers often believed that the injuries 
caused to the victims were unimportant, and that the discrimination event was the mere result of the victim's 
perception or could be attributed to oversensitivity of the claimant. These assumptions disregard the moral 
and psychological harms that discrimination can produce on people.1308 A participant also referred to the 
lack of racial fluency among judicial servers, and their overall rejection to investigate situations of 
discrimination related to their work.1309 
Although some situations of discrimination had their origin in the judicial servers' explicit biases, 
others appeared to be the result of a lack of cultural competency on Afro-descendant issues and, particularly, 
 
1304 Id. at 148–149. 
1305 Interviews 26, 27 and 28.  
1306 Interview 25. 
1307 Interview 37. 
1308 Interview 9. 
1309 Interview 23. 
 309 
cultural traditions of certain Afro-descendant ethnic groups.1310 Also, some situations of discrimination 
seem to have been the result of the overlapping of race and class forms of oppression.1311 An Afro-
descendant attorney mentioned that in certain cities the lack of competent legal counsel prevents poor 
people from presenting criminal complaints when they were the victims of certain types of crimes since 
they are often undermined by bureaucratic employees who use filters to decide on the merits of the case 
without legally having such authority.1312 
The limited or restrictive interpretation of anti-racist legislation and the lack of knowledge about 
racial discrimination in Latin America has frustrated litigation efforts to address this issue in many 
countries. Seth Racusen mentions that, in the case of Brazil, it is common for courts to dismiss 
discrimination cases when the person accused of engaging in racial discrimination claims to be mixed-race, 
as judges tend to see this as evidence of lack of racial prejudice.1313 Comparable situations happen in other 
Latin American countries, such as Perú, where the law allows employers accused of engaging in acts of 
racial discrimination to argue as a defense that the discrimination act was “objective and reasonable”.1314 
Similarly, Antonio Guimarães writes about how laws enacted to punish acts of race discrimination are 
difficult to enforce in Brazil. The text of these statutes is not sufficiently clear and tries to specifically target 
overt acts of race discrimination, which are not the most common way in which racial prejudice manifests 
in this country. Besides, when judges interpret the law and apply it to cases, they tend to quickly assume 
that those accused of racism did not act with the intent to discriminate based on race and often narrow down 
the scope of anti-discrimination laws.1315 
My perception is that Afro-descendant representation might have some potential to improve the 
levels of racial discrimination and prejudice in the justice system. This might not be the effect of the "more 
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empathic nature" of Afro-descendant judges and judicial employees, their alleged greater awareness of how 
racism and race discrimination operates in the court system, or any other quasi-essentialist argument that 
portraits Afro-descendants as less biased. Instead, this effect might come from their presence inside judicial 
institutions and its potential influence in helping to dismantle the multiple negative stereotypes held against 
black people (their dangerousness, intellectual inferiority, and proclivity to crime). I do not necessarily 
believe that a more significant Afro-descendant presence on Latin American courts will change case 
outcomes (this effect might be contingent on other aspects besides the ethno-racial identity of judicial 
servers). However, ethno-racial integration could change the perceptions and imaginaries present inside 
judicial institutions and, through them, lessen the role of judicial institutions in the preservation of racial 
subordination. 
In the next section, I will briefly present the dissertation's general conclusion, discuss the study 
limitations and introduce some recommendations for researchers, judicial institutions, judges and 
























VI. Conclusions, limitations, and recommendations 
 




The main conclusion arising from this dissertation is that Afro-descendants are, in general, 
underrepresented on high and intermediate courts in Colombia. Afro-descendants are absent from the 
Constitutional Court’s group of magistrates and, seemingly, from its group of judicial employees. Afro-
descendants appear to be only a few among the magistrates and judicial employees of the Supreme Court 
of Justice, the State Council, and the Superior Council of the Judicature. This ethno-racial group might 
account for between approximately 2% and 4% of intermediate tribunals magistrates and judicial 
employees; and might be underrepresented even among the group of lower court judges, except in certain 
areas. Similarly, indigenous persons appear to be virtually absent from the Colombian judiciary. In the case 
of women, even though they are a majority of judicial servers, they also experience a crystal sealing. 
Women enjoy significant representation among the lower levels of the judicial pyramid, but limited 
representation in its upper layers.  
 The SJP seems to be an exception to the general rule of Afro-descendant and indigenous 
underrepresentation in judicial institutions since in this tribunal the level of Afro-descendant representation 
among magistrates resembles their share of the national population—as reported in the 2005 Colombian 
national census. The level of indigenous representation in the group of magistrates surpasses their 
percentage in the national population. Likewise, women in the SJP account for half of the magistrates on 
this court. A significant level of Afro-descendant and women representation also appears to exist among 
this court’s judicial employees. 
Geographic location plays a significant role in explaining Afro-descendant underrepresentation in 
judicial institutions in Colombia. Certain regions appear to follow the general rule of minimal representation 
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(i.e., Medellin, Cartagena, Tumaco, Buenaventura, and Cali). In contrast, some places seem to be exceptions 
to such rule (i.e., Quibdó and San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina). Several conditions seem to 
explain the uneven distribution of the Afro-descendant representation among the country's courts. Regional 
demographic differences, the institutional dependency of peripherical regions on central regions of the 
country, stiff regional disparities in access to services and the effects of structural discrimination, the 
conflation of regional and racial identities and stereotypes, the lack of ethno-racial self-identification among 
the Afro-descendant population in some regions (Cartagena), the presence of social mobilization calling for 
increased black presence in judicial institutions in some areas, and the pervasiveness of racial stereotypes 
are some of these conditions. 
 Likewise, there appear to be several factors contributing to the underrepresentation of Afro-
descendants on Colombia's courts and the stratification of judicial institutions, including the statistical 
invisibility of the Afro-descendant population in the country’s databases; the overlapping of race and class 
subordination; the lack of Afro-descendants’ access to good quality education and, particularly, higher 
education; the interaction of race and gender forms of oppression; the influence of race, color, and identity 
on the representation assessment; the negative disparate impacts that some judicial selection mechanisms 
cause on Afro-descendants; the ubiquity of different forms of racial discrimination and bias in judicial 
institutions and the legal profession. Moreover, courts and judicial servers seem to have competing 
narratives regarding the importance of race in the composition of judicial institutions, ranging from the lack 
of acknowledgment of racial differences to the recognition of issues of racial discrimination in judicial 
institutions.  
 Finally, from a policy perspective, several types of rationales for asserting the need for women and 
minorities' representation in judicial institutions have been identified in the U.S. academic literature on this 
topic (role model rationales, altered or improved decision-making rationales, and fairness and legitimacy 
rationales). The study participants appeared to elicit similar foundations in favor of increased Afro-
descendant representation on Colombia’s courts. They also introduced other rationales that have not had a 
prominent role in U.S. scholarly works (equality in access to resources).  
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Concerning the impact of race and gender on judicial decision-making, there has been a significant 
number of empirical studies on this issue. Although most of the evidence on this matter continues to be 
inconclusive, in some instances of a particular gender or racial salience, some studies suggest that the race 
and gender of the judge might play a significant role in the decision of cases. In the case of Colombia, some 
participants argued that, in some areas of the law, the ethno-racial identity of the judge might play an 
important role in judicial decision-making.  
Likewise, participants described several instances in which attorneys and citizens experienced 
situations of discrimination in their interactions with judicial personnel, which leads to the question of 
whether improved Afro-descendant representation on courts also might help to prevent or to address racism 
in the justice system. 
 
2. Study limitations  
 
Perhaps the most visible limitation of this study were challenges arising from of having to begin 
the research within a vacuum in social sciences’ literature regarding the ethno-racial composition of Latin 
American judicial systems, the absence of systematic race statistics in Colombia, and the cultural taboo of 
discussing racial discrimination in this region. Despite the different restrictions arising from these 
conditions, I consider that my dissertation helps to narrow down a knowledge gap—at least at an 
exploratory level—concerning the role of race in the composition of judicial institutions in Colombia, since 
this topic has received minimal attention from the disciplines mentioned above.  
Also, my study does not depart from a unified criterion to define who counts as an Afro-descendant 
to assess representation in the judiciary. This aspect is, in part, the result of the fluidity of ethno-racial 
identities in Latin America. The consequence of this limitation is that different identification criteria (self-
identification—hetero-identification) to establish Afro-descendants' presence on courts at different stages 
of the research process. Although this is, of course, an important limitation, I addressed some of the 
principal issues related to the multiple definitions of Afro-descendant identities and the methodologies used 
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to inquire about them. I also analyzed the participants' narratives around race and identity in the different 
stages of the project, therefore providing nuance and critique to the data gathered throughout the project’s 
development. I consider that the lack of precise definitions of racial categories is not a significant barrier to 
the research project because, given the statistical extremity of low Afro descendant presence, the added 
nuance of precise definitions would not alter the conclusions. Finally, as I explained in chapter 1 of this 
project, despite the fluidity of Afro-descendant identities in this region, I consider that it is possible to rely 
on the social and cultural meanings attached to these identities for understanding issues of discrimination, 
exclusion, and inequality. In the end, ethno-racial identities are cultural constructs that enjoy a shared social 
meaning.  
Another limitation is the scarcity of the data on the ethno-racial composition of the lower courts. I 
could not obtain data from the courts themselves in this level of the judiciary nor integrate into the study 
the perspectives of the judiciary’s administrators (The Superior Council of the Judicature) and Afro-
descendant organizations. In both cases, this was a consequence of time and access limitations. I contacted 
persons inside these spaces and ask them to participate. Nevertheless, they did not provide final responses 
to my petitions.  
Likewise, the focus on Afro-descendant narratives and perspectives, although it was an outcome of 
the study design, does entail certain limitations. Such a focus does not fully encompass the perspectives of 
other ethno-racial groups that might have unique views on this debate and whose appraisals on this issue 
might be different. 
Similarly, I would have liked to delve into the particularities of the role that color plays in the 
stratification of the Colombian judicial system. I consider that studying whether color differences determine 
which Afro-descendants attain access to judicial positions would have been relevant for this research. It 
could be, for example, that skin color plays an essential role in the hierarchization of minority judges and 
judicial employees within the judicial pyramid. Further research efforts such inquire about this aspect. 
Finally, two additional study limitations are the amount of time dedicated to the fieldwork 
component of this research, which was completed in approximately three months, and the lack of a historical 
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perspective of this project. Concerning the fieldwork duration, this was, to a great extent, a consequence of 
financial restrictions, and, even though time was certainly limited, it did allow me to gather a significant 
amount of data to achieve the project's objectives. With respect to the lack of a historical perspective, it 
would have been essential to explore how levels of representation of women, Afro-descendants and 
indigenous persons have varied through time since this would have added a desirable layer of complexity 
to this research project. Nevertheless, the lack of available data and the scope of this project did not allow 
me to engage in that adjacent conversation. This is especially true if one considers that, before this research 




The creation of empirical data on the ethno-racial composition of Colombia’s judicial institutions 
and the racial dynamic within them is, perhaps, the most salient contribution of this dissertation. Based on 
the study findings, I would like to recommend the following actions to researchers, judicial administrators, 
judges, and magistrates, the Afro-descendant social movement, and universities and higher education 
institutions. 
 
3.1. To researchers 
 
-To create databases concerning the composition of the judicial system and the legal profession that 
are independent from judicial administrators’ databases. 
-To further study the composition of the legal profession in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, 
sexuality, class, and other factors in the region. 
-To grant considerable attention to judicial politics in their research agendas and to conduct 
additional qualitative and quantitative research on the composition of the judiciary and the effects of race 
in judicial decision-making. 
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-To evaluate and empirically assess the conditions identified in chapter 3 as potentially responsible 
for the underrepresentation of Afro-descendants on Colombian courts. 
-To research on the specific influence of color and color-based discrimination in the composition 
of judicial institutions and the legal profession. 
-To engage in historical analysis of the ethno-racial composition of Latin American judiciaries and 
other state institutions. 
 
3.2. To judicial administrators 
 
-To address the statistical invisibility of Afro-descendants in the judicial system and judicial 
institutions by collecting data on the ethno-racial composition of courts, the legal profession and the 
communities they serve. An alternative for this would be to regularly conduct a judiciary census, like the 
one undertaken in Brazil. 
-To further assess and correct the disparate impacts that judicial selection mechanisms have on 
Afro-descendants. 
-To consider the use of affirmative action and other types of special measures for the judiciary. 
-To create new judicial selection methods that are sensitive to race and ethnicity and that facilitate 
the recruitment of minority candidates to different judicial positions. 
-To incentivize universities to guarantee Afro-descendant access to high-quality legal education 
and their recruitment by all sectors of the legal profession.  
-To address situations of racial discrimination affecting judges, judicial employees, attorneys, and 
private persons in judicial institutions and the legal profession, by studying these issues, enforcing existing 
anti-discrimination and employment harassment laws, using their disciplinary powers, training judicial 




3.3. To judges and magistrates 
 
-To consider the gender and ethno-racial composition of the courts in hiring practices. 
-To use free appointment and removal positions and provisional positions to increase the level of 
representation that Afro-descendants and other marginalized groups have in judicial institutions, especially 
in the upper layers of the judiciary. 
-To address situations of racial discrimination that occur among their staff and during judicial 
procedures over which they preside. 
-To secure training for themselves and the judicial servers that they supervise on implicit bias, 
Afro-descendant rights, and anti-discrimination practices. 
-To incentivize fair access to high-quality legal education for Afro-descendants and indigenous 
persons. 
 
3.4. To the Afro-descendant social movement 
 
-To include the issue of Afro-descendant underrepresentation on courts in their mobilization 
agendas as a means to secure greater access of minority applicants to judicial positions. 
-To require judicial institutions to address situations of racial discrimination and bias inside the 
courts and affecting the judicial system's users, including discrimination based on language, color, and 
micro-aggressions. 
-To demand Afro-descendant statistical visibility in the justice sector. 
 
3.5. To universities and legal education institutions 
 
-To study and address situations of racial discrimination and bias inside higher education 
institutions. 
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-To incorporate Afro-descendant and ethnic perspectives into their research agendas and curricula. 
-To provide adequate training for future lawyers on ethnic rights and anti-discrimination law and 
policy. 
-To create student recruitment policies that are sensitive to ethno-racial difference.  



















1316 TELLES, supra note 42 at 232. (Regarding public support for affirmative action programs, Edward Telles reported 
that across different Latin American countries, there was widespread support for affirmative action policies to benefit 
indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants. This support is especially true in the context of education, as "In all 
countries studied in the PERLA project […] more than 80 percent of respondents supported affirmative action policies 




1. Legislative materials 
 
Acuerdo Final de Paz Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera. Signed 
between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP on Nov. 12, 2016.    
A. PSAA16-10618, diciembre 7, 2016, Consejo Superior de la Judicatura. [C.S.J.] (Colomb.) art. 22. 
A. 003/18, enero 26, 2018, Jurisdicción Especial de Paz. [J.E.P.] (Colomb.). 
A. 001/18, marzo 9, 2018, Jurisdicción Especial de Paz. [J.E.P.] (Colomb.) art. 103. 
AL. 1/17, abril 4, 2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
Constitución Política de Colombia [C.P.]. 
D. 1627/96, septiembre 10, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
L. 70/93, agosto 27, 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
L. 47/93, febrero 19, 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
L. 270/96, marzo 7, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
L. 581/00, mayo 31, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
L. 1581/12, octubre 17, 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
L. 1755/15, junio 30, 2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
L. 1957/19, julio 6, 2019, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
PD. 587/17, abril 5, 2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colomb.). 
 
2. Court decisions 
 
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978). 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 11, 1993, Sentencia C-530/1993 Gaceta de la 
Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colomb.). 
 320 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 15, 2008, Sentencia C-713/2008 Gaceta de la Corte 
Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colomb.).  
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 27, 2015, Sentencia SU-553/15, Gaceta de la Corte 
Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colomb.). 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 15, 2018, Sentencia C-080/2008 Gaceta de la Corte 
Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colomb.). 
 
3. Books, articles and other sources 
 
Abrahamson, Shirley S. “The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions.” Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 14 (1984): 489–504. 
Acquaviva, Gregory L., and John D. Castiglione. “Judicial Diversity On State Supreme Courts.” Seton Hall Law 
Review 39 (2009): 1203–51. 
Adorno, Sérgio. “Discriminação Racial E Justiça Criminal Em São Paulo.” Novos Estudos, no. 43 (November 
1995): 45–63. 
“Afrocolombianos, población con huellas de africanía.” Bogotá: Ministerio de Cultura de Colombia, 2010. 
https://www.mincultura.gov.co/areas/poblaciones/comunidades-negras-afrocolombianas-raizales-y-
palenqueras/Documents/Caracterización%20comunidades%20negras%20y%20afrocolombianas.pdf. 
“Afro-Descendants in Latin America: Toward a Framework of Inclusion.” Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 
2018. https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/brief/afro-descendants-in-latin-america. 
Aliotta, Jilda M. “Justice O’Connor and the Equal Protection Clause: A Feminine Voice.” Judicature 78, no. 5 
(April 1995): 232–35. 
Allen, David W., and Diane E. Wall. “Role Orientations and Women State Supreme Court Justices.” Judicature 
77, no. 3 (December 1993): 156–65. 
———. “The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court Justices: Are They Tokens or Outsiders.” The Justice 
System Journal 12, no. 2 (1987): 232–46. 
 321 
Alves, Dina. “Rés negras, juízes brancos: Uma análise da interseccionalidade de gênero, raça e classe na 
produção da punição em uma prisão paulistana.” Revista CS, no. 21 (2017): 97–120. 
Alves Dos Santos Cruz, Adriana, and Carlos Alberto Plastino. “A Discriminação Racial Contra 
Afrodescendentes No Brasil E O Impacto Sobre A Democracia: Um Olhar Sobre A Atuação Da Justiça 
Federal De Segunda Instância. [En] Racial Discrimination Against African Descendants in Brazil and the 
Impact on Democracy: A Look at the Performance of Federal Courts of Appeals.” Master, Pontifícia 
Universidade Católica Do Rio De Janeiro, 2010. https://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-
rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=19097@2. 
Anastopoulo, Constance A., and Daniel J. Crooks III. “Race And Gender On the Bench: How Best Achieve 
Diversity in Judicial Selection.” Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy 8 (Spring 2013): 174–204. 
Antón, Jhon, Álvaro Bello, Fabiana Del Popolo, Marcelo Paixão, and Marta Rangel, eds. Afrodescendientes en 
América Latina y el Caribe: del reconocimiento estadístico a la realización de derechos. Serie población 
y desarrollo 87. Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas, CEPAL, 2009. 
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/7227/1/S0900315_es.pdf. 
Antón, Jhon, Álvaro Bello, Fabiana del Popolo, Marcelo Paixão, and Marta Rangel, eds. Afrodescendientes en 
América Latina y el Caribe: del reconocimiento estadístico a la realización de derechos. Serie población 
y desarrollo 87. Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas, CEPAL, 2009. 
Anton, John, and Fernando Garcia. “Plan Nacional Para Eliminar la Discriminación Racial y la Exclusión Étnica 






Aparecida de Jesus, Eunice. “Preconceito Racial e Igualdade Jurídica no Brasil.” Master thesis, University of 
Sao Paulo, 1980. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2134/tde-03032008-103152/pt-br.php. 
 322 
Appelbaum, Nancy P., Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt. “Introduction: Racial Nations.” 
In Race and Nation in Modern Latin America, edited by Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and 
Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, 1–31. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
Ashenfelter, Orley, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stewart J. Schwab. “Politics And The Judiciary: The Influence Of 
Judicial Background On Case Outcomes.” The Journal of Legal Studies 24, no. 2 (June 1995): 257–81. 
Bailey J., Frank. “Does The Federal Article I Bench Reflect the Ethnicity Of The Populations That They Serve? 
What If the Answer Is No?” Judges’ Journal 55, no. 2 (Sping 2016): 21–25. 
Barbary, Oliver, and Fernando Urrea Giraldo. “Introducción.” In Gente negra en Colombia: dinámicas 
sociopolíticas en Cali y el Pacífico, edited by Olivier Barbary and Fernando Urrea Giraldo, 21–68. 
Medellin: Centro de Investigaciones y Documentación Socioeconómicas, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y 
Económicas de la Universidad del Valle, 2004. 
http://www.humanas.unal.edu.co/colantropos/files/3714/8564/0886/Gente_Negra.pdf. 
Bartlett, Katharine T. “Feminist Legal Methods.” Harv. L. Rev. 103, no. 4 (February 1990): 829–88. 
———. “Race-of-Officer Effects in Traffic Stop Outcomes Representative Bureaucracy and the Routine Traffic 
Stop,” March 2019, 38. 
Beck, Scott H., Kenneth J. Mijeski, and Meagan M. Stark. “¿Qué Es Racismo?: Awareness of Racism and 
Discrimination in Ecuador.” Latin American Research Review 46, no. 1 (2011): 102–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2011.0008. 
Beiner, Theresa M. “How the Contentious Nature of Federal Judicial Appointments Affects Diversity on the 
Bench.” U. Rich. L. Rev 39 (2005): 849-870. 
———. “The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New Millennium.” U. C. Davis L. Rev 
36 (2003): 597–618. 
———. “What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice.” Mich. J. Gender & L. 6 (1999): 113–52. 
———. “White Male Heterosexism In The Confirmation Process.” Women’s Rights Law Reporter 32 
(Winter/Spring 2011): 105–42. 
 323 
Bello, Álvaro, and Marta Rangel. “Equity and Exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Case of 
Indigenous and Afro-Descendant Peoples.” Cepal Review, no. 76 (April 2002): 39–53. 
Bethell, Leslie. “Between the Law and Their Land: Afro-Brazilian Quilombo Communities’ Struggle for Land 
Rights.” Austin, Texas: Bernard and Audre Rapoport Center for Human Rights and Justice: Rapoport 
delegation on Afro-Brazilian Land Rights, September 22, 2008. https://law.utexas.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/31/2016/02/brazil-eng.pdf. 
Blackburne-Rigsby, Anna. “The Importance Of A Diverse Judiciary To Closing The Historic ‘Health’ Gap 
Between Blacks And Whites, And President Obama’s Legacy.” Howard Law Journal 60 (Spring 2017): 
641–62. 
“Boletín Censo General 2005: Perfil Bogotá, Bogotá.” Institutional. Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadística (DANE), September 13, 2010. 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/11001T7T000.PDF. 
“Boletín Censo General 2005: Perfil Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca.” Institutional. Bogotá: Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), September 14, 2010. 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/76109T7T000.PDF. 
“Boletín Censo General 2005: Perfil Cali, Valle del Cauca.” Institutional. Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadística (DANE), September 14, 2010. 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/76001T7T000.PDF. 
“Boletín Censo General 2005: Perfil Cartagena, Bolívar.” Institutional. Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadística (DANE), September 13, 2010. 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/13001T7T000.PDF. 
“Boletín Censo General 2005: Perfil Medellín Antioquia.” Institutional. Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadística (DANE), September 13, 2010. 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/05001T7T000.PDF. 
“Boletín Censo General 2005: Perfil San Andrés, Archip. de San Andrés.” Institutional. Bogotá: Departamento 




“Boletín Censo General 2005: Perfil Tumaco, Nariño.” Institutional. Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadística (DANE), September 14, 2010. 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/PERFIL_PDF_CG2005/52835T7T000.PDF. 
“Boletín Estadístico 2018.” Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, 2019. 
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/19887/Boletin%20Estad%C3%ADstico%20201
8.pdf?sequence=1. 
Bonilla Maldonado, Daniel. La constitución multicultural. Bogota: Siglo del Hombre Editores. Universidad de 
los Andes, Facultad de Derecho. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Instituto Pensar, 2006. 
Bonneau, Chris W., and Heather M. Rice. “Impartial Judges? Race, Institutional Context, and U. S. State 
Supreme Courts.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 9, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 381–403. 
Boyd, Christina L., Lee Epstein, and Andrew D. Martin. “Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging.” 
American Journal of Political Science, 54, no. 2 (April 2010): 389–411. 
Bratton, Kathleen A., and Rorie L. Spill. “Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of the Appointment 
Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts.” Social Science Quarterly 83, no. 2 
(June 2002): 504–18. 
Brittain, John C., and Kenneth W. Chandler. “What Was Key To Becoming A Judge? A Survey Of Minorities 
And Women On The Bench.” Judges’ Journal 48 (Fall 2009): 10–13. 
Brown-Nagin, Tomiko. “Identity Matters: The Case Of Judge Constance Baker Motley.” Columbia Law Review 
117 (2014): 1691–1739. 
Caulfield, Sueann. “Interracial Courtship in the Rio de Janeiro Courts, 1918-1940.” In Race and Nation in 
Modern Latin America, edited by Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra 
Rosemblatt, 163–86. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
“Censo del Poder Judicial: Vectores Iniciales y Datos Estadisticos.” Brasilia: Consejo Nacional de Justicia, 2014. 
http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/dpj/CensoJudiciario.final.pdf. 
 325 
Carlos Roberto Peña / SRG. “Ranking de las mejores universidades de Colombia 2019 | U-Sapiens.” Sapiens 
Research Group, March 10, 2020. https://www.srg.com.co. 
Cepeda Espinosa, Manuel Jose. “The Judicialiazation of Politics in Colombia.” In The Judicialization of Politics 
in Latin America, First Edition., 67–104. New York City: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005. 
https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Judicialization_of_Politics_in_Latin.html?id=_rgYDAAAQB
AJ. 
Chen, Edward M. “The Judiciary, Diversity, And Justice For All.” California Law Review 91 (2003): 1109–24. 
Chew, Pat K. “Anticipating The Wise Latina Judge.” Denver University Law Review 91 (2014): 853–68. 
———. “Judges’ Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases: Emerging Evidence-Based Empirical 
Conclusions.” Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 14 (Spring 2011): 359–74. 
Chew, Pat K., and Robert E. Kelley. “Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial 
Harassment Cases.” Wash. U. L. Rev 86 (2009): 1117–66. 
———. “The Realism of Race in Judicial Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis of Plaintiffs’ Race and 
Judges’ Race.” Harv. J. of Racial & Ethnic Just. 28 (2012): 91–116. 
Chew, Pat, and Luke Kelley-Chew. “The Missing Minority Judges.” Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 14, 
no. 1 (Fall 2010): 179–97. 
Chin, Ming W. “Keynote Address: ‘Fairness Or Bias?: A Symposium On Racial And Ethnic Composition And 
Attitudes In The Judiciary.’” Asian Law Journal 4 (May 1997): 181–94. 
Chong, Alberto, and Hugo Ñopo. “Discrimination in Latin America: An Elephant in the Room?” SSRN Scholarly 
Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, July 1, 2007. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1820904. 
Clark, Mary L. “One Man’s Token Is Another Woman’s Breakthrough? The Appointment Of The First Women 
Federal Judges?” Villanova Law Review 49 (2004): 486–550. 
Clementi, Hebe. “El Negro En América Latina.” In Discriminación y Racismo en América Latina, edited by 
Ignacio F. Klich and Mario Rapoport, 37–50. Buenos Aires: Nuevo Hacer, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 
1997. 
 326 
Cohen, Mathilde. “Judicial Diversity in France: The Unspoken and the Unspeakable.” Law & Social Inquiry 43, 
no. 4 (Fall 2018): 1542–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12331. 
———. “Judicial Diversity in France: The Unspoken and the Unspeakable,” n.d. 
Collins, Paul M., Kenneth L. Manning, and Robert A. Carp. “Gender, Critical Mass, and Judicial Decision 
Making.” Law and Policy 32, no. 2 (April 2010): 260–81. 
Collins, Todd, and Laura Moyer. “Gender, Race, and Intersectionality on the Federal Appellate Bench.” Political 
Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 2008): 219–27. 
Rama Judicial de Colombia. “Comisión Nacional de Género--Rama Judicial.” Institutional, March 10, 2020. 
https://www.ramajudicial.gov.co/web/comision-nacional-de-genero/leyes-y-decretos. 
Ámbito Juridico. “Conozca Cuál Es El Sueldo de Los Magistrados y Jueces de Colombia,” March 12, 2020. 
https://www.ambitojuridico.com/noticias/general/administracion-publica/conozca-cual-es-el-sueldo-de-
los-magistrados-y-jueces-de. 
Contreras Calderón, Jorge Andrés. “El precedente judicial en Colombia: Un análisis desde la teoría del derecho.” 
Revista Facultad de Derecho Y Ciencias Políticas 41, no. 115 (December 2011): 32. 
Coontz, Phyllis. “Gender and Judicial Decisions: Do Female Judges Decide Cases Differently than Male 
Judges?” Gender Issues 18, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 59–73. 
Correa Sutil, Jorge. “Judicial Reforms In Latin America: Good News For The Unprivileged?” In The (Un)Rule 
of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America, edited by Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo A. O’Donnell, and 
Paulo Sérgio de M. S Pinheiro, 255–77. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999. 
Costa, Sérgio, and Guilherme Leite Gonçalves. “Human Rights as Collective Entitlement? Afro-Descendants in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.” Journal for Human Rights / Zeitschrift Für Menschenrechte 5, no. 2 
(October 2011): 52–71. 
Cottrol, Robert J. “The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Racial Hierarchy and Identity 
in the Americas.” Tulane Law Review 76 (2002 2001): 11. 
Cox, Adam B., and Thomas J. Miles. “Judging the Voting Rights Act.” Columbia Law Review 108, no. 1 (January 
2008): 1–55. 
 327 
Crenshaw, Kimberlé, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds. “Introduction.” In Critical Race 
Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement, xiii–xxxii. New York City: New Press, 1995. 
Cross, Frank. “Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance.” 
Nw. U. L. Rev 92, no. 1 (1998 1997): 251–326. 
Crowe, Nancy E. “The Effects of Judges’ Sex And Race On Judicial Decision-Making On the U.S. Courts of 
Appels 1981-1996.” Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, June 1999. 
“¿Cuántos Somos?” Accessed March 17, 2020. https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-
tema/demografia-y-poblacion/censo-nacional-de-poblacion-y-vivenda-2018/cuantos-somos. 
Dane: Información para todos. “Cuentas nacionales departamentales: PIB por departamento,” March 10, 2020. 
https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/cuentas-nacionales/cuentas-nacionales-
departamentales. 
Da Silva Moraes, Graziella, and Elisa P. Reis. “Perceptions of Racial Discrimination Among Black Professionals 
in Rio De Janeiro.” Latin American Research Review 46, no. 2 (April 2011): 55–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2011.0026. 
Dakolias, Maria. “The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Technical Paper. Washington D. C.: 
The World Bank, June 30, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-3612-6. 
“DANE--Información para todos. Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 2018, Colombia.” Institutional, 
March 17, 2020. https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/demografia-y-
poblacion/censo-nacional-de-poblacion-y-vivenda-2018/cuantos-somos. 
Gobernación de Antioquia, Unidos. “Datos de Antioquia.” Institutional, March 10, 2020. 
http://antioquia.gov.co/index.php/antioquia/datos-de-antioquia. 
Davis, Abraham L. Blacks in the Federal Judiciary: Neutral Arbiters or Judicial Activists? Bristol, Ind., USA: 
Wyndham Hall Press, 1989. http://books.google.com/books?id=uiFFAQAAIAAJ. 
Davis, Sue. “Do Women Judges Speak in a Different Voice--Carol Gilligan, Feminist Legal Theory, and the 
Ninth Circuit.” Wis. Women’s Law Journal 8 (1993 1992): 143–74. 
 328 
Davis, Sue, Susan Haire, and Ronald R. Songer. “Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.” 
Judicature 77, no. 3 (December 1993): 129–33. 
Dawson, April G. “Missing In Action: The Absence Of Potential African American Female Supreme Court 
Justice Nominees--Why This Is And What Can Be Done About It.” Howard Law Journal 60 (Fall 2016): 
177–220. 
De La Cadena, Marisol. “Reconstructing Race: Racism, Culture and Mestizaje in Latin America.” NACLA Report 
on the Americas 34, no. 6 (May 1, 2001): 16–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2001.11722585. 
De La Torre, Carlos. “Afro-Ecuadorian Responses to Racism: Between Citizenship and Corporatism.” In Neither 
Enemies Nor Friends: Latinos, Blacks, Afro-Latinos, edited by Anani Dzidzienyo and Suzanne Oboler, 61–
74. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
De Secondat, Charles, and Thomas Nugent. The Spirit of Laws. Kitchener, CANADA: Batoche Books, 2000. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fordham-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3117782. 
Delgado, Richard. Critical Race Theory An Introduction. 2nd ed. New York: NYU Press, 2014. 
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE). “Censo general 2005.” Institutional. Dane: 
Información para todos, March 10, 2020. https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-
tema/demografia-y-poblacion/censo-general-2005-1. 
Diario La Opinión. “Piden investigar fraude en examen de jueces.” La Opinión. 2019. 
https://www.laopinion.com.co/piden-investigar-fraude-en-examen-de-jueces-85647. 
Domingo, Pilar. “Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary? Recent Trends in Latin America.” 
Democratization 11, no. 1 (February 1, 2004): 104–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340412331294152. 
Dos Santos, Sales Augusto. “Historical Roots of the ‘Whitening’ of Brazil.” Latin American Perspectives 29, no. 
1 (01 2002): 61–82. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X0202900104. 
———. “Who Is Black in Brazil? A Timely or a False Question in Brazilian Race Relations in the Era of 
Affirmative Action?” Latin American Perspectives 33, no. 4 (July 2006): 30–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X06290122. 
 329 
Dulitzky, Ariel E. “A Region in Denial: Racial Discrimination and Racism in Latin America.” In Neither Enemies 
nor Friends, edited by Anani Dzidzienyo and Suzanne Oboler, translated by David Sperling, 39–59. 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982636_2. 
Kennedy, Duncan. “Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology.” Journal of Legal 
Education 36, no. 4 (1986): 518. 
Dzidzienyo, Anani. “The Changing World of Brazilian Race Relations?” In Neither Enemies Nor Friends: 
Latinos, Blacks, Afro-Latinos, edited by Anani Dzidzienyo and Suzanne Oboler, 137–56. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Eder, Phanor J. “The Impact of the Common Law on Latin America.” U. Miami L. Rev. 4 (1950): 435. 
Edwards, Harry. “Race and the Judiciary.” Yale Law & Policy Review 20, no. 2 (2002): 325–30. 
Epstein, Lee, Jack Knight, and Andrew Martin. “The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences 
for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court.” California Law Review 91, no. 4 (July 2003): 903–66. 
Espacio Nacional de Consulta Previa. “Acta de Consulta Previa, Concertación y Protocolización del proyecto de 
ley ‘Estatutaria de la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz.’” Ministerio del Interior, July 19, 2017. 
Universidad de Cartagena. “Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas,” March 10, 2020. 
http://derecho.unicartagena.edu.co/programas-academicos/derecho/informacion-general. 
Farhang, Sean, and Gregory Wawro. “Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority 
Representation under Panel Decision Making.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 20, no. 2 
(October 2004): 299–330. 
Federal Judicial Center. “Diversity on the Bench | Federal Judicial Center.” Accessed April 2, 2018. 
https://www.fjc.gov/node/7491. 
Feenan, Dermot. “Women Judges: Gendering Judging, Justifying Diversity.” Journal of Law and Society 35, no. 
4 (2008): 490–519. 
Fish, Peter. “Evaluating the Black Judicial Applicant.” Judicature 62, no. 10 (May 1979): 495–501. 
Fricke, Amber, and Angela Onwuachi-Willig. “Do Female ‘Firsts’ Still Matter? Why They Do For Female 
Judges of Color.” Michigan State Law Review, 2012, 1529–54. 
 330 
Fry, Peter. “Color And The Rule Of Law In Brazil.” In The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin 
America, edited by Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo A. O’Donnell, and Paulo Sérgio de M. S Pinheiro, 186–
210. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999. 
Garavito, César A. Rodríguez. Etnicidad.gov: los recursos naturales, los pueblos indígenas y el derecho a la 
consulta previa en los campos sociales minados. Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad, 
Dejusticia, 2012. 
Gates, Henry L. Black in Latin America. New York: New York University Press, 2011. 
Gazal-Ayal, Oren, and Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan. “Let My People Go: Ethnic In-Group Bias in Judicial 
Decisions—Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 7, no. 
3 (September 2010): 403–28. 
Gobernación del Archipiélago de San Andrés, Providencia y Santa Catalina. “Geografia Del Archipiélago.” 
Institutional, March 10, 2020. https://sanandres.gov.co/index.php/archipielago/informacion-
general/geografia. 
George, Tracey. “Developing a Positive Theory of Decision-Making on U.S. Courts of Appeals.” Ohio St. L.J. 
58 (1998): 1635–96. 
George, Tracey E., and Albert H. Yoon. “Measuring Justice In State Courts: The Demographics Of The State 
Judiciary.” Vanderbilt Law Review 70 (November 2017): 1887–1910. 
Geyh, Charles. “The Role of Courts in Preserving Customary Independence.” In When Courts and Congress 
Collide: The Struggle for Control of America’s Judicial System, 223–51. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2006. https://eds-a-ebscohost-
com.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/eds/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzMxMDExNF9fQU41?sid=ba3bb
b92-f2cd-4e3f-b475-92daea56b319@sessionmgr4007&vid=4&format=EB&rid=7. 
Gilligan, Carol. “In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and Morality.” In Gender and Psychology., 
edited by Viv Burr and Viv Burr (Ed), 33–74. Critical Concepts in Psychology. New York, NY, US: 
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. 
 331 
Goelzhauser, Greg. “Diversifying State Supreme Courts.” Law and Society Review 45 (September 2011): 761–
81. 
Goldman, Sheldon. “Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the Federal Courts.” U. Rich. L. 
Rev. 39 (2005): 871–908. 
———. “Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?” Judicature 62, no. 10 (May 1979): 488–94. 
Góngora-Mera, Manuel. “Transregional Articulations of Law and Race in Latin America: A Legal Genealogy of 
Inequality,” 2012. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781138019263-3. 
González Morales, Felipe, and Jorge Contesse Singh. “The Judicial System and Racism Against People of 
African Descent: The Cases of Brazil, Colombia, The Dominican Republic and Peru.” Santiago de Chile: 
Justice Studies Center of the Americas, March 2004. 
http://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/3568/raz-sistema-judicial-racismo-
ing.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
Gottschall, Jon. “Carter’s Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on 
Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.” Judicature 67, no. 4 (October 1983): 165–74. 
Graham, Barbara L. “Toward An Understanding Of Judicial Diversity In American Courts.” Michigan Journal 
of Race and Law 10 (Fall 2004): 153–81. 
Grbich, Carol. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Introduction. SAGE, 2012. 
Greene, Linda S. “A Tale Of Two Justices: Brandeis, Marshall, And Federal Court Judicial Diversity.” Wisconsin 
Law Review 2017 (2017): 401–23. 
Greene, Shane. “Introduction: On Race, Roots/Routes, and Sovereignty in Latin America’s Afro-Indigenous 
Multiculturalisms.” The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology 12, no. 2 (2007): 329–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/jlat.2007.12.2.329. 
Greenstein, Marla N. “The Challenge Of Maintaining Confidence In A Judiciary Lacking In Diversity.” Judges’ 
Journal 55 (Sping 2016): 40. 
 332 
Grossman, Guy, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Samuel D. Pimentel, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. “Descriptive Representation 
and Judicial Outcomes in Multiethnic Societies.” American Journal of Political Science, 60, no. 1 (January 
2016): 44–69. https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12187. 
Gruhl, John, Cassia Spohn, and Susan Welch. “Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges.” American 
Journal of Political Science, 23, no. 2 (May 1981): 308–22. 
Guimarães, Antonio Sérgio Alfredo. Preconceito e discriminação: queixas de ofensas e tratamento desigual dos 
negros no Brasil. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2004. 
Guthrie, Chris, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich. “Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases.” 
Cornell L. Rev. 93 (n.d.): 1–44. 
———. “Judging by Heuristic - Cognitive Illusions in Judicial Decision Making.” Judicature 86, no. 1 (August 
2002): 44–50. 
Haider-Markel, Donald P., and Mark R. Joslyn. “Bad Apples? Attributions for Police Treatment of African 
Americans.” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, no. 1 (2017): 358. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12146. 
Handsley, Elizabeth, and Andrew Lynch. “Facing up to Diversity? Transparency and the Reform of 
Commonwealth Judicial Appointments 2008-13.” Sydney Law Review 37 (June 2015): 187–215. 
Harris, Angela P., and Carmen G. González. “Introduction.” In Presumed Incompetent: The Intersections of Race 
and Class for Women in Academia, edited by Gabriella Gutiérrez y Muhs, Yolanda Flores Niemann, 




Hawkins, Stacy. “Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism: Confronting The Reality Of Our Inequality.” Mercer Law 
Review 66 (Spring 2015): 577–649. 
Haywood, J.m. “Anti-Black Latino Racism in an Era of Trumpismo.” International Journal of Qualitative 
Studies in Education 30, no. 10 (26 2017): 957–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2017.1312613. 
 333 
Helmke, Gretchen, and Julio Rios-Figueroa. “Introduction.” In Courts in Latin America, edited by Gretchen 
Helmke and Julio Rios-Figueroa, 1–26. New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Hernández Romero, Astrid. “La visibilización estadística de los grupos étnicos colombianos.” Documento para 
tomar decisiones. Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), 2005. 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/etnia/sys/visibilidad_estadistica_etnicos.pdf. 
Hernández, Tanya K.. “The Limits of U.S. Racial Equality Without a Latin American Constitutional Right to 
Work -- A Thought Experiment,” 2017. 
Hernández, Tanya K. “Hate Speech and the Language of Racism in Latin America: A Lens for Reconsidering 
Global Hate Speech Restrictions and Legislation Models.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law 32 (2011 2010): 805–41. 
Hernández, Tanya K. “Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination 
Laws, a United States-Latin America Comparison.” Cornell Law Review 87 (2002 2001): 1093. 
———. Racial Subordination in Latin America: The Role of the State, Customary Law, and the New Civil Rights 
Response. Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Holmes, Malcolm D., Harmon M. Hosch, Howard C. Daudistel, Dolores A. Perez, and Joseph B. Graves. 
“Judges’ Ethnicity and Minority Sentencing: Evidence Concerning Hispanics.” Social Sciences Quarterly 
74, no. 3 (September 1993): 496–506. 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell. The Path of the Law. [S.l.]: The Floating Press, 2009. 
https://login.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=e000xna&AN=313932&site=eds-live. 
Hooker, Juliet. “Afro-Descendant Struggles for Collective Rights in Latin America: Between Race and Culture.” 
Souls 10, no. 3 (September 12, 2008): 279–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999940802347764. 
———. “Indigenous Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and Multicultural Citizenship in Latin 
America.” Journal of Latin American Studies 37, no. 2 (2005): 285–310. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X05009016. 
———. Race and the Politics of Solidarity. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 334 
HoSang, Daniel, Oneka LaBennett, and Laura Pulido. Racial Formation in the Twenty-First Century. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=962595. 
Hoster, Paige E. “Understanding The Value Of Judicial Diversity Through The Native American Lens.” 
American Indian Law Review 36 (2012): 457–87. 
Hsu, Josh. “Asian American Judges: Identity, Their Narratives & Diversity On The Bench.” Asian Pacific 
American Law Journal 11 (Spring 2006): 92–119. 
Htun, Mala. “Dimensions of Political Inclusion and Exclusion in Brazil: Gender and Race.” Technical papers. 
Washington D. C.: Inter-American Development Bank, December 2003. 
http://iknowpolitics.org/sites/default/files/dimensions_of_political_inclusion_and_exclusion_in_brazil.pd
f. 
———. “From ‘Racial Democracy’ to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in Brazil.” Latin 
American Research Review 39, no. 1 (2004): 60–89. 
———. Inclusion without Representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
Hurwitz, Mark. “Selection System, Diversity And The Michigan Supreme Court.” Wayne Law Review 56 (Fall 
2010): 691–704. 
Hurwitz, Mark, and Drew Noble Lanier. “Diversity in State and Federal Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity 
across 20 Years.” The Justice System Journal 29, no. 1 (2008): 47–70. 
———. “Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on 
State Supreme and Appellate Courts.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 3, no. 3 (Winter 2003): 329–52. 
Hurwitz, Mark S., and Drew Noble Lanier. “Women and Minorities on State and Federal Appellate Benches.” 
Judicature 85, no. 2 (October 2001): 84–92. 
Ifill, Sherrilyn A. “Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts.” 
Boston College Law Review 39 (December 1997): 95–150. 
———. “Judicial Diversity.” The Green Bag An Entertaining Journal of Law 13, no. 45 (Autumn 2009): 1–10. 
 335 
———. “Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence.” Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 57 
(2000): 405–96. 
———. “Through The Lens Of Diversity: The Fight For Judicial Elections After Republican Party Of Minnesota 
V. White.” Michigan Journal of Race and Law 10 (Fall 2004): 55–99. 
Ikawa, Daniela. “The Construction of Identity and Rights: Race and Gender in Brazil.” International Journal of 
Law in Context 10, no. 4 (2014): 494–506. 
“Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,” n.d. 
Johnson, Angela. “Intersectionality, Life Experience & Judicial Decision Making: A New View Of Gender At 
The Supreme Court.” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 2014 (2014): 353–81. 
Johnson, Kevin. “How Political Ideology Undermines Racial And Gender Diversity In Federal Judicial Selection: 
The Prospects For Judicial Diversity In The Trump Years.” Wisconsin Law Review 2017 (2017): 345–65. 
———. “The Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law Schools: One Dean’s Perspective.” Iowa Law 
Review 96 (2011): 1549-1578. 
Johnson, Kevin R. “An Essay on the Nomination and Confirmation of the First Latina Justice on the U.S. 
Supreme Court: The Assimilation Demand at Work.” Chicana/o-Latina/o Law Review 30 (2011): 97–162. 
———. “On the Appointment of a Latina/o to the Supreme Court.” Harv. Latino L. Rev. 5 (2002): 1–16. 
Johnson, Kevin R., and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer. “A Principled Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the 
Judiciary.” Mich. J. Race & L. 10 (Fall 2004): 5–54. 
Jones, Deborah. “Constructing Identity In Law And Social Science.” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 11 
(2001): 731–45. 
Jorge L. Esquirol. “The Failed Law of Latin America.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 56, no. 1 
(2008): 75. 
Kalunta-Crumpton, A. Race, Ethnicity, Crime and Criminal Justice in the Americas. Springer, 2012. 
Kapiszewski, Diana, and Matthew M. Taylor. “Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in Latin 
America.” Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 4 (December 2008): 741–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592708081899. 
 336 
Kastellec, Jonathan P. “Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts.” American Journal of 
Political Science 57, no. 1 (January 2013): 167–83. https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-
5907.2012.00618.x. 
Keiser, Lael R., Vicky M. Wilkins, Kenneth J. Meier, and Catherine A. Holland. “Lipstick and Logarithms: 
Gender, Institutional Context, and Representative Bureaucracy.” The American Political Science Review 
96, no. 3 (September 2002): 553–64. 
Kennedy, Anthony M. “The Voice of Thurgood Marshall.” Stanford Law Review 44 (Summer 1992): 1221–25. 
Kennedy, Deseriee A. “Judicial Review and Diversity.” Tennessee Law Review 71 (2004): 287–301. 
Kennedy, David. “The Canon of American Legal Thought.” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 52 (January 
1, 2007): 319. 
King, Nancy J. “Batson For The Bench? Regulating The Peremptory Challenge Of Judges.” Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 73 (1998): 509–32. 
Kulik, Carol T., Elissa L. Perry, and Molly B. Pepper. “Here Comes the Judge: The Influence of Judge Personal 
Characteristics on Federal Sexual Harassment Case Outcomes.” Law and Human Behavior 27, no. 1 
(February 2003): 69–86. 
“La Situación de las Personas Afrodescendientes en las Américas.” Washington D. C.: Comisión Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos., December 5, 2011. 
http://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2012/8311.pdf. 
Lamm, Carolyn B. “Diversity And Justice: Promoting Full and Equal Participation in the Legal Profession.” 
Judges’ Journal 48 (Summer 2009): 1–5. 
Landau, David. “The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New Approach to Modeling 
Judicial Behavior in Latin America.” George Washington International Law Review 37 (2005): 687. 
Lara-Borges, Oswald, Andrea Gastagnola, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. “Diseño Constitucional y Estabilidad 
Judicial En América Latina, 1900-2009 / Constitutional Design and Judicial Stability in Latin America, 
1900-2009.” Política y Gobierno 19, no. 1 (2012): 3–40. 
 337 
Larkin Nascimento, Elisa. “Aspects of Afro-Brazilian Experience.” Journal of Black Studies 11, no. 2 (December 
1980): 195–216. https://doi.org/10.1177/002193478001100203. 
———. The Sorcery of Color: Identity, Race, and Gender in Brazil. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2008. http://www.myilibrary.com?id=129906. 
“Las mejores universidades en derecho en Colombia 2018.” Dinero. May 24, 2018, sec. Tedencias. 
https://www.dinero.com/edicion-impresa/caratula/articulo/las-mejores-universidades-en-derecho-en-
colombia-2018/258791. 
ONU Mujeres | Colombia. “Las mujeres en Colombia,” March 12, 2020. https://colombia.unwomen.org/es/onu-
mujeres-en-colombia/las-mujeres-en-colombia. 
Lazos Vargas, Sylvia R. “Does A Diverse Judiciary Attain A Rule Of Law That Is Inclusive?: What Grutter V. 
Bollinger Has To Say About Diversity On The Bench.” Michigan Journal of Race and Law 10 (Fall 2004): 
101–52. 
———. “Only Skin Deep: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench.” Indiana 
Law Journal 83 (2008): 1423–80. 
Lipshutz, Robert, and Douglas Huron. “Achieving a More Representative Federal Judiciary.” Judicature 62, no. 
10 (May 1979): 482–85. 
Loveman, Mara. National Colors: Racial Classification and the State in Latin America. New York, NY, US: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Malleson, Kate. “Diversity in the Judiciary: The Case for Positive Action.” Journal of Law and Society 36, no. 
3 (2009): 376–402. 
Mansbridge, Jane. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes.’” The 
Journal of Politics 61, no. 3 (August 1999): 628–57. 
Martin, Elaine. “Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administration.” 
Judicature 71, no. 3 (November 1987): 136–42. 
———. “Men and Women on the Bench: Vive La Difference.” Judicature 74, no. 4 (January 1990): 204–8. 
 338 
Martin, Elaine, and Barry Pyle. “Gender, Race, and Partisanship on the Michigan Supreme Court.” Albany Law 
Review 63 (2000): 1205–36. 
Maule, Linda. “A Different Voice: The Feminine Jurisprudence of the Minnesota State Supreme Court.” Buffalo 
Women’s Law Journal 9 (2001 2000): 295–316. 
McClellan, Frank M. “Judicial Impartiality & (and) Recusal: Reflections on the Vexing Issue of Racial Bias.” 
Temple Law Review 78 (Summer 2005): 351–78. 
Méndez, Juan E., Guillermo A. O’Donnell, and Paulo Sérgio de M. S Pinheiro, eds. The (Un)Rule of Law and 
the Underprivileged in Latin America. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999. 
Merola, Linda M., and Jon B. Gould. “New Judges Speak About The Process And Its Impact On Judicial 
Diversity.” Judicature 93, no. 5 (April 2010): 184–93. 
Messamer, Gina. “Iowa’s All-Male Supreme Court.” Iowa Law Review 98 (November 2012): 421–63. 
Miguel-Stearns, Teresa M. “Judicial Power in Latin America: A Short Survey.” Legal Information Management 
15, no. 2 (June 2015): 100–107. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1472669615000274. 
Miller, Marilyn Grace. Rise and Fall of the Cosmic Race: The Cult of Mestizaje in Latin America. Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 2004. 
Milligan, Joy. “Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions about Political 
Morality.” N.Y.U. L. Rev 81 (June 2006): 1206–48. 
Ministerio del Interior. “Listado de Universidades que Otorgan Descuento a las Comunidades Negras, 
Afrocolombianas, Raizales y Palenqueras.” Ministerio del Interior. Accessed March 10, 2020. 
https://dacn.mininterior.gov.co/sites/default/files/listado_de_universidades_que_aplican_descuento_mayo
_2018.pdf. 
Mitchell, Michael J., and Charles H. Wood. “Ironies of Citizenship: Skin Color, Police Brutality, and the 
Challenge to Democracy in Brazil.” Social Forces 77, no. 3 (1999): 1001. https://doi.org/10.2307/3005969. 
Monteiro, Fabiano Dias. “Discursos raciais e leis antirracismo no Brasil: retornando à questão da ambiguidade.” 
Campos - Revista de Antropologia 12, no. 2 (2011). https://doi.org/10.5380/cam.v12i2.30617. 
 339 
Morin, Jason L. “The Voting Behavior of Minority Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Does the Race of the 
Claimant Matter?” American Politics Research 42, no. 1 (2014): 34–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X13486925. 
Mosquera, Claudia, Mauricio Pardo, and Odile Hoffmann. “Las Trayectorias Sociales e Identitarias de los 
Afrodescendientes.” In Afrodescendientes en Las Américas: Trayectorias Sociales e Identitarias, edited by 
Claudia Mosquera, Mauricio Pardo, and Odile Hoffmann, 1st ed., 612. Bogota: Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, 2002. http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers11-03/010029701.pdf. 
Mutua, Athena. “Disparity In Judicial Misconduct Cases: Color-Blind Diversity?” American University Journal 
of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 23 (2014): 23–105. 
Myers, K.O. “Merit Selection And Diversity On The Bench.” Indiana Law Review 46 (2013): 46–57. 
Nava, Michael. “The Servant Of All: Humility, Humanity, And Judicial Diversity.” Golden Gate University Law 
Review 38 (Winter 2008): 175–94. 
Ng’weno, Bettina. “Can Ethnicity Replace Race? Afro-Colombians, Indigeneity and the Colombian 
Multicultural State.” The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology 12, no. 2 (2007): 414–
40. https://doi.org/10.1525/jlat.2007.12.2.414. 
Ñopo, Hugo. New Century, Old Disparities: Gender and Ethnic Earnings Gaps in Latin America and The 
Caribbean. Latin American Development Forum. Washington D. C.: The World Bank; Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8686-6. 
Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro. “What Do We Know about Discrimination in Latin America? 
Very Little!” In Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective, edited by Hugo Ñopo, Alberto 
Chong, and Andrea Moro, 1–12. Latin American Development Forum Series. Washington D. C.: The 
World Bank, 2010. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/319981468054542299/pdf/520980PUB0EPI1101Official0Us
e0Only1.pdf. 
“Observatorio de Discriminación Racial.” NGO, 2019. http://www.odracial.org. 
 340 
O’Connor, Sandra D. “Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur.” Stanford Law Review 44 (Summer 
1992): 1217–20. 
OEA. “OEA - Organización de los Estados Americanos: Democracia para la paz, la seguridad y el desarrollo.”  
Derechos de las Personas Afrodescendientes y contra la Discriminación Racial, August 1, 2009. 
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/afrodescendientes/default.asp. 
O’Neil, Shannon K. “Latin America Needs Better Judges.” Bloomberg. August 16, 2018, sec. Politics & Policy. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-16/latin-america-needs-better-judges. 
Onwuachi-Willig, Angela. “Just Another Brother on the SCT? What Justice Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About 
The Influence of Racial Identity.” Iowa Law Review 90 (March 2005): 931–1010. 
———. “Representative Government, Representative Court - The Supreme Court as a Representative Body.” 
Minn. L. Rev. 90 (May 2006): 1252–74. 
“Outsiders?: The Changing Patterns of Exclusion In Latin America And The Caribbean.” Washington D. C.: 
Inter-American Development Bank; David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard 
University, 2007. https://webimages.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Outsiders-The-Changing-
Patterns-of-Exclusion-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean.pdf. 
Padgett, Tim. “Picking Sotomayor: Bridging the Black-Latino Divide.” Time, May 27, 2009. 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1901249,00.html. 
Paschel, Tianna S. Becoming Black Political Subjects: Movements and Ethno-Racial Rights in Colombia and 
Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691169385.001.0001. 
Paschel, Tianna S., and Mark Q. Sawyer. “Contesting Politics as Usual: Black Social Movements, Globalization, 
and Race Policy in Latin America.” Souls 10, no. 3 (September 12, 2008): 197–214. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10999940802347707. 
Peña, Yesilernis, Jim Sidanius, and Mark Sawyer. “Racial Democracy in the Americas: A Latin and U.S. 
Comparison.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 35, no. 6 (2004): 749–62. 
 341 
Peresie, Jennifer L. “Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal 
AppellateCourts.” The Yale Law Journal 114, no. 7 (May 2005): 1759–90. 
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1967., 1967. 
———. The Concept of Representation, n.d. 
“Población Negra, Afrocolombiana, Raizal y Palenquera: Resultados del Censo Nacional de Población y 
Vivienda 2018.” Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), November 6, 
2019. https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/grupos-etnicos/presentacion-grupos-
etnicos-poblacion-NARP-2019.pdf. 
“Por errores en examen para jueces, demandarán concurso de la Rama.” Asuntos legales. June 27, 2019, sec. 
Legislación. https://www.asuntoslegales.com.co/actualidad/por-errores-en-examen-para-jueces-
demandaran-concurso-de-la-rama-2878389. 
Universidad del Valle / Cali, Colombia. “Pregrado,” March 10, 2020. 
https://www.univalle.edu.co/formacion/pregrado. 
Prillaman, William C. The Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America: Declining Confidence in the Rule 
of Law. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000. 
Racusen, Seth. “‘A Mulato Cannot Be Prejudiced’: The Legal Construction of Racial Discrimination in 
Contemporary Brazil.” Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. 
https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/31104. 
Ravitch, Sharon M., and Nicole Mittenfelner Carl. Qualitative Research Bridging the Conceptual, Theoretical, 
and Methodological. Los Angeles, Calif: SAGE, 2016. 
Redacción Nacional. “Firman acta para mejorar redes de acueductos en San Andrés y Providencia.” El 
Espectador. February 26, 2019, sec. Nacional. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/firman-
acta-para-mejorar-redes-de-acueductos-en-san-andres-y-providencia-articulo-841974. 
Reddick, Malia, Michael J. Nelson, and Rachel Paine Caufield. “Racial And Gender Diversity On State Courts 
An AJS Study.” Judges’ Journal 48 (Summer 2009): 28–32. 
 342 
Ríos-Figueroa, Julio, and Andrea Pozas-Loyo. “Enacting Constitutionalism: The Origins of Independent Judicial 
Institutions in Latin America.” Comparative Politics 42, no. 3 (2010): 293–311. 
Rivera, Jenny. “Diversity and the Law.” Hofstra Law Review 44 (Summer 2016): 1271–86. 
Rodríguez Garavito, César A., Tatiana Alfonso Sierra, Isabel Cavelier Adarve, Eliana Fernanda Antonio Rosero, 
and César A. Rodríguez Garavito. Raza y derechos humanos en Colombia: informe sobre discriminación 
racial y derechos de la población afrocolombiana. 1st ed. Serie Justicia global 2. Bogotá, D.C.: 
Observatorio de Discriminación Racial: Programa de Justicia Global y Derechos Humanos y CIJUS, 
Universidad de los Andes: Proceso de Comunidades Negras (PCN); Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia 
y Sociedad (Dejusticia), 2009. 
Rodriguez Garavito, Cesar, and Carlos Andrés Baquero Díaz. Reconocimiento con redistribución: el derecho y 
la justicia étnico-racial en América Latina. Colección Dejusticia. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de Derecho, 
Justicia y Sociedad, 2015. https://www.dejusticia.org/publication/reconocimiento-con-redistribucion-el-
derecho-y-la-justicia-etnico-racial-en-america-latina/. 
Romero, Leo M. “Enhancing Diversity In An Appointive System Of Selecting Judges.” Fordham Urban Law 
Journal 34 (January 2007): 485–500. 
Saad, Paulo. “Situación de las personas afrodescendientes en América Latina y desafíos de políticas para la 
garantía de sus derechos.” Santiago de Chile: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 
(CEPAL), Diciembre 2017. 
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/42654/1/S1701063_es.pdf. 
Sansone, Livio. Blackness without Ethnicity: Construcing Race in Brazil. New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003. 
Saunooke, Robert O. “Native Americans And The Federal Bench: The Time Has Come.” Judges’ Journal 48 
(Fall 2009): 25–27. 
Schanzenbach, Max. “Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District Level Judicial 
Demographies.” Journal of Legal Studies 34, no. 1 (January 2005): 57–92. 
 343 
Scherer, Nancy. “Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice System Possible.” 
Northwestern University Law Review 105, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 587-634. 
Universidad del Valle / Cali, Colombia. “Sede Pacífico,” March 10, 2020. http://pacifico.univalle.edu.co/. 
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. Cambridge ; New York, 
NY : Cambridge University Press, 1993., 1993. 
———. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge 
University Press, 2002., 2002. 
Segal, Jennifer A. “Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court Appointees.” 
Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (March 2000): 137–50. 
———. “The Decision Making of Clinton’s Nontraditional Judicial Appointees.” Judicature 80, no. 6 (June 
1997): 279. 
Segato, Rita Laura. “El color de la cárcel en América Latina: Apuntes sobre la colonialidad de la justicia en un 
continente en desconstrucción.” Nueva Sociedad, no. 208 (2007): 142–61. 
———. La nación y sus otros raza, etnicidad y diversidas religiosa en tiempos de politicas de la identidad. 
Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2007. 
Sen, Maya. “Diversity, Qualifications, And Ideology: How Female And Minority Judges Have Changed, Or Not 
Changed, Over Time.” Wisconsin Law Review 2017 (2017): 367–99. 
Sheriff, Robin E. Dreaming Equality: Color, Race and Racism in Urban Brazil. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2001. 
Sisk, Gregory C., Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss. “Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An 
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning.” N.Y.U. L. Rev. 73, no. 5 (November 1998): 1377–1500. 
Búsqueda de programas de instituciones de educación superior. “Sistema Nacional de Información de la 
Educación Superior,” 2018. https://snies.mineducacion.gov.co/consultasnies/programa. 
Slotnick, Elliot E. “Lowering the Bench or Raising It Higher?: Affirmative Action and Judicial Selection During 
the Carter Administration.” Yale Law & Policy Review 1, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 270–98. 
 344 
———. “The Paths to the Federal Bench: Gender, Race and Judicial Recruitment Variation.” Judicature 67, no. 
8 (March 1984): 371–88. 
Smith, Michael David. Race versus Robe. Port Washington: Associated Faculty Press, 1983. 
Smith, Susan. “Diversifying the Judiciary: The Influence of Gender and Race on Judging.” University of 
Richmond Law Review 28 (March 1994): 179–204. 
Solanke, Iyiola. “Diversity And Independence In The European Court Of Justice.” Columbia Journal of 
European Law 15 (Winter  /2009 2008): 89–121. 
Solberg, Rorie Spill. “Court Size And Diversity On The Bench: The Ninth Circuit And Its Sisters.” Arizona Law 
Review 48 (Summer 2006): 247–62. 
Solberg, Rorie Spill, and Kathleen Bratton. “Clinton and Diversification of the Federal Judiciary.” Judicature 
84, no. 5 (April 2001): 256–61. 
Solimine, Michael E., and Susan E. Wheatley. “Rethinking Feminist Judging.” Indiana Law Journal 70 (Summer 
1995): 891–920. 
Songer, Donald R., Sue Davis, and Susan Haire. “A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender 
Effects in the Courts OfAppeals.” The Journal of Politics, 56, no. 2 (May 1994): 425–39. 
Sotomayor, Sonia. “A Latina Judge’s Voice.” Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 13 (2002): 87–94. 
Spann, Girardeau A. Race Against the Court: The Supreme Court and Minorities in Contemporary America. 
New York: New York University Press, 1993. https://eds-a-ebscohost-
com.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/eds/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzQ4MTg0X19BTg2?sid=ba3bbb
92-f2cd-4e3f-b475-92daea56b319@sessionmgr4007&vid=8&format=EB&rid=7. 
Spohn, Cassia. “The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities.” 
Law and Society Review 24, no. 5 (1990): 1197–1216. 
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. “Indigenous Peoples and the State in Latin America: An Ongoing Debate.” In 
Multiculturalism in Latin America, 24–44. Institute of Latin American Studies Series. Palgrave Macmillan, 
London, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403937827_2. 
 345 
Steffensmeier, Darrell, and Chester L. Britt. “Judges’ Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black Judges 
Sentence Differently?” Social Sciences Quarterly 82, no. 4 (December 2001): 749–64. 
Steffensmeier, Darrell, and Chris Hebert. “Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge’s Gender Affect the 
Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?” Social Forces 77, no. 3 (March 1998): 1163–96. 
Stepan, Nancy. “The Hour of Eugenics”: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991. 
Straus, Emily E. “Unequal Pieces of a Shrinking Pie: The Struggle between African Americans and Latinos over 
Education, Employment, and Empowerment in Compton, California.” History of Education Quarterly 49, 
no. 4 (November 1, 2009): 507–29. 
Stubbs, Jonathan K. “Demographic History of Federal Judicial Appointments by Sex and Race.” Berkeley La 
Raza Law Journal 26 (2016): 92–128. 
Tagarao, Serafin, Edward Dailo, and Christine J. Gonong. “Filipinos On The Bench: Challenges And Solutions 
For Today And Tomorrow’s Generations.” Asian Pacific American Law Journal 22 (Fall  -Spring 2017 
2016): 57–67. 
Telles, Edward. Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, Race, and Color in Latin America. Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 
2014. https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu. 
Telles, Edward E. “Residential Segregation by Skin Color in Brazil.” American Sociological Review 57, no. 2 
(1992): 186–97. 
Telles, Edward, and René Flores. “Not Just Color: Whiteness, Nation, and Status in Latin America.” Hispanic 
American Historical Review 93, no. 3 (August 1, 2013): 411–49. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-
2210858. 
Telles, Edward, and Tianna Paschel. “Who Is Black, White, or Mixed Race? How Skin Color, Status, and Nation 
Shape Racial Classification in Latin America.” American Journal of Sociology 120, no. 3 (November 1, 
2014): 864–907. https://doi.org/10.1086/679252. 
Tharps, Lori L. Same Family, Different Colors: Confronting Colorism in America’s Diverse Families, 2016. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1141005. 
 346 
“The Failed Law of Latin America on JSTOR.” Accessed March 16, 2020. https://www-jstor-
org.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/stable/20454604?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 
“The Federal Government: A Model Employer or a Work In Progress?: Perspectives from 25 Years of the Merit 
Principles Survey.” Institutional. Washington D. C.: U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 09/08. 
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps126717/viewdocs.aspx.pdf. 
Thomas, Cheryl. “The Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity 2010.” London: Advisory Panel on 
Judicial Diversity, 2009. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/judicial-institute/sites/judicial-
institute/files/report_of_the_advisory_panel_on_judicial_diversity.pdf. 
Tobias, Carl. “Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts.” University of Cincinnati Law Review 61 (1993): 
1237–50. 
———. “Considering Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, and Bisexual Nominees for the Federal Courts.” Washington 
University Law Review 90 (2012): 577–86. 
———. “Diversity and the Federal Bench.” Washington University Law Review 87 (2010): 1197–1212. 
———. “The Federal Judiciary Engendered.” Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal 5 (1990): 123–26. 
———. “The Gender Gap on The Federal Bench.” Hofstra Law Review 19 (Fall 1990): 171–84. 
Torres-Spelliscy, Ciara. “A Bench That Looks Like America Diversity Among Appointed State Court Judges.” 
Judges’ Journal 48 (Summer 2009): 12–17. 
Tumaco, Sede. “Sede Tumaco.” Universidad Nacional de Colombia, March 10, 2020. http://tumaco-
pacifico.unal.edu.co/. 
Twine, France Winddance. Racism in a Racial Democracy: The Maintenance of White Supremacy in Brazil. 
New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1998. 
Uhlman, Thomas M. “Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges.” American Journal of Political 
Science 22, no. 4 (November 1978): 884–95. 
United Nations: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. “Situación de las personas 
afrodescendientes en América Latina y desafíos de políticas para la garantía de sus derechos.” Santiago de 
 347 
Chile: United Nations: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 12/17. 
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/42654/1/S1701063_es.pdf. 
Universidad del Pacífico. “Universidad del Pacífico,” March 10, 2020. 
http://www.unipacifico.edu.co:8095/web3.0/inicio.jsp. 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Consejo Superior de la Judicatura. “Comunicado a los aspirantes de la 
convocatoria 27 del Consejo Superior de la Judicatura y a la comunidad en general,” 2019. 
http://actosadministrativos.ramajudicial.gov.co/GetFile.ashx?url=%7E%2FApp_Data%2FUpload%2FPC
SJA18-11077a.pdf. 
Derecho. “Universidad Tecnológica del Chocó, Diego Luis Cordoba,” March 10, 2020. 
https://www.utch.edu.co/portal/es/menu-prog-academicos-derecho.html. 
Uprimny, Rodrigo. “The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends and 
Challenges.” Texas Law Review 89 (September 4, 2014): 1587–1609. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203797655-13. 
Van Cott, Donna Lee. “Building Inclusive Democracies: Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities in Latin 
America.” Democratization 12, no. 5 (December 1, 2005): 820–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340500322215. 
———. The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America. Billie R. DeWalt. Pitt 
Latin American Studies Series. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 
Vasaly, Mary. “Men In Black: Gender Diversity And The Eighth Circuit Bench.” William Mitchell Law Review 
36 (2010): 1703–18. 
Villa, Mario. “La ONU denuncia que los indígenas siguen siendo víctimas de la discriminación.” El País. August 
9, 2017, sec. Mundo. https://www.elpais.com.co/mundo/la-onu-denuncia-que-los-indigenas-siguen-
siendo-victimas-de-la-discriminacion.html. 
Wade, Peter. Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of Racial Identity in Colombia. Baltimore; London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 
 348 
———. “Debates contemporáneos sobre raza, etnicidad, género y sexualidad en las ciencias sociales.” In Raza, 
etnicidad y sexualidades: ciudadanía y multiculturalismo en América Latina, edited by Peter Wade, 
Fernando Urrea Giraldo, and Mara Viveros, 41–66. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2008. 
———. Race and Ethnicity in Latin America. Second. New York: Pluto Press, 2010. 
http://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=625258. 
———. Race and Sex in Latin America. London; New York, NY; New York: Pluto Press ; Distributed in the 
United States of America exclusively by Palgrave macmillan, 2009. 
Walker, Thomas G., and Deborah J. Barrow. “The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process 
Ramifications.” The Journal of Politics 47, no. 2 (June 1985): 596–617. 
Walsh, Catherine. “Afro In/Exclusion, Resistance, and the ‘Progressive’ State.” In Black Social Movements in 
Latin America, 15–34. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137031433_2. 
Weinstein, Barbara. “Racializing Regional Difference: Sao Paulo versus Brazil, 1932.” In Race and Nation in 
Latin America, edited by Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, 
237–62. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
Welch, Susan, Michael Combs, and John Gruhl. “Do Black Judges Make a Difference?” American Journal of 
Political Science, 32, no. 1 (February 1988): 126–36. 
Westergren, Sarah. “Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited: The Data since 1994.” Georgetown Law 
Journal 92 (March 2004): 689–708. 
Wilkins, Vicky M., and Lael R. Keiser. “Linking Passive and Active Representation by Gender: The Case of 
Child Support.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 1 (2006): 87–102. 
Wynn, James, and Eli Mazur. “Judicial Diversity: Where Independence And Accountability Meet.” Albany Law 
Review 67 (2004): 775–90. 
Yancey, George. “‘Blacks Cannot Be Racist’: A Look At How European-Americans, African-Americans, 
Hispanic-Americans and Asian-Americans Perceive Minority Racism.” Michigan Sociological Review 19 
(2005): 138–54. 
 349 
Yashar, Deborah J. “Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America.” 




Afro-descendant man attorney. Interview 01. In person, March 4, 2019. 
———. Interview 04. In person, March 6, 2019. 
———. Interview 07. On-line, March 9, 2019. 
———. Interview 30. In person, April 10, 2019. 
———. Interview 32. In person, April 12, 2019. 
———. Interview 35. In person, May 2, 2019. 
———. Interview 36. In person, May 4, 2019. 
Afro-descendant man judge. Interview 05. In person, March 7, 2019. 
———. Interview 06. In person, March 7, 2019. 
———. Interview 26. In person, April 1, 2019. 
———. Interview 28. In person, April 3, 2019. 
———. Interview 29. In person, April 4, 2019. 
———. Interview 40. In person, May 15, 2019. 
———. Interview 41. In person, May 15, 2019. 
———. Interview 43. In person, May 15, 219AD. 
———. Interview 44. In person, May 15, 2019. 
Afro-descendant man judicial employee. Interview 21. In person, March 26, 2019. 
———. Interview 23. In person, March 29, 2019. 
Afro-descendant woman attorney. Interview 02. In person, March 4, 2019. 
———. Interview 08. In person, March 12, 2019. 
———. Interview 31. In person, April 10, 2019. 
 350 
———. Interview 33. In person, April 12, 2019. 
———. Interview 37. In person, May 7, 2019. 
———. Interview 38. In person, May 12, 2019. 
———. Interview 39. In person, May 15, 2019. 
———. Interview 42. In person, May 15, 2019. 
Afro-descendant woman judge. Interview 15. In person, March 15, 2019. 
———. Interview 17, n.d. 
———. Interview 25. In person, April 1, 2019. 
———. Interview 27. In person, April 2, 2019. 
———. Interview 34. In person, May 2, 2019. 
———. Interview 45. In person, May 15, 2019. 
Afro-descendant woman judicial employee. Interview 09. In person, March 12, 2019. 
———. Interview 10. In person, March 12, 2019. 
———. Interview 13. In person, March 13, 2019. 
———. Interview 14. In person, March 13, 2019. 
———. Interview 16. In person, March 15, 2019. 
———. Interview 18. In person, March 18, 2019. 
———. Interview 19. In person, March 18, 2019. 
———. Interview 24. In person, March 31, 2019. 
Indigenous man judicial employee. Interview 11. In person, March 12, 2019. 
Indigenous woman judge. Interview 12. In person, March 13, 2019. 
Indigenous woman judicial employee. Interview 20. In person, March 18, 2019. 
Mestizo man judicial employee. Interview 22. In person, March 27, 2019. 
Mestizo woman judge. Interview 03. In person, March 5, 2019. 
 
